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
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Articles and Statements

War Propaganda on the Revolutionary Navy in October 1917 – February 1918

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Abstract

The article deals with the organization of revolutionary and war propaganda in the Navy in the first months of Soviet power. It examines the state propaganda of the fleets together with the objective difficulties associated with the abolition of the system of control of naval forces in the Russian Empire.

In conclusion, the author notes reasons for which the Bolsheviks had to support lawlessness among the sailors of the fleet. At the same time he explores the beginning of public policy on the creation of the worker-peasant red fleet.

Keywords: navy, propaganda, revolution, Bolsheviks, the sailors and officers.

1. Introduction

The title of the “Revolutionary Guard” (words said by V.I. Lenin in October 1917. – Auth.) was confirmed to be rightly used for sailors as they played an active role in the October events of 1917. V.I. Lenin pointed out in his article: “Applied to Russia and October 1917, this means: a simultaneous offensive on Petrograd, as sudden and as rapid as possible, which must without fail be carried out from within and from without, from the working-class quarters, and from Finland, from Revel and from Kronstadt, an offensive of the entire navy, the concentration of a gigantic superiority of forces...”

Combine our three main forces – the fleet, the workers and the army units – so as to in the first instance occupy without fail and to hold at any cost a) the telephone exchange, b) the telegraph office, c) the railway stations, d) the bridges.

Assign the most determined elements (our “shock forces” and young workers, as well as the best of the sailors) to form small detachments to occupy all the more important points and to take part everywhere, in all important operations, for example: to encircle and cut off Petrograd; to seize it by a combined attack of the sailors, the workers, and the troops – a task which requires art and triple audacity” (Lenin, 1975).

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October 11, 1917, Petrograd saw the launch of the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, and its delegates adopted a testimonial to the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. Following the October Revolution, the Naval Revolutionary Committee liquidated the officer cadres enlisted in the Russian Imperial Fleet. However, Baltic Fleet sailors continued to see themselves as the arbiters of the destinies both for the revolution and the nation after the October Revolution, and proceeded to handle all matters guided by single conscience available to the revolutionary (Panova, 2011). Many actions and atrocities of raging sailors instilled constant fear of the new authorities among the metropolitan inhabitants.

In December 1917, the initiative of ship committees of vessels and naval units of the Baltic Fleet elected the board of the “Club of Navy Mariners.” The Soviet government almost immediately supported the aspirations of its beloved “revolutionary guard” and soon “... the board was given the building of the stock exchange and the Strogonov Palace on the corner of the Moika and Nevsky... Some time later the sailors received the Regina Hotel on the Moika for to use as a canteen and hostel” (Krasavin, Smuglin, 2004).

The activities of the Baltic sailors were complemented by revolutionary events in the Black Sea Fleet, which developed after the withdrawal of A.V. Kolchak, when mass lynchings were perpetrated by sailors in December 1917 (Lazarovski, 2013). Conservative estimates indicate that about 600 members of the officer corps fell victim to the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet (Lizar, 2013).

As a result, after they came to power, the Bolsheviks had to put up with the sailors’ arbitrary behaviors and try to control their sentiments.

2. Materials and methods

The author formed the basis of their paper using the materials of the funds collected by the Russian State Navy Archives (RGA VMF), St. Petersburg. The author also employed publications from the Morskoy Sbornik (Sea Collection) and a range of research papers in parallel with the materials.

The study provided utilizes traditional and general scientific methods together with the historical situational method to review various fleets and flotillas.

3. Discussion and results

In fact, managing a fleet proved to be no small task. In November 1917, the newspaper “Svobodny flot” (Free Fleet), echoing revolutionary zeal, published an essay by P. Kulikovskiy “Sailors Revolutionaries 1905” (Kulikovskiy, 1917). The key issue that stirred “Svobodny flot” at that time was reflected in the editorial: “As we seek to the best of our ability to cover the most crucial issues, related to the life of the fleet, in the pages of our journal, we ask our readers, officers and sailors to answer the following question: “How can we build and strengthen mutual trust between all the ranks in the fleet?” (Anketa «Svobodnogo flota», 2017). An important consideration is that the “Svobodny flot” newspaper deliberately avoids publications on the revolutionary process in Petrograd in November and December 1917 and calls for the state building of the armed forces.

Initially, the Bolsheviks were compelled to proceed with the policy designed to destroy the fleet. In January 1918, the newspaper “Revolutsionnyi flot” (The Revolutionary Navy – the edition changed its title from “Svobodny flot” to “Revolutsionnyi flot” in the context of the new political environment as the Bolshevik rise to power. – Auth.) publishes an article entitled “On the fleet demobilization,” which reads the following words: “The war is drawing to an end, peace is in the air. New peacetime interests replace the war interests that the country has lived up to since it was declared” (Novitsky, 1918). After January 29, 1918, a decree on the organization of the fleet was ratified that stipulated the following: “... the fleet that exists on the basis of tsarist-time universal conscription is declared dissolved and the Socialist Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet is hereby organized...” (Chernyak, 2001). The next day, the order announcing this decree, signed by the People’s Commissar for Maritime Affairs P.Ye. Dybenko (Figure 1) and collegium members S.Ye. Saks and F.F. Raskolnikov, was communicated to fleets and flotillas. The following day, January 30, 1918, witnessed the “Revolutsionnyi flot” newspaper publishing “Regulations on the fleet democratization” (Polozhenie o demokratizatsii flota, 1918).



Fig. 1. P.E. Dybenko

The new government decided to get rid of both old personnel of the Russian Imperial Navy and pre-revolutionary symbols at one whack. November 19, 1917, pursuant to the resolution by the 1st All-Russian Congress of the Navy, the Supreme Naval Collegium issued an order transmitted by specialists at the New Holland radio station to all Central Fleet Committees: "To raise the flag of The Internationale on all ships of the All-Russian Navy instead of the St. Andrew's Flag to mark that the entire Russian Navy, as one, stood up to protect the Rule of the People represented by the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies" (Krasavin, Smuglin, 2004). The delegates of the said congress approved a resolution by a majority vote, which, in particular, stated: "The congress publicly declares that the entire strength of the navy will be faithful and impregnable supporting the rule of the Soviets... which has given us the land and freedom and is now boldly heading towards the near future" (Baltiiskii flot..., 1932).

The most outstanding document issued as part of the process to introduce civil liberties in the Navy became Order No. 11 by the Maritime Department, dated January 8, 1918, which constituted in essence a "Regulation on democratization." This document enshrined that the personnel of the naval forces consisted of free citizens that enjoy equal civil rights. Military ranks were abolished. The Regulation introduced the rank "sailor of the Navy of the Russian Republic" for all servicemen (RGA VMF. F. 92. Op. 1. D. 382. L. 115).

After they put into practice a list of government measures of this sort, the Bolsheviks faced an unpleasant discovery in late 1917 and early 1918. The total absence of professional officers started to exert its adverse impact. On the other hand, revolutionary comrades P.E. Dybenko and F.F. Raskolnikov could only successfully facilitate destructive agitation, rather than build a military organization (RGA VMF. F. 203. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 11).

Despite the measures to eliminate the officer corps of the tsarist fleet, which were in line with the interests of revolutionary sailors, it was necessary to ensure smooth operation of the service. And in this connection we can cite a peculiar piece published by a sailor of the "Vsadnik" fleet destroyer, S. Prokofiev, who came up with proposals on how to establish relations between officers and sailors: "... I propose the following conditions and methods to strengthen the relations that are now establishing between officers and sailors:

- 1) Each officer must have a political training and education in the spirit of democratic ideas, sufficient for himself, and if he has not received the one in the corps, he must make every effort to ensure that the word "politics" does not become a synonym for something terrible and dangerous.

- 2) Each officer must always remember that his service in the navy is a service for his people and his motherland, and therefore he must serve by vocation.

3) Both sailors and officers need open sea voyages and the longer and more diverse they will be, the higher chances are for them to achieve better understanding of each other and ensure self-development.

4) The more efficient and responsible the officer is in performing his duties, the more affinity and respect the sailors will feel toward him.

5) If a sailor approaches the officer to ask for advice, the officer must himself help him rather than sending the sailor to others.

6) The officer's word should be his bond: if he promises something to the sailor, then do it right away without any delay; this will elevate him in the eyes of the crew.

7) In hours free from duty and training, the officer devotes his leisure time not to a meeting or club, but spends it among sailors in a comradely conversation, giving explanations to current events and sharing his knowledge" (Prokofiev, 1918).

We can actually see in this article of February 20, 1918, the first attempt to initiate a dialogue between the new government and the officers of the Russian Imperial Fleet. A remarkable fact is that while the article gives them a lot of "useful" tips, it does not deny the very need for officers to get the navy work in a normal way.

Despite the above positive trend, the zealous revolutionary rhetoric continued to dominate the Bolshevik propaganda activities in the navy. In the same issue of the journal, sailor G. Konov expresses his view on the fleet personnel reform: "...Serving as a sailor for several years and knowing well the sailors' environment, I can say with certainty that the only way to ensure trust between all fleet ranks is to introduce elective commanders, and this, I have no doubt, will then eliminate all deplorable phenomena very undesirable for all parties" (Konov, 1918).

In the "Revolutsionnyi flot" newspaper, F.F. Raskolnikov publishes an article specifically for sailors, written on February 15, 1918, where he glorifies the newly formed Red Army: "... When this army of responsible revolutionaries trained in the art of war and consolidated with a single purpose, will be put on its feet, we can feel completely sure about the fate of the revolution.

We will then know that at the first conscription call of the Soviet government, a powerful army of well-trained revolutionary fighters will stand up for its defense, ready to make ultimate sacrifice for the triumph of the revolution" (Raskol'nikov, 1918b).

In fact, F.F. Raskolnikov seems to largely support the belief in the historical role of sailors among the crews at the fleet ships. In January 1918, the "Morskoy Sbornik" journal published his article with the headline "The Uprising in the German navy," which ends with the following statement: "... And this inspires strong confidence that our German comrades-in-arms will not stop halfway, but, given the whole experience of the recent past, with the general approval of the proletarians across the world, they will mount a decisive onslaught on the strongholds of tsarism, militarism and imperialism. And the developments in all other countries foster an unshakable belief that the revolutionary actions of German democracy are supported by the world working class.

A glaring red dawn of the socialist revolution is breaking before our eyes" (Raskol'nikov, 1918d). Further on, the combined 1918 February and March issue of "Morskoy Sbornik" proceeds with a series of essays by F.F. Raskolnikov – "Revolutionary Kronstadt" (Raskolnikov, Revolutionary 1918) and "Indictment on the case of Lieutenant Schmidt" (Raskol'nikov, 1918a).

Here is what F.F. Raskolnikov wrote at the time: "In the revolution of these days, Kronstadt has a special, exceptional place and by all rights. Throughout the entire revolutionary period, Kronstadt played an outstanding political role, often drawing the attention of all Russia to itself, provoking false and fantastic intricacies around its name and instigating violent, angry curses of the bourgeoisie.

In the minds of the latter, Kronstadt symbolizes sheer terror, some evil spawn of hell, a formidable, fearful, shaking specter of future anarchy, a nightmarish revival of new Russian Vendée on the Russian land. And this feverish and panic fear, felt by the bourgeoisie at the mere thought of Kronstadt, is not an accidental misconception engendered by the false inventions of capitalist newspapers, but rather a natural, legitimate concerns about one's interests dictated by the bourgeois and, in this sense, healthy instinct of the bourgeoisie as a class social" (Raskol'nikov, 1918c). F.F. Raskolnikov himself was nicknamed "black garde-marine," and he erroneously called Kronstadt a revolutionary Vendée. Apparently, the wartime midshipman was not taught history. The province of Vendée in France was on the contrary the stronghold of the pro-monarchy forces (Figure 2).



Fig. 2. F.F. Raskolnikov

The organization of military propaganda in the revolutionary navy also faced certain issues. The Bolsheviks, led by V.F. Polukhin in Murmansk and K.I. Pronsky in Arkhangelsk, carried out active propaganda activities among sailors of the Arctic Ocean flotilla. In mid-November 1917, the initiative of the Bolsheviks at the Central Arctic Flotilla Committee (Tseledflot) appointed commissars to armed units and ships in Arkhangelsk (RGA VMF. F. 19. Op. 1. D. 15. L. 87) (Figure 3).



Fig. 3. V.F. Polukhin

The rise of Soviet rule received a unanimous welcome from sailors of the Caspian Flotilla. In early November 1917, the 1st Congress of the Flotilla sailors enacted a decision to support only the executive committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the Baku Soviet.

4. Conclusion

A general review of the revolutionary propaganda campaign in the navy between October 1917 and February 1918 clearly shows that the ambiguity of the policy pursued by the Bolsheviks. First, they had to maintain a dialog with the "Revolutionary Guard" using the language of slogans and zealous messages, emphasizing in every possible way the historical role of sailors. However, they gradually come to experience issues related to the state building of naval forces, and at this

point, using official publications, they make attempts to protect officers of the Russian Imperial Fleet, of course, after first guiding them to the right path, because only their support can help defend the Soviet rule. It is these two tendencies that influenced and shaped military propaganda at the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet during the Civil War and intervention period.

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
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Agitation in Extermination Battalions during the Great Patriotic War as a Means of Political Training (as Illustrated by the Example of Sochi City)

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Abstract

The paper uses the example of the city of Sochi to explore the forms of agitation and morale building activities practiced in extermination battalions during the Great Patriotic War.

Materials that helped accomplish the paper include archival records of primary party organizations in the Sochi extermination battalions, stored by the Center for Documentation of the Contemporary History of the Krasnodar Krai (Krasnodar, Russian Federation).

Research problems were addressed using both general scientific methods (analysis and synthesis, concretization, generalization) and traditional methods of historical analysis. The historical chronological approach allowed an insight into issues that existed in extermination battalions and was instrumental in reviewing the forms and methods of agitation and morale building activities carried out among the personnel.

The extermination battalions were created early in the Great Patriotic War, and first inspections revealed weak discipline and numerous violations in them. To correct this, the party bodies were assigned the task of organizing morale building activities and agitation campaigns among the personnel.

Agitation efforts in the extermination battalions were the responsibility of specialists appointed by primary party organizations of the units. These specialists utilized a wide range of activities, including rallies, lectures, production of wall newspapers and combat leaflets, roll-outs of patriotic and political campaigns and other. Importantly, these had a strong focus on reading and understanding the “Brief course of the history of the AUCP(B)” (Kratkiy kurs istorii VKP(b)), which contributed to the ideological indoctrination of Communists, Komsomols and non-Party personnel in line with Marxism-Leninism pillars.

Keywords: agitation, propaganda, morale building, extermination battalions, Great Patriotic War.

1. Introduction

June 22, 1941 saw the breakout of the Great Patriotic War. In this connection, the Politburo of the AUCP(B) Central Committee adopted a number of major Decrees “On the mobilization of citizens liable for military service...”, “On declaring martial law in certain areas of the USSR” and “On martial law” ([Vestnik Arkhiva..., 2010](#); [Vedomosti..., 1941](#)).

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On June 24, 1941, the USSR Council of People's Commissars (hereinafter "the CPC"), in order to timely and efficiently terminate saboteurs, inserted by the enemy by parachute or otherwise, adopts the Decree "On measures to combat enemy paratroopers and saboteurs in the front-line zone". This resolution initiated the recruitment of the extermination battalions in the Soviet Union. Leadership over the extermination battalions was entrusted to Deputy Chairman of the USSR CPC, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, Lavrentiy Beria (TsDNIKK. F. 1774-A. Op. 2. D. 276. L. 1, 2).

The newly formed extermination battalions received commanders appointed from among the NKVD personnel, as well as commissars and political instructors, typically from local party organizations that had a scope of activities extending beyond political propaganda and also included military training. Political training in the extermination battalions was given by commissars and political workers in various formats such as rallies, lectures, producing wall newspapers, arranging patriotic political campaigns, Particular emphasis was put on the study of the "Brief course of the history of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)".

2. Materials and methods

Materials that helped accomplish the paper include archival records of primary party organizations in the Sochi extermination battalions, stored by the Center for Documentation of the Contemporary History of the Krasnodar Krai (Krasnodar, Russian Federation).

Research problems were addressed using both general scientific methods (analysis and synthesis, concretization, generalization) and traditional methods of historical analysis. The historical chronological approach allowed an insight into issues that existed in extermination battalions and was instrumental in reviewing the forms and methods of agitation and morale building activities carried out among the personnel.

3. Results

The Decree of the USSR CPC dated June 24, 1941, established three extermination battalions on the territory of present-day Greater Sochi: Lazarevsky (Shapsugsky), Sochinsky and Adlersky (TsDNIKK. F. 1774-A. Op. 2. D. 276. L. 7). There were 220 people in the Sochinsky extermination battalion, and 200 in each of the Adlersky and Shapsugsky battalions. The total personnel were 620 people (TsDNIKK. F. 1774-A. Op. 2. D. 276. L. 30).

A combat readiness check was carried out in the new extermination battalions already in July 1941 and revealed massive violations. For example, these included personnel's late arrivals to collection points or failures to arrive (TsDNIKK. F. 1774-A. Op. 2. D. 276. L. 47). This resulted into a decision to launch efficient agitation efforts among service personnel of the extermination battalions. To this end, the task of managing entire party and political work in the battalions was given to first secretaries of City Committees (Gorkoms) and District Committees (Raikoms) of the AUCP(B) (TsDNIKK. F. 1774-A. Op. 2. D. 276. L. 47ob.).

Field activities began. For example, early in the operation of the party organization in the Sochinsky extermination battalion, two study groups were set up to read and understand the "Brief course of the history of the AUCP(B.)", and the knowledge was systematically checked and tested among Communists and Komsomols. The groups studying the "Brief course of the history of the AUCP(B.)" covered 35 people. Consultants were assigned and duty schedule was introduced at the party's consultant office. Following a series of classes, the two groups were merged into one because part of the students were sent on duty assignments, and the group leader, Kaylin, was off for medical reasons. The merged study group was supervised by Okhotnikov. In this mode, the study group continued operating until June 1943. As a large number of combatants and commanders left for duty missions to handle operational and administrative tasks, classes at the study group were suspended (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 97).

On November 24, 1942, the Sochinsky extermination battalion held rally led by Battalion Commissar Skorokhod and Secretary of the Primary Organization Yepikhin. The event celebrated the successful offensive mounted by the Red Army in the Stalingrad area. Here is the transcript of the speeches made at the rally:

Skorokhod: Comrade Stalin has pointed out in his order dated November 7 that the day is not far away when the enemy will see the brunt of new attacks by the Red Army. The Hitlerite armies

are already bearing the might of our first assaults. In just three days, the Hitlerite gang has lost 26,000 killed, 24,000 taken prisoner, more than 700 guns, 2,625 machine guns, 2,826 vehicles and more. With each passing day the Red Army is becoming increasingly mature, tempered and strong in its power. The Soviet people have the profound belief that valiant Soviet soldiers, under the leadership of our beloved leader and commander, great Stalin, will crush Hitlerite brigands and will clear the Soviet land of the abhorrent enemy. Long live our great Stalin!

Yepikhin: The fire of battles has fortified and toughened the courage of Stalingrad defenders. They have fought firmly confident that not only will they defend the city of Stalin, they will drive Hitler's bastards away from the Volga. The Red Army soldiers have withstood! They have seen the joyous and inspiring day of retribution come true. Comrade Stalin has said that we can and must cleanse the Soviet land of the Hitlerite scum. The rout of the enemy at Stalingrad will mark the beginning of the defeat of the Hitlerite predatory army. Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, our Red Army will destroy Hitler's rascals. Our extermination battalion, when it receives an order to march on our mortal enemy, our soldiers, commanders and political workers will honestly fulfill their duty to the Motherland. We will fight to live up to the example of Stalingrad defenders (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 4).

After the political workers delivered their speeches at the rally, extermination battalion fighters resolved as follows "Having heard the report of Battalion Commissar Comrade Skorokhod on the successful offensive of our troops in the Stalingrad area, We, the battalion soldiers, commanders and political workers, with a feeling of sheer joy are hailing our dear Red Army, its fighters, commanders and political workers who are successfully carrying forward the advance and smashing gangs of German fascist invaders.

The cities of Kalach and Abganerovo as well as the villages of Krivomuzginskaya, Chernyshevskaya, Sovetsk and others have been liberated, dozens of localities have been set free. This is only the beginning of fulfilling Comrade Stalin's instructions that "we can and must cleanse the Soviet land of the Hitlerite scum". The Red Army guided by its tried and true generals has already proved to the whole world that it is not only able to contain the onslaught of the armored German armies, but also smash them with the full support of its people, and through the comprehensive communication with the rear, it succeeded in fending off Hitler's hordes at a distance of 400 km in winter last year. It can protect our beloved capital of Moscow and the cradle of the revolution, the city of Lenin.

Now, when the enemy troops themselves have been exhausted over the vast Soviet-German front, when Hitler's best divisions have been exterminated, when thousands of tanks and aircraft have been destroyed, the day has come when the enemy will again experience the severity of new attacks by the Red Army. But we know that the enemy is not yet smashed, that we are yet to deal the final blow, that German invaders will orchestrate new schemes, and they will still try to execute their bloody plans. We know that the complete defeat of the enemy will require an even greater strain on all the sinews of the army and the people, of the front and of the rear, and therefore each of us undertakes to strengthen the iron military discipline, strengthen the unity of command and further enhance our combat and political training to be prepared any minute to join combat banners. We have the profound belief that our valiant soldiers, under the leadership of our beloved leader and commander, great Comrade Stalin, will crush Hitlerite brigands and will clear the Soviet land of the abhorrent enemy. Long live our valiant Red Army! Long live our beloved I.V. Stalin! (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 40b.).

The rally, as a propaganda tool, was intended to enhance morals, determination, patriotic and combat qualities of the extermination battalion personnel. The political workers acted in the spirit of their time – their speeches were focused on the talent of the leader, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Comrade Stalin, his role in the victories won, but also praised the bravery of the Red Army soldiers whom extermination battalions were to take for models.

On November 27, 1942, the general meeting by the AUCP(B.) primary organization of the Adlersky extermination battalion was attended by 5 party members and 1 candidate member to the AUCP(B.). The meeting elected M. M. Devyatov as a chairman.

The meeting heard Comrade Stalin's report commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. In addition, it highlighted the work to make provisions for the defense

of the Adler district, a mission given to the extermination battalion. In this regard, party activists proposed to build up combat and political training for the soldiers. The meeting resolved:

1. Strengthen the combat and political training of the soldiers in the unit; implement these activities on a daily basis according to the developed plan;
2. Encharge the command of the extermination battalion with a task of formulating, no later than November 25, 1942, an action plan on combat and political training for November and December 1942 (TsDNIKK. F. 2473. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 20b.).

The meeting also made a decision to start a wall newspaper – “Boevoy listok” (Combat Leaflet) – and recommend to M.M. Demin, G.I. Gurov and N.I. Kulakova for its editorial board (TsDNIKK. F. 2473. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 4).

We should note that the meeting by the primary party organization instructed the battalion command to develop a plan for combat and political training.

On November 28, 1942, a general, closed party meeting by members and candidates for AUCP(B.) membership of the Sochinsky extermination battalion took place. There was an attendance of 20 party members and 11 candidates for party membership at the meeting. The agenda comprised the following items:

1. Hearing a report by Battalion Commander Ignatenko on the soldier and commander combat training and a co-report by Commissar Skorokhod on political indoctrination work in the extermination battalion;

2. Approving the plan and schedule of the political indoctrination work for December 1942.

Ignatenko: The territory of the city of Sochi, Shapsugsky and Adler districts were reconnoitered and developed in last winter, spring and summer. Soldiers and commanders grew stronger in the campaigns, and their morale improved. The extermination battalion sent 600 soldiers to the Red Army, and some demonstrated heroism and prowess. We will have to work hard with a new generation of fighters. The proximity of the front requires vigilance and better discipline, and we must be ready to join the battle at any moment. The battalion has the regular size of 200 people, while in fact, the detachment has 162 people (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 3).

Skorokhod: The soldiers and commanders in the battalion have undergone good political indoctrination and ideological training. Political conversations carried out – 105, motion pictures run – 59, lectures delivered – 15, theater visits made – 8, battalion wall newspapers produced – 6, which positively affected the morale of the soldiers and commanders (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 3-30b.).

The meeting further approved the plan and the schedule of the political indoctrination work for December 1942 (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 4).

The plan approved by the meeting and the schedule for political indoctrination work in December 1942 (Table 1) are methods of political work and agitation among the soldiers and commanders in the battalion. The planned activities included club work, commander training, a discussion meeting with the political personnel, lectures by political workers at the Sochi City Committee of the AUCP(B.), reports, amateurs’ events, meetings of Communists and Komsomols, consultations on the “Brief course of the history of the AUCP(B.)”. Communists were engaged to carry out events and activities.

Table 1. The schedule of the political indoctrination work in the Sochinsky extermination battalion for December 1941 (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 44)

date	hours	Name of activity	Description of activity	Who delivers, arranges, reports	Completion date
	-30	Club work	Motion picture. Kinosbornik (Fighting Film Album) No. 11	Club Head	
	-30	Commander training	As per program	Assistant drill battalion commander	

	20-30	Briefing with command and political personnel	On the unity of command	T. Skorokhod	
	10-30	Lecture, a Gorkom lecturer	Events in North Africa and the internal situation in Europe	Lecturer Lobov, AUCP(B.) Gorkom Club Head	
	20	Report	Report on the Constitution Day	Skorokhod, Yepikhin	
	22	Club work	Motion picture "Makar Nechay"	Club Head	
	23	Club work	Amateurs' event	Baranovskaya	
	21	Commander training	As per program	Assistant Battalion Commander	
		Club work			
	- 20	Meeting by the party bureau	Report on the club work for the second half of the year	Club Head	
	- 20	Meeting by the VLKSM Komsomol Committee		Rogovskaya	
	- 20	Club work	Fiction reading	Baranovskaya	
	- 21	General Komsomol meeting		Rogovskaya	
	- 22	General party meeting	Report on the ideological level of Communists	Yepikhin	
	- 10 ³⁰	Lecture	Stalingrad defensive operation in 1918 and during the Patriotic War	Lecturer Nikolaev, AUCP(B.) Gorkom	
	- 21	Club work	Motion picture	Club Head	
	- 23	Amateurs' event		Baranovskaya	
	- 21	Commander training	As per program	Assistant Battalion Commander	
	- 20	Briefing with command and political personnel		Ignatenko, Skorokhod	
	- 22	Club work	Motion picture	Club Head	
	- 22	Club work	Fiction reading	Baranovskaya, Club Head	
	- 22	Consultation	On the study of the "Brief course of the history of the AUCP(B.)"	Skorokhod	
	- 21	Meeting by the VLKSM Komsomol Committee		Rogovskaya	
	- 10 ³⁰	Lecture		Lecturer Kabanova, AUCP(B.) Gorkom	
	- 21	Meeting of the party bureau	Report by the Secretary of the VLKSM Komsomol	Club Head Yepikhin, Rogovskaya	

			Organization on the work in study groups		
	- 22	General Komsomol meeting		Rogovskaya	
	- 22	Club work	Motion picture	Club Head	
	- 21	General closed party meeting	Report of the VLKSM Secretary on the organization of the VLKSM Komsomol with the new committee members	Yepikhin, Secretary of the VLKSM Komsomol Committee	
	18 ³⁰ - 22	Amateurs' event		Baranovskaya, Club Head	
30.12	18 ³⁰ - 20 20 ³⁰ - 22	Commander training Club work	As per program Motion picture	Chief of staff Kobets	

The Politburo meetings considered the reports delivered by political instructors responsible for implementing political indoctrination activities. The Politburo members actually led political work and controlled that the plan for political agitation was consistently put into operation among soldiers and commanders of the extermination battalion (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 44, 47).

On December 5, 1942, a closed meeting by the AUCP(B.) primary organization of the Adlersky extermination battalion took place, attended by 9 people. Participants also included a representative of the AUCP(B.) district committee, Soprunov. They heard a report on the state of the battalion and approved the action plan for the primary party organization in December 1942.

In the end, the party meeting concluded that there was insufficient political work (lectures, reports, conversations) carried out as there was no party organization within 4 months. To address this situation, it was decided to overhaul the work on the soldier political indoctrination, arrange conversations, lectures and reports on a regular basis, instruct secretaries of party organizations to make provisions for consultations with each member and candidate for party membership (TsDNIKK. F. 2473. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 7).

On December 16, 1942, the primary AUCP(B.) party organization of the Adlersky extermination battalion held a closed meeting that elected Krylov as a secretary and was chaired by Zubchenko. After they heard Lomtev's report on how large-scale organizational work and political indoctrination efforts were deployed, meeting participants decided to appoint responsible persons:

1. Vorobyov – the agitation team leader, agitators Krylov, Gazin, Markaryan, Kalashnikov, Lukyanenko and Kovalev;
2. Zubchenko – the wall newspaper editor, members of the editorial board – Lomtev, Mezhanov, Kovalev, Shcherbinin;
3. Markaryan – organization of slogan, poster and scale model production;
4. Romanenko – organization of cultural and awareness-raisin work;
5. Pogorelov – organization of reports and lectures;
6. Arkhinev – organization of library work (TsDNIKK. F. 2473. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 11-11ob.).

On December 17, 1942, a rally brought together soldiers and commanders of the extermination battalion in Sochi, aimed to celebrate the successful offensive by the Red Army and collect New Year gifts for soldiers at the front.

Skorokhod: The struggle of our Red Army against Hitler's German-fascist army has been continuing over 17 months. Our heroic Red Army is leading a successful assault at the Stalingrad front, at the central front and in Mozdok. Everywhere our Red Army is chasing the enemy off our sacred land. Our enemies are digging in and are eager to hold on every hillock. The Red Army is sweeping the enemy out all fortified positions and is expelling it from warm places to the freezing cold. We are warming our fighters with our brotherly love and constant care. We, soldiers, of the

extermination battalion must now take care of our Red Army soldiers and pick up New Year parcels for them with various presents that will ease their burden and boost their courage and valor.

Bogatov: Each report brings us news of the successes notched by our Red Army at all fronts. It is essential to help our brothers, fathers and sons with New Year gifts. My proposal is that everyone should give at least 5 % of their wages.

Malin: It is about a year and a half that our heroic army is fighting against Hitler's predatory army. We as one will take part in collecting New Year gifts for our Red Army soldiers. I propose to allot two-day earnings for New Year gifts for soldiers.

Rogovskaya: We know what hardships our brother soldiers have to endure there at the front, but when they receive our gifts and letters, they will feel the love of their rear, which will comfort them and relieve their burden.

We approve Malin's proposal to deduct two-day earnings of soldiers and commanders to buy New Year gifts for Red Army soldiers.

Having heard and discussed the information presented by commissar of the extermination battalion Skorokhod, (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 7), the rally adopted the following resolution: "We, soldiers, commanders and political workers, have made a decision to take an active part in the collection of New Year gifts for Red Army soldiers. The Soviet people have been fighting against the German fascist invaders over 18 months. Not only has the valiant Red Army held the furious onslaught of the fascist hordes at bay, but has made and is continuing to make violent strikes on them. The current year has marked the beginning of the defeat of the Nazi gangs, and the coming 1943, will be the year of the final cleansing for the Soviet land off the fascist scum.

The Soviet people is expressing their love for the dear Red Army by picking New Year gifts for Soviet soldiers. Patriots are carrying out a gift collection campaign for the Red Army throughout cities and villages of the Soviet Union.

We, soldiers, commanders and political workers, will not stand aside in this patriotic initiative. We resolve to allot two-day earnings to buy New Year gifts for soldiers of the Red Army. Let the new 1943 bring a new success to Soviet weapons, let it pass into history as the year of cleansing the Soviet land of fascist gangs" (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 7ob.).

In addition, commanders and political instructors rolled out political campaigns in the Sochi extermination battalions in December 1942 to raise funds needed to purchase fighter planes for the squadron "Kubansky komsomolets" (A Kuban Komsomol Member) (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 98ob; TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 3).

In addition to New Year gifts for Red Army soldiers and fund-raising activities to buy fighter planes, the party organization of the Sochinsky extermination battalion carried out other political campaigns as well: *Political campaigns deployed in the extermination battalion is one of the top priorities in the Sochi party organization. The extermination battalion collected 6,112 rubles for New Year gifts to the Red Army, and more than 12 thousand rubles for the "Kubansky Komsomolets" squadron. We are completing an application form for the 2nd State military loan with the 113 % repayment from the wages; we have collected scrap iron, books and magazines for people who have been in the enemy occupation (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 98ob.).*

December 25, 1942, saw a closed meeting by the primary AUCP(B.) party organization of the Adlersky extermination battalion. It paid much attention to the editorial board performance and wall newspaper production. The Communists ratified the following resolutions at the meeting – to approve the wall newspaper work plan and encourage party members to actively engage in the work of the wall newspaper (TsDNIKK. F. 2473. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 13-13ob.).

Political instructors put a major focus on conclusion by soldiers of the extermination battalions of socialist contracts to participate in the socialist competition that was conducted for individuals and for platoons, was a technique of public party activities and was designed to boost the combat and political training of soldiers and commanders (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 97ob.). The following criteria were used to choose a winner in the socialist competition – drill training, weapon materiel, grenade throwing, disguise skills, knowledge of the guard service regulations, intelligence, production of combat leaflets, discipline, alarm collection and bayonet fighting (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 88).

The Sochinsky extermination battalion organized work with young communists on a regular basis. Young people were engaged in public work, political instructors routinely conducted conversations with them, Komsomol members had the task preparing reports and presentations at the party bureau and general meetings (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 97).

Political work comprised agitation activities that were implemented by study groups as well as individually by communists and Komsomol members. Lectures on a variety of topics were given by instructors and lecturers send by the AUCP(B.) city committee two or three times a month. A large section in the agitation efforts was dedicated to the activities of the battalion's editorial board, production of wall newspapers and combat leaflets. Cultural events included the organization of club evenings, amateur events for soldiers and commanders and visits to the state theater by the personnel. The planned agitation efforts, which engaged political instructors, soldiers and commanders, produced a beneficial effect on the work to maintain the military discipline and a combative mood of the battalion personnel (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 97-97ob.).

In 1943, the Sochinsky extermination battalion ran the following study groups – arts and literature, drama, choral singing, sniper skills, chess, physical culture and amateur performances (TsDNIKK. F. 2378. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 19).

In late 1943, the extermination battalions were abolished together with their primary party organizations. Soldiers of the conscription age in the extermination battalions, suitable for military service, were drafted into the Red Army, and the rest joined local air defense units.

4. Conclusion

The extermination battalions were created early in the Great Patriotic War, and first inspections revealed weak discipline and numerous violations in them. To correct this, the party bodies were assigned the task of organizing morale building activities and agitation campaigns among the personnel.

Agitation efforts in the extermination battalions were the responsibility of specialists appointed by primary party organizations of the units. These specialists utilized a wide range of activities, including rallies, lectures, production of wall newspapers and combat leaflets, roll-outs of patriotic and political campaigns and other. Importantly, these had a strong focus on reading and understanding the “Brief course of the history of the AUCP(B)”, which contributed to the ideological indoctrination of Communists, Komsomols and non-Party personnel in line with Marxism-Leninism pillars.

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
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German Propaganda as an Aiding Factor for the Voluntary Recruitment of “Eastern Workers” in the Third Reich

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Abstract

The article researches the problem of the impact of propaganda on the civilian population of the occupied territories of the USSR during the recruitment activities for the Third Reich. Despite the fact that the local population played an insignificant and unenviable role in Germany's vision of war, the information impact was of particular importance: starting from abduction and deportation of large contingents of workers up to the documented justification of humanity and civilizedness of these activities.

The propaganda system was focused on the “Eastern workers” and was distinguished by a good organization, involved a wide range of methods and techniques with a variety of information channels. Nevertheless, it cannot be attributed to the motivation factors for leaving for work in Germany, based only on the citizens' idea of the unacceptability of cooperation with the enemy. But the very experience of applying the German propaganda in this direction, the variety of reactions to it from both sides shows the problems of deportation and further employment of Soviet citizens in the Third Reich.

Keywords: the “Eastern workers”, propaganda, the Third Reich, the Great Patriotic War, World War II, deportation, employment.

1. Introduction

By the beginning of World War II, it was clear that propaganda would be the most important factor in the future confrontation due to the almost incredible success of the use of propaganda during World War I, as well as the impact of huge technological progress in the development of communications (radio was the most developed). The experience of ideological influence on the masses accumulated during the period between the two wars was very important, as well as its' theoretical comprehension. The work of W. Lippman, published in 1922 made a special contribution to the systematization of forms and methods of public opinion managing (Lippman, 2004) and the monograph of E. Berneis, published in 1928 summarized this research for the practice of organized manipulation of the masses (Berneis, 2016). It was the time when the appeal to the psychology was not made with a desire to help to heal a person's mind (as in Freud's methods), but for manipulating it in all areas – in politics, business and culture.

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2. Material and methods

The scale and specificity of the phenomenon stir a particular research interest and cause the appearance of a whole range of questions, the answers to which should involve both the historical genetic methodology and the analysis of the ideas of the National Socialist theorists and their vision of forced labor.

3. Discussion

Propaganda became one of the defining levers in achieving the goals set for the National Socialists, it was actively and diversely used in all spheres and in relation to various subjects. After the Nazis came to power, the propaganda “games” acquired exceptional importance in communication, gradually “penetrating all the pores of the society” (Bramsted, 1965: 52). The slogan that decorated the hall of the Congress of the NSDAP in Nuremberg in 1936 eloquently stated: “Propaganda helped us to come to power. Propaganda helps us to hold the power. Propaganda will help us conquer the whole world” (Zhelev, 1991: 90). And those were not just beautiful words, but a profound narrative on Hitler’s key attitude towards propaganda as a means of moving towards the goal - the struggle for the existence of the German people (Gitler).

This message received serious institutional support. On March 13, 1933, A. Hitler, the Reich Chancellor of Germany, signed an order establishing an apparatus for propaganda with the official name “Imperial Ministry of Public Education and Propaganda”. Joseph Goebbels was appointed the Minister of the Office.

The organizational structure of the ministry included 20 departments (propaganda, press, cinema, literature, music, fine arts, special cultural tasks, foreign press, foreign tourism, personnel, army propaganda, etc.). In the beginning of World War II, there were 13 offices (41 by the end of the war), and their status was upgraded to the imperial departments (management of printed publications distribution, management of artistic forms, imperial film archive, imperial photo archive, imperial sound archive, imperial alliance of the German press, etc.). Despite the constantly growing bureaucracy of the propaganda department, it worked quite quickly and diversely (Zalepeev, 2012: 104). In the official description, the Ministry of War Propaganda was described as “a large unit whose initiative and work is felt literally everywhere” (Anikeev, 2000: 218).

Due to the fact that foreign labor was actively used in the German economy (in the pre-war time, based on a more or less contractual system, during the war - forced, relying on the total removal of the population from the occupied territories and the involvement of prisoners of war), this part of the country's life also had to be built into the system of ideology and its propaganda. Moreover, there was a considerable contingent of workers. According to the materials of the Nuremberg trial, Germany used about 10 million of forced laborers in industry and partly in agriculture during the war, both from the occupied territories and from the prisoners of war (Nyurnbergskii protsess). According to P. Polyansky's calculations, the number of people displaced from the territory of the USSR to the territory owned or controlled by the Third Reich or its allies was about 8 million 700 thousand people, of which about 5 million 450 thousand people were civilians and 3 million 250 thousand were prisoners of war (Polyan, 2002).

The immediate proximity of the residence and work of the “Eastern workers” and the Germans caused not only an ideological dislike, but also an interest in each other, and many ideas about the Soviet man could be revised. For example, the police reports referred to very lively discussions, which suggested that “people from the Soviet Union are better, at least not as bad as they were thought to be. Previously, the broad circles of the German public believed that Soviet people are distinguished by godlessness, low level of intelligence and education, disrespect for family values and immorality. Now many Germans were amazed how much they were mistaken in their former convictions” (Predstavleniya naseleniya, 1994: 34).

Therefore, in order to avoid the influence of the “Eastern workers” on the local population, the authorities forbade any contact between them. Measures were taken to isolate the workers, organize their compact places of residence and establish circulars with the strictest prohibition of communication, “except for service duty” (Prestupnye tseli..., 1985: 203). In regard to Soviet prisoners of war who “passed the school of Bolshevism”, it was prescribed “complete isolation ... from the civilian population, both at work and during leisure time...” (Nyurnbergskii protsess, 5: 343).

Repressive measures could have the opposite effect, and their intensity was superfluous in conditions of the country's mobilization and the idea of the unity of the people and the state during

the war. Therefore, propaganda activities aimed at forming a “special” opinion and attitude towards people from the East. It was conducted both among the civilian population of Germany and in the army, parts of which were involved in the process of deporting Soviet citizens to the Reich ([Krasnozhenova, 2015](#)). For this purpose, the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department was created, which controlled and determined the work of the so-called “propaganda companies”. The personnel of these units were staffed from among journalists, agitators, artists, photo reporters and cameramen who got military training. Smaller military units had propaganda detachments. All these units carried out three main tasks: they spread the National-Socialist ideology in the army through front-line newspapers, radio, movies and interviews with personnel; supplied the Ministry of Propaganda, newspapers, radio and agencies with information about the daily life of the German army, which later was used inside the country and abroad; carried out the functions of military intelligence, informing the relevant authorities about the morale of soldiers and officers.

Nazi propaganda portrayed Soviet citizens through the prism of limited social, cultural and racial traits (“... a soldier who met the Soviet Union only in the present war, will hardly believe this. He sees dirty huts full of insects, concrete skyscrapers of industrial cities and does not know that there used to be some culture in the country, a culture completely destroyed by the Bolsheviks” ([GARK. F. P-156. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 10-11](#))). The image of a barbarian horde threatening the prosperity of Europe was consistently built in the minds of the Germans. With its’ massive impact, this idea did not sound so absurd for the Germans, moreover, it helped to justify the lawlessness and violence towards the Soviet soldiers and civilians ([Pfeifer Justin Thomas, 2014: 93-94](#)).

The presence of propaganda ideas in the minds of the Germans is a rather complex issue, but the negative image of Bolshevik Russia as an enemy state played a pivotal role in the educational process ([Malysheva, 2011: 56](#)). In the memoirs of the former “Eastern workers” we find descriptions of their daily life in the Reich, filled with unbearable work, rude treatment and violence. But there are also enough examples when the Ostarbeiters found understanding and even support among the Germans. Z. Bulycheva recalled that the pipe factory in Witten had separate bomb shelters for the “Eastern workers” and the Germans. When the Allied armies carried out a massive bombardment, and the symbolic shelters for Ostarbeiters burned with the plant, German workers rescued Soviet people, letting them into their shelters. Many of them were participants of the First World War and spoke of Russians with respect and even with some nostalgia for those times ([Lichnyi arkhiv N.A. Garazha](#)). Although, these manifestations were especially characteristic at the final stage of the war, when the fate of the Reich was already evident, and the Germans were afraid of reckoning. This is remembered by the overwhelming number of Ostarbeiters. Filonenko Vladimir Ivanovich, resident of the village of Taman in Krasnodar Region worked as a loader at a glass factory in the city of Ilmenau (Thuringia). He recalled that the German population treated them well, in his opinion mainly out of fear of retaliation from the advancing Soviet troops. The woman for whom he worked in the city constantly told him: “Waldemar, tell them that I did not offend you” ([Lichnyi arkhiv N.A. Garazha](#)).

Since the economically motivated interest in large contingents of the “Eastern workers” increased in proportion to the growing tensions of the war, propaganda rhetoric toward Soviet citizens was balancing between the ideological constant about the Untermensch and the support of workers loyal to the Nazis, which the enterprises and Bauer farms badly needed. In the specialized brochures that acted as a guide for dealing with the civilian population of the occupied territories, the accent was made on the fact that not the entire population of the USSR was subjected to the Jewish-Bolshevik influence (“Are the Eastern peoples aligned with Bolshevism?” Soldiers must distinguish a friend from the enemy” ([GARK. F. P-156. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 10](#))), therefore, “those who want to live and die on their land, operate the machines or work in the field of non-manual labor, must be attracted to our side by our benevolent attitude” ([GARK. F. P-156. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 10-11](#))).

Propaganda among the civilian population of the occupied areas of the USSR, Soviet prisoners of war and Ostarbeiters was active and inventive and was applied at all stages: from recruitment and deportation to working process at the enterprises and leisure time organization. A special organization, “Vineta”, was created for the propaganda “treatment” of civilians from the occupied territories and prisoners of war. Formally, it was not a division of the Ministry of Propaganda, but a registered non-profit organization that even had its own charter, but funded through the office of J. Goebbels. Its task was to prepare propaganda materials for the East in order to organize a voluntary departure to Germany for work and to undermine moral and psychological

state of Soviet citizens. “Vineta” produced printed materials and radio broadcasts in six languages (Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian) (RGVA. F. 1370. Op. 1. D. 10. L. 69). Yu. A. Orlov noted that “its existence was considered most necessary, for example, when the citizens of the USSR in Germany exposed Nazi allegations about the conditions of work and life in the USSR in their everyday contacts with the local population” (Orlov, 1985: 124-125).

Due to the Polish precedent, when the forced recruitment of citizens caused the outburst of the partisan movement, the Nazis at first tried to lure Soviet people to Germany, promising them a better life, appealing to their hardships in the USSR during the war and the accumulated resentment of certain sections of the population against Soviet power. The centers of recruiting workers for Germany were the “labor exchanges” (“labor bureaus”), which were opened everywhere in the cities. In 1942, 110 “labor bureaus” operated in Ukraine. German agitators urged the population to take their part in “building new Europe and ensuring the speedy end of the war” in every possible way attempting to lure people with promises of benefits that supposedly awaited them in the Reich: high wages, the acquisition of valuable specialties and getting acquainted with the European culture (Zemskov, 1986: 180). Indeed, there were examples of voluntary departure caused by a difficult situation or sometimes by the young people’s desire of new impressions (“We lived in a hut, poorly, because our father was repressed. When the German authorities offered the city’s youth to go for six months to work in Germany, I decided to see the world. No one could have foreseen that our people would return” (Doronina, 2012: 43) (reminiscences of R.F. Denschikova, born in the city of Stavropol)).

It is not possible to determine the percentage ratio of deportation/evacuation/departure of Soviet citizens as voluntary or forced. For example, in the city of Oryol local residents were forced to sign labor obligations for a “voluntary” trip to Germany. People were kept under arrest for 3-5 days in the basement, forced by threats, beatings and execution. Thus, 1 221 native inhabitants of Oryol were abducted (GAOO. F. 691. Op. 1. D. 123. L. 5). The way to facilitate the forced export of citizens from the occupied cities of the Leningrad region (Slutsk, Pushkin) to Germany was absolutely unique: people were told that they were “returning” to their homeland, as allegedly, they were the descendants of the Germans who moved to the vicinity of St. Petersburg under Catherine II (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 172. L. 39).

At industrial enterprises, the German occupation administration practiced “workers’ meetings” allegedly with the aim of identifying those wishing to go to work in the Reich, knowing for sure that the workers would refuse such a trip. Therefore, they used a different method, for example, false offers of free food or movies. In fact, people who showed up were put into trains and sent to the territory of the Reich (Zemskov, 1986: 6).

The Nazis often resorted to lies, for example, declaring that the remaining members of the volunteer families would be fully provided with everything (Slin'ko, 1965: 222). This later provoked bewilderment among the trusting adolescents taken to the Reich, as, for example, Varya Karnaukhova from Evpatoria wrote: “Dear family, do not worry about the parcels, for you are receiving rations” (28.08.1943) (GARK. F. P-4602. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 7).

We see the intent to present the abduction of Soviet citizens as voluntary trips for a number of reasons, including propaganda. In this regard, the documentation of the voluntarily departure of Soviet citizens to Germany created a favorable background and statistics for subsequent recruiting of the “Eastern workers”, the appearance of the civilized nature of German business and the possibility of justifiable maneuvers in the future.

Since 1942 Germany was improving the system of forced labor, and the executive branch was undergoing further centralization. The most important measure in this direction was the appointment of Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia “the general commissioner for the use of labor”. In this position, he spoke on behalf of the office, had a four-year plan and in his activity relied on the apparatus of the Ministry of Labor and its peripheral bodies. Also, the Central Planning Office was established, headed by Albert Speer. This institution carried out centralized administration on all issues relating to the economic potential of the country (in the interests of military industry). It also dealt with the labor force (Prestupnye tseli..., 1985: 229).

Since that time, the export of Soviet people to Germany was carried out mainly violently. The methods did not differ in variety and were reduced to repression. The German occupation authorities issued a huge number of orders containing open threats. People, who evaded labor mobilization and ran away, were declared partisans and saboteurs. The practice of detaining

hostages, often members of families mobilized to be sent to Germany, was used to prevent people from escaping. The main method was conducting mass raids on the streets, bazaars and other places of accumulation of people. “Combing” of city quarters and apartments was often carried out at night.

Nevertheless, the vector of propaganda influence continued to play its role, but with a diversified argumentative focus, as it was directed more on the potential of the leaders of the Reich, on the production sector of the German economy, and the world community as a whole. F. Sauckel appealed to the centuries-old experience of the deportations of England and Russia, explaining that Germany included foreign workers in the social community of their country (which never happened before); provided an opportunity to acquire rich work experience and promoted social recovery of Europe (RGVA. F. 1370. Op. 2. D. 284. L. 3). A high-flown propaganda style permeated the records of organizations involved in deportation and labor distribution at enterprises in the Reich. There were frequent references to “providing work in Germany to millions of European workers”, “solving workers’ problems in improving their rations and reviewing the issue of wages” (GARF. F. P-7021. Op. 148. D. 11. L. 33), “providing foreign workers with light apartments, theaters, art and music” (RGVA. F. 1370. Op. 2. D. 284. L. 8), which in fact did not correspond to reality.

A. Rosenberg didn’t participate in the lengthy arguments about the significance of Germany’s abduction of the civilians from the occupied territories. He insisted that the method of threats and violence was not productive, moreover, it provoked the partisan movement. A more reasonable belief was that: “after the people realized the feasibility of this, 90 % of them enrolled as volunteers and left the train station accompanied by the music. If you surrounded the villages in advance, it will only awaken the old fear of Bolshevik deportations and it would make it difficult for everyone” (Politicheskii dnevnik..., 2015: 351).

The representatives of the armed forces noted that the “rude statements, for example: “the colonial people should be treated with a whip just as Negroes ...”, “the Slavic people should be kept as ignorant as possible ...” had the worst impact on the will to work than any other activities. Therefore, they insistently demanded to soften the rhetoric of appeals: “If we were to announce our will to the people in an obviously aggressive form with respect to domestic policy as opposed to other issues, then the political leadership in the East should be secretive about the necessary cruelty of the German policy. We must remain silent about the possibly negative treatment of the conquered peoples. Obviously, reasonable German policy can achieve more under certain conditions by minor indulgences and in some cases by some humanity than by open ill-considered cruelty” (GARF. F. P-7021. Op. 148. D. 217. L. 2). Propaganda was supposed to equilibrate violent actions.

What real propaganda methods were used during the deportation, what were the principles and rules of propaganda, and what were the active information channels? The Ministry of Propaganda singled out the following propaganda principles extrapolated to the “Eastern workers”:

1. Cynicism and perseverance,
2. Counter-information method (i.e. immediate response, reaction to the opponent’s actions),
3. Repetition of the same statements,
4. Exaggeration and distortion of opponents’ messages,
5. Gloss over everything related to Germany (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 38. L. 66-69),
6. Priority of slogan expressions,
7. The masses are the recipient of propaganda. “Propaganda is the content and form of an idea that has reached the broad masses, and its correctness is measured solely by its real success”

(Mazer, 2007: 223-224, 228).

8. The autochthonous population should be perceived as an actively consumed resource: “no artificial intellectual development of the population, preservation as a labor force”. The interest of Germany was a primary basis for staying in the occupied territory and for interaction with the local population, from which “certain strict government actions follow, depending on the circumstances and in accordance with the behavior of the population” (GARF. F. R-7021. Op. 148. D. 217. L. 1).

Later, these principles were transformed into specific organizational structures and activities, for example, the Crimean propaganda headquarters activities. It worked on the following types of propaganda activities:

- active propaganda. Propaganda work among the population through meetings, demonstrations, posters, leaflets, brochures, reading-rooms, shop windows and by using agitation cars with radio.

- printing. Control of the press and publication of newspapers in German.

- Cinema.

- Radio and telegraph.

- Cultural work. Coverage of all existing theaters, orchestras, local writers. Control over cinemas and libraries, influence on pedagogical literature and management of local teachers (GARK. F. P-156. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 1).

One of the characteristic signs of psychological influence was the use of original propaganda techniques. In the memoirs of the “Eastern workers” of all ages there is evidence of how the local population was irritated by the noise that their wooden shoes were making when the column of workers was moving along the road. Such unnecessary noise was deliberately created on the direct order of the guards. C. Birdsall refers this to acoustic propaganda, which uses resonant urban spaces, in which sound is reflected from walls and other street surfaces. The vibrating sounds, according to the researcher, are historically considered an illustration of the power of the authorities (Birdsall, 2012: 32-33). In the case of Ostarbeiters, this was a domestic irritant in the well-adjusted rhythm of life of the Germans, simultaneously demonstrating the dependence of the defeated enemy on the conqueror.

Printed products differed in a variety of forms, accompanied by texts in fluent Russian (or Ukrainian/Belarusian), illustrations and photographs. But all the texts were conditional, i.e. contained mandatory conditions, which lowered credibility. For example, as in Information No. 1 for workers from the eastern regions stated: “Germany can and will help you. In Germany, you get work and bread. If you work diligently and behave impeccably, you will meet humane, dignified and just attitude” (GARF. F. P-7021. Op. 148. D. 67. L. 2).

One of the forms of voluntary recruitment of Soviet citizens for work in Germany was the Ostarbeiters’s letters home with a description of the “blessings” that they were given in a foreign land. A. Rosenberg at the meeting of the German Labor Front in November 1942 emphasized the psychological significance of this method, ensuring the effectiveness of new workers recruitment.

Promises of the best, civilized and, most importantly, prosperous life in Germany were to be effective for the population suffering from hunger. “... It was not easy at all”, Rosenberg said, “you cannot imagine how big the load was during these days - 3,000 trains with food arrived from the East to Germany; add to this that the entire army in the East is being supplied on site, and this supply does not include what the soldiers are getting for themselves” (Nyurnbergskii protsess, 4: 664). Therefore, the total plunder of only Krasnodar Territory was amounted to 28,764 thousand rubles (damage to enterprises and offices of the Narkomtorg), for the RSFSR this figure reached 347 million rubles, or 75 % of the total amount of damage in the republic. The remaining 25 % was the damage inflicted on the inhabitants of the province, their personal property and economy during the occupation period (GARF. F. P-7021. Op. 147. D. 11. L. 11, 27).

Nazi propaganda actively used the publication of letters in occupation newspapers with favorable reviews of Soviet people who were working in Germany. For example, Maria Glazkova’s letter was published on the front page of the “Maykopskaya zhizn” (“Life of Maykop”) newspaper. In this letter she allegedly conveyed her impressions of the conditions of female labor in the USSR, on the basis of her personal experience, comparing them with the organization and working conditions in the city of Ratenkov in Germany (Malysheva, 2011). The method of contrasting the “virtues” of National Socialism with the negative features of Bolshevism, which has long been approved by the Nazis, is vividly traced in this letter, and it once again convinces us of its propaganda agenda.

The testimonies of female workers who visited Germany were also used in special propaganda programs on the Crimean radio, with the active participation of RLA representatives (GARK. F. P-156. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 27). Those programs alternated with entertainment ones to increase the audience. And this, according to D. Welch, is the most impressive achievement of the Nazis, that was aimed at creating a massive community of listeners (Welch, 2012: 43).

By the middle of the war, there was a decrease in interest in political radio programs in favor of entertainment ones in Germany. For example, the most popular radio program was “songs on demand” - Wunschkonzert. We can judge the effectiveness of this in the occupied territory only on

the basis of the general mood of the enemy's rejection, on the one hand, and on the other, the intensification of the regime of violence by the occupation authorities during the deportation. The collection of letters of the "Eastern workers" from Crimea in The State Archives of the Republic of Crimea demonstrates the young age of the authors (mostly teenage schoolchildren) (the collection totals 1,607 pcs, collected in 15 cases) (Garazha, 2016).

Cinema was another actively used propaganda channel. All the pre-war cinemas operated in the occupied territories, with their programs printed in the newspapers. There were no prohibitions or obstacles for visiting the cinema for the locals. But sometimes a selection of films or presumptive propaganda documentary films caused viewers' negative emotions (ridicule, irritation or boredom). For example, according to the report of the Chief of Police and SS of the Crimea to the Crimean propaganda headquarters "On Films", dated 16.03.1943, the first performance for young people organized by the Crimean propaganda headquarters was held in the "Tsentrall" cinema (city of Simferopol). The theater was full of visitors, mostly children from 7 to 12 years. "The mood before the beginning of the session was joyfully tense. ... Advertising contradicted the movie. ... The movie "King Edelweiss" is a love story with an attempted suicide, etc. Many children were bored and some left during the movie. ... The film is boring and is not suitable for children" (GARF. F. P-156. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 9). Further, the Chief of Police and SS of Crimea stressed that the propaganda film about the delivery of bombs to Tunisia caused ironic comments: "I think it is necessary to cut out these images from the weekly sessions".

Since the workers' arrival on the territory of the Reich and their inclusion in the production activities, propaganda work continued. Its main tasks were maintenance of discipline and order in places of compact residence of workers, motivation for work, formation of moods of rejection of the Soviet ideology and authorities. In the auxiliary methodological recommendations for labor camps it was said that "... spiritual upbringing (care) is of the greatest importance for keeping foreign workers capable and joyous with labor" (GARF. F. R-7021. Op. 148. D. 11. L. 76-77). In labor camps talks, concerts and sporting events, films, libraries and foreign language courses, etc. were to be organized. But such leisure activities were not widespread due to the prevalence of violent methods of communication with the "Eastern workers".

Manipulation of values and beliefs, pressure on the most sensitive aspects of the psychology were used by the Nazis as one of the necessary tools of communication with their people as well as the means of their fight against the enemy. This gave this war the character of the Nazi revolt against culture, morality, against man, his right to dignity, honor and, finally, his right of life.

4. Conclusion

Specificity of ideological influence on society and individual personality lies in the fact that it can be used multiply on the same object. During the war, in its different periods and from different sides, Soviet citizens, German occupation authorities and Wehrmacht troops were subjected to mutual ideological influence. The German forces created a precedent of the possibility of involving potential workers from the occupied territories in their propaganda activities, avoiding coercion and maneuvering the moods of the enemy/occupant. The confluence of threats, well-reasoned beliefs and flirting on ethnic, religious and gender grounds became a distinctive feature of the information and communication work of German propagandists, including the work with "Eastern workers".

At the same time, the tasks of propaganda and, in general, its role in the deportation of Soviet citizens to the Reich underwent changes, mainly on the basis of the change in military situation and discussions within the party and the administrative structures on the occupied territory.

Undoubtedly, the mass departure was forced, but the seeds of doubts in Soviet ideology and politics were planted in the minds of some citizens, and extensive documentation related to propaganda work emphasized its effectiveness. Confirmation of the latter had the value of a prolonged strategic orientation.

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
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Mediatization of the Topic of Human Victims of the Occupation in the Soviet Newspaper Periodicals of 1943 (on the Example of Photographic Materials)

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Abstract

The article reviews mediation processes that accompanied the preparation of the first trials of war criminals in the USSR in 1943. During the liberation of the country's territories occupied by the Nazi invaders, the truth about the atrocities committed against peaceful Soviet citizens was revealed. The crimes of the enemy and his accomplices were covered in the Soviet press, including through photo-printing of newspapers. In this article, we analyzed the content and dynamics of the photographic presentation of this topic in the central and regional printed periodicals during 1943, and also evaluated the possible effects of its impact on the audience. This aspect is of interest in the context of the topic of information preparation of the first trial of the accomplices of the enemy, which took place in Krasnodar in July 1943, as well as the next war crimes tribunal that was held in Kharkov in December 1943.

Keywords: the Second World War, the German fascist invaders, collaborators, crime, Krasnodar trial in 1943, human victims, the Soviet newspaper, media policy, photographs.

1. Introduction

Seventy five years have passed since a high-profile trial over the accomplices of the German fascist invaders, which took place in Krasnodar. It was the first process in a series of tribunals referred to as the "Soviet Nuremberg" by researchers. Today, the issue of the organizational and legal principles for prosecuting Hitler's war criminals and their accomplices can be considered as the one that has been quite thoroughly addressed. In this regard, particular emphasis should be put on the dissertation research, monograph and scholarly papers by A. Ye. Epifanov (Epifanov, 2017; Epifanov, 2001). A number of Russian researchers are successfully working to reconstruct the historical context of specific tribunals and create a detailed picture of these events in "faces" (of victims, the accused, judges, spectators) (Stepanov, 2010; Astashkin, 2015). However, in our view, one essential aspect of the topic of the trials over war criminals still remains inadequately studied. This is the information preparation. The useful works that highlights this aspect include the papers by D.Yu. Astashkin (Astashkin, 2016), V. Voisen (Voisen, 2012) and I. Bourtman (Bourtman, 2008). The author of this paper also published the findings of her own content analysis focused on the issues of mediatizing the topic of crimes committed by the Hitlerites and their accomplices (as illustrated by the example of information support of the tribunals carried out in Krasnodar in 1943 and in the 1960s) (Tazhidinova, 2016; Tazhidinova, 2017).

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2. Materials and methods

Since photographs provide valuable documentary evidence, and given the purpose and special nature of their use in the printed media, the discourse analysis of the photographic presentations covering specific events, topics and problems becomes more relevant than ever. Our study is centered on the topic of the victims of the occupation, spotlighted by Soviet printed periodicals in 1943, i.e. over the year when the war was yet to end, and the country was swept by a first wave of trials over German fascist invaders and their accomplices, charged with grave crimes against civilians. The study of the photographic imagery devoted to this problem was carried out using the materials of two central newspapers (*Izvestija* and *Krasnaja Zvezda*) and a regional newspaper (*Bolshevik*, the official printed mouthpiece of the Krasnodar Krai Committee and the City Committee of the AUCP B (All-Union Communist Party Bolsheviks), Krasnodar Krai Council of Working People's Deputies). The analysis of the photographs is an integral part of our content-analytical research into publications in the Soviet printed periodicals of 1943, which covered the range of issues related to the atrocities perpetrated by the enemy in the temporarily occupied territories of the USSR. In general, this study intends to discover the role that the Soviet printed media played in the preparation of the Krasnodar trial of 1943. (Tazhidinova, 2016). The interpretation of the photographs focuses much on the communicative force of the photographic images, considering the meanings they contain and those messages that they carried to the audience of the Soviet printed media at the time of publication.

The methodological foundation of the study was formed by the principles of objectivity and historicism, which imply an unbiased approach to the analysis of problems under review and a critical attitude to sources, as well as mean considering phenomena in the corresponding historical environment. The comparative and historical method allowed for a comparison of the situation, which preceded the Krasnodar process (July 1943), and the circumstances that evolved shortly before the next major trial – in Kharkov (December 1943).

3. Results and discussion

In earlier works, we already described the goals of the articles, thematic collections and photographs in the Soviet press periodicals (central and regional ones), which highlighted the issues of the atrocities perpetrated by the enemy in the temporarily occupied territories of the USSR (Tazhidinova, 2016). As a reminder, their first goal was to foment hatred towards the enemy on an emotional level; an objective basis for this was provided by the statistics and details of the atrocities committed by the Nazis on the USSR's territories liberated from the occupation. Secondly, the dynamism of publications on this topic was fuelled by the need to make the desired effect on the international community, and respond to the provocative “newsbreaks” on the part of the Hitlerites. Activities undertaken by all Soviet media had great significance for the preparation campaign before the first open trial over the enemy's accomplices, held in Krasnodar from July 14 to 17, 1943.

The presentation of the Krasnodar process in 1943 in the Soviet print media was by no means limited to the chronicles of its court sessions, although, of course, the chronicle was the core of this presentation; accordingly, readers' attention is focused on the Soviet system of justice as a subject of the process. Other elements of the presentation (we mean by-liners and photographic materials, that have received only cursory attention of researchers so far) were targeted other subjects in the process. So, by-liners purposefully focused on the “executioners” from among the accused. Although the images of the latter (photographs or cartoons) never leaked into the Soviet press (and this tactical move was a specific feature of the Krasnodar process presentation), the content of these articles is critical, and we will certainly provide an in-depth analysis of it in the near future. Speaking of the photo design of the newspapers containing the materials on the process, it also had its own essential focus.

In addition, the support of the Krasnodar process with photographic materials deserves attention because in the period under review, providing most Soviet newspapers with visual evidence did not yet evolve into routine practice. For a regional newspaper, placing one or several photographs became what is called an “event of the issue”. A number of central printed editions did not provide many photographs as well; for example, far not every issue of *Izvestija*, one of the country's leading newspapers, published photos. In this context, it is obvious that any photographs

attracted exceptional interest of the readership, if the pictures did appear and in particular if they reproduced the stories that were rarely seen in the Soviet press.

At this point, we should note that the visual display of the traces of the “excruciation” practiced by the Nazis on the USSR territories, liberated from temporary occupation, was not ranked among themes widely employed by social and political newspaper journalism; photographs that recorded the ravages of warfare were constantly demonstrated by Soviet newspapers, but human victims of Hitler’s terror were left behind the scenes. This policy can be explained, on the one hand, by the wish to show delicate empathy for people who were already utterly afflicted and saw enough of the horrors of war. Probably, the very ugliness of “the work of death,” which journalistic cameras would inevitably fix, deterred the newspapers from publishing shocking images. On the other hand, civilian casualties – those who were not kept safe or protected – were an indirect incrimination for the authorities. They were a reproach to their weakness and inability to confront the aggressor at a certain time; of course, the authorities did not want for others to draw such conclusions and did not intend to instigate them.

Over the first half of 1943 (right until the Krasnodar process), photographs of victims in the USSR’s territories liberated from the occupation appeared only twice in the pages of *Izvestija*. The first publication exposed the “atrocities of the German fascist cannibals in Rostov-on-Don” in mid-March. The Report on the Crimes of the Hitlerites in this city was then accompanied by 8 pictures with half of them showing the bodies of the shot and tortured Rostovites ([Izvestiya, 1943: 13 marta](#)). The next selection of photographs was released in *Izvestija*’s April issue that covered the atrocities of the German fascist invaders in the cities of Vyazma, Gzhatsk, Sychevka and Rzhev ([Izvestiya, 1943: 6 aprelya](#)). This issue, in addition to an editorial and large communication from ChGK (Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Perpetrated by the German-Fascist Invaders and their Accomplices), also featured a selection of 7 photographs. Three of them captured the corpses of killed women and children, and in another picture, citizens could see the ChGK Chairman himself, N.M. Shvernik, in the group of people standing in the ruins of Sychevka. Actually, only these two “cases” formed *Izvestija*’s contribution to the visualization of “atrocities” in the first half of 1943.

We cannot say that *Izvestija* made efforts to provide diverse photographic perspectives for the materials of the first open trial in Krasnodar in July 1943; we discovered no pictures from the courtroom nor from the execution site in the six issues of the newspaper, which covered the proceedings of this case. It is all the more obvious that the focus of attention was deliberately put on the human victims of Hitler’s terror in the Kuban region; it was this death toll that was featured by 8 of 9 photographs in four consecutive issues of the newspaper.

The first two photos actually preceded the Krasnodar Tribunal, and it is significant that they were not even “tied” to any text. Indeed, *Izvestija* of July 14, 1943, published no materials related to Krasnodar, but the penultimate page of the issue contained two photographs of adults and children “killed by carbon monoxide poisoning <...> found in an anti-tank ditch on the outskirts of the Krasnodar city” ([Izvestiya, 1943: 14 iyulya](#)). The three issues of the newspaper, which followed, consistently presented materials on the Krasnodar trial and necessarily exhibited photo selections on the topic of “atrocities committed by the German fascist invaders and their accomplices.”

Actually, this was the first experience of such variety, which produced a prolonged and, accordingly, massive impact on the audience of the printed media. The images reflected two kinds of “atrocities” that were primarily discussed at the trial. This was poisoning people in the “gas chambers” and burning alive in the Gestapo building. *Izvestija*’s selections included no pictures of people living at that time, whether they were the accused, lawyers, witnesses or the public. One minor exception only concerned people in “white coats.” The panoramic photo of the excavated graves, printed in the issue of July 15, only allows for visible outlines of doctors or other medical staff far in the background. In the issue of July 16, the materials on the trial were illustrated with a photograph which showed medical expert Dr. P.S. Semenovskiy making a post-mortem examination of the corpse of a child “brutally murdered” by invaders (however, the face of the doctor who bent over the body remained hidden, but his shocking manipulations with the body turned up in the foreground) ([Izvestiya, 1943: 15 iyulya, 16 iyulya, 17 iyulya](#)). As for the location of all these photographs, they were traditionally given the lower part of the 2nd or 3d page of the 4-page newspaper. The authors of the photographs were TASS photo correspondents I. Ozerskoy, F. Belosludtsev and others.

Photographs of photo chronicler Belosludtsev were also printed by Krasnaja Zvezda. Some of them were similar to those published in Izvestija, and they were even located almost in the same positions in specific numbers. The message of the created photographic series was also in no way different from Izvestija's line. Three successive issues of Krasnaja Zvezda were illustrated by 8 photographs, 7 of which showed the bodies of Krasnodar inhabitants tortured to death by the Hitlerites ([Krasnaya Zvezda, 1943: 15 iyulya, 16 iyulya, 17 iyulya](#)). These photographs, placed directly under the trial materials, showed the two most terrible sites in liberated Krasnodar – the anti-tank ditch where Germans brought thousands of people poisoned with carbon monoxide, and the Gestapo building in which they burned 300 people. The quality of the photographic images, printed by newspapers, left much to be desired and was able to worsen the already painful emotions from viewing them. Comparison with other photo materials in both printed editions (in other issues or on other topics) reveals that they often have a higher level. We can take the liberty of suggesting that the photo chroniclers left the blur in the images intentionally to mitigate the details of the horrifying shots.

Speaking of the Kuban newspaper Bolshevik, it featured the materials of the trial in five of its issues, but none of them were supported by visual evidence. In general, photos documenting the atrocities of the German fascist invaders in the Krasnodar Krai were already displayed by this regional edition a few months earlier. The presentation was designed as a very strong block in the Bolshevik issue arranged by theme to expose specific crimes of the Hitlerites. The photo block was published March 28, 1943 and accompanied the editorial “Let us punish the murderers!” ([Bol'shevik, 1943: 28 marta](#)). 9 photos inserted on different levels of the 2nd page of the issue (horizontally at the top and at the bottom, vertically in the center) were supposed to bolster the Report on Fascist Atrocities in Krasnodar and a series of exposing articles. The photographs captured traces of the “atrocities” in Krasnodar and in the Apsheonskaya stanitsa (village) – they presented material devastation and victims in equal proportions. No documentary photographs of the atrocities perpetrated by the invaders on the Kuban land in 1943 appeared in the newspaper, with one exception. A single photograph was published in the May issue of Bolshevik directly above the block of propaganda materials titled “We will wreak vengeance on fascist bandits for blood and tears of Soviet people!” The photo showed inhabitants of the Akhtyrskaya stanitsa, Abinsk district, bending over the corpses of the villagers shot by Germans ([Bol'shevik, 1943: 12 maya](#)).

In general, if compared with textual evidence (editorials, topical collections, articles), photo documents in the regional press were not given much space, which could be related to technical and material difficulties of publishers. At the same time, it is logical to assume that photographs attracted attention and enhanced the reliability of the content detailed in articles. In addition, Bolshevik announced the launch of photo display cases and exhibitions on the atrocities that took place during the Kuban's occupation. We know from the newspaper that in April 1943, such photo display cases were installed right on the streets of Krasnodar, and people crowded around them all day long. The exhibition featured materials shot in the first days after the city's liberation and during grave excavations. The Museum of the Local History of Sochi prepared a special display on the same topic to be launched in early summer ([Bol'shevik, 1943: 13 aprelya, 30 maya](#)).

In August 1943, three weeks after the execution of eight people sentenced at the open Krasnodar trial, Bolshevik announced to the Kuban audience that soon a cine-magazine “The People's Verdict” would come out, created by a special Soyuzkinokhronika crew based on the materials of the Krasnodar trial process (the cine-magazine already began its run in Moscow). A month passed, and one week (from September 5 to 12) witnessed the newspaper advertising the documentary shows in the “Velikan” movie theater (the very venue where the trial took place); prices for all places were “reduced,” and team viewing applications were accepted ([Bol'shevik, 1943: 10 avgusta, 31 avgusta, 5 sentyabrya](#)).

Over the remainder of the year after the Krasnodar process, the regional press, to the best of its ability, continued its efforts to make the public aware of the atrocities in the Kuban and other regions of the country, but from the perspective of their photo coverage, its contribution – already rather small – was further minimized. The issues of Bolshevik printed only one photograph over the second half of 1943, which is related to the issue of the “atrocities.” This is a photo from the September issue of Bolshevik, which showed Red Army soldiers standing over the bodies of twenty inhabitants of the Peshkovo village, Orel region, shot dead ([Bol'shevik, 1943: 10 sentyabrya](#)).

Generally speaking, the question of the trends in photo design of textual materials on the atrocities “after” the Krasnodar trial is, of course, important. If we turn to *Izvestija*, we will find out that the trend reflected a surge in photographic materials in September, and following the events – no photos, right until the illustration of the materials on the Kharkov trial in December 1943. In September, photographic documents were published in four issues of *Izvestija*; they were directly associated with further liberation from the occupation of the country's all new territories and with the facts of atrocities uncovered there. This is about the Orel city and region; *Izvestija* of September 7 featured an editorial and a large report by the ChGK, accompanied by 6 photographs of the atrocities perpetrated by Germans in Orel. This photo coverage was different from the “model” coverage of the Krasnodar trial as the former showed a greater variety of topics and scenes. Although the dominating idea of the images (of 4 of 6) still described opened graves, but one shot captured a ChGK member, Academician N.N. Burdenko when he examined skulls and corpses. In addition, the publication included a photo of hanged Orel inhabitants ([Известия, 1943: 7 сентября](#)).

September issues of *Izvestija* printed photographs of the atrocities three more times, and in all cases, they denounced the atrocities of the Hitlerites in Ukraine. 3 photos of the corpses of children and women showed traces of Germans’ stay in Makeyevka. A distinction was that the victims here were listed by name and with details on how exactly they were killed ([Известия, 1943: 12 сентябрия](#)). Another 6 photos in the newspaper's two issues captured the traces of the invaders’ stay in Poltava. They were about the burning of civilians in the building of the Poltava museum and in the school building in the state farm Stekhovka, the Grobinovsky Selsoviet (rural council), Poltava district ([Известия, 1943: 28 сентябрия, 30 сентябрия](#)).

Analyzing the September photos, it is noticeable that most of them were made with the higher quality compared to those that were made in Krasnodar and published during the trial process in July. It is particularly salient in the photographs from Makeyevka shot with maximum zoom and clarity – and therefore chillingly realistic – whose author was a special military correspondent of *Izvestija*, S. Gurariy. Now the photo blocks were more often filled with living people who had just dug up graves or were performing forensic medical examination. An example is, in particular, a photo from Orel which showed city residents and the Red Army soldiers frozen in front of the pit, or the military doctors examining skulls directly in the pit (author – E. Kopyt, TASS photo chronicle).

Finally, the last visualization on the subject of the atrocities, published by *Izvestija* in 1943, was related to the trial in Kharkov in December. It is much more laconic than what bolstered materials of the Krasnodar trial in July; it appears only in two issues of the newspaper and includes only three photographs (two of human remains from excavated ditches, one of hanged Kharkovites) ([Известия, 1943: 16 декабря, 17 декабря](#)). The authorship of the photographs, which were traditionally placed on the third (i.e. next to the last) page of the edition, is not given, but the photographs seem clearer than the Krasnodar ones.

4. Conclusion

An analysis of the content and trends in the photo presentation on the subject of human victims of Hitler’s terror in the occupied territories of the USSR, featured in the Soviet printed media throughout 1943, allows us to speak of intensified propaganda activities in terms of “retaliation policy.” The key goal that the Soviet leadership tried to achieve by various methods, including the media policy tools, was to prevent Hitler’s “executioners” from going unpunished for their monstrous crimes.

Photographic materials depicting the atrocities of the enemy against civilians received increasingly wider presence in newspapers since early 1943. Their quantitative growth and visual “harshness” reflected the trajectory of information preparation before the first open trial over war criminals, which was soon held in Krasnodar July 14-17, 1943. As for the photo materials on the trial itself, the coverage of the Krasnodar tribunal by the central and regional printed media has a specific feature (if compared to subsequent reports of the “Soviet Nuremberg”) – the focus of the photo visualization. It is essential that the photos, which preceded and accompanied the chronicle of the trial in Soviet newspapers, captured not the accused, judges, witnesses or spectators, but the victims of Hitler’s terror in the period of the Kuban's occupation. We can suggest that this explicit

perspective of the trial's photo coverage was not chosen by chance; it certainly made a strong impression on readers both inside the country and abroad.

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
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Letter to the Editor

“Soldier’s Greetings” Lubok Print as a Historical Source of the Period of the Russo-Japanese War

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Abstract

The article analyzes the historical source – “the Soldier’s greetings” lubok print. The attention is paid to the internal and external criticism of the source.

The material is a two-sided lubok picture “Soldier’s greetings”, printed in St. Petersburg, compiled by G. Bayturov. Lithograph of T. Kibbel. Currently, this lubok is a rarity. It was found in an antique shop in Chisinau (Republic of Moldova) in 2018.

In conclusion, the author notes that the presented lubok picture is attributed to the period of the Russo-Japanese War. This picture was distinguished by simplicity and plain text, since the main readers of lubok prints were servicemen and their family members, as well as the civil population. The main propaganda messages were: the Soldier’s service is difficult, but honorable; the future prosperity of the country depends on the soldier; in faithful service there are no big difficulties, the soldier just needs to follow the oath, and also about the unity of the Tzar with the people.

Keywords: lubok print, Russo-Japanese War, historical source, “Soldier’s greetings”, military oath.

1. Introduction

The Lubok art was an important part of military propaganda of the early twentieth century. Lubok was a popular print, a leaflet with a joke. Lubok is a kind of graphics, an image with a caption distinguished by the simplicity and accessibility. Originally it was a kind of folk art. At the beginning of the 20th century, due to the development of book printing it became more professional, elegant and informative. In this respect, an interesting lubok called “Soldier’s greetings”, printed during the Russo-Japanese War draws our attention.

2. Materials and methods

The material is a two-sided popular picture “Soldier’s greetings” (Figure 1), printed in St. Petersburg, compiled by G. Bayturov. Lithograph of T. Kibbel. There also is information about the publisher, part of it is lost, it reads “Publ ... turov”. We can assume it was published by G. Bayturov.

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Currently, this lubok is a rarity. It was found in an antique shop in Chisinau (Republic of Moldova) in 2018.



Fig. 1. "Soldier's greetings" lubok print.

The methodological basis of the research was the traditional historiography principles of historicism, scientific objectivity and systematic. Methods of working with historical sources, as well as internal and external criticism, have been used.

3. Results

External criticism of the source

The dimensions of the print are 19.5 cm tall and 12.5 cm wide. The paper is about 500 g/m. Central medallion – a portrait of Emperor Nicholas II pressed by the contour. Multicolor printing. At the bottom in the center there is a partial loss of lubok, which, however, is not significant. Lubok has obvious signs of usage and stains. The degree of preservation and the method of printing of the paper clearly indicate that it was created in the early twentieth century. This indicates that the source is authentic and original.

The reasons for which we determined that the source was created during the period of the Russo-Japanese, and not in the First World War are the following:

1. In the First World War, St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd;
2. At the lithography, the emperor is of an age, as well as has a set of awards characteristic for the early twentieth century.

For comparison, we can give the following examples (Figure 2)



Fig. 2. Emperor Nicholas II: a – at the end of the XIX century, b – at the beginning of the XX century, c- In the 1910's.

Internal criticism of the text

A portrait of Emperor Nicholas II with the signature "His Imperial Majesty the Emperor Nicholas Alexandrovich" is on the front side of the postcard. Below in the center there is an officer's order of St. George on the St. George ribbon in a wreath. A patriotic poem "Soldier's greetings" is on both sides of the image.

"The whole world
Knows the Russian soldier!
Let us sing, fellows
Our greetings to the sun!
The Tzar,
The White Russian Tzar,
Is the Head of everyone,
Our First Emperor!
You just say the word,
You only glance,
We are willing to die,
Even if You lead us right away!
And just like before, again,
For You, our dear,
With fidelity
We will be ahead!

8 patriotic slogans and a military oath are printed on the reverse side. The text of the military oath to Emperor Nicholas II and the Motherland might have been published quite often, but at the present time it is rare to find. The text of the oath takes the central place of the card and moves to the reverse side. The text of the oath is as follows:

"Military oath of allegiance to the Tzar and the Motherland.

I, hereinafter named, promise and swear by Almighty God, before His Holy Gospel, in what I want and owe to His Imperial Majesty, my true and natural All-Merciful Great Emperor Nikolai Alexandrovich, the autocrat of the All-Russian and legitimate Imperial Majesty of the All-Russian Throne, the Heir, to serve truly and unfeigned, not to spare my life, to the last drop of blood. And all to His High Imperial Majesty's Autocracy, to the power belonging to the rights and advantages, legitimized and further legitimized, at the extreme understanding, power and opportunity, to fulfill, His Imperial Majesty the State and the lands of his enemies, in body and blood, in the field and in fortresses, in water and dry way, in battles, in parties, sieges and assaults and in other military

cases, brave and strong to rebuild resistance and to try to help that to His Imperial Majesty faithful service and benefit of the state in any case may concern. On the damage to His Majesty's interest, harm and loss, as soon as I know about it, not just to announce it in time, but also by any measures to ward off and not to be allowed to be stolen, and I will firmly keep any entrusted secrecy, and to the appointed home-based superiors in everything that is useful and service of the State will concern, properly maintain obedience and all in the conscience. And for my self-interest, property, friendship and enmity against service and oath not to act, from the team and the banner where I belong, although in the field, the convoy or the garrison, I never leave, but for that, while alive, I will follow and in everything behave and act as an honest, faithful, obedient, brave and agile soldier. In what ways does the Lord God Almighty help me. In the conclusion of this oath I kiss the words and the cross of my Savior. Amen”.

The image of the slogans as follows (Figure 3)



Fig. 3. Numbering of slogans

According to Figure 3 we can see a slogan No. 1 above the military oath, interspersed with the monogram of Nicholas II: “The soldier will not falter in a terrible hour: He is sworn in oath: In it, God and Tzar’s orders are: Win or die” (Figure 4).



Fig. 4. Slogan № 1, interspersed in the monogram of Nicholas II

Below the oath is the text of the slogan the No. 2. It is partially lost, but readable: “The royal servants are such men, They will not forget the oath, They may be without a head, but they cannot be without honor!”

On the left side of the oath are three verbal statements (Nos. 3-5):

No. 3. “Soldier, forget your desire: Oath is the will of Amen”;

No. 4 “Soldier needs hardness most of all: even on the bottom of the sea he is with it!”;

№ 5. “In the Tsar's hand, the army is a sword, So that the Tzar can protect the truth!”.

On the right side of the oath, three slogans (Nos. 6-8) are also presented:

№ 6. “The soldier will die, but he will not betray, For this the Tzar appreciates the soldier”;

No. 7. “To scare the enemy, All Russia is given to the soldier for keeping it safe”;

No. 8. “He who is sworn in with an oath, is straightforward”.

As expected, this picture has simple and clear texts. The target readers of lubok were to be among the servicemen and their family members, as well as the civil population. The main message that this propaganda material conveys is that the soldier's service is difficult, but honorable (Slogan № 2) and that the future prosperity of the country depends on the soldier (Slogan № 7). At the same time, attention is focused on the fact that there are no big difficulties in the faithful service, the soldier just needs to follow the oath (Slogans № 3, 8). The connection of the Tzar with the people is also important. This message is found in the slogans № 1, 2, 5, 6.

4. Conclusion

Summing up, we would like to note that the presented lubok picture is attributed as a source of the period of the Russo-Japanese War. As expected, this picture has simple and straightforward texts. The target readers of lubok were to be among the servicemen and their family members, as well as the civil population. The main propaganda messages were: the Soldier's service is difficult, but honorable; the future prosperity of the country depends on the soldier; in a faithful service there are no big difficulties, the soldier just needs to follow the oath, as well as the unity of the Tzar with his people.