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Vietnam and Cambodia: Anti-Drug Cooperation in the Border Areas

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Abstract

Collaborative activities on drug prevention between Vietnam and Cambodia have contributed to reducing drug crimes in the border areas of the two countries, in Southeast Asia and in the world. This article discusses the cooperation process between Vietnam and Cambodia in anti-drug on the border between 1998 and 2019. It describes the situation of drug crimes and characteristics of drug trafficking groups on the Vietnam-Cambodia border. It reviews results of cooperation between the two countries on this issue. The article discusses proposing some solutions to improve cooperation effectiveness in the coming time. The article concludes that cooperation between Vietnam and Cambodia against drug crimes will be strengthened but requires more efforts of the two countries' authorities.

Keywords: anti-drug, anti-drug on the borders, collaborative, drug trafficking groups, Vietnam-Cambodia border, Vietnam-Cambodia cooperation.

1. Introduction

Drug trafficking is one of the principal illicit activities worldwide and constitutes a serious threat to the entire international community. Cooperation, coordination and commitment by all countries are essential to curb this crime. Vietnam – Cambodia has a land border of about 1,137 kilometer from the first point at the junction of Vietnam – Laos – Cambodia border (Indochina junction) to the end point on the coast of Ha Tien, Kien Giang province of Vietnam, adjacent to Cambodia's Kampot province. Both are located in the Greater Mekong Subregion and near the Golden Triangle and also the point of departure, arrival and transfer of drug. In recent years, along the Vietnam – Cambodia border, especially the triangle of Vietnam – Laos – Cambodia has become an important area for criminals to form lines, organize trade, transport illegally drug substances into Vietnam for consumption or transshipment to third countries. Cooperation activities against drugs between Vietnam and Cambodia began in 1998 when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding between Vietnam and Cambodia on cooperation in controlling drugs, psychotropic substances and pre-chemicals. More than 20 years, these activities have contributed to the prevention, detection and arrest of cross-border drug smuggling crimes, contributed to reducing drug crimes in each country, creating a good change in prevention, fighting crimes and contributing to protecting the security and order in the border areas. In addition to the achieved results, the cooperation between Vietnam and Cambodia in this area is still limited, difficult and challenges need to be addressed soon. The article uses the situational analysis based on declassified documents and key reports. The author wants to find the causes of the limitations in

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cooperation between the two countries, simultaneously, proposing some solutions to improve the effectiveness of this work in the future.

2. Discussion and results

The situation of drug trafficking on the Vietnam-Cambodia border areas

The Golden Triangle is the world's second-largest drug producing region, and the effects are being felt in Cambodia and Vietnam border. Traffic of illicit drugs has been developing complicatedly and showing rising trend in Vietnam and Cambodia recently. Both have become a destination and significant transit for trafficking of illicit drugs and their precursor chemicals to international markets. The drug market in Cambodia includes heroin, ketamine and mefomketamine. They are produced from the Golden Triangle area into Cambodia via Rattanakiri province along the border. Then, these products are packaged, branded, shipped to other countries. For example, in 2016, Cambodian authorities broke more than 4,000 drug transport cases, arrested 9,933 suspects and confiscated 179 kilogram of drugs (Yan, 2017). In 2018, Cambodia detected and arrested 4,399 cases with 8,389 subjects, including 98 Vietnamese, who were from Nigeria, Brazil and Colombia were also arrested in Cambodia (Chuong, 2018a).

Vietnam has become a destination and significant transit for trafficking of illicit drugs and their precursor chemicals to international markets. A large share of illicit drugs trafficked into and through Vietnam, over the past few years, has been smuggled by land and sea from neighboring countries, which partly being further trafficked to other countries. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Cambodia have been identified as a transit area for drugs from drug centers in the Golden Triangle, and the Golden Crescent in Asia and South America to Vietnam and to other countries (UNODC, 2019), and 80 percent of drugs brought into Vietnam are bound for another country (VNA, 2019), in which Cambodia accounts for over 10 percent. And that's why drug trafficking around Vietnam-Cambodia border have become more complicated as Vietnam has become a transit hub for traffickers. The situation of illegal trafficking and transportation of drugs through the Vietnam-Cambodia border area is most complicated in the three provinces of Tay Ninh, An Giang and Kien Giang (Vietnam) and five provinces of Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng and Prey Veng, Takéo, Kampot (Cambodia).



The Economist

Fig 1. Drug trafficking routes from the Golden Triangle
Sources: UNODC; The Economist (Dahaka, Kutkai, 2018)

Drug from the Golden Triangle area through Thailand, Laos and Cambodia to Vietnam. Domestic and foreign traffickers continue transporting drug from Cambodia through border areas to Binh Hiep and My Quy Tay in Long An Province, Moc Bai in Tay Ninh Province and Hoa Lu in Binh Phuoc Province to the Central and Southwest provinces or Mekong River Delta, and then gathered at warehouses in provinces bordering cities such as Binh Duong province, Dong Nai province and Long An province... After that, they were transported to secret warehouses in Ho Chi Minh City to find a way to disguise themselves into cargo containers, machines and then use illegal export border companies to third countries such as the Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Australia through ports, international airports in Ho Chi Minh city.

According to data from Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security, the number of drug trafficking cases at the end of 2018 and in the first months of 2019 in southern localities has reportedly risen, especially after northern and central localities stepped up a crackdown on drug traffickers. More and more drug traffickers have fled to the south and Cambodia to produce synthetic drugs, set up drug trafficking rings and transport drugs from Cambodia to Vietnam for local consumption or to ship elsewhere. In 2018, across the Vietnam – Cambodia border, the authorities arrested 1,537 cases (6.26 percent nationwide), 2,626 subjects (6.94 percent), seized 11.58 kilogram of heroin (0.73 percent), 5.2 kilogram of dry marijuana, 76.83 kg (4.38 percent) and 1,073 synthetic drugs (Ha, 2019). In the first half of 2019, drug prevention and control forces and border forces in Vietnam joined hands with Cambodian functional agencies to arrest and detect 32 cases and 60 subjects, seizing nearly 130 kilogram of drugs of all kinds (30 bricks of heroin, 55,461 meth pills and nearly 114 kilogram of synthetic drug), making up 6.64 percent of the total cases, 8.04 percent of criminals and 5.94 percent of the total drugs (Hai, 2019).

Characteristics of drug trafficking groups in the Vietnam-Cambodia border areas

Illicit activities: Vietnam and Cambodia are participating in UN conventions on drug control such as United Nations Convention on Narcotics in 1961; Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 1971; United Nations Convention against the Illicit Trade of Narcotic Drugs and Psychological Substances in 1988. Drugs and drug trafficking are both illegal activities in both countries. Legally, the death penalty was abolished in Cambodia, but the Law on the Control of Drugs bodes ill for those caught with controlled substances, at least on paper. Under Cambodian law, individuals involved in the illegal use of addictive substances will be sentenced to between 1-6 months and fined from 100,000 riel (25 USD) to 1 million riel. And continuing recidivism will result in a fine of between 6 months and 1 year and a fine of 1-2 million riel. For cases of illegal possession and trafficking of addictive substances, a fine of 2-5 years in prison and a fine of 4-10 million riel. For serious cases, offenders will be punished from 5-20 years in prison and fined 10-40 million riel. For example, in June 2017, a Malaysian man arrested with 1.08 kilogram of heroin at Phnom Penh International Airport was sentenced to life imprisonment (Kongkeo, 2017). In 2016, the Cambodian Court of Appeals upheld the life sentence of three French, Australian and Nigerian subjects arrested with 2.2 kilogram of heroin in their luggage (Helen, 2018). Cambodia's laws prescribe punishment ranging from 5 years to life in prison, but law enforcement is lax (Michael, 2019), and drugs are readily available, thus, easy to access, including illegal substances (Oppenheimer, 2009). Vietnam strictly enforces its drug laws. In 2000, the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam passed the Law on Preventing and Combating Narcotic Drugs. This law asserts: "The drug problem poses a major threat to the entire society, doing harm to human health, causing offspring degeneration, degrading human dignity, disrupting family happiness, and gravely affecting social order and safety and national security" (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2000). As prescribed by Article 96a and Article 203 of the Vietnamese Criminal Code in 1999, possession of heroin in quantities larger than 1.3 pounds gets you a mandatory death sentence. In 2007, 85 people were executed for drug-related offenses.

According to a study in Vietnam, the period of 2001-2010, the total number of defendants who were illegally storing, transporting, trading, or appropriating narcotics were sentenced to death by 569 defendants (accounting for 40.04 percent of capital punishment in Vietnam during 2001–2010, second only to murder offenses) (Toan, 2012). The Vietnamese Criminal Code in 1999 has 13 Articles (from Article 247 to Article 259) providing for crimes drug-related crimes, in which the death penalty framework is applied to the illegal trafficking of narcotic substances (Article 250) and the illegal trading of narcotic substances (Article 251).

Cross-border activity: The Vietnam-Cambodia border-based drug crime carries out a close bond at home and abroad to form cross-border criminal lines and organizations. In the Vietnam-Cambodia border, transnational drug-crime groups, mainly led by Taiwanese, collocated Vietnamese and Cambodian to organize drug transportation in very large numbers. Many people who are wanted by Vietnamese drug criminals flee to Cambodia to connect with Cambodian and Lao people to form drug gathering places right near the border and hook up the establishment of drug transport lines into Vietnam. In order to bring narcotics from outside the border into inland Vietnam, offenders often form a closed line organization from exploiting sources of goods to transport and consume drugs. Cambodian subjects colluded with Vietnamese people to the remote forests of Vietnam or Cambodia in the bordering area to set up tents and shacks to illegally store and trade narcotics. In addition, these criminals often associate with overseas Vietnamese or do business and business in Cambodia, the subjects are tourism, career, freelance labor... often back and forth between the two sides. In addition to illegal trade, heroin, synthetic drugs, marijuana from Cambodia to Vietnam are consumed in the southern provinces, even transported to the North for consumption (Nguyen, 2019).

Violence and armed: Drug organizations operate with great audacity and disregard for life and law. Normally, after trafficking in drugs, criminals often immediately transport the purchased drugs to Vietnam. Subjects can be transported by road across the border into Vietnam, mainly walking by trails and shortcuts in the forest. They rely on the long-standing kinship relationship between people living on both sides of the border, especially the Khmer, Gia Rai, Ede, Stieng ... to operate, such as hiring transporters with high wages. Or hire Cambodians who have close relations on the border of Vietnam, have the opportunity to visit, do business, trade and transport drugs. These people come to Vietnam easily to find shelter, even sheltered places of relatives, relatives in Vietnam.

In addition, the instigators and leaders have manipulated and used the object of women and children of ethnic minorities to transport drugs for them from Cambodia to Vietnam. This is a popular form of transportation and very suitable for the terrain of Vietnam – Cambodia border provinces. And subjects can transport drugs across the border into Vietnam by means of cars or motorbikes that directly enter and exit through national border gates; some subjects also use tourist cars and official-duty vehicle number plates. Cambodia to transport drugs into inland Vietnam. Besides, drug users often use a large number of people involved in drug transportation, including the assignment of goods-carrying subjects, border-guard subjects and subjects carrying protective weapons. When detected and arrested, they fight back fiercely and run into the forest so it is very difficult to catch them. A recent high-profile example of this violence is the on September 11, 2019, Cambodian and Vietnamese authorities successfully broke the drug line from Cambodia for consumption in Ho Chi Minh City, arrested 7 subjects, seized 35 kilogram of drugs, 2 gun and 21 bullets.

More recently, with sophisticated nature, methods, tricks, recklessness and aggression, drug offenders are equipped with many modern means of communication, drug transportation by many different and available means ready to use many firearm to fight back when detected or arrested.

These existing mechanisms to combat drug trafficking

Bilateral

Cooperation in the propagation and dissemination of the law on prevention and combat of drug-related crimes: The documents on cooperation agreements between Vietnam and Cambodia in this field contain provisions on law dissemination and exchange of documents legal documents related to the prevention and fight against drug-related crimes on the border line between the two sides. From 1998, the propaganda and dissemination of drug prevention and control legislation has been concerned by the Governments of the two countries with rich and diversified content and forms. Thereby, helping the functional forces of the two sides be fully aware of the nature, requirements and tasks of international cooperation in the fight against drug-related crimes between Vietnam and Cambodia. However, the law propaganda and dissemination still has many shortcomings, so the signed documents only exist in the form. In reality, there are still some documents signed but not disseminated, propagated and not instructed for implementation, so the functional forces and officials did not understand the content of the documents, so it was very

embarrassing circumstance request for international cooperation in the fight against drug-related crimes (Thanh, 2011).

Cooperating in negotiating, signing and organizing the implementation of multilateral and bilateral international treaties: Negotiating, signing and organizing the implementation of international treaties related to the prevention and fight against drug crimes between Vietnam and Cambodia is an important form of international cooperation. Up to now, the State and ministries, functional branches and localities of the two countries have negotiated and signed many bilateral cooperation documents on crime prevention and fight including drug offenses (treaties, Memorandum of understanding - MOU, agreement)*. However, the practice of organizing the implementation of these treaties is still inadequate, especially the transformation of the contents of international treaties into internal laws has been carried out very slowly; the assignment and specific responsibilities assigned to each agency and force in coordination have not been specified; the review of experience has been rarely implemented, so there is still a situation of signing cooperation documents but not paying attention to the implementation organization...

Cooperation in the provision and exchange of information on drug crimes: Cooperation between Vietnam and Cambodia in exchanging information on drug crime prevention and combat through INTERPOL and ASEANPOL channels, exchange of experience, and organize briefings... Through INTERPOL and ASEANPOL cooperation channels, the two countries mainly focused on sharing of experiences in crime prevention and fighting in general, cooperating in investigations on background checks, criminal records, criminal records and Cambodian subjects crimes in Vietnam or vice versa, with the greatest focus on clarifying drug offenders and catching fleeing criminals across the border between the two countries. Through the Standing Office for Drug and Crime Prevention, the Police Department investigates drug offenses and the Police Force investigates drug offenses Police of provinces that share the border with Cambodia, exchange information, especially information serving the discovery of drug-related crimes on the borderline, cooperating in wanted and sought activities, extradition of drug-related crimes. The functional forces of the two countries have proactively built a cooperation mechanism, exchanged their experience of struggle, as well as information on the methods and tricks of drug-related criminal activities in each country, types of newly discovered drug offenses, experience in detecting and preventing... And drug prevention and fight agencies of the two countries have conducted regular meetings and briefings, especially the police of provinces and districts on both sides of the border fairly regularly (Hiep, 2012). The content of exchange is about information related to drug-related activities; coordinate in the investigation and verification of information gathering, case documents and subjects. In the past time, on the border of the two countries, 5 pairs of Border Liaison Office (BLO) have been established in Tay Ninh and An Giang provinces (Phong, 2017). The BLOs have done a good job as a contact point, exchanging information on drug prevention and fight between Vietnam and Cambodia, as a direct receiving point and collecting and assessing the crime drug situation offenses in border areas, timely advising leaders of the two countries in directing functional forces to carry out coordinated activities to raise the effectiveness of drug crime prevention and combat (Khanh, Binh, 2018).

However, the process of coordinating the exchange of information on drug crimes and coordination in solving some cases is still slow and ineffective. The mechanism of cooperation is still rigid according to administrative procedures, especially in coordinating solving urgent and important cases, so it has not met the requirements in the coordination of crime prevention and fighting, has not yet promoted to the fullest possible conditions of the two parties. And the coordination of information exchange and drug prevention and fighting experiences among border

* Agreement on cooperation in drug prevention and fight in Mekong sub-region in 1993; Agreement on Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia drug cooperation in 1998; Agreement on extradition between Vietnam and Cambodia in 2013; Program of coordination between the Department of Drug and Crime Prevention (Vietnam Border Guard Command), Department of Drug Investigation Police (Vietnam Ministry of Public Security) and Department of Drug Prevention (Ministry of the Interior of Cambodia) on September 26, 2018; Agreement between Vietnam and Cambodia on the implementation of projects using Vietnam's non-refundable aid capital to implement investment projects on the construction of a number of items of the Project on Center for voluntary detoxification community-based in Preah Sihanouk province, Cambodia on December 7, 2018.

provinces has not been conducted regularly. The regular and irregular conferences and briefings between the two countries' forces have places and levels are not deep, the content is not specific and formal, so the effectiveness is still low.

Cooperate in patrolling, ensuring security, border safety and preventing criminal activities: This has been maintained by the two sides in strict compliance with the Treaties and Treaties of the Governments of the two countries. Accordingly, the Border Guard and the Police of the border provinces organize regular and irregular border patrol and control sessions. Thereby, contributing to maintaining and building relationships between border localities in order to enhance the confidence, understanding and solidarity of people on the two border sides, creating favorable conditions for management tasks, protecting sovereignty, border security, in effectively combating crime prevention, maintaining the border of peace, friendship, comprehensive cooperation and sustainable development. According to statistics at the Conference on coordination of border management and protection between the High Command of the Border Guard, the Ministry of Defense of Vietnam and the General Department of National Police, Ministry of the Interior of Cambodia, in the period of 2013–2018, Vietnam Border Guard stations and Cambodian Border Guard Police stations held 432 patrols with 4,124 soldiers. Coordinate propaganda 363 times for 2,558 people, and organize cultural exchange, arts, sports and sports was 289 sessions with 2,668 soldiers ([Ministry of Defense of Vietnam, 2018](#)). A case in point is that the An Giang Border Guard Command has cooperated with the Cambodian authorities of Ta Kéo and Kandal in combating crime prevention, maintaining main security stability border areas. All relevant cases that have been resolved are promptly handled in accordance with the treaty, treaty and border regulations. From 2009 to 2019, the border protection forces held 180 regular meetings and border posts coordinated to organize 770 bilateral border patrols with 6,930 soldiers from both countries ([Bay, 2019](#)).

Cooperating in the implementation of measures to prevent, investigate and arrest criminals: In order to effectively fight against this type of crime, three units of two countries (the Police Department investigating drug-related crimes (the Ministry of Public Security); the Department for Prevention and Control of Drugs and Crime, the Ministry's High Command The Border Guard (Ministry of National Defense) and the General Department of National Police, Ministry of the Interior of Cambodia have made great efforts, gathered forces and vehicles, and implemented programs and plans to fight the crime. This is the case in every country as well as participating in the forums and activities of countries around the world and in Southeast Asia. In particular, the provincial and district forces in the opposing areas have focused on coordinating to detect, arrest and prevent the remote source of illicit drug into the inland.

Table 1. Vietnam-Cambodia in the arrest of drug offenders (2015–2019)

Time	Cases	Objects	Amount of drug seized
2015	405	567	2,932 kilogram of heroin, 6,304 tablets and 31,627 kilogram of synthetic drugs, 1.25 kilogram of synthetic drug in stone form, 60,422 grams of methamphetamine, 1.2 kilogram of dry marijuana, 0.5 kilogram of cannabis seeds and many exhibits... (Ministry of Public Security of Vietnam, 2015).
2016	602	890	19.2 kilogram of heroin, 13.5 kilogram of opium, 4.6 kilogram of dry marijuana, 56.2 kilogram and 896 synthetic drugs.
2017	1.223	1.986	9.67 kilogram of heroin, 8.9 kilogram and 979 synthetic drugs, 11.6 kilogram of opium, 3.4 kilogram of dry marijuana, and many related exhibits.
2018	1.537	2.626	11.58 kilogram of heroin, 5.2 kilogram of dry marijuana, 76.83 kilogram and 1,073 synthetic drugs (Ha, 2019).
half of 2019	32	60	129,892 kilogram of drugs including 30 heroin crackers, 55,461 tablets, and 113.94 kilogram of synthetic drugs... (Anh, 2019).

According to the [Table 1](#), from 2015 to 2018, on the Vietnam-Cambodia border, functional units of the two countries cooperated to destroy 3,767 cases, arrest 6,069 subjects, seize nearly 1 ton of drugs of all kinds. This is illustrated in 2018, across the Vietnam - Cambodia border, Vietnamese authorities arrested 1,537 cases, 2,626 subjects, seized 11.58 kilogram of heroin, 5.2 kilogram of dry marijuana, 76, 83 kilogram and 1,073 synthetic drug pills. At the briefing meeting between the three forces of Vietnam and Cambodia (The Department of Drug Prevention and Combat against the Border Guard is under the Ministry of National Defense of Vietnam, the Police Department investigates drug offenses under the Ministry of Public Security of Vietnam and the Department of Drug Prevention and Prevention, the General Department of National Police under the Ministry of the Interior of Cambodia.) in coordinating the fight against drug offenses held in Da Nang on September 26, 2018, it was pointed out: In 2018, the border guards and the Vietnam-Cambodia border police units held regular and irregular meetings 273 times, exchanged 126 valuable news, coordinated to arrest more than 188 kilogram of drugs types ([Ministry of Public Security of Vietnam, 2018a](#)). Colonel Nguyen Dich Nam, Deputy Director of the Police Department investigating drug offenses, Vietnam Ministry of Public Security said:

"In just the first 9 months of 2018, the number of heroin seized was more than 1 ton and the number of exhibits was larger than that of 2017 combined. The activities of drug offenses are considered by the parties to be increasingly large and dangerous" ([Chuong, 2018b](#)).

Some typical cases are: Investigation into a robbery 414C of the Border Guard of Tay Ninh province in 2014. Through exchanging and coordinating to verify information between the Prevention and Control of Drugs and Crimes, the Provincial Border Guards and the Police Department Ba Vet, Svay Rieng province on the illegal trading and transporting network of narcotics through the Moc Bai international border-gate area, the Tay Ninh Border Guard has established investigation into a robbery 414C. It fought to break a line of illegal drug trafficking and transportation across the border, arresting 03 subjects, collecting 9.8 kilogram of heroin and 12 kilogram of additives ([Anh, Anh, 2016](#)). On March 28, 2018, Tay Ninh Police coordinated with Cambodian functional units to successfully break the largest ever illegal cross-border drug trafficking project with the total seized material evidence of more than 11 kilogram of assorted drugs, more than 5 billion and many other objects and related documents ([Nhung, 2018](#)).

In the first 6 months of 2019, although the number of drug trafficking cases and subjects were seized and handled by the Vietnamese drug prevention and control forces and border guards, in coordination with the Cambodian authorities only 32 cases, 60 subjects but collected 129,892 kilogram of drugs including 30 heroin crackers, 55,461 tablets, 113.94 kilogram of synthetic drugs, accounting for 6.64 percent of the cases, 8.04 percent of the subjects, accounting for 5.94 percent of all seized drugs on Vietnam's entire border ([Anh, 2019](#)).

In addition to the achieved results, the work of grasping the situation of drug-related crimes on the Vietnam-Cambodia border is still lacking in comprehensiveness, not being proactive, thus exchanging information and situation of drug-related crimes not often, timely, mainly social relations and handling specific cases. The timely sharing of information and coordination has led to the fact that the crimes continue to become a major threat, directly affecting the security of the Vietnam-Cambodia border ([Khanh, 2018](#)). Drug control forces at the Vietnam-Cambodia border have not been deployed synchronously, lacking equipment to check and detect drugs. Activities of coordinating verification and arrest of drug offenders are still limited, especially in the coordination of investigating specific cases, thus limiting the effectiveness of the fight, leaving the crime or slow to detect, arrest and handle, especially transnational organized drug offenders.

Cooperating in the training and retraining of a contingent of officials engaged in crime prevention and fighting: Through the signed agreements, protocols, agreements, cooperation activities in training and fostering the contingent of crime prevention between Cambodia and Vietnam. Both participated in cooperating to conduct training and exchange programs on criminal investigation, personnel, and to inform each other about the annual training schedule as well as plans, visits, surveys and awards exchange managers, training... According to data from the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Public Security of Vietnam, every year Vietnam trains Cambodia with 100 cadres at the Public Security schools but most of them are in management and leadership, very few cases follow. study related subjects to prevent and combat drug-related crime. On the Cambodian side, Cambodia receives 20 annual training courses for Vietnamese police, mainly about Khmer language and culture ([Ministry of Public Security of](#)

Vietnam, 2018, b). In general, training cooperation activities between Vietnam and Cambodia are not commensurate with the potential and needs of both sides; the number of training is not high, not professionally trained in the fight against drug-related crimes. The majority of the training classes are organized by Vietnam, while the Cambodian side is very few.

Multilateral

Vietnam and Cambodia have actively participated in related anti-drug forums and conferences such as ASEAN conferences, tripartite cooperation mechanism on drug prevention between Vietnam - Cambodia - Laos. Through these forums, countries have been shared latest information, discuss emerging trends and potential risks to countries inside and outside the region, and analyzing and assessing the situation of drug trafficking and production, identify new drug trafficking routes, drug trading and production hubs as well as ringleaders of illegal drug trafficking and production networks in the region. Vietnam and Cambodia are also involved in the development of effective plans, initiatives and implementation of existing cooperation mechanisms; help and support capacity building of law enforcement on drug prevention and fight; recommending regional countries to consider investing in building and deploying a system of public drug control stations at locations adjacent to the Golden Triangle area, in order to coordinate the control of drugs and precursors, towards the goal of encircling, isolating drug production area at Golden Triangle.

Regarding the tripartite cooperation mechanism on drug prevention between the three countries Vietnam – Cambodia – Laos. This mechanism has been established since 1998. After more than 20 years of operation, this mechanism has been increasingly effective, resulting in a significant contribution to maintaining, strengthening and strengthening relations friendly cooperation between the three countries in drug prevention. The tripartite ministerial meeting between Vietnam – Cambodia – Laos on cooperation in drug prevention and control was held annually to create favorable conditions for the parties to exchange information, experience and unify the coordination mechanism.

Cooperation through ASEAN: ASEAN is a dynamic development area, but always faces many threats and challenges of transnational crime, especially terrorism and drug crimes. Since its inception, ASEAN has strengthened and expanded cooperation to fight and prevent transnational crimes and Vietnam is an active country in that regard. ASEANAPOL was established in 1979 with the purpose of connecting the Police forces of countries in the region, creating a synergy against transnational crimes. Since its establishment, ASEANAPOL has made remarkable progress with a total of 10 member countries, 10 dialogue partners and 6 observers. The purpose of ASEANAPOL is to cooperate in combating against emerging crimes in the region such as pirates, drug smuggling, economic and financial fraud... Since the ASEAN-China Joint Declaration on cooperation in non-traditional security areas, ASEAN countries have implemented with dialogue countries, especially with China, Japan, Korea, and the US, EU, and international organizations in cooperation to fight transnational crimes, including drug crimes such as: "ASEAN Anti-Drug Cooperation Strategy 2000"; "Beijing Joint Declaration on Cooperation anti-drug cooperation in 2001"...

ASEAN countries have implemented the Conference Mechanism of Ministers and senior officials of ASEAN countries on drug issues, the ASEAN Drug Crime Information Center, the ASEAN Working Group on prevention and control drug by air and by sea, ASEAN Plan on Drug Control in the Golden Triangle area. At the same time, promoting bilateral cooperation with ASEAN countries and partners in drug prevention... For example, the ministerial meeting on enhancing the effectiveness of cooperation in fighting transnational drug crime was held in Hanoi the same day at the initiative of the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security in 2019. It attracted nearly 200 delegates from Cambodia, Laos, China, Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines, Vietnam, the US' Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), and the Regional Office of Southeast Asia and the Pacific of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Solutions to improve the effectiveness of cooperation

Due to the super profits from drug trafficking, in the near future, the activities of international drug crimes will increase in complexity. Drug trafficking gangs will promote drug trafficking on a large scale, not only operating in the region and continents as before but also expanding the trade route, transportation, invasion add more countries to operate. In particular, they continue to take advantage of economic globalization, open-door policies to attract investment from developing countries to penetrate, conduct activities of drug production, trade and money

laundering from smuggling. drug. Southeast Asia is and will not contain new complexities about drug crimes. The Golden Triangle is still the center of drug production in the world and the region, the production and trade of drugs here does not decrease but also spread to other countries in the region. In addition, criminal organizations in this field operate across countries, which are tightly organized, equipped with modernity, aggression and recklessness (Hung, Duong, 2012). Therefore, countries need to focus on international cooperation on information sharing, struggle experience and coordination of investigations.

In the coming years, the situation of drugs on the Vietnam-Cambodia border will have new complicated developments. Taking advantage of the open door policy and international integration, as well as the terrain of the provinces on the Vietnam-Cambodia border, rugged and difficult to control, drug-related crimes at this border line are constantly expanding and the scope of activities, especially associated with crimes on the Vietnam-Laos border, makes the situation of drug crimes between the two countries more complicated. Drug users will continue to attract people, especially ethnic minorities in areas bordering Vietnam - Cambodia, to engage in drug trafficking and transportation activities. In addition, they will use the global information network to illegally trade and trade narcotics. The above situation requires Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities to further improve the effectiveness of their cooperation in the prevention and combat of drug-related crimes, thus contributing to building a border line of peace, friendship and stability. planning and development. In particular, focus on some solutions as follows:

Firstly, the two countries need to organize the effective implementation of legal documents on cooperation in the prevention and combat of drug crimes. Both need to conduct a preliminary review of the signed documents, and promote the dissemination and propagation of the signed documents (published in newspapers, via radio and television newspapers, etc.) in order to raise the awareness of the people and officials involved in relevant work cooperation between Vietnam and Cambodia in the prevention and fight against drug-related crimes. The two countries assigned and decentralized in detail the implementation of signed documents between Vietnam and Cambodia, and strengthen the inspection and guidance of units and localities to implement international treaties on drug crime prevention and fight. In addition, the authorities of the two countries should continue to develop agreements, agreements and memorandums of cooperation in the fight against crimes, including drug-related crimes.

Secondly, strengthening coordination in exchanging information on drug prevention and fight between Vietnam and Cambodia. The authorities of the two countries need to maintain and strengthen meetings to discuss the issue of drug prevention and control cooperation. The two countries need to exchange through monthly, quarterly and annual briefings and set up a hotline for information exchange between the two competent authorities. At the provincial and border areas, it is necessary to maintain regular meetings to assess the results of drug prevention and combat coordination of each party, and at the same time exchange information, notify the situation, draw experience and discuss the Measures to improve the effectiveness of coordinated struggle. The two countries need to continue maintaining and promoting the operation of BLO, and further researching the functions and tasks of the BLO to suit the requirements of drug crime prevention and control activities right at the border.

Thirdly, coordinate closely in patrolling and protecting the common border, perform basic professional tasks, investigate and handle drug-related offenders related to Vietnam and Cambodia. Border protection forces of the two sides coordinate in well implementing the border patrol and protection regime. The two sides work together to control activities across the border in accordance with the law of each country. For the management of immigration, security of border gates, it is necessary to coordinate smoothly and facilitate the cross-border circulation, when there is an unexpected situation, the two sides actively exchange information and coordinate solve quickly together. When drug cases occur, they need to coordinate actively to check and handle crimes, and conduct the extradition of crimes in accordance with the agreements the two sides have signed.

In addition, the two sides need to strengthen the cooperation between the Police, Customs and Border Guards on the Vietnam-Cambodia border in the prevention and combat of drug crimes in the border areas and border gates; regularly conduct preliminary and summary meetings and set out directions for cooperation in drug-related crime prevention in the coming time. The Government and

Vietnamese functional forces should strengthen to assist Cambodia in training, staff training, providing financial support, means of detecting and investigating drug crimes.

3. Conclusion

In the past year, cooperation activities on drug prevention between Vietnam and Cambodia have contributed to preventing, detecting and arresting drug smuggling across the border, contributing to reducing drug crimes in each country, creating a positive change in the prevention and fight against criminals and contributing to protecting the security and order in the border areas. In the coming time, the Governments of the two countries need to direct the functional agencies in the country and the provinces sharing the border to further promote the coordination of drug prevention, especially to enhance information exchange and coordination closely coordinate in investigating, discovering and destroying drug trafficking and transportation lines on the border of the two countries. The two sides should continue to share information and experiences in the field of drug prevention, support each other in training to improve the capacity of staff working on drug prevention; coordinate in multilateral cooperation forums and drug prevention. Thereby, contributing to timely prevention and effective handling of various types of drug-related crimes in Vietnam – Cambodia are increasing, contributing to building a border of peace, friendship, development cooperation between Vietnam and Cambodia.

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Church-State Interplay in Post-Soviet Russia, and the Image of the West*

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Abstract

This paper's aim is grasping the issue of tradition-change in the Russian Federation from religious and cultural perspective. In particular, it will consider the return to power of the Russian Orthodox Church in post-soviet era, analysing the ideology on which its role is based on, and its connections with Kremlin's ideology.

After the failure of the Soviet project, a large part of Russia's political elites believe that Russia must adapt its political and religious systems according to its own history and identity: this shift means henceforth the idea that Russia must not be a copy of Western world. One harbinger of this idea was the concept of "managed democracy" developed by V. Surkov and embraced by the Kremlin in 2004. The concept may be interpreted in strict relation with the one of Russkij Mir, developed later to identify the community of ethnic Russians. The second harbinger may be seen in the "traditional values" discourse, that present Russia as a different civilizational universe. Although it is difficult to trace the exact moment in which the term traditional values was used for the first time in explicit opposition to liberal values, it is designated to denote the moral sphere, and this field has become the center of the Church presence in the public debate. In 2014, in his annual state of the nation address, President Putin pointed to traditional value as one of the country's policy priorities: this is perfectly coherent with Russia tendency in the public sphere to define its international activity in terms of moral duty. This is true in particular in relation to the liberal – secularized West, appointed as the "antichrist". What are the terms and reasons of this opposition? Which kind of principles allow us to identify the Russian community as different from the western one?

Keywords: traditional values, Russian Orthodox Church, Kremlin, democracy, Soviet legacy.

1. Introduction

The role and the value of Orthodox religion as source of Russian identity have a long history: they tie in with the Byzantine conception of "symphony" kept since the Christianization in 988, that characterized the political space of the "Russian" princes and tzars as a space "enlighten by the faith", and with the messianistic idea of Russia as the "Third Rome", developed after the fall of

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Constantinople. The idea of Holy Russia was gradually developed from cultural oppositions but maintaining at the same time a strong relationship with the Russian ethnicity. It was based, on one hand, on the “Christian meta-ethic universalism”, that is the idea of “messianism” we referred before, on the other hand it may be recognized in the gradual merging of two dimensions of the Russians; the fact that the term “others” was used in referring both to people of foreign origins and to people of other religions, help us understanding this concept. The transformation of the Orthodox Church into an “autocephalus” national institution corresponded with the raise of its universalistic claims. At the same time, major historical and philosophical debates contributed in constructing the Russian idea and in proclaiming Orthodoxy as the cornerstone of this Russian idea (Agadjanian, 2000). Dostoevsky once stated that to be Orthodox is to be Russian (and we can recognise this tendency in the recent relation of Russian people with religion)*, this strong perception of Orthodoxy as being linked to Russian identity is highlighted by the analysis of the significance of religious factor in Russian history: the Church, throughout the centuries has been the second most important political symbol of Russia after the state: the Russian state assumed the Byzantine legacy of a universal Christian empire and the sense of having a mission. In the history of Russian state the religious factor fulfilled the roles of creating cultures legitimating its social function in foreign policy. This is why, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the State found in the Russian Church the source of a new ideology and of a way to strengthen his mandate overcoming the legitimization crisis (Curanovic, 2012).

Moscow gargantuan Cathedral of Christ the Saviour and the giant monument to Vladimir the Great are visible testimonies to the Orthodox Church position in the national, spiritual and political life of Russia. Decreed to be built by Tzars Aleksandr I to commemorate the Russian forces’ victory over –Napoleon in 1812 the cathedral was destroyed by Stalin command forty-eight years later his consecration in 1883. The remnants of the foundation were made into an open-air swimming pool which closed in 1993. In 1994 Mayor Iurii Luzhkov announced that the cathedral would be reconstructed: it was consecrated in September 1997 (Knox, 2005).

On November 2017 a monument was unveiled in Moscow to Vladimir the Great, the Prince under whose rule the Kievan Rus’ was Christianized in 988. In a symbolic perspective, not only is important to note that the monument is placed just outside the Kremlin walls (watching toward the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour), but also the context of the meeting of his inauguration, attended by a number of selected Russian leaders. The group picture shows the Patriarch standing up front next to President Vladimir Putin and the other religious leader lined up in the first row of the audience. This image has made easy understanding the Russian model of church-state relations: the state is Orthodox, the President and the Patriarch are on the top, and other religions are bystanders and minor partners.

2. Discussion and results

Church-State relation in Contemporary Russia

On which principles are based nowadays Church-State relation in Russia?

With the fall of the Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox Church regained freedom but not the privileges it had enjoyed before the Revolution and not a substantial State support. Moreover, soon enough was clear that the benefits of religious freedom and pluralism could have been a threat to the own position of the Russian Orthodox Church. In order to face the growing competition of the other religious communities, the Russian Orthodox Church under Patriarch Alexi II decided to seek a refuge under the wing of a close collaboration with the State. At the same time, as has been underlined before, the Kremlin recognized some privileges in supporting the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution perceived positively by the majority of Russians . Therefore, we can affirm that the complementarity of respective interests, provided the incentives for a Church-State rapprochement in post-soviet Russia (Curanovic, 2015).

The extent of the Moscow Patriarchate’s presence in the political life of the country is indicative in order to understand the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on civil society as well. We should note that the Russian Constitution affirms: 1) the separation of Church and State, that Russian Federation is 2) a secular state, that 3) no religion may be established as state religion

* We refer here to the phenomenon of “belonging without believing”, post-Soviet sociological variations of the Western of the theme “believing without belonging”.

or a compulsory religion, and that 4) religious associations are separated from the state and equal before the law. This is the article 4.1 of the Russian Constitution. But, in order to grasp Church State interplay in Russia today is important considering that any endeavour to assess the relation of religion and politics on the basis only of the constitutions is reductionist: it is important to consider the political development considering the development of civil society as well. Moreover, it is important to read the principles affirmed in the Constitution not referring to “our” “own” categories, but considering the cultural history of the country and the link between identity and religion to which we have referred before (Knox, 2005).

The set of concrete demands the Moscow Patriarchate developed vis-à-vis the State, with minor variants have remained the same since 1990s: restitutions of Church’s properties, the introduction of an “Orthodox” element to education in all levels of public schooling, the introduction of Orthodox chaplains into the armed forces; and, the restriction of competition from the ROC’s rivals in the religious field, in particular religious organization with foreign support (Papikova, 2011).

The Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, a document on the Patriarchate’s conception on the Orthodox Church’s political and social role and on the challenges the Church has to dealt with, adopted in mid August 2000, is fundamental in order to grasp this relation. In the document Russian Orthodox Church’ perception of Church-State relations is thus explained: “In church-state relations, the difference in their natures should be taken into account. The Church has been founded by God Himself, our Lord Jesus Christ, while the God-instituted nature of state power is revealed in historical process only indirectly. The goal of the Church is the eternal salvation of people, while the goal of state is their well-being on earth.” (III. 3, mospat.ru). Moreover, it is specified: “the tasks and work of the Church and the state may coincide not only in seeking purely earthly welfare, but also in the fulfilment of the salvific mission of the Church” (mospat.ru). At paragraph III. 4 we read that the historical Church-State symphonia is not compatible with a modern state: “The Orthodox tradition has developed an explicit symphonic ideal of church–state relations. Since church–state relations are two-way traffic, the above-mentioned ideal could emerge in history only in a state that recognises the Orthodox Church as the greatest people’s shrine, in other words, only in an Orthodox state”.

Both Alexei and Kirill stated that Church wishes to be separated from the State* and they clarified as well that “The principle of the secular state cannot be understood as implying that religion should be radically forced out of all the spheres of the people’s life, that religious associations should be debarred from decision-making on socially significant problems and deprived of the right to evaluate the actions of the authorities. This principle presupposes only a certain division of domains between church and state and their non-interference into each other’s affairs”. Moreover, the document made explicit Church’s perception of church state cooperation in a long list. At paragraph III. 8, we can read:

The areas of church–state co-operation in the present historical period are as follows:

- a) peacemaking on international, inter-ethnic and civic levels and promoting mutual understanding and co-operation among people, nations and states;
- b) concern for the preservation of morality in society;
- c) spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic education and formation;
- d) charity and the development of joint social programs;
- e) preservation, restoration and development of the historical and cultural heritage, including concern for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments;
- f) dialogue with governmental bodies of all branches and levels on issues important for the Church and society, including the development of appropriate laws, by-laws, instructions and decisions;
- g) care of the military and law-enforcement workers and their spiritual and moral education;
- h) efforts to prevent crime and care of prisoners;
- i) science and research;
- j) healthcare;
- k) culture and arts;

* [Kirill, the Russian Orthodox Church and the third millennium, and Patriarch Alexei’s statement in many interviews that “Church is separated from the state but not from society” (Knox, 2005; Papikova, 2011).

l) work of ecclesiastical and secular mass media;
 m) preservation of the environment;
 n) economic activity for the benefit of the Church, state and society;
 o) support for the institution of family, for motherhood and childhood;
 p) opposition to the work of pseudo-religious structures presenting a threat to the individual and society.

I would ask to point out attention to points C, F, and G, that clearly refers to the historical Orthodox role in the country. The cooperation with the State declared at point f, is then perfectly clarified at points I, l, and p (which clearly refers to the 1997 religious law and to the “managed pluralism”) (Knox, 2005).

Now, I will briefly refer to the main issues that I think may help to understand what is underlined in the document, that are the concepts of: managed pluralism, sovereign democracy, traditional values/modernity, spiritual security.

Managed pluralism

Nikolas Gvosden has pointed out that there exist an important connection between the post Soviet “managed” or “hierarchical” pluralism and the role of the ROC in Russia’s identity (Wharola, 2006). The problematic question of Russian identity firstly has surfed with the new law on freedom of conscience adopted in 1990. The law asserted freedom of conscience and religion as an inalienable right of the citizen, proclaimed the equality of forms of religious belief, affirmed the separation of Church and State; moreover religious movements were granted the right to practise all religious activities, and the procedure for registration which enables religious communities to acquire the status of legal entity was very simple. As we already said, this religious pluralism was soon perceived by the ROC as a threat and it undertook an effective lobbying to amend it. In 1997 a new federal religious law, drafted under pressure from the Russian Orthodox Church, was issued. In its preamble it affirms: “the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia”. The affirmation in law of the existence of a dominant religion is accompanied by the specification of the so-called “traditional religions” and by a concern in classifying the various religious groups, distinguishing sects from the other religious movements. The distinction reminds the system of classification used by the Council for Religious Affairs: moreover, in the present law to the Soviet distinction between Russian and foreign religions as well as to the distinction between religious groups having relations with the State and those groups outside its control, has been added the criteria of “tradition” (Roussetlet, 2000). This is confirmed by the restrictions to the registration of “non-traditional religious groups” and by the cases of some religious groups appointed as extremist as Jenovah Witnesses*. The Russian attitude toward religious pluralism may be understood referring also to the Basic Principles of Attitudes to the Non-Orthodox, in which is affirmed that the Orthodox Church is the true Church of Christ’, and is claimed that Russia’s church is the Church of the “canonical territory” and minorities have the right to work only in the territories that belong to them (Anderson, 2016). Indeed the administration of religious pluralism has been assimilated by Putin administration to the strengthen of the State, as confirmed by the new national security concept which see the “moral and religious education” as a matter of the State and the “harmful influence of foreign missionaries” to be controlled. This is confirmed by the agreements between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Federal Government regarding army and education (Doklad v rabochey gruppe: Doklad Predsedatelya Uchebnogo Komiteta pri Svyashchennom Sinode arkhiepiskopa Vereyskogo Yevgeniya, cooperation agreement between the ROC and the ministry of Education signed in April 2000 (Curanovic, 2012; Roussetlet, 2000).

Managed democracy

The issue of managed pluralism lead us to focus more on the concept of “managed democracy”.

Politicians, the experts serving the government and the party United Russia have produced several documents, statements, formulations on the issue of “sovereign democracy”. In order to grasp the concept, central among them is the speech that Vladislav Surkov made in 2006 to

* Art. 9 of the 1997 law on freedom of conscience.

students of United Russia's Center for Party Personnel Training, and his article titled "The Nationalization of the Future".

The time and place of the publication prove that the concept should be viewed as an attempt to formulate Putin's discourse in the form of a textual/contextual political quintessence of the current era, not as a mere ideological party platform (Okara, 2007). The basic features of sovereign democracy may be considered: the primacy of sovereignty over democracy and a sovereign Russian democratic institutional development which does not correspond to Western standards (Petrov, 2005). In order to understand this system is important to identify the coordinates of sovereign democracy on the map's of Russian intellectual culture: an analysis of Surkov's document reveals that the author borrowed the bulk of his ideas from the conservative/revolutionary ideology and political philosophy (Okara, 2007). Indeed, the term refers to three central findings of the system: first, this system has enabled Russia's leaders to govern more by a non-participation pact with society than by outright repression. Second, the more centralized this system becomes, the more likely political outcomes are to diverge from social ideals, and the more vulnerable the regime becomes to shocks. The survival of the regime depends heavily on the personal reputation and skills of the top leaders, who must increasingly exercise manual control over the system. And third, political outcomes in a hybrid regime are closer to social ideals and the system is less vulnerable than would be the case in a regime that relies primarily on outright repression—allowing no political opposition to exist and creating no substitutions to serve any of the functions of democratic institutions. But the authors conclude that while overmanaged democracy may be stable in the short term, it will not last in the long term. I think it is not possible to say if this system, in Russia's case, will survive Putin himself (Petrov et al., 2010). The system has been qualified as a "democracy that accords with Russian traditional values", Religion's role in the evolution of the political system may be recognized in the scepticism about liberalism that the Church and the political system saw as characterizing Western society. I quote here Metropolitan Kirill: "the fundamental contradiction of our epoch...is the opposition of liberal civilised standards on the one hand, and the values of national, cultural and religious identity on the other" (2000), and Fr Vsevolod Chaplin, one of the Moscow Patriarchate's leading spokesmen on public affairs, who stated that a government that 'rejects religious authority and declares the government independent from God... it is rooted in competition... The Church's ideal is the nation as a living organism, a unified body that sees disagreements as unnatural and unhealthy'. Moreover, in terms of priorities, the primary aim of the church should be less with democratic development than 'uniting its forces in service to the fatherland and the nation'(Chaplin 2004 in Anderson 2015). So, the objection to the idea that Western European norms should be depicted as universal and determinative for Russia, and this approach dovetailed nicely with the evolving Kremlin's ideas about 'sovereign democracy' (Anderson, 2015).

Now, I would focus more on the concepts of traditional values, human rights and liberalism, concepts which came from the foregoing discussion.

Tradition/traditional values/modernity

As we explained before, the concept of "sovereign democracy", embraced by the Kremlin after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004–2005, although later disappeared from its agenda, showed the logic that Russia must stay true to its political tradition, and not be judged according to Western standards. Indeed, the term "sovereign democracy" was followed by the concept of *Russkij Mir* (community of ethnic Russian in and outside the territory of the Russian Federation). A logical consequences of presenting Russia as a distinctive civilization universe was to define Russia's own set of values, set of values different from the Western ones. A good example of this tendency may be found in Putin's speech delivered to the participants of the Valdai Discussion club in September 2013. In his speech Putin went to identify traditional values exclusively with religious values, declaring that defending Christian values is the only right thing a state can do, and stated that if one wants to learn about true Russian tradition, one should refer to Russian Orthodoxy. This has been the main thesis of the dynamic conservatism promoted by the United Russia's party and, of course, by the Moscow Patriarchate that, in 2011 issued a document entitled "The Basic Values: the Fundamentals of National Unity". The document provides a catalogue of 17 values which combined with some laws enacted in recent years in the Russian Federation, illustrate Russian Federation's efforts to shape public morality in an increasingly rigid manner. We can affirm that what exactly

tradition means for Orthodox and political rhetoric (in a secular sense) is that the efficiency of Russian modernization is conditioned by the revival of tradition, that is identified with religion (Curanovic, 2015). In broader term, we should understand the use of tradition here as associated with “morality”, the field that is become the main focus of the church’s presence in public debate*.

But, coming back to our paper Alexander Agadjanian recognises in the capitalistic, libertarian and legalistic moral options the connection with western values and the link to new post-soviet freedoms. According to Agadjanian these spheres have created a new interpretation of community and of individual subjectivity. Proceeding from Zigon’s theory of multiple moralities or Stoeckl’s theory of the Russian Orthodox Church as moral norm entrepreneur, we can affirm that Russian Orthodoxy gradually shaped itself into an opposition to the moral programmes of the new era, therefore we should note that while the 90s was the time of the church and the country’s liberation from the communist grip, traditional values so the Russian Orthodox Church, serves as a channel to transmit continuity with the Soviet past in the sphere of conservative ethos and morality. Of course, referring to the transmission of the moral Soviet package requires a complex analysis, but we could find in the rhetoric of the solid and traditional family, in the inequality of the gender roles, in the emphasis on responsibilities rather than rights, in the ones on intra-collective social control and solidarity, on the priority of the ‘spiritual’ over the ‘material’; on sexual (self)restraint; homophobia; and the subjugation of individual interests and expressions to the collective good, the main pillars which constituted this moral programme: inherited from the Soviet past, they have been sacralised and subsumed in a longer continuity of the Russian history (Agadjanian, 2017).

This attitude toward morality and traditional values should be considered from what Kristina Stoeckl named “norm entrepreneurship”, term used in international relations to describe the “normative agency of actors in transnational governance regimes”. Stoeckl underlines that focusing on the internal multivocality is crucial in order to understand the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian society today. The position of the Russian Orthodox Church as defender of traditional values in and outside the country, means also that the position of the Russian Church with regard to human rights changed from a total rejection of human rights as a western invention to endorsing human rights as concept, but using it in a way that was different from the liberal and egalitarian evolution of the international human rights system. The ROC confronts itself with the international human rights system in a non-static way in order to “expand and grant freedom and equality to individuals and groups that are not, at least not in the eyes of those protagonists, representative of the traditional majority population or culture of a country”. This resentment may be sensitized in a quotation from a representative of the Moscow Patriarchate in Strasburg: “The Russian Church believes that state and society should secure rights of all citizens and not only some of them. Minorities’ rights shouldn’t be secured at the expense of majority’s rights’ (Ryabykh 2010a in Stoeckl, 2016). Therefore, we can say that the ROC opposes not human rights tout court, but the gradual egalitarian evolution of the human rights system. In particular, what the Russian Orthodox Church opposes is the “norm diffusion” doing this thanks to the “discover of article 29” of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which allows the church “to position itself no longer simply in opposition to a western progressive understanding of human rights, but instead to actively present itself as the vanguard of a more original understanding of human rights, an understanding which emphasises the importance of morality, duties and community”. This shift was the precondition for the ROC to become moral norm entrepreneur in the field of the international morality politics: the ROC coupled its traditional values agenda with article 29 in order to universalize the message of traditional values (Stoeckl, 2016). We may affirm that this concept, together with the relation with the state that derives from the Social Doctrine testifies of how the Russian Orthodox Church deals with secularism and religious pluralism, with believers, politics and society and, widely, they also concern the idea of the Church’s position in the world. Relation between Russian Church and Russia in general, may be well understood referring to this question by at that time still Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill: “..The question arises here: Can human rights as set forth today really claim to be universal? (Metropolitan Kirill of

* Outside this paper is the debate, widely important, about the clash between conservative East and liberal West with regard to traditional values on which, in particular, D. Ulzaner and Kristina Stoeckl’s project on post-secular conflicts works. The recent World Family Congress held in Italy last March offers an important angle from which considering the debate.

Smolensk and Kaliningrad, 2006, in [Stoeckl, 2011](#)). This statement from Kirill obliges to think from a multiple modernities perspectives Russia's relation with human rights and with West: and to consider that what have found in the West an adequate interpretation may be not the same adequate elsewhere ([Stoeckl, 2015](#)). The argumentation on human rights put in the centre of the debate the relationship between secularity and religion in the West and therefore, the debate on modernity. The issue not only concerns the process of redefinition of Orthodox religion inside the society, but also the debate we referred before about conservatism and liberalism in the West and in Russia.

In a recent talk to Aljazeera, Metropolitan Hilarion confirmed that the "ROC is in a battle with liberalism, clarifying that this is not a battle of theological and religious reasons only, not related to the issue of whether God exist and how we understand God, it is by large a battle for human life and for the future of humanity, so it is not so much a theological dispute as it is an anthropological dispute. When we speak about liberal values we understand the liberal society as happens in many countries of the West", therefore is important clarifying the relation of the Church with same sex unions, for instance, pointing out on the importance of the meaning of the word "marriage" in a religious/theological perspective ([Aljazeera, 2014](#)).

Indeed we have seen that the ROC has had a crucial role to play in legitimizing the Kremlin's role as defender of "traditional values", and, for this reason, the ROC has become an indispensable instrument in the Kremlin's foreign policy strategy, in particular in defending and promoting the idea of the Russkij Mir that, according to the Russian state and the Church's narrative, must resist Western liberalism and preserve traditional values as a way to achieve its own sphere of influence considered as a power status to be defended and strengthened: this is view as an essential component of Russian identity ([Curanovic, 2015](#)), – and, as Minister Lavrov recently noted, should be common for all leading religions – (Lavrov, 2018 in [Curanovic 2015](#)).

3. Conclusion

Finally, proceeding from this analysis, we can state that the restored church-state symphonia, in post-soviet period assumed different characteristics from the ones on which were based church-state collaboration in the soviet period*: its main features is the major presence of the Church in Russia's internal and foreign affairs[†] met up with the Kremlin's task "to preserve and maintain the status quo in Europe that emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union... – as far as – Russia is not seeking to revise the existing balance of power, but nor will it tolerate attempts to stamp out its regional influence, which is the West's principal goal". For this reason, Russia "cannot but considered itself a social phenomenon different from the West; in other words, a special "civilization" with its own orbit and power of attraction. Naturally, Russia can explain its right to a special "sphere of influence" by its special sense of belonging to Europe and its greater sense of enlightenment with regard to the countries to which such influence could be applied. We call this policy "delegated hegemony" (a situation where the "right" to international hegemony in the near abroad is delegated to Russia by the collective "West" in exchange for its loyalty on matters of global politics)". This has been the main policy on post-soviet period. But, considering that from the moment when Russia used all the possible means of integration with the West for geopolitical reasons, all hope for the revival of delegated hegemony have been dropped, this just left to Russia the appeal to "civilizational rhetoric" as a marker of its distinction from the Euro Atlantic world. The meaning of this distinction may be understood referring to this quotation by President Putin of the by prominent nineteenth-century Russian thinker Nikolai Danilevsky: "it is impossible to imagine the history of humanity without such unique civilizations as India, China, Western Europe, America, and many others. It is really a multifaceted complexity where each facet supplements and enriches the others..." No civilization can call itself supreme, the most developed one. Today the understanding of the complexity of civilizational development provides the foundation for building a multipolar world and defending the principles of international law. The weight and the influence

* See Roccucci, Stalin e il Patriarca, Riccardi, il Vaticano e Mosca.

[†] This may be linked according to some scholars to the arrival of metropolitan Kirill at the Department for External Relation of the Moscow Patriarchate, to his leadership, his presence in the media, his relations with the outside world and in the way he lobbied the state to defend the interests of the Church (see in particular [Papkova, 2001](#)).

of its poles on the common development will, of course, be determined by their economic, scientific, cultural, spiritual, and human potential” (Putin, 2018 in [Mezhuev, 2019](#)).

And, of course, the enlisting of Orthodoxy in shaping this new nation has been natural in Russia, given its link with the dominant ethnos, but we should also pay attention to which may be considered the real weight of the role of Russian Church in Russian society ([Agadjanian, 2000](#)) and considering this “special separate civilization” starting from the revival of identities which has lead the process of inclusion into the global world ([Rousselet, 2000](#)). Starting from these consideration we can better grasp the relation of Russia with the West and with “western modernity”.

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Role of Self-Government Bodies in Strengthening the Family Institute and Preserving Family Values

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Abstract

In this article, the author analyzes the institution of the family as one of the most important phenomena in society. The relation of state policy to this institution is described. It shows that the family is one of the important indicators of the stability of society and evaluates the role of self-government bodies (mahallas) in strengthening family traditions and values. In the mahallas, regardless of their financial situation and occupation, everyone respects the older generation and tries to help each other. Mahalla residents always try to help old, helpless and low-income people. The older generation also helps young people create a happy family, provide all possible assistance in resolving conflict situations at no cost. The most valuable and fundamental principle of this system is respect for the older generation. All problems regarding society are always considered and solved with the participation of the older generation, where the last and decisive word will be given by the most respected and senior person. On the basis of this, it is also customary in every Uzbek family to respect the older generation and the respectfulness of children to their parents. Adult children are required to provide both their parents with moral and material support when they complete their labor activity. Such social traditions as feeling sorry for the sick and small, providing moral and material support to low-income and large families, instill kindness and humanism in people, makes them closer to each other. Important tasks such as ensuring the welfare and tranquility of the inhabitants of the mahalla, educating honest and hardworking youth who value national and national values and fight for the justice and dignity of their families are carried out in the mahalla.

Keywords: mahalla, family, self-government, older generation, national traditions, stability.

1. Введение

«Семья – эта первичная среда, где человек
должен учиться творить добро»
В.А. Сухомлинский

Семья является важным институтом общества, который играет значительную роль не только в частной жизни людей, но и в экономической, социальной и культурно-духовном развитии каждого общества. Одновременно с семьей, которая выполняет круг социальных задач в данном обществе, государство тоже старается создать благоприятные условия для развития и процветания института семьи. Это связано с тем, что будущее каждого общества во многом зависит от степени развития семьи как части данного общества. В нормальной

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семье каждый человек получает моральную и психологическую энергию и вместе с членами своей семьи старается решить все проблемы жизни.

Сегодня институт семьи всё более претерпевает разные проблемы, такие как рост разводов (отсюда рост числа неполных семей), снижение культуры межличностных отношений и отсутствие ответственности в воспитании детей и т.д.

Наша основная цель – изучение роли органов самоуправления в воспитании подрастающего поколения и сохранении семейных ценностей. Объектом изучения статьи является традиции и обычаи, которые влияют на общественное мнение узбекского народа. Научная новизна этой статьи заключается в том, что дальнейшая судьба института семьи во многом зависит от сохранения духовных ценностей, традиций и обычаев, которые существуют живут в той среде, где растёт и живёт молодое поколение. Не секрет, что в современном мире отношение между старшим и молодым поколением, вернее между детьми и родителями не всегда правильные. «Это одна из причин того, что сегодня есть много молодёжи, которая идёт по пути деградации, тратя своё время на бесполезные занятия и увлечения» (Юрьев, 2020).

2. Материалы и методы

В данной статье мы пользовались методами описания, контекстуального анализа, изложения и сопоставления. На основе изложения идёт обобщение и конкретизация понятия.

3. Обсуждение и результаты

В Республике Узбекистан стабильное развитие института семьи является как одним из важных показателей стабильности общества. Исходя из этого в стране созданы ряд нормативных документов для развития института семьи. Они отражены в Конституции Республики Узбекистан (Конституция, 1992), Семейном кодексе (Семейный кодекс, 1998) и в других правово-нормативных актах страны.

Указом Президента Республики от 2 февраля 2018 года «О мерах по коренному совершенствованию деятельности в сфере поддержки женщин и укрепления института семьи» (Указ, 2018) было закреплено, что конституционный принцип «Семья находится под защитой общества и государства» является одним из приоритетных направлений политики государства и в агитации данного принципа требуется активное участие всех государственных и негосударственных организаций.

«В целях укрепления существования институтов гражданского общества 15 февраля 1991 года был принят закон «Об общественных объединениях в Республике Узбекистан» (Закон Республики Узбекистан, 1991). Впервые в истории общественно-политической жизни страны было дано определение деятельности общественных объединений в соответствии с международными и демократическими принципами. Впервые институты гражданского общества – общественные объединения – были признаны в качестве негосударственных юридических субъектов, действующих самостоятельно вне государства и правительства» (Журабекова, 2016).

Махалля – квартал, район (Ефремова, 2000) является одним из древних институтов самоуправления, где на протяжении многих тысячелетий передались от поколения в поколение национальные традиции, обычаи. В древние времена махалли состоялись из нескольких семей, объединённые в одной территории по роду занятий, профессий. Например, махалля сапожников, столярей и т.д. В настоящее время махалля объединяет в себя семьи в количестве 500 и выше. В махаллях, независимо от материального положения и рода занятий, все уважают старшее поколение и стараются помочь друг другу. Здесь ценится справедливость и большое место отводится мнению большинства в разрешении тех или иных проблем. Жители махалли всегда стараются помочь старым, беспомощным и малообеспеченным людям. Также старшее поколение помогает молодым создать счастливую семью, оказывают посильную помощь в разрешении конфликтных ситуаций на безвозмездной основе.

В годы независимости в Республике Узбекистан был взят курс на построение демократического общества, где верховенствует закон. При осуществлении коренных преобразований в стране значительная роль была отдана местным органам самоуправления,

которые помогали государству в осуществлении социальной политики. Некоторые исследователи считают, что это нетрадиционная община Узбекистана, другие называют махаллю «национальной школой восточной демократии». Самые важные события в жизни трёх поколений узбекской семьи (что является нормальным явлением для узбеков) происходят при помощи и прямом участии махалли. В махалле все граждане равны, независимо от занимаемой должности в обществе.

Самый ценный и главный принцип этой системы – уважение к старшему поколению. Все проблемы, относительно общества, всегда рассматривают и решают при участии старшего поколения, где последнее решающее слово скажет самый уважаемый и старший человек. На основе этого в каждой узбекской семье тоже принято уважать старшее поколение, почтительность детей к родителям. Взрослые дети обязаны обеспечить и морально и материально своих престарелых родителей, когда те завершат свою трудовую деятельность. Такие общественные традиции, как жалеть больных и маленьких, оказать моральную и материальную поддержку малоимущим и многодетным семьям, воспитывают в людях доброту и гуманизм, делает их ближе друг к другу. Такие важные задачи, как обеспечивать благосостояние и спокойствие жителей махалли, воспитывать честную и трудолюбивую молодёжь, которая ценит национальные и общенациональные ценности и борется за справедливость и достоинство своей семьи осуществляется именно в махалле. Ведь именно здесь все знают успехи и неудачи каждого члена махалли, именно здесь каждый человек откровенен и близок друг к другу и в радости и в печали. Исходя из этого, можно сказать, что махалля – это большая семья, где существуют свои законы и правила.

Органы самоуправления, объединяющие в себе опытных жителей в лице аксакалов, мудрых женщин, могут оказать посильную помощь в решении тех или иных проблем семьи. Особую роль при этом играет «Родительский университет», который осуществляет свою деятельность при органах самоуправления. Согласно уставу, деятельность университета направлена на обеспечение здорового образа жизни в каждой семье, укреплению института семьи и помочь родителям в повышении правовых, культурно-нравственных, педагогических и психологических, медицинских знаний.

Эффективное осуществление требований концепции «Семья – махалля – школа» тоже может дать положительные результаты в воспитании гармонично развитого поколения. Координатором этой концепции также выступает махалля.

Семья не является изжитком прошлого. Она всегда была и остаётся той средой и очагом, который учит маленького ребёнка творить чудеса и быть настоящим человеком. Самый лучший пример при этом подаёт родители, которые воспитывают в каждом ребёнке патриота и защитника Родины.

Воспитывать молодёжь, приучать их к труду и знаниям, помочь в создании новой семьи и в благоустройстве считаются вечными национальными традициями каждой узбекской семьи. Семья – это священный очаг, где воспитывается будущее нации. Каждый родитель, воспитывая своё чадо, надеется, что оно будет благосклонным когда он будет в преклонном возрасте.

В узбекских семьях принято, что родители стараются помочь молодым семьям до тех пор, пока они не станут на ноги. Это считается одной из национальных ценностей и чертой характера узбекской семьи и каким-то образом обязывает молодых перед старшим поколением.

Именно нравовоспитания старшего поколения, личный пример родителей, обстановка в семье, культура отношений между молодыми и старшими переходят от поколения к поколению.

В настоящее время институт семьи тоже имеет ряд своих проблем. Одна из таких проблем – это незаконные семьи, то есть семьи, созданные только по шариату, без регистрации записи актов гражданского состояния. Это положение может отрицательно повлиять на будущее детей, которые родились в таких семьях. «Вслед за переменами в обществе не только уменьшились средние размеры семьи, но и удельный вес больших семей, а тенденция увеличения доли малых семей находятся в стадии непрерывного роста. Это неразрывно связано с изменениями в обществе, в политической, экономической и культурной областях, в репродуктивных намерениях населения с сокращением рождаемости, развитием индустриализации и урбанизационных процессов проявляется

тенденция уменьшения численности семьи, ее нуклеаризации, приводящих к преобладанию в семейной структуре простых семей. В настоящее время среди узбекских семей доля нуклеарных и неполных семей ниже, чем в развитых странах. Комплекс внутрисемейной и родовой мотивации, имеющий решающее значение в формировании репродуктивных установок и репродуктивного поведения, в силу распада большой семьи разрушается, замещаясь стереотипами общественного сознания, ориентированными, прежде всего, на личный успех, и социальную мобильность» (Мамадалиева, 2017).

«В результате эмансипации женщин современная семья значительно изменила свой облик, превратившись в добровольный эгалитарный союз. В то же время дальнейшее развитие женщин от эмансипации до феминизма привело их к невозможности сочетания профессиональных и семейных ролей, что породило негативные явления в области семейно-брачных отношений: рост числа разводов, падение рождаемости и т.п.» (Пещеров, Пирогов, 2013).

Согласно Конституции, семья в Республике Узбекистан является первичной ячейкой общества. Статья 63 гласит: «Семья является основной ячейкой общества и имеет право на защиту общества и государства. Брак основывается на свободном согласии и равноправии сторон». А также статьёй 64 закреплено, что «Родители обязаны содержать и воспитывать детей до их совершеннолетия». Ведь «благополучие и стабильность семьи невозможны без одинакового понимания ценностей всеми ее членами» (Шаваева, 2014).

Концептуальная идея «Благополучная семья – основа развития общества» поставила перед нами важные задачи, которые направлены на укрепление института семьи и совершенствование новой модели современной семьи. Успешное осуществление этих задач во многом зависит от крепкого сотрудничества государственных и общественных организаций. Значительную роль при этом выполняют и органы самоуправления, деятельность которых совершенствуется с каждым днём.

4. Заключение

Таким образом, в настоящее время орган самоуправления (махалля) является ключевым звеном в осуществлении демократических преобразований, считается очагом национальных и общечеловеческих ценностей. Государство проявляет все усилия на пути по повышению авторитета и значения махалли в жизни населения. Всё более укрепляется сотрудничество органов самоуправления с государственными и негосударственными органами в вопросах воспитания духовно и физически здорового поколения, обеспечения их занятости, социальной защиты представителей старшего поколения и т.д.

Создание новой модели современной семьи невозможно представить без традиционных ценностей узбекского народа. Будем надеяться, что органы самоуправления будут важным звеном в сохранении семейных ценностей, передавая их от поколения в поколение.

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Роль органов самоуправления в укреплении института семьи и сохранении семейных ценностей

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Аннотация. В данной статье автор анализирует институт семьи как одним из важнейших явлений общества. В Республике Узбекистан институт семьи считается одним из важных институтов общества в воспитании подрастающего поколения. Поэтому одним из важных направлений государственной политики является благополучие семьи как благополучие общества. Автор показывает что, от стабильности семейных отношений зависит стабильность общества и оценивает роль органов самоуправления (махалли) в укреплении семейных традиций и ценностей. Самый ценный и главный принцип этой системы – уважение к старшему поколению. Все проблемы, относительно общества, всегда рассматривают и решают при участии старшего поколения, где последнее решающее слово скажет самый уважаемый и старший человек. На основе этого в каждой узбекской семье тоже принято уважать старшее поколение, почтительность детей к родителям. Взрослые дети обязаны обеспечить и морально и материально своих престарелых родителей, когда те завершат свою трудовую деятельность. Такие общественные традиции, как жалеть больных и маленьких, оказать моральную и материальную поддержку малоимущим и многодетным семьям, воспитывают в людях доброту и гуманизм, делает их ближе друг к другу. Такие важные задачи, как обеспечивать благосостояние и спокойствие жителей махалли, воспитывать честную и трудолюбивую молодёжь, которая ценить национальные и общенациональные ценности и борется за справедливость и достоинство своей семьи осуществляется именно в махалле.

Ключевые слова: махалля, семья, органы самоуправления, старшее поколение, национальные традиции, стабильность.

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