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## Relations among Indochinese Countries under the Rise of China: Will China Affect Their Existing Unity?

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### Abstract

Over different periods in history, the relations of the three states of Indochina region – Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia – have always tied together and lived under China's sphere of influences. However, with China involved in maritime disputes with Vietnam recently, it seems that the unity and cooperation of the Indochinese nations might be at risk with the appearance of China's rise. How would leaders in Indochinese nations respond to China's power in the region? Will the rise of Beijing weaken the identity and the common interests of Indochina as one single region and affect the regional unity? The writer provides an analysis of the China – Indochina relations since the ancient days. The primary argument is that while the governments of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia might hold different opinions towards China, however, for small states, a broken relationship with their neighbors will not provide positive outcomes. Past experiences and lessons have proved that despite different changing courses in history, the three Indochinese countries had always tried to maintain peaceful and coordinative relations.

**Keywords:** Indochina region, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, China- Indochina relations.

### 1. Introduction

China's emergence from a poor developing state to one of the most global powers has been one of the most spectacular phenomena of human history in the international affairs in the past four decades. Over this period of time, the People Republic of China (PRC) has succeeded not only in increasing China's economic power but also in improving China's strengths in other areas. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China's presence can be felt from almost every corner of the world that some have begun to view China as the direct competitor against the United States in the world affairs. When China's assertiveness in its foreign policy started to be revealed, some scholars of International Relations, both Chinese and foreigners, have shown their suspicion over its behavior and argued that an aggressive China is doomed to fail (Yan, 2014). However, recent evidences have shown that China's advancement in terms of foreign relations over the course of transforming its grand strategy has attracted attention from scholars and political leaders around the world, especially with the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. With this new grand strategy aiming at driving the PRC into the role as the center of the international system, China's economic development has brought both opportunities and challenges for many states across the world. Small, developing or underdeveloped regions like Africa or Southeast Asia saw the Chinese's initiatives as an opportunity to improve their economy and regional integration. Meanwhile, the Western powers like the United States and its allies considered China's policy as "predator

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economic strategy” (Mohan, 2017) or a direct threat towards the current international system. Thus, whether holding a positive or negative view on Beijing policies, it can be seen that the rise of China along with its BRI has recently become one of the most debated topics in modern world politics.

Then, as China promised to strengthen the regional and global connectivity, the development of transportation and infrastructure that connects China and other regions will have strategic implications upon China’s aspirations to become a great power. The BRI will emphasize the Chinese influences outward of Asia and further to other different areas such as Africa or the Indian Ocean. It can be observed that Southeast Asia would be one of the most important among the targeted beneficiaries. As Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia being the heart of China’s Indochina Peninsular Corridor, this land bridge is expected to boost China’s cooperation with this region (Xinhua, 2017a). Having considered the relationship among Vietnam, Lao and Cambodia has been under the strong Chinese influences for thousands of years, from the Imperial China tributary system throughout the Communist revolutionary wars up to the modern days, this research paper will focus on the study of the relations between China and the Indochina region. Taking into considerations that China has been continuously involved in disputes with Vietnam in the recent years, the author seeks to provide an analysis of the China – Indochina relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century contemporary international affairs. The essay also concentrates on analyzing the influences of China upon Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia throughout their course of history and examines whether the rise of China would diversify the national interests of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, consequently, weakening the identity and common interests that underlying Indochina as a single region.

The research essay will be divided into three different parts. It will begin with a brief introduction about the “peaceful rising” of China since 1978 along with the Belt and Road Initiative as Beijing’s most recent grand strategy before thoroughly analyzing Chinese influences upon the Indochina region since the ancient days until the modern era. Then, I will examine the Chinese impacts on the foreign policies of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in order to address the main question, whether the rise of China will weaken the regional unity of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

## **2. Discussion**

### **The rise of China and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)**

To begin with, since the decision to reform and open its national economy in 1978, China has been emerging from a developing country to one of the great powers in the international affairs, especially in terms of economic power. Over the past four decades, China has emerged in the international affairs as a major power of Asia, especially in terms of economic power. From an underdeveloped Asian country with the largely state-controlled economy, China has experienced the “fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history” (Morrison, 2018), and now ranked as the second largest economy in the world. From the expansion of its economic presence in Asia to the strengthened military might, China’s rise is undoubtedly one of the most debated topics in international politics as well as within China. Thus, the growth of Chinese power can be roughly divided into two main periods: Prior to 1978 and since 1978 with the focus on the Belt and Road Initiative.

#### ***Prior to 1978***

In this period, the China national economy was operated under the system of budget subsidies and directed by the state. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, Beijing developed a centrally planned economy. The policy in which most of the industrial production was controlled by the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has limited the opportunities for private firms or foreign-invested companies to prosper in China. Since the government had the full authority to set production goals, prices, and resources in most of its economy, there were little incentives for the Chinese labors to become more productive or concern about the quality of their products, thus, by 1978, its national economy accounted for only less than 1% of the world total (Zheng, 2005). According to the World Bank, from the 1950s to 1978, China, under Mao leadership, had suffered tragic economic downturns, with the Great Leap Forward (1958 to 1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976) which led to the death of millions of people and widespread political chaos. Nevertheless, shortly after the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) has decided to break away from the Soviet-style economy. After the rough period of the Cultural Revolution, that significantly damaged the faith of their people upon the CCP, the Chinese government, then under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping sought to shore up its legitimacy by adjusting its economic policy according to free-market principles and opening up to the West. Taking economic development as its highest politic goal, Beijing has hoped that economic growth would in consolidating its power in China and raising the living standards of its people.

### **Since 1978**

Beginning in 1978, China, has so far, launched several economic reforms by decentralizing its economic policy. In contrast to the previous era, economic control of various enterprises was being granted to the provincial and local governments, thus, allowing them to follow free market principles instead of under state-directed guidance. Additionally, the central government had gradually removed the state price controls in the wide range of products and trade barriers which encouraged great competitions, boosted exports and attracted huge flows of foreign investments (FDI) to China. In four decades, China economy has expanded dramatically and been able to avoid a major economic crisis. From 1979 to 2016, Beijing was able to double the size of its national economy in every eight years, with China's annual GDP averaged 9.6 %. As China's GDP surpassed Japan in 2010 to rank only behind the United States, its economic development has rapidly changed its status in international affairs to the extent that many analysts began to wonder if and when would China overtake the U.S. to become the largest economic power in the world. Statistics have shown that from 1980 to 2017, while the U.S. share of global GDP on a basis of the PPP (purchasing power parity) dropped from 24.3 % to 15.3 %, China's share rose to estimated 18.3 % from 2.3 %. Thus, China economic growth is so noteworthy that the IMF predicted that on a PPP basis, China's economy will be 46.6 % greater than the U.S. by 2022 (Morrison, 2018). Such growth has enabled China to improve the living standard of its citizen, successfully brought estimated 800 million people out of poverty. Moreover, the actual size and the rapid growth of China has been a subject for debates of among economists and scholars of IR, with the magnitude of the Chinese labor forces and its commitment to development, there is no doubt that the rise of China will be unprecedented in the future decades (Ikenberry, 2014). Moreover, various aspects of the rise of China, from its continuously expanding influences in internal politics in its growing demands in developing military strength are also major concerns of many scholars in the world, especially in the U.S. and its allies. If we look at how China ranks in both internal and external politics over the course of its reforming era, it can be argued that by the 2010s, China has succeeded in achieving its original goal that was set out in 1978. Thus, China has entered the phase when it's success in economic growth has created greater opportunities to pursue its foreign policy goal, China began to strengthen its commitment in the international relations and expand its influences in many areas. With the transition in the Chinese grand strategy from keeping a low profile (*taoguang yanghui* – KLP) to striving for achievement (*fenfa youwei* – SFA) in 2013 (Yan, 2014), the rise of China has been outward of its region. The upgrade in its national economic power has led China to increase its involvement in the construction of the global economy, resulting in the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – China's grant strategy to enhance its presence on a global scale.

### **The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)**

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or the "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) reflects Beijing's decision to take its rising policy to the next level of commitment. First unveiled in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the BRI represents China's grand strategy to boost economic integration and connectivity with its neighbor states and a large number of Chinese trading partners across the world, stretching from Eurasia to Africa (Morrison, 2018). According to Xi (2017), the initiative calls for joint contribution from all over the world with the aims to developing a more dynamics platform for Asia-Pacific multilateral relations (Xinhua, 2017b). Although it was launched by China with the original focuses on Asia and other continents, the initiative "belongs to the world" and is open to all Chinese partners. Therefore, by focusing on the establishment of an international economic network that sets China in the central position, the initiative is said to welcome other countries from other regions to enjoy the benefits of China's financial growth as well as strengthening their foreign relations with other partners (Cheng et al., 2018). With the goal to connect as many countries as possible by 6 international inland corridors along with a Maritime

Silk Road, the BRI is expected to account for approximately 31 % of the global GDP. Significantly, by December 2017, Beijing has officially announced that about 100 agreements of cooperation have been made under the BRI between China and other 86 countries (Xinhua, 2017c). To successfully develop this grand strategy, it is predicted that the BRI would cost China from around \$4 trillion (The Economist, 2016) to approximately \$9 trillion (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017).

Thus, the Belt and Road Initiative highlighted the Chinese commitment in developing a Sino-centric economic system, it is believed to bring progress to many countries among different regions. As China already fostered for the establishment of the \$100 billion Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) (Morrison, 2018), focused at the infrastructure development in Asia, it is undoubtedly that Asia will probably enjoy huge advancements in the following decades fueled by the Chinese financial sources and capital. Consequently, among the targeted beneficiaries, it seems that the three countries including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia - the former French Indochina – China's closest neighbors would be the sub-region that received both opportunities and challenges from Beijing's policy. As the small powers in the international communities, history of the Indochinese nations in the field of foreign relations and economic development have been largely influenced by China. While Beijing's strategies have become more aggressive over the year, Chinese power is believed to cast great impacts upon the Indochina region, due to its geographical proximity with the PRC. Hence, the following part of the essay will be used to examine the relationship between China and the region of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia throughout their changing history. The analysis will later contribute to answering the core argument of the paper as for how the rise of China would affect the Indochinese community in the contemporary international affairs.

### **The history of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: From Chinese tributary states to ASEAN members**

The three Southeast Asian countries in terms of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have shared a long relationship together through various periods of time. In the Western academic literature, historically, these sovereign states usually categorized as the Indochina region (or the former – Indochina Union), once colonized by the French for most of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the roots of the bond between Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have dated back from centuries, and the impact of China upon this region has always remained strong since the ancient days. One of the reason is the matter of geography, especially in their proximity to China. In contrast with the island states in ASEAN such as Indonesia and the Philippines where China seems to have limited influences, the Indochina- the Southeast Asian mainland countries – throughout their changing history from traditional kingdoms, colonial fiefdoms to the modern days have always under robust Chinese influences (Reilly, 2013). This part of the paper seeks to offer a historical and theoretical background of how the Indochina countries have been influenced from the Chinese sphere, as they existed from the ancient days to their “discovery” by the European explorations until the modern days. It will include several concepts about the theories of International Relations and political studies of China and the involving countries such as identity, geopolitics and the ancient-China tributary system.

### ***Historical and theoretical background***

The historical records of Indochinese nations showed that China has taken part in shaping the life and cultural standards of the Indochinese nations, especially for Vietnam. As mentioned in these records, at the beginning of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE, Vietnam had spent the next following twelve centuries under Chinese domination, leading to the transformation in many aspects in this country. From a “south seas civilization”, the thousand years domination of China have fostered the receptivity of the Vietnamese on the Chinese model of language, philosophy, cultural habitats and a certain amount of Sinic norms (Gunn, 2011). In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, even though globalization has made Vietnamese society become an overlapping sphere of many cultures such as Japanese, French, and American via the huge amount of investment and diplomatic cooperation from major powers in the world, the legacies of China in Vietnam remains strong and not difficult to realize. Then, the region of Indochina, especially with Laos and Vietnam are directly connected to the southern border of China, has always been co-opted into China's sphere of influences, particularly



with the practices of the Chinese tributary system – an international system that is believed to be one of the greatest achievement of traditional China (Zhang, 2001; Reilly, 2013).

The tributary system (*chaogong tizhi*) was the traditional Chinese one for managing its foreign relations. Based on established rules and symbolic forms by which the neighbor countries entered and processed their relationship with China, the origins of the tributary system can be traced back to the Han Dynasty (Zhang, 2001). Throughout their course of history, the tributary system has evolved and supported China in constructing a close relationship with its neighboring states, provided it an effective mechanism of compliance from the neighbors in terms of political, economic and diplomatic concerns (Higgins, 1992). Taking advance of the idea of a superior China, the tributary system played an important role in creating a Chinese world order, Pax Sinaca, that witnessed the participation of many non – Chinese countries from Central, South and Southeast Asia (Zhang, 2001). Making the Chinese emperor known as the Son of Heaven (*tianzi*) with the morality power to rule over the *Tianxia* (all-under-heaven). From establishing social harmony to cosmic realms, the tributary system established an international order within which Imperial China is the Middle Kingdom (*Zhongguo*), the center of the world civilization and considered all that beyond the Chinese boundaries as barbaric, less civilized communities. These “barbaric communities” would offer tribute to China, usually a largely token of native products or rare commodities, along with an act of ritual obeisance (*kowtow*), then, Chinese ruler would formally grant the foreign rulers the legitimate acceptance into the Sinocentric order. Throughout centuries, this tributary system developed beyond the scope of an international trading system and became an institution that served the Chinese conception of their ethnocentric world view. Later on, with Confucian ideology, which highlighted hierarchy, ritual and ethical behavior acted as the key beliefs of the system, the tributary system portrayed an unequal relationship between China and its neighbor societies (Higgins, 1992).

Furthermore, according to Benjamin Reilly (2013), more than economic benefits, the practices of the tributary system also took part in protecting Imperial China’s security and its ruled order. The argument can be proved by analyzing the facts about how the neighboring countries engaged with China, particularly the distinction in China’s relationship between the communities to the north and southern societies. Due to its geographical proximity with Southeast Asia, in the past, the southern kingdoms have been concerned as parts of China’s “backyard” (Ba, 2008). In sharp contrast with centuries of conflicts against the Mongols and the northern barbarians at the Great Wall of China, for centuries, with the lack of another Great Wall at the southern border, those kingdoms to the South of China have been integrated into the Chinese socio-cultural order through the tributary system with the responsibility of peacekeeping along China’s southern frontier. By asking the “Near countries” to its borders like Vietnam or the Lao kingdom of Lang Xand to send tribute every three years, Imperial China has maintained a close relationship with its southern neighbors (Reilly, 2013). Besides trading purposes, the tributary system also served to safeguard China’s security. The deep historical ties of tributary relations between China and the Indochina states left significant legacies that have still existed in the modern days, even with the fall of the system. The hierarchic relations embodied in Confucianism like ranking and respectful to the Empire still reflect in some aspects of the relationship between China and Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia today.

Then, in the aftermath of the two Opium Wars (1839-42; 1856- 60), with the Western civilizations began to aggressively expand to East Asia that eventually lead to the collapse of the tributary system. The regional affairs of China and the concerned Southeast Asian states have been transformed. From the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the Southeast Asian states like Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were referred as the French Indochina (or the Indochina Union) and colonized by the French until the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. These Southeast Asian countries, being located closed to one another, in the afterlife of the tributary relations, once again shared a common identity as the colonies of the French empire. In the following part of the essay, the author will provide further explanation that not only the expansion of the West has contributed in transforming the political affairs of China and Indochina, ending the dynastic cycles in these nations, but the clashes of two international orders and the intellectual contest (European vs. Chinese) also paved the way for a new era of Chinese influences upon the concerned countries. This era marked the retreat of Imperial China and the beliefs of Confucianism as the moral and an intellectual foundation. From a universal dynastic empire, China has taken a transition to become a

“civilized state”, gradually and forcefully integrated to the European standards and the global international society (Zhang, 2001). However, while the collapse of Imperial China along with the cherished Confucianism principals were somehow a huge loss for the Chinese who lived in the nineteenth century (Zhang, 2001), in the long term, at a system level, this development did not affect the strong influences of China upon its neighboring region, particularly the Indochina Union. When the French were defeated and forced to withdraw from the region in 1954, historical literatures have shown that the proximity to China critically shaped the revolution and offered a model of governance in the following period to the countries in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (Ba, 2008; Reilly, 2013). All witnessed the rise to power of the communist parties in the 20<sup>th</sup> century with the help of China, to a lesser or a greater extent. From the tributary relationship, the Chinese sphere of influences shifted to the communist revolutions and Leninist political structures as a response to the domination of the West. With the fall of the Japanese Empire at the end of the Second World War and the victory of Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China has continuously demonstrated its support towards the non-democratic political authority of its neighboring countries. Such non-democratic parties are still ruling in Laos and Vietnam.

To avoid further challenges to its power, China since the Mao’s era has attempted to reestablish the model of the tributary system in the neighboring countries. The history of Southeast Asia indicated that although Communism, as both a doctrine and political ideology, tried to consolidate its power in almost every country, but it was only in Indochina that ideology could be successful. In other Southeast Asian states like Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, the Communist movements were suppressed and faced radical resistance (Reilly, 2013). The political structures of Southeast Asia have experienced a great division in terms of political authority ever since this era. Almost all maritime states in the region have transformed the model of government to democracy, while the mainland nations who proximity to China remained autocratic (Reilly, 2013). One of the reasons could be due to the limited influences of China but of the USA instead upon the further states in Southeast Asia. Historically, the relationship between China and the maritime Southeast Asian states were much less developed in comparison to the mainland nations.

### ***Contemporary Indochina***

The Indochina region nowadays can be seen as the “buffer states” of China (Reilly, 2013). Differences in geographical proximity provided proper explanation to the remaining of the Sinic influences in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia through different periods of history. Today, the three countries of Indochina also mostly depend on China for foreign investment and various supports for economic growth. Vietnam and Laos remained as the outstanding illustration of the “China model” of modern single-party autocracies, the communist political system with open market economies. Meanwhile, Cambodia even though practices a different model of government, yet, remained under an effective single-party authority (Reilly, 2013). Moreover, geographical linkages and traditional friendship among Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have resulted in an extremely close trilateral relationship in many aspects, from political commitment to economic development. According to Ccheang and Wong (2015), similarities can be found in the economic policy of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as the three governments together share some common principals, including opening up to the outside world and aim for the diversification in the sources of investment. This sub-regional cooperation or the “growth triangle” represents the special relationship of the Indochina countries in the international affairs. In fact, in comparison to other growth triangles in Southeast Asia, the Indochina’s one was quite well-developed (Ccheang, Wong, 2015). The trilateral relationship being established since the communist movement during the war against colonization and imperialism has been still relevant to the modern days. With the geographical proximity of locating next to one another, the developing process of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia has always been closely tied to together. Frequently exchanges of state visits and open dialogues have been launched by the three governments with the respect in maintaining trust and political commitment among the three. In addition to China, Vietnam is one of the key investors and economic partners of both Laos and Cambodia, with Vietnam ranked in the top three of Lao’s Foreign Direct Investor in 2012 (Ccheang, Wong, 2015). Besides, in 2017, Vietnam celebrated its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of relations with Laos and the 55<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Vietnam – Cambodia relations, marking another milestone in the development of the Indochina regional cooperation (Hanoi Times, 2017; VOV, 2017).



Furthermore, in the recent decades, China has continued to expand its presence into the maritime domain of the region, notably with its increasing investment in military capacities. By claiming its authority towards the Paracel and Spratly Islands, to which a number of Southeast Asian countries also claimed to be their territories, notably Vietnam, the Chinese influences upon Southeast Asia has evolved outward of the mainland realm (Ba, 2008). Some of the members of ASEAN, especially the non-communist countries plus Vietnam have begun to pursue a dual strategy that involved the external relations with the Western major powers like the United States, bringing the balance of power between the great powers into the regional affairs (Ba, 2008). In short, since the Southeast Asian states are considered to be small powers in comparison with the strength of China and the U.S., worries that the rise of China could affect the regional security, the Southeast Asian countries have encouraged external powers to engage in the region and maintaining the regional status. With China becoming stronger in terms of military, politics and economy, power dynamics remaining the defining character in the studies of the relations between China and Southeast Asia, notably the Indochina, to engage China has been one important aspect that motivated their foreign policy.

Even though states may have different concerns at the rise of China, none can deny the fact that Beijing has brought many opportunities into this region. Recent history has proved that China somehow can be viewed as the magnet attracting major powers to engage to Southeast Asia. It was the imperial expansion and the Chinese trade to the Western expansion that eventually lead to the colonization of the West in the region leading to the revolutionary wars (Ba, 2009). In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, proximity to China also played significantly in attracting the great power conflicts of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to the region, notably in the Vietnam War. Although a country like Vietnam has always under conflicts with China and been looking to the U.S.' power to contain the rise of China, especially having the South China Sea disputes occurred, yet, the PRC remained as one of its most important diplomatic partners. At the moment, the U.S. is still considered to be the dominant power in this region, yet, the presence of China upon Southeast Asia is cannot be ignored, especially in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia due to geo-political connection. Most significantly, as Alice Ba (2009) noted, while China's dominant power in the past has been materially constrained, recent economic growth has provided Beijing with the capabilities to perform coercion strategies that were absolutely absent in the former period (Ba, 2009). As regional multilateralism being considered as the pillar for Beijing's national policy, there are high possibilities that the regionalism future of Southeast Asia, especially the Indochina will be influenced by the rise of China.

With the above-mentioned analysis, we could summarize that even when the ancient-China's tributary system collapsed, its legacies upon the regional countries still exists. To understand the relationship between the Indochina and China in the contemporary politics in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, one important aspect is to understand how the influences of China could be maintained in this region throughout history. For centuries, Beijing had consistently attempted to assimilate the countries at its southern frontier into the Chinese sphere of influences whether it was by means of diplomatic or otherwise (Reilly, 2013). The Indochina countries seem to have shared a long history of living under the shadow of China as well as several sets of common cultural values and identities. However, as Vietnam now has strong concern about the PRC's expansion and tends to enhance the relationships with the U.S to balance against the Chinese power while the others do not, different perspectives and approaches to national interests have generated among the governments of the Indochinese nations. While Cambodia and Laos seem to get closer to China, Vietnam is looking for supports and assistance from U.S and its allies (Ccheang & Wong, 2015). It is argued that in the context of an increasingly aggressive China, the cooperation among the Indochina nations is vulnerable to cope with the change in the regional affairs and especially with the intensive competition for power between the United States and China in the region. As the unity and cooperation between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia might be at risk, the critical questions could be whether the rise of Beijing will weaken the identity and the common interests of Indochina as a region or whether Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia will maintain their close ties as they have always done in the past? In what ways that China does the rise of China to become a great power could affect the relations and cooperation among Indochinese countries. And will the historical development of the region provide an effective way to have a proper answer? The final part of the

essay will analyze how the Indochinese nations have respond to the Chinese expansion and hope to find out some arguments for those questions.

### **The unity of Indochina, as a single region in dealing with the rise of China**

Even though Southeast Asia, notably the Indochina is a region that comprised of the middle or small power in the international affairs, however, in the recent year, due to its geo-strategic position and rich in natural resources, the region has become the favorite playground for other major powers. The regional politics of the Southeast Asian countries have been largely influenced by the implications of other stronger countries, taking the U.S – China rivalry as an example when focusing on the rise of China's might.

While China economic rapid growth and the Belt and Road Initiative are being considered to build up the interconnected cooperation to achieve common prosperity in the region (Xinhua, 2017a), the U.S. today is said still the dominant power in Asia. As the result, scholars from America and region view the BRI quite differently than what has been told by Chinese officials. Beijing's movements and activities have been widely considered as the direct challenge to the U.S. power in Asia. Based on the various approaches, the regional policy makers and scholars have overwhelming arguments that as China succeeded in achieving the great power status, the U.S already existed order will be vulnerable. A certain number of previous works of literature of IR has looked at the recent Sino- U.S. relations as the reemerging of the bipolarity in the global affairs, which will put an end to the U.S. – led world order that has established since the end of the Cold War (Tunsjø 2017). During the first two decades of the post- Cold War period, while Washington was busy with its military campaigns in the Middle East, the PRC has started to show assertiveness in its policy towards its neighbors, resulting in various territorial disputes in the maritime domain. The rise of China has been the magnet that, once again, leading to increase activities of the U.S in Southeast Asia. Noting that among the states that have been involved in maritime conflicts with China, many of them are Washington's allies and partners, such as Japan, or especially Vietnam in the South China Sea disputes. That's why, the U.S interests would be affected significantly if China's power can continue to expand. Then, with the aim to limit the aggressive expansion of the PRC to maintain the current status quo, the U.S. policymakers have launched several attempts to implement that goal, beginning with President Obama's pivot to Asia (Obama, 2012).

Since the beginning of the 2010s when the U.S. administration took the protection of its supremacy in the Asia-Pacific as its highest politics (Clinton, 2011), the following years witnessed a period of rebalancing from Washington against China. From Obama's pivot to Trump's recent announced Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States has been trying to indirectly contain the rise of China by attempting to boost the power of other states in the region. By managing to strengthen the cooperation in Asia with its allies and partners through trade agreements such as the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), Washington was looking forward to creating a coalition of Asian nations as a counterweight against China's power. Then, among the U.S partners, Vietnam has been viewed as one of the most active participants. As a member of the Indochina states that shares border with the PRC, Vietnam, has been contesting over the islands at the South China Sea since the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Morrison, Vaughn, 2006). When Beijing attempted to legitimate its claim in the South China Sea based on the nine-dash line, stating that China's rights in this region are "historical and solid" (Hiebert, Nguyen, Poling, 2014), Vietnam has been leaning towards the U.S. as one of the comprehensive partners for the Southeast Asian regional stability and the balancing factor against China. While still showing its support for China's BRI, the Vietnamese government is trying to develop a mix strategy by strengthening closer ties with Washington. Following the lift of U.S. embargo on the sale of lethal weapons in May 2016, for the first time since the Vietnam War, an American aircraft carrier – the USS Carl Vinson- visited Danang in March 2018 (France-Presse, 2018). Some analysts have viewed these events as a new level of commitment between the U.S. and Vietnam to deal with an aggressive China. Up to now, Vietnam has remained as the most vocal claimant in the South China Sea after the China-friendly President of the Philippines backed off from the disputes. The Vietnamese government, while managing to stabilize its foreign relations with China, has worked hard to invite other major powers like the U.S. and its allies to the region in order to establish a strategic equilibrium regarding the Chinese factor (Ccheang, Wong, 2015).

Nevertheless, even though the rise of China is believed to raise serious concerns among the Southeast Asian states, their perspectives upon the PRC are quite diverse. Although Vietnam may

see the rise of China would lead to unwanted security challenges, thus, making Vietnam to perform hedging strategy towards China, Laos and Cambodia, who have no direct involvement in the South China Sea disputes may hold different opinions. With Laos and Cambodia plus Brunei signed the four-point consensus with China stating that the South China Sea is not an ASEAN' issue (Parameswaran, 2016), both Laos and Cambodia governments have indicated great interests in enhancing their foreign relations as well as enthusiastic supports to China's initiatives (Pang, 2017). Indeed, China has become the major economic investor in both Laos and Cambodia with China's total accumulated investment in Laos reached \$187 million in 2014 and \$12 billion at Cambodia by the end of 2016 (Pang, 2017). According to Prime Minister Hun Sen, Cambodia's economic development in the past years has owed largely to China's assistance (Pheakdey, 2012). The Cambodian leader has also praised and appreciated the "wisdom of Chinese President Xi Jinping" when talking about the BRI (Fresh News, 2018). Hence, the present-day footprint of China as the major donor upon the development of Laos and Cambodia cannot be denied, and it is likely to further enhanced by the launch of the BRI. Both Laos and Cambodia are the key points in the construction of China's "Indochina Peninsular Corridor" in Southeast Asia. Great number infrastructure buildings, including railways and roads to connect the Indochina with other continents have been constructed by China since 2013. For Cambodia, the Chinese investment represents great opportunities for developing its economy, because the Chinese financial support usually does not go with strictly requirements about human rights as the U.S. and European states often have insisted (Fifield, 2018). Cambodia has gained huge profits from Chinese infrastructures, with 30 casinos and 70 more are under constructions, Chinese tourists also contributed to the progress of Cambodian's economy.

From then on, it seems that previous studies have suggested that the rise of China might have brought sharp division among the Indochinese community. If the territorial disputes in China-Vietnam relationship leads to serious tension, it will generate pressures upon both Cambodia and Laos in its strategic responses. Although the relation between Vietnam and China could be seen as be a major concern for both Laos and Cambodia, they are obvious to be under strong China's sphere of influences which have been observed through the South China Seas issues (Ccheang, Wong, 2015). In the worst scenario, Laos and Cambodia might be forced to choose side, a situation in which would heavily affect the national interests of both states. Consequently, through the lens of neo-realism, it can be observed that the response to Chinese behavior from the Indochina is in sharp contrast. Strategically, although the Vietnamese government do not directly show its desire to balance against China, Vietnam might have been, to some extent, relied on the U.S support to counter China's rise. Meanwhile, Cambodia and Laos are having the trends of bandwagon towards China by moving closer to Beijing (Ccheang, Wong, 2015). Then, it seems China's quest in regaining its "rightful place" and establishing the modern-tributary system has brought the struggle for power of the great powers into Southeast Asia, resulting in high possibilities of a sharp division among the Indochinese policymakers.

Nevertheless, recognizing that a broken Indochina cooperation will not bring positive effects for the national interests of all three involving countries, the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been trying to strengthen regional cooperation. Despite their different views upon Beijing's behavior, for the small powers, serious conflicts will not produce benefits, especially when Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are located right next to one another. That's why, many visits and dialogues from the Vietnamese top diplomats and leaders to Laos and Cambodia have been frequently launched in order to remind the Indochina countries about their trust, comprehensive relations and traditional friendship (Ccheang, Wong, 2015). Moreover, taking its national interests and China factor into considerations, Vietnam's leaders have decided to take a proactive approach on the other two. A conference of the three Indochinese leaders along with other high-ranked officials of various international institutions such as President of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Takehiko Nakao, World Bank Managing Director Joaquim Levy and ASEAN Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi was organized in Hanoi in March 2018 following the 10<sup>th</sup> Development Triangle Area Summit (Nhandan, 2018). Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Cambodian Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen along with Laos Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith have signed a joint declaration that promised to expand the trilateral cooperation to a national level, rather than just in border provinces (Vietnam News, 2018). The trio has agreed on a positive cooperation that will stretch from security issues such as timber smuggling plus human and drug

trafficking to the other domain of trade, education, and infrastructure development. Succeeded in strengthening this Indochina's growth triangle will further contribute to the realization of the ASEAN Community in 2025 (Nhandan, 2018). Then, regarding the trends of events that occurred in the Indochina region so far, it seems that the three countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are still trying the best efforts in deepening the regional trilateral cooperation. Although it is clearly that each government might have different opinions upon China's movements, the rise of China and especially the BRI, however, past experiences and lessons have shown that despite different changing courses in history, the Indochina triangle had always tried to maintain peaceful and coordinative relations. Even if the rise of China did generate sharp division in the perspectives of each Indochinese government, in an anarchic international affair, "security is the highest end", only when security is assured that states allowed to safely pursue other goals (Waltz, 1979). The Indochina states should focus on the course of developing its national power and avoid any potential conflicts; especially conflicts within the Indochina. As Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc recalled in the 10<sup>th</sup> Development Triangle Area Summit, saying:

"There is a Vietnamese proverb that we brothers heartily endorse: It takes not one but three trees to make a high mountain" (Vietnam News, 2018).

### 3. Conclusion

To sum up, China's rapid growth and emergence as a major power has led to the increasing concern for not just the major powers like the U.S. and Japan, but also for the small countries like Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Having geographical proximity to the PRC, it is obvious that the three Indochinese nations should be cautious the most when referring to their approaches towards the PRC. Even though the China factor might have brought some glances of disagreement among the Indochinese governments, at the moment, the history of this region still provides us an effective guideline to examine the Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia trilateral relations and the links between China and the Indochina as a single region. As the sign of the Chinese influences upon these countries can be traced back to thousands of years, since China will definitely become stronger in the near future, the Indochina region will continue to live under its shadows. With the Belt and Road Initiative is in the developing phase, China's strategy is expected to deliver significant changes for these Southeast Asian countries in terms of economic and infrastructure development, hence, it is too early to give an exact prediction of what would the regional unity of Indochina might become under the shadow of China. Nevertheless, today, it can be argued that for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, national interests and security with their neighbors remained as the highest politics. While the three governments might have different visions about China's policy, Vietnam may continue to look at the U.S.' power to counter China's expansion, however, to sustain the Indochina triangle is also one of their main concerns. Despite external pressures from Beijing, the three states of Indochina are still trying to avoid serious regional disharmony.

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## The Right and Left as Two Peas in the Same Pod: International Political Media

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### Abstract

In many ways, the globalisation process facilitates the development of international media. The standardisation of work and the reporting process is now a trend in media outlets around the world. Both the political right and left often present similar political agendas to the public. Such a reality forces us to question whether the traditional dichotomy between the right and left still exists. In this paper argues from the analysis of a globalist agenda on both sides that both the right and left are two peas in the same pod.

**Keywords:** political media, globalisation, hidden societies, freemasonry history.

### 1. Introduction

In the past decade or two, we have witnessed the overwhelming sensitivities over the confrontations between the left and the right. This is especially true when it comes to the war on the media. Each side, however, is sponsored by a hidden power of which the general population are not aware. These powers, according to Coleman (Coleman, 1992: 54), are the so-called committee of 300, which consists of hundreds of think tanks and front organisations that run the whole gamut, from private businesses to government leaders. Both left leaning democratic or right leaning conservative politicians of all kinds have adopted a western centric point of view, which sees the conflicts of human societies as a pre-existing condition for being human. The general public or commoners are voters that are taken by their own supposed rationality, not by force. However, their rationality and reasoning are somewhat delusional in the world we are living in today due to the various kinds of subliminal opinion injection mainly perpetuated by our media. Our analytical faculty, according to Pelkmans and Machold (2011), is often influenced by asymmetrical power relations where we are “blinded by power”, in which we are likely to believe all non-official sources have inherited “epistemological deficiencies”. Thus, the vast majority will have no opportunity no belief systems to afford the non-normative information system.

Makow (2017) contested that freemasonry power controls both the right and the left: the central bankers empower Freemasons to control the society by fomenting division and supporting both sides. Their aim is to create a unified one world government and destroy the basic structure of sovereign states. The end of the Cold War ushered in a unipolar world, cementing U.S. dominance over a generally liberal international order (Preble et al., 2016), where the plural culture in the western media also leads to a lack of focus and concentration due to the overload of information noise.

However, since the recent rise of Donald Trump and his priority on nationalism rather than globalism, China is now announcing its willingness to lead globalisation. According to President

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Xi Jinping: “The concept of globalization should pay more attention to openness and tolerance, while the direction should focus on balance” (Martin, Zhai, 2017). Along with China’s global ambition to create a so-called silk road project to link the traditional Euro-Asian trade route as well as the ancient maritime paths, the rise of non-western media voices have also begun to impact the world stage. This type of non-western voice focuses on a non-liberal and politically paternalistic approach in managing globalisation and may also mean quite a different style of reporting and media system implementation. However, although the perspectives of western and non-western media on certain matters may suffice oppositions, the ultimate goal of a new era for humankind is the same for both spectrums.

## 2. Discussion The Struggle

The transatlantic west (United States, EU and its allies) has been aiming to create a one world government that trespasses on the very essence of our true freedom of speech, which is our judgements based on non-manipulated information, instead of using democracy and liberal values as a cover that is used to shape our belief systems (Herman, Chomsky, 1988). In fact, much of the western style governance is first done in cooperation with the hidden societies through the spread of pre-constructed messages that eventually influence the view points of the masses. The unseen forces and the shadow government aim to control how the information flows and what news is created and released to the public. According to Herman and Chomsky (1988), this stage setting is a strategy for democratic governments to prepare the receptive environment for their propaganda. The control of ideology will be exercised through global planning and crisis management (Coleman, 1992). The hidden societies and organisations that plan the fate of humankind are never to be exposed as the main narratives of the international order and human history. For example, the Globalist European Union is an elite project which intends to achieve economic integration without democratic legitimacy and is out of reach of the regular European individual (Malinauska, 2016). Malinauska (2016) further argues that the democratic deficit is also reflected by the recent refugee crisis inside the European Union (EU): some refugees are from countries that are characterised by political violence and instability, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea; however, it cannot be denied that there are also economic migrants who try to take advantage of the current chaos, which in turn compromises the well-being of the EU citizens. In truth, most liberal European media is hesitant to report these facts due to the self-censored political correctness and political hypocrisy funded and supported by hidden societies. According to Hagopian (2017), the globalists’ fixation on absolute power and control is currently manifesting as the deep state’s invasive silencing of any and all voices of truth and dissidence. This is achieved by completely cutting off the world’s free access to accurate information from legitimate sources that are solely maintained as confidential files in the top securities and intelligence forces around the world.

Coleman (Coleman, 1992: 243-253) produced a list of the names who control the world events behind the scenes, including families from Rothschild to Rockefeller, from Astor to Vanderbilt. It is mainly the Anglo-American power controls the world’s affairs. In relation to the evidence that proves the existence of these organisations and forces, it is important to remember how modern academia is structured, namely by positivism and the falsification of hypotheses in accordance with the Freemasonry Newtonian approach. Any primary sources of the anti-establishment evidences are usually tarnished before being released to the public. This is in agreement with the flak filter concept put forward by Herman and Chomsky (1988), which describes the efforts to discredit organisations or individuals who disagree with or cast doubt on the prevailing assumptions by the mainstream in a given society. The same is true when it comes to funding: Soros and the liberal think tanks, for example, support research finance for most institutions within the United States and also the liberal democratic west (Media Research Center, 2017). Another example is reported by Professor Michael Salla (2004), who attempted to collect the evidence on extra-terrestrial intelligence and their influences on masonry orders and military forces. His tenure professorship at the American University in Washington DC was cancelled, and without reason his papers have been refused by academic journals, even on his mainstream academic research lines. These hidden organizations manage the globe as a form of shadow government that uses media to create a technotronic era that misleads modern consumerism to accomplish the goal of biochemical mind control (Coleman, 1992: 28) that eventually will result in a total surrender of our self-reasoning and rational consciousness.

The hidden societies which often operate from the shadow as foundations of various kinds that orchestrate seemingly innocent episodes, bring progressive social ideas around the world. As identified by Robertson (2015), such portkeys are incidental events that change and shape the course of media-political interactions. In other words, portkeys are everyday events that can cause a huge impact on media-political relations (Robertson, 2015, see preface). Nonetheless, we have to consider to what extent these liberal institutions manipulate and control our modern media. George Soros, the contemporary equivalent of Astor and described as the moneybags of the left by various conservatives, has spent \$36 million alone in 2008 funding politicians and the left's political machine. He also gave a total of \$550 million to liberal causes in 2000-2009 (Media Research Center, 2017). From homosexual rights to environmentalism, from black lives matter to boycotting the right movement, these organisations use the media outlets to spread their messages. They control the major and minor political parties, the process of government, the process of information flow and the process of creating money (Springmeier, 1995). Media often act in the interest of the power; as argued by Robertson (2016), media act as an information relay and agenda setter. Controlling an agenda first needs a deep degree of infiltration: one needs to have methods and human power to have an influence. This is crucial from an offensive point of view but also equally important for defence, or the ability to rebound and neutralise allowing the real hidden power to stay intact.

On the other weaker end, the non-political western powers such as Russia – which portrays itself through the Kremlin as an ideological guardian of conservatism and traditionalism and has designated liberalism as an opponent (Trenin, 2015) – have also created their own media outlets such as Russian Today (RT), Sputnik, to portray the other side of the story. Russia, with its self-imagined orthodox religious incarnation, still believes strongly in its God-given responsibility to defend Christianity, strongly refusing the current world order that is largely based on the western liberal ideals. Currently, such a movement is also partially joined by the People's Republic of China through their recent installation of state sponsored global media channel China Network TV (CNTV), which can be accessed on YouTube. However, the Chinese-Russian cooperation creates fears among the western powers in the realms of security and economics (Bolt, 2014). Such fear demonstrates that the west still considers the Chinese-Russian alliance as a threat to their hegemony in terms of both the hard and soft power. Additionally, Bolt (2014) argues that “the current world order that China and Russia wish to undermine is the liberal emphasis on human rights and minority self-determination that resulting erosion of sovereignty that these entail”.

On either the right or left, the truth is to create essentially opposite narratives to call distract the attention of the masses so that they will not realise the de-facto power structure that rules their daily lives. Media, especially the left leaning media, urges to create a world of surficial equality, in which the world will possess two classes: those who govern and those who are governed (Coleman, 1992). Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued that in the so-called democratic societies, a collective filter such as the ownership of the modern media is often “profit driven” multinational companies that seek to control public opinion by assuring the market for whatever they try to sell. The struggle between the right and left is also a method for the establishment (which is the third filter mentioned) to create an illusion conflict, which is utilised to consolidate the power structure itself. Left or right, western or occidental, this is essentially a struggle for methods, not the end. Creating a globalised world was agreed upon long ago, despite the fact that the actual structure and pathways are highly debated among these two camps.

### **A War on Faith**

To consider the rather simplistic assumption of the left-right dichotomy of media control, it is also useful for us to understand the radical religious divisions between the two major forces in the Middle East: Zionism versus Islam. The association of Jews with the devil appeared often in the Koranic verses and in hadith; the collective guilt of Jews is also mentioned at length in the Muslim legal texts (Ye'or, 1987). Each of these faiths are backed up by different masonic powers. According to Lewis (1998), the ideological polemic against Zionism and political warfare against the state of Israel was first adopted by the Europeans, namely the Germans, and it was subsequently borrowed by the modern Islamists. However, Islamic power alone will not be able to accomplish a full abolishment of the Zionist agenda. Thus, by sponsoring the liberal media outlets in the west they can stir some general zeal of anti-Semitic agenda into the predominately left leaning general public. Many of these initiatives are supported by the Saudi government through the various liberal and



democratic organisations throughout the world. The leftists have also recently joined the Islamic powers; many European Muslim Brotherhood organisations disguised as civil rights groups have received funds from the George Soros' Open Society Foundation, which was founded to combat 'Islamophobia'. The Zionist power, on the other hand, also utilised some of the right wing leaning or anti-establishment media to balance their own interests, as the majority of the media that exist today are based on liberal democratic ideas (Preble et al., 2016; Robertson, 2016) that at some point were staged by the political spin doctors to sell the mainstream political view. Much of this was done to control the public. Recently, much of the negative sentiment on the refugee crisis in Europe is also backed by the Jewish establishment. For example, in 2016 Ami Horowitz, a prominent Jewish film maker, produced a documentary called "Stockholm Syndrome", which shed a rather critical light on the Liberal Swedish refugee policy and its rapid Islamisation. As a result, his work is criticised all over the world by democratic and liberal establishments.

The typical state sponsorship of both Israel and Saudi Arabia can also provide us with illustrations of how the current global affairs work. From the Saudi's side, for example, J Street, a non-profit liberal advocacy group, is funded by Soros in support of Saudi initiated Israel-Palestinian conflicts settlement (Ben-David, 2011). According to the recent Panama paper leaks, Soros Capital set up an offshore company in the Cayman Islands for the purpose of investing private equity with the Carlyle Group, alongside members of Saudi Arabia's Bin Laden family (Byrne, 2016). Saudi, for example, is liberal Sweden's largest trading partner and buyer of Swedish arms to the amount of \$ 1.25 Billion alone in 2010 (Sputnik News, 2016). At the same time, the Soros funded Muslim Brotherhood is well rooted in Sweden through various cover organisations (Norell et al., 2017). Recently there was also a plan for the Muslim Brotherhood to move its international headquarter to Sweden (Westerholm, 2017), which is deemed to be the most democratic and liberal country in the world. On the other side of the spectrum, it can be observed that the recent election of Donald J. Trump was orchestrated by the Zionist power structure, which consists of free market capitalists of various Jewish and "Israel First" elites (Petras, 2017).

Nevertheless, both the Jews and Arabs control much of the banking systems and natural resource sectors around the world. Therefore, a large proportion of the fights are also based on their financial power struggles in order to further expand their ideological ambition globally, namely the ideological influences on the general western public constructed by each of these powers. For example, in relation to the the Gulf Monarchies (including Qatar), the Jews and Arabs wanted to get rid of President Assad and the Friendship Pipeline he had agreed to with Iran and Iraq in order to sell their energy directly to the EU (Korybko, 2015). Samuel Huntington (1997) proposed that the main challenges of the future world order are China led East Asia and Islam. However, his theory however failed to highlight that the decline of western civilisation is due to the dialectical thinking that pre-exists within the Judo-Christian tradition, which also shares a major root of its conflict with Islam. Both Islam and the Judea-Christian religions share a common ontological similarity in absolutism: the strong advocate on thesis and anti-thesis worldviews. Bringing China into the picture is a typical liberal approach, which attempts to hide the real problem by allocating a scapegoat. This is the typical structure of an anti-thesis tactic deployed by the liberal media. To make the point clear, those who control public opinions or "critical mass", as referred to by the western academia, managed in the past to draw attention away from the problem by manipulating the identities of *Bonafide* actors.

### 3. Conclusion

Nations, dictators and megalomaniacs use media as a classical power to advance their own interests, which often sits under the radar when it comes to orchestrating mind control. In such a way, very few people in this world retain their own freewill in deciding their own political views without external political and ideological influences. The majority of the world's population either have a left leaning liberal or right political view. Such a divide is intentionally constructed by the hidden power dynamic and political elites from the top of the food chain in order to safeguard their power prominence. The illusion of the "left" and "right" backed up by different powers becomes a daily ritual. The general public in fact have no idea that all these powers are actually all aiming at one thing: keeping the status quo of their prominence of power. The contesting powers between the liberal and non-western conservatives are also the main driving force for international media activities. Although the goal of globalisation is clear, the path to achieving this goal is still debated.



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## Modernization Public Administration in the Republic of Uzbekistan

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### Abstract

This article deals with the process of modernization and renewal in Uzbekistan after independence. As in all post-soviet countries and Uzbekistan in the building of a new nation-state focused on the creation of legislation that meets the new requirements and conditions. An important place was given to national traditions and mentality of the people. The experience of developed countries and the theory of a democratic society that increasing legal, political, social, spiritual and economic culture of the members of the society, improve the living standards of the population. Active participation in the implementation of reforms in every field of national economy will lead to a successful implementation of these reforms. A prompt and effective solution of social and financial issues serves to ensure the well-being of the people.

**Keywords:** independence, modernization, rights and powers, public organizations, political parties, civil society, reform, strategy, concept, administrative.

### 1. Введение

Последнее десятилетие XX века характеризуется коренными изменениями в развитии ряд стран, которые ранее были в составе бывшего Советского Союза. Каждая страна, приобретавшая свою национальную независимость, стала развиваться в зависимости от своего географического расположения, культурно-национальных ценностей, учитывая социально-экономические, правовые и духовные условия в регионе. Как показывает опыт развитых стран, нет готовой модели развития и модернизации общества на основе определённых направлений. Но есть общепринятые общечеловеческие принципы и ценности, которые в той или иной мере влияют на ускорение или замедление развития каждой отдельно взятой страны. Ими являются свобода волеизъявления каждого члена общества, равноправие, приоритет мнения большинства по отношению меньшинств, активное участие граждан в управленческих делах государства и общества, обеспечение свободы выбора, подотчётность выборных органов и т.д.

В Узбекистане в первые дни становления молодого государства базовой основой развития республики были выбраны такие общечеловеческие и национальные приоритеты как верность общепринятым человеческим ценностям, укрепление и совершенствование духовного наследия народа, полная реализация человеческих возможностей и патриотизм. Избегая моральных и материальных потерь революционного пути развития, народом был выбран эволюционный путь разрешения проблем.

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## 2. Материалы и методы

В данной статье мы пользовались методами описания, контекстуального анализа, сравнения и сопоставления. На основе сопоставления идёт обобщение и конкретизация понятия.

## 3. Обсуждение и результаты

В Республике Узбекистан повышение жизненного уровня населения и построение нового демократического общества стали самой главной целью реформ, которые проводились в каждой отрасли народного хозяйства. По инициативе первого Президента страны Ислама Каримова правительством был разработан свой собственный путь развития – «узбекская модель» нового общества на основе 5 принципов. В начале 1990-х годов положение в республике было весьма печальным. Возросла безработица, на пороге стояла инфляция, нехватка жизненно важных продуктов питания, иждивенческое настроение многих граждан и другие многие проблемы осложняли внутреннюю политику страны. Правительство считало необходимостью то, что в переходный период очень важное место в социальной политике страны имеет сильная защита многодетных и малообеспеченных семей, инвалидов, пенсионеров и т.д. Была разработана специальная адресная программа по оказанию материальной помощи населению. Поэтапно стали формироваться многоукладная рыночная экономика и новая база законодательных актов, образовалась новая частная форма собственности, которая была обеспечена сильной защитой государства. У населения постепенно формировалось новое экономическое мышление. Государство провело гибкую налоговую политику, в результате которой совершенствовалась налоговая система. Назрела необходимость разработать новую законодательную систему и на основе учёта опыта развитых стран в стране разрабатывали новую законодательную базу. В 1992 году была принята новая Конституция страны. Постепенно стала формироваться законодательная система, на основе которой страна шла по пути разрешения проблем и достижения новых рубежей в каждой области развития. 1997 год была провозглашена годом интересов человека. Стало традицией, что теперь каждый новый год стал называться определённым названием. В каждый год со стороны правительства страны была разработана и принята специальная Программа, охватывающая каждую отрасль народного хозяйства и финансируемая правительством для успешного выполнения принятых мер. 2018 год в стране объявлен годом поддержки активного предпринимательства, инновационных идей и технологий.

Как известно, все правовые акты, настолько они сильными и правомерными не были, действуют только тогда, когда они усвоены всеми членами общества. Члены общества должны знать не только свои права и возможности, но и свои обязанности. Республика шла по пути преобразований: менялись условия, менялись общественные и государственные отношения, которые требовали изменений законов. Ряд статей Основного закона тоже подверглись изменениям и поправкам.

И.А.Каримов после своего избрания совмещал в себе функции и главы государства и Председателя Кабинета Министров. После внесённых изменений, некоторые конституционные права Президента Республики были отданы премьер-министру и Парламенту.

Право выдвижения кандидатуру на должность премьер-министра Республики принадлежит той партии, которая получает на выборах в Олий Мажлис самое большое количество депутатов или же получившие одинаковое число депутатов несколько политических партий. На основе этого Президент Республики вносит своё предложение на должность премьер-министра на утверждение Парламента, который утверждает кандидатуру премьер-министра. Внесённые изменения требуют подотчётность Премьер-министра за свою деятельность перед Законодательной палатой и Сенатом Олий Мажлис. Премьер-министр за период своего функционирования отчитывается перед Парламентом за выполнение своих обязанностей (*Конституция...*, 2010).

В стране постепенно реформируются управленческие обязанности государства. Они всё более подвергаются демократическим изменениям. В экономике основное место занимает частный сектор. Государство старается всячески поддержать и развивать инициативу и работу

людей, которые производят материальную ценность и хотят налаживать свой, малый и семейный бизнес и фермерскую деятельность в сельских местностях.

Концепция дальнейшего углубления демократических реформ и формирования гражданского общества в стране, предложенный первым Президентом страны И.А. Каримовым, содержала в себе несколько законодательных инициатив по принятию некоторых законов (Каримов, 2010). Одним из таких законов был Закон «Об открытости деятельности органов государственной власти и управления», который должен обеспечить свободный доступ на получение сведений о принятых официальных документов государственных структур и своевременное их выполнение.

Конечной целью и мечтой узбекского народа является постепенное построение справедливого гражданского общества, где господствует закон и каждый член общества внесёт свою лепту на будущее страны. Исполон веков гражданское общество считается высшей формой человеческого общества, позволяющая каждому члену общества осуществить свои возможности и активно участвовать в принятии решений общественного и государственного характера. Оно состоит из различных корпораций объединений и сообществ, которые действуют и двигаются вперёд на основе совместной деятельности во всех сферах развития общества.

В настоящее время в Республике действуют 4 партий (НДПУ, Адолат, Миллий тикланиш и УзЛиДеП), которые всё ещё находятся на стадии совершенствования. Они имеют своё определённое направление, свой устав и свою политическую программу, работают со своим электоратом. Однако политические партии пока ещё не являются той движущей силой общества, которая объединяет всех граждан страны. Назначение хокимов со стороны Президента, а не избрание их со стороны населения и отсутствие конкуренции между политическими партиями на местном уровне способствует к понижению полномочий местных Кенгашов народных депутатов. По мнению Мурааматсу (Мурааматсу, 1997), это может привести к низкому уровню оппозиционной деятельности населения или политических партий. Например, на вопрос «как вы оцениваете деятельность политических партий в стране?» 45 % респондентов отвечали положительно, 14 % средне, 41 % дали отрицательный ответ. При этом, отвечавшие положительно, учитывали деятельность партий не относительно вопросов управления властью, а по проведению ими различных мероприятий просветительского характера (Аннакличев, Юсупов, 2010). Со стороны респондентов также отмечено, что принятие в 2007 году Конституционного Закона о повышении роли политических партий в модернизации и обновлении государственного управления и демократизации страны во многом изменил миссию политических партий и повысил роль партий в жизни общества.

В результате проведённых в ряд реформ в области политики, экономики и права, отношение народа к нововведениям существенно изменилось и с каждым годом у людей повышается политическое сознание и развивается активная гражданская позиция, ярким примером которой были выборы Президента Республики, проводимые в 2016 году. Каждый гражданин Республики сознательно отнёсся к выбору Президента страны, где в будущем должны быть обеспечены такие общечеловеческие и национальные ценности как мир под голубым небом, счастливое детство, благополучная и здоровая семья, рабочее место в родном коллективе и спокойная старость в кругу родных и т.д.

Новый подход к модернизации государственных и местных органов управления связан с избранием нового президента республики Ш.Мирзиязева. Стратегия действий по пяти приоритетным направлениям определила новые направления развития страны, где звучит основная идея этих изменений – "Не народ должен служить государственным органам, а государственные органы должны служить народу" (Стратегия действий..., 2017).

Стратегия действий по пяти приоритетным направлениям развития Республики Узбекистан в 2017-2021 годах воплощает в себе стратегию тех реформ, которые были осуществлены развитыми государствами для построения гражданского общества, основанного на приоритет закона.

Современная модель реформ по модернизации государственных органов на основе принципа децентрализации была выдвинута концепцией Административных реформ, предложенной Президентом республики в сентябре 2017 года.



Концепция Административной реформы в Республике Узбекистан предусматривает передачу полномочий центральных органов местным органам власти, от области к городу (району) путём поэтапной децентрализации государственного управления.

Осуществление административной реформы направлено на достижение следующих результатов, которые способствуют:

1. Созданию отвечающей общемировым тенденциям инновационного развития системы государственного управления, способной обеспечить полноценную реализацию намеченных реформ, своевременно выявлять и эффективно решать проблемы общественно-политического и социально-экономического развития, в том числе путем:

– оптимизации и децентрализации системы государственного управления за счет устранения избыточных и несвойственных задач, функций и полномочий, ликвидации дублирования и параллелизма;

– де бюрократизации и снижения издержек государственного управления, повышения эффективности деятельности и прозрачности системы принятия управленческих решений;

– внедрения системы стратегического планирования, инновационных идей, разработок и технологий;

– дальнейшего сокращения административного воздействия на отрасли экономики и расширения рыночных механизмов управления, направленного на развитие здоровой конкурентной среды, повышения инвестиционной привлекательности страны и деловой активности населения;

– формирования эффективных форм общественного и парламентского контроля, направленных, прежде всего, на предупреждение коррупционных проявлений.

2. Созданию действенных механизмов обеспечения прав и свобод граждан, дальнейшее повышение их благосостояния и уровня удовлетворенности деятельностью органов исполнительной власти, в том числе путем:

– совершенствования административных процедур, направленных на четкую регламентацию правовых отношений государственных органов с физическими и юридическими лицами;

– развития системы административной юстиции, предусматривающей совершенствование порядка обжалования решений и действий органов исполнительной власти, внедрение механизмов коллегиального заслушивания обращений физических и юридических лиц;

– повышения эффективности оказания государственных услуг посредством совершенствования системы «Электронное правительство»;

– обеспечения верховенства закона, укрепления законности и правопорядка в обществе ([Концепция административной реформы..., 2017](#)).

#### 4. Заключение

Таким образом, в Республике Узбекистан повсюду продолжают новые преобразования. Быть может, что они идут не так как осуществлялись они в других развитых странах. Но каждый народ и каждое общество идёт своей собственной дорогой, используя свои силы, возможности и условия. Будем надеяться и верить, что миролюбивый и многонациональный народ Республики Узбекистан, который является верный продолжателем дел своих великих потомков, оставит будущему поколению свободную и процветающую Родину, где интересы каждого человека превыше всего ([Мирзиёев, 2016](#)).

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## Модернизация управления в республике Узбекистан

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**Аннотация.** В статье рассматривается процесс модернизации и обновления Республики Узбекистан после обретения независимости. Как и во всех постсоветских странах, так и в Узбекистане в строительстве нового национального государства основное внимание уделяется созданию законодательства, отвечающего новым требованиям и условиям. Важное место отводилось национальным традициям и менталитету народа. Опыт развитых стран и теория демократического общества свидетельствует о том, что повышение правовой, политической, социальной, духовной и экономической культуры членов общества

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приведёт к улучшению и повышению уровня жизни населения. Активное участие в реализации реформ во всех сферах народного хозяйства приведет к успешной реализации этих реформ. Быстрое и эффективное решение социальных и финансовых вопросов служит для обеспечения благосостояния народа.

**Ключевые слова:** независимость, модернизация, права и полномочия, общественные организации, политические партии, гражданское общество, реформы, стратегия действий, концепция, административные.