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COGNITIVE PRAGMATIC REGULARITIES IN COMMUNICATIVE MANIFESTATION OF POSITIVE EVALUATION

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Abstract: The article focuses on the pragmatic peculiarities of evaluative cognitive judgment formation and its transformation into an evaluative communicative utterance. The article provides a positive evaluative taxonomy of approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts, functioning in English literary discourse and film discourse. The illocutionary aims, evaluation objects and themes, as well as the perlocutionary effect of approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts have been outlined.

Key words: evaluation, evaluative judgment vs evaluative utterance, literary discourse, film discourse, speech act, approval, praise, compliment, flattery.

1. Introduction

Evaluation has received the status of a universal cognitive category that affects all spheres of human being and thinking. This fact generates an increased interest of contemporary linguists in the issues of evaluation processes. In the present paper, an attempt has been made to study the cognitive pragmatic properties and regularities of communicative manifestation of positive evaluation in English literary and film discourse.

The category of evaluation has been defined as a pragmatic and semantic category represented by evaluative units at all speech levels. Typically, these evaluative units convey positive, negative, or ambivalent speaker's attitude to the message content.

They aim to realise a communicative intention and achieve some perlocutionary effect (Prihodko 2016).

The functional semantics of evaluation has been thoroughly investigated by Bulygina & Shmelev (Булыгина & Шмелев 1997), Ivin (Ивин 1970), Martin & White (2005), and Volf (Вольф 2006). The speech realization and pragmatic relevance of evaluation have been analysed by Ananko (2017), Byessonova (Бєссонова 2002), Hunston & Thompson (2001), Kolegaeva & Strochenko (2018), Myroniuk (2017), Prihodko (2016), Samokhina & Pasynok (2017), Zagraevskaya (Заграевская 2006).

However, there are certain gaps in researching the mechanism of transforming an evaluative cognitive judgment into an evaluative utterance. The relevance of the present study is determined by the fact that the evaluative cognitive process and the speech realization of evaluation demand further development. In the proposed conception, the category of evaluation is interpreted as the key cognitive and communicative category that correlates with the sociopragmatic characteristics of the communicants and determines their speech behaviour, serving as the starting point of a speech act. When analyzing a particular instance of the speech realization of evaluation, a researcher should take into consideration who is expressing evaluation, who the addressee is, in what extralinguistic context it is happening, what the speaker's aims are, whether they are achieved or not, what the communicants' social status is, and how sincere they are.

It is with the feeling of this need to probe more deeply into the area of evaluation production that this brief study has been prepared focusing on the pragmatic peculiarities of cognitive judgment formation and its transformation into a communicative utterance.

The **subject** of the discussion is manifestation of positive evaluation in English literary discourse and film discourse.

2. Methodology

The major **aim** of this study is to formulate the research methodology of a new linguistic branch – Cognitive Communicative Axiology of Reproduced Discourse. There is also a need to devise a taxonomy of positive evaluative speech acts functioning in literary discourse and film discourse. This task involves integral research into the illocutionary aims and the perlocutionary effect of positive evaluative speech acts. Among the positive evaluative speech acts, compliment speech acts have been most thoroughly studied (Бессонова 2003; Серебрякова 2002; Altani 1991; Herbert 1989; Holmes 1988; Manes 1983; Wolfson 1983; etc.) but they are still confused with praise speech acts, investigated predominantly by Russian and Ukrainian linguists (Клочко 2003; Конова 1992) in terms of their evaluation objects. Flattery has also become the object of predominantly Eastern European investigations (Дорда 2007; Петелина 1988). Approval is least explored (Кабанкова 2011; Ярошевич 2003), and it is frequently confused with praise and compliment. Thus, there is a clear need to identify the evaluation objects, the evaluation themes, and the degree of sincerity of all the above acts.

The **material** under analysis is represented by 1,400 speech episodes taken from English literary discourse in which the characters express positive evaluation of certain objects. The other data set includes 700 episodes taken from film discourse, in which the characters express positive evaluation.

The pragmatic aspect of the episodes has been analysed with the help of certain linguistic **approaches**, as well as general and special linguistic **methods**. Since the process of communication cannot be fully described without covering the cognitive processes that occur in the communicants' minds during speech production and speech perception, the exploration of the relevant linguistic and extralinguistic properties of evaluative communication is seen as a vitally important task. Obviously, neither a merely communicative analysis of evaluative discourse, nor a merely cognitive analysis of evaluative discourse, chosen separately, cannot provide such an

opportunity. Here is a good reason for using a combination of the communicative and cognitive paradigms while analysing evaluation contexts. A complete and thorough explanation of evaluative processes can be made with the help of **the Cognitive Discourse Approach**, offered by Kubryakova (Кубрякова 1986; 2005), which allows for the interpretation of evaluative patterns from the point of view of the cognitive and communicative functions they perform.

The linguistic analysis of the selected data has been based on the application of **general scientific methods**, namely: the methods of synthesis and analysis that promoted the holistic research into the literary discourse; the method of observation that enabled the identification of the peculiar characteristics of the investigated data; the descriptive method that was helpful in establishing the variant and invariant characteristics of the collected evidence; **special linguistic methods**, namely: the contextual-interpretational method was used to identify the pragmatic properties of the speech realization of evaluation, the communicants' implicit and explicit intentions, presuppositions, their background knowledge, conventions, and evaluative stereotypes in each communicative situation; the cognitive discourse analysis was used to describe the cognitive processes that precede the verbalization of evaluation in a certain type of discourse; the componential analysis was helpful in establishing how a certain positive evaluative meaning becomes highlighted in speech due to certain language means.

Evaluation is seen as a cognitive operation, which presupposes the use of two types of knowledge: the knowledge of the evaluated object and the knowledge of the evaluator's own inner needs.

3. The correlation between an evaluative cognitive judgment and an evaluative utterance

3.1 Evaluation as a cognitive process in a person's mind
According to Selivanova, evaluation as a psychological mechanism, which still

remains open to debate, implies projecting evaluation upon cognitive or sensory-emotional processes (Селіванова 2010: 525).

There is no need to prove the fact that any utterance is conditioned by a number of extralinguistic situations. An utterance is plunged into macro- and microcontext and is determined by the worldview that is created during a person's life. The essential prerequisites for context formation are known to be the communicative situation, the communicants' experience and knowledge, their intentions in regard to each other, their status and role characteristics, the topic of conversation, mental and physical states, as well as certain cultural and social phenomena that determine the content realization of an utterance. All these factors are reflected in the speaker's evaluative attitude to the environment and the interlocutor.

It should be noted that evaluation is characterized by selectivity: it extracts and retains the features that are important from the evaluation subject's point of view. The very fact of the evaluation process gives evidence that the object of evaluation seems valuable for a certain subject, and so it gets into the subject's zone of concern. One and the same object can be of interest to one subject and can leave another subject uninterested. From a multitude of various objects people evaluate those, which are significant for them at a given moment, and those that provoke their emotions. If an object has not attracted the attention of a certain subject, no evaluation will be produced: neither in mind nor in speech.

Undoubtedly, evaluation as a cognitive process in a person's mind occurs on an on-going basis, while expression of evaluation in speech occurs by far less frequently. A wish or reluctance to produce speech evaluation is determined by a set of pragmatic factors. If an evaluative speech act takes place, it will not always equal an evaluative cognitive judgment (as to its intensity, or even its positive or negative character).

There is an opposition "evaluation – non-evaluation". If an object gets into a subject's zone of concern, the process of evaluating is sure to take place, and thus positive, negative, or mixed evaluation is produced.

Furthermore, foregrounding of neutral evaluation may be refuted. If a certain subject states their neutral or indifferent attitude to a certain object, it suggests rather a negative attitude. As Vorkachyov puts it, in case a speaker says he/she is indifferent to an object, it implies a certain neglect or contempt (Воркачев 2006: 106).

Bearing in mind these observations, on no account should evaluation be classified into positive, negative, and neutral types. Evaluation cannot be neutral. If a person states his or her neutral attitude, he or she expresses latent negative evaluation.

Thus, the position of the norm as an accepted standard on the intensity scale clearly has to be reconsidered. My own view is that the norm does not occupy the scale centre but its positive pole; thus, the evaluation scale functions in language as an asymmetric one. "Good" means corresponding to the norm, as well as indicating the qualitative enhancement of an evaluated feature, while "bad" means deviation from the norm in the direction of decreasing.

It has been long reported in the academic literature that the process of evaluation includes the following stages: delimitation of the essential characteristics of an evaluation object, identification of a problematic area, establishing the object's discrete characteristics, choice of evaluation criteria, the criteria assessment, and elaboration of the evaluative characteristics of the chosen criteria (Вольф 2006; Ananko 2017; Prihodko 2016). Following the evaluation judgment creation stage there might be a stage aimed at choosing evaluation devices, either verbal (lexical, grammatical, stylistic) or non-verbal, thus, an evaluative judgment may get transformed into an inner or outer speech utterance.

3.2 The transformation of an evaluative cognitive judgment into an evaluative utterance

A crucial aspect of evaluative utterance production is its motivation. The very fact of evaluation presumes that the object of evaluation has become the focus of attention for a certain person; it is considered that any person directs his/her evaluative activity towards the objects qualified as valuable for him or her. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that there occur sometimes communicative situations, in which the addresser's evaluation (predominantly, positive evaluation) is forced by the addressee. It happens when a person is asked to produce an evaluative utterance: people can ask what they look like, or how a person likes the food they have cooked or the things they have done – thus, an evaluative utterance is caused by the communicative situation. In such a case it is not the speaker's genuine purpose to express evaluation: he or she is forced to instantly assess the interlocutor's strong points to sound realistic. Thus, the recognized necessity of a positive evaluative utterance may precede the evaluative cognitive process.

One should also keep in mind the communicative rituals: when a person receives a present, or is shown another person's house, or treated to dinner, the question arises: which goes first: the evaluative judgment formed in one's mind or the realized necessity of producing a positive evaluative utterance, demanded by the communicative situation? My answer is: the second option. The communicant has to produce positive evaluation, and the object of a required positive evaluation is obvious.

Moreover, it must be taken into account that positive evaluation often allows the addresser to skirt a topic, to soften refusal or criticism, thus serving as a tactics realizing certain communicative strategies. In such circumstances, the realized necessity of producing an evaluative utterance also comes first.

On the other hand, in real life communication not every evaluative judgment, formed in a person's mind, becomes transformed into an utterance. Moreover, if a person has

opted for voicing his or her evaluation of a certain object, the evaluative utterance he/she produces will not necessarily equal his or her evaluative judgment as to its intensity and the plus-minus character. I suggest the following variants of the correlation between an evaluative judgment (EJ) and an evaluative utterance (EU):

1) EJ = EU in terms both of "+ / –" character and the degree of intensity;

2) EJ ≠ EU in terms of their "+ / –" character (EJ is negatively coloured ("–" icon), while EU is positively coloured ("+" icon), or vice versa);

3) EJ ≠ EU as to the degree of intensity (EJ is a rational positive evaluation, EU is an exaggerated emotional evaluation);

4) EJ → no EU;

5) no EJ → EU as a ritual communicative act (Бігунова 2017: 63).

Besides, the sense of an utterance, presupposed by a speaker, may be misinterpreted by an addressee. A language meaning incorporates such elements, as content basis and interpretation component that are closely linked, but, nevertheless, should be differentiated in a particular speech situation (Бондарко 1996: 6). Consequently, it is important to take notice of how the recipient of a positive evaluation takes the evaluative utterance – as sincere/insincere, relevant/irrelevant, etc.

Furthermore, not every evaluation formed in a person's mind becomes transformed into an adequate utterance. For instance, etiquette regulations prevent a communicant from expressing his/her negative evaluation: a communicant may keep silent or express a diluted negative evaluative statement, or they may opt to express a counter positive evaluative statement. A positive evaluation will not become verbally or non-verbally explicit if the evaluation subject is jealous of the evaluation object or angry at them, or follows some pragmatic guidelines.

Thus, being shaped into an utterance, a mental judgment goes through pragmatic filters. At this stage, the sincerity/insincerity factor becomes foregrounded, as well as the degree of evaluation intensity.

4. Speech realization of evaluation in literary and film discourse

This research is focused on evaluation realization regularities in literary discourse, as well as in film discourse.

4.1 Fiction vs real communication

Undoubtedly, all fiction created by man in natural language is a verbal representation of a fictional world, but the procedures applied in fiction correspond to natural language operations, and in this respect fiction resembles a prototypical representation of metalanguage (Кубрякова 1986: 104).

Any fictional work intending to express a certain content, embodies its conception by means of the play of the actors who articulate this or that text – a fragment of the discourse as a speech-cognitive activity, which is "sunk in life" (Арутюнова 1988: 136), or as a language activity, set in certain pragmatic conditions, and also demanding interpretation in a rather sophisticated coordinate system (Демьянков 2005; Кубрякова 2005).

Any discourse, including literary, incorporates the textual area proper (verbal) and the supertextual area (i.e. implicit hints, connotations, evaluation), which can be revealed in the course of the secondary cognition, i.e. in the course of the reader's or researcher's analysis of the author's conception (Буров 2001: 5).

The dialogic speech of the fiction and drama is seen as an imitation of oral conversation and is largely regulated by its formation and functional principles. Speech authenticity in fiction is achieved by imitating the main characteristics of oral speech: emotionality, spontaneity, its situational and contact-oriented character, etc. (Кухаренко 2018).

In literary discourse, dialogue is aimed at creating the effect of objectiveness and authenticity of events, as the author tries to refrain from the description and evaluation of the events, delegating this function to the speaking hero.

Literary discourse as a product of the author's cognitive and speech-productive activity necessarily implies the author's attitude: modality and evaluation. Both are manifested in all discourse segments, including reproduced dialogue.

Evaluation expressed by literary discourse characters is always connected with peculiar connotations allowing the author to express his attitude to a certain object, and evaluation manifestation in a word is accompanied by an extension and deepening of a semantic meaning.

Page has written a valuable study of dialogue in literature. He concludes his analysis of the "reality-status" of such a dialogue by noting that:

> *...for various reasons it seems overwhelmingly likely that no dialogue in a novel or play will consist merely, or even mainly, of an accurate transcript of spontaneous speech. It is important to insist at this point that there is an inevitable gap – wider or narrower at different times, but never disappearing entirely – between speech ...and even the most "realistic" dialogue in a world of literature* (1973: 7).

The same applies to film discourse.

Film discourse, seen as a coherent text (the verbal component of a film) along with an audio-visual system and other significant extralinguistic factors (Зарецкая 2010), has also served as a resource of factual data for the present paper. As well as in literary discourse, film discourse features explicit and implicit information. The implicit information is conveyed to the spectator via verbal and non-verbal means, and also through specific film means, such as text layout over a moving icon, an offscreen voice, and providing the spectators with offscreen metatextual commentary.

Film text and film dialogue have been defined as film discourse constituents, structural-linear, strongly determined, fixed, conditioned in time, differentiated by the intermixing and overlapping verbal and visual components according to the author's

conception, characterized by reproduction multiplicity in the same form and, thus, by predictability (Колодина 2013).

Film dialogue is seen as "a verbal component of a feature film, whose conceptual completeness is guaranteed by an audiovisual system in a film discourse" (Горшкова 2006: 77).

It goes without saying that film dialogue is different from real communication. It is characterized by duality: it is never spontaneous but it should seem so. It is permanent but must appear to be as ephemeral as the speech it imitates. Film dialogue is aimed at creating an impression that the actor says what in reality he recites. In sharing the convention, the film audience also has a share in the film discourse duplicity. Kozloff, addressing the problems of a drama dialogue, points that:

"we (the film goers – N.B.) simultaneously accept the illusion of spontaneity and know that it is a pretense. For it is not the hearing of the words by the interlocutor that completes the exchange, as it is in everyday speech, but the witnessing and interpreting of both the utterance and the response by the audience. Much of the particular effect of drama derives from the gap between two ways of hearing, that of the interlocutor on stage and that of the audience, and from the audience's consciousness of the gap. The audience sets each utterance beside each previous utterance made within the limited time span of the play and, in doing so, catches implications beyond those immediately relevant to speaker and interlocutor" (2000: 17).

Film dialogue may strive mightily to imitate natural conversation, but it is always an imitation:

"It has been scripted, written and rewritten, censored, polished, rehearsed, and performed. Even when lines are improvised on the set, they have been spoken by impersonators, judged, approved, and allowed to remain. Then all dialogue is recorded, edited, mixed, underscored, and played through stereophonic speakers with Dolby sound. The actual hesitations, repetitions, digressions, grunts, interruptions, and mutterings of everyday speech have either been pruned away, or, if not, deliberately included" (ibid., 18).

In agreement with Lakoff and Tannen, the present study claims that "artificial dialog may represent an internalized model or schema for the production of conversation – a competence model that speakers have access to" (1984: 323).

Essentially, both literary dialogue and film dialogue are contrived (by the endeavours of the scriptwriter, film maker, and the actors) as the imitation of real life dialogue.

4.2 Markers of evaluation in reproduced discourse

As it has been said, evaluation as a cognitive operation is based on a cognitive judgment, but is not necessarily transformed into an evaluative utterance. In real life communication, one communicant may be oblivious to the genuine evaluative attitude of another communicant. On the contrary, in reproduced discourse, the situation is different. The subject of an evaluative judgment may not voice it to his/her interlocutor, but the reader becomes informed about the former's attitude from other resources: from the author's comment and the character's inner speech in literary discourse and the off-screen voice explaining the character's attitude in film discourse.

Genuine evaluative judgments become explicit to the reader of a literary discourse from the author's description of the characters' non-verbal behaviour and their thoughts. For instance, in the following episode Anne listens carefully to Andrew, asks appropriate questions and tells jokes. Andrew's non-verbal behaviour (*he grinned*) and his inner speech reveal his positive evaluation of Anne's sense of humour, even though he does not express it out loud:

*He **grinned and nodded**. It seemed she **had a good sense of humour**. That earned her a second tick of **approval*** (A.D. Parsons "The call on high country", p. 46).

In another novel, the heroine did not like the talk at dinner, which she did not voice either, but the reader gets to know about it from her inner speech, provided by the author:

*I **was glad** when the meal was over and we were outside in the sunshine again* (B. Pym "A glass of blessings", p. 22).

Hamish, a policeman, who is about to question a young girl, perceives her as very attractive, which the reader comes to know from the author's description of Hamish's

thoughts. Nevertheless, Hamish does not voice his positive evaluative judgment: it will not be appropriate in formal communication:

Melissa swung round, saw Hamish's uniform, and turned pale.

*"It's all right," he said easily. "I am not going to question you at the moment." **She had beautiful eyes, he noticed, well spaced and dark grey. He thought her pink hair suited her**. "Did Blair give you a hard time?" he asked* (M.C. Beaton "Death of a prankster", p. 51).

The next episode from the same novel serves to illustrate a positive evaluative judgment, which remains unexpressed for other reasons. Lesley is having dinner in a restaurant with Hamish, who is handsome and unmarried. She has worked out a plan how to seduce him. Suddenly, a beauty comes into the restaurant and joins them. She turns out to be a friend of Hamish's. Lesley's inner speech informs the reader of her perception of Priscilla as a beauty, but Lesley does not compliment on the girl's appearance as she treats her as a rival:

*Hamish introduced Priscilla to Lesley. Lesley's heart sank. **Who on earth was this classy vision, impeccably dressed, serene and beautiful? Her face was perfect, as was the smooth bell of her blonde hair**. Lesley had drunk a lot so that she would have the excuse of asking Hamish for a bed for the night. It was still worth a try.*

"I'm afraid I'm not in a fit condition to drive this evening," she said.

"Don't worry about it," said Priscilla. "I'll put you up at the hotel as my guest." All Lesley could do was to say dismally, "Very kind of you" (M.C. Beaton "Death of a witch", p. 94).

Positive evaluation becomes manifested in the characters' inner speech and in the author's comment by means of positive evaluative lexemes: *glad, like, admire, enjoy, pleased*, etc.:

- *He smiled. He felt unusually well. Penelope had begged him to slow down on his drinking, and he only had a couple of pints the evening before. He was **pleased***

with Penelope. The money was good, and this detective series would make her name (M.C. Beaton "Death of a scriptwriter", p. 36).

- *Hamish **admired** her sturdy legs as she walked out of the kitchen* (ibid., p. 125).

It is noteworthy that the subject of evaluation is not always sure whether his/her evaluation is positive or negative: an object of evaluation can evoke mixed feelings, as it is in a speech situation depicting Wilmet's response to the news about Father Ramson's staying at their place. Her positive evaluation of the news results in the use of the word *amused* and her negative evaluation of the same news gets explicit by the use of the word *annoyed*:

*I was **both annoyed and amused** at her news, **annoyed** because for some reason I did not want him to live at the Beamishes, and **amused** at the picture of him cooking his own breakfast on a gas ring* (B. Pym "A glass of blessings", p. 41).

Etiquette regulations, a wish to save "one's face" prevent a communicant from expressing his/her negative evaluation: a communicant may keep silent, or soften a negative evaluative statement, or even express an opposite evaluative statement. For example, a wife tries to conceal her displeasure at her husband's behaviour. He has spent a couple of hours with their child and has performed some routine actions, and boasts about them. Out loud she expresses praise but her genuine feelings become explicit from her inner speech:

"Already fed and watered," Tom says proudly, <u>like he's conquered a small continent rather than just done the thing I do every day without comment</u>. "I took him out."
*"**Great**," I say, <u>although a little part of me thinks, "damn"</u>* (P. Williams "How to be married", p. 46).

The mismatching of an evaluative judgment and an evaluative utterance is also illustrated in the following episode, featuring Emma who is sitting next to her husband in his car. She is immersed in the thoughts about her lover who has suddenly disappeared. She is in despair but when asked about her state of mind says she is OK:

Alex's hand moved to her knee and she jumped. "You OK, Em?"
How many more times was he going to ask? *"Yes. Yes, **I'm fine"** (J. Highmore "The birthday", p. 130).

As Hamish, the protagonist in a series of M.C. Beaton's novels, wittily remarks, "luckily, not all the things inside one's head get to the outside", in such a way he himself forms a positive evaluative judgment, which does not become voiced:
Hamish had a sudden image of Blair being blasted to death by a shotgun and he smiled.
It was great that some of the things inside his head never got to the outside, he thought (M.C. Beaton "Death of a witch", p. 112).

The audiovisual aspect of film discourse becomes enhanced due to the non-verbal behaviour of characters in reproduced communication. Facial expression, body movements, and gestures indicate the sincerity/insincerity of evaluative utterances, as well as their degree of intensity.

In the film "Love actually", there is an episode depicting exchange of presents by members of a family. The husband (played by Alan Rickman) and the wife (Emma Thompson) are middle-aged and have been married for quite a long time. They have two children. The wife knows that in his office a young and pretty secretary is flirting with him. The day before Emma warned her husband against that cheeky young girl. Besides, the viewers know that the secretary would like Alan to give her a Christmas present. Just before dinner, the husband and wife had been shopping and Emma noticed her husband buying something at the jewelry store. On coming home, she searched his pockets and found a pendant and a necklace. Judging by Emma's joyful face expression, the viewers think she reckons the present is meant for her. Such are the presumptions and implications of the present exchange moment. When Emma eventually tears the wrappings of her present, her expectations are stirred up by Alan:
This is slightly special. Personal (Film "Love actually", 1.32 min).
At last, the wrappings are torn:

To my brilliant wife! (ibid., 1.34 min).

There is a disk with retro music inside. Emma desperately tries to conceal her disappointment and despair. She says:

Goodness! That's great! (ibid., 1.35 min).

Emma smiles, hugs her husband. The diversity of the uttered positive evaluation of the gift and the evaluative judgment formed in Emma's mind (which is obviously negative) gets explicit by means of a long pause, panic in Emma's eyes, shifty eyes, and her hand raised to the forehead, which is known as a sign of perplexity. And finally, to persuade the viewers of the complete discrepancy between the approving utterance and the true state of things, Emma is shown apologizing and leaving the room. She goes to another room and gives rein to her passions for some time: she cries bitterly. Thus, the discrepancy of the uttered positive evaluation and the evaluative judgment becomes obvious to viewers of film by means of presuppositions, implications, background knowledge of the speech situation, as well as by virtue of non-verbal means.

Here is an example of a negative evaluative judgment, which completely contradicts the cognitive evaluative judgment of film discourse heroes. Monica and Chandler, sitcom "Friends" characters, are talking at the wedding reception. They have spent their first night together. Their eyes are shining; they are overwhelmed with feelings, but avoid looking at each other. Both of them refer to the previous night as a "crazy and stupid" act, which is obviously not what they are feeling and then they decide on meeting again:

Chandler: What we did last night was…

*Monica: **Stupid!***

*Chandler: **Totally crazy and stupid!***

Monica: What were we thinking?!

Chandler: I'll come over tonight, all right?

Monica: Oh, yeah. Definitely! (Sitcom "Friends", 13.30.04).

As well as in real life communication, literary discourse often contains situations,

where characters are forced to express evaluation. It especially refers to compliments. For example, Honey has to assure Paige who is doing her best to look nice on her first date:

Saturday, Paige managed to get to a beauty salon. She went shopping and splurged on a new dress.

"Do I look all right? Do you think he'll like it?"

***"You look sensational!"** Honey assured her* (S. Sheldon "Nothing lasts forever", p. 30).

In certain circumstances, communicants use evaluative utterances as a means of skirting a topic, which is harmful to their "faces", or a means of softening refusal or criticism, thus saving the interlocutor's "face". To illustrate a realized necessity of producing an evaluative utterance as a stage preceding the speech production of evaluation, here is an episode depicting a husband complimenting on his wife's cooking because he dislikes the turn the conversation is taking. Thus, a positive evaluative utterance helps the speaker to skirt an undesirable topic:

'One of the reasons for living here is to be involved.'

'Not in everything. Not so that you are so tired you can't see straight.'

She said, looking at him hard, 'But I don't think it's that.'

<u>Visibly he flinched. She saw his mind tiptoe away from the turn the conversation was taking, a turn he could not bear</u>. He waved his fork at her.

***'Frightfully good**, this,' he said* (J. Trollope "A village affair", p. 68).

The next episode serves as an illustration of using a positive evaluative utterance to avoid refusal and to get from the interlocutor exactly what the speaker wants, namely to get rid of an intrusive girl and to make her call a colleague of hers:

'What do you like to do, Myron?'

'Do?'

'For fun.'

*'Look, Tawny, **you seem very nice, really**, but can I talk to the girl in the ad?'*

(H. Coben "Deal breaker", p. 15).

Thus, a character of literary discourse and film discourse can hide their evaluative judgment and fail to express it out loud, they might express it in a distorted, exaggerated, or embellished way. Nevertheless, the reader or the viewer becomes informed about the real state of affairs from the given implications and background situation as well as from the author's comment and the characters' inner speech (in literary discourse), or the characters' non-verbal behaviour (in film discourse).

The pragmatic reasons why an evaluative judgment made by a character does not correspond to his/her evaluative utterance are identical to those in real communication: following the etiquette, a wish to save the speaker's own "face" and the "face" of the interlocutor, sticking to the rituals, manipulating the addressee, etc. All these pragmatic functions disable the communicants from expressing negative evaluation: they opt to keep silent or express a softened negative evaluative statement, or they may opt to express a counter positive evaluative statement. Here is an example to illustrate the latter case: Merrion is furious with her boyfriend Guy for the previous night but she is well-bred and keen on maintaining their relationship; therefore, instead of rejecting his proposal, which is what she feels like doing (as her inner speech reveals, *"Don't bother"*), she expresses a positive evaluation of his proposal. The discrepancy between the disapproving evaluative judgment and the opposing approving utterance as well as the effort she makes (*Only in the nick of time had she checked herself*) become obvious to the reader:
*Guy had rung her that morning in the flat, as he always did, to say he would be on the usual train and that he would like to take her out to dinner to compensate for the night before. She had nearly said, "Don't bother." Only in the nick of time had she checked herself and said, "**Lovely**." She hadn't said it in quite the voice she would have wished, but at least she had said it* (J. Trollope "Marrying the mistress", p. 244).

Having expressed a polite response, Merrion thinks that her voice has not been really

convincing but she is glad she has managed a proper positive evaluative response. Thus, apart from her inner speech, the non-verbal means, such as her voice transformations, serve to tell the reader that the outspoken positive evaluation is not sincere.

On the other hand, a positive evaluative utterance can get hyperbolic, especially if the communicant is involved in a speech ritual. Positive evaluation can also serve as a communicative tactics, used by speakers to meet their own (but, in fact, designed by the author) aims.

5. Positive evaluative speech acts taxonomy

The theory of speech acts has proved that words are not used just to say things, i.e. describe states of affairs, but rather to do things actively (Austin 1962; Searle 1969; Strawson 1967; Wierzbicka 1991). The focus of the speech act theory has been on utterances, especially those made in conversational and other face-to-face situations.

A speech act has been defined as "a basic minimal unit of verbal communication, an intentionally and situationally determined, as well as grammatically and semantically organised utterance, that is accompanied by corresponding actions of the speaker, which are directed at the addressee and his reaction" (Селіванова 2010: 425).

In my view, positive evaluation becomes communicatively expressed in approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts. There is a clear need to provide the reasons for uniting them in one class alongside identifying their illocutionary aims and perlocutionary effect as well as differentiating their objects, themes, and addresser-addressee relationship.

5.1 Approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts: Illocutionary aims

I consider approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts to be syncretic illocutionary speech acts, as they simultaneously realize two or more illocutions,

among which major and minor illocutions should be distinguished in a certain communicative exchange. However, their incorporation in the taxonomy is justified by the fact that their major illocutionary aim is to express positive evaluation of certain people, things, state of affairs, or ideas. The perlocutionary aim of an evaluative utterance is to persuade the addressee to agree with the speaker's judgment.

Another common aim of positive evaluative speech acts, which is presupposed by their expressive character, is a desire to make a positive emotional impact upon the addressee and to create a favourable conversation atmosphere. In case the addressee and the evaluation object is one and the same person, the speaker aims to encourage the listener to behave in the same way as he/she did before.

Moreover, positive evaluative utterances are manifestations of politeness and courtesy, and they are often parts of a communicative ritual, thus they serve to express speech etiquette. They realize positive politeness strategies aimed at demonstrating concern to the interlocutor, as well as negative politeness strategies presupposed by the wish to avoid the obstruction of the interlocutor's freedom of action.

The comparative analysis of illocutionary aims of positive evaluative speech acts in literary discourse allows for identifying in literary discourse has been helpful to identify the following APPROVAL speech act illocutionary aims:

1) the intention to express the speaker's emotional state by referring to the object's features as being adequate/good;

2) the intention to establish contact with the interlocutor and to make a positive emotional impact on them;

3) the intention to mitigate refusal or criticism and thus save the interlocutor's face;

4) the intention to change an undesirable topic and thus save the speaker's own face.

To illustrate the last point, here is a situation in which a refusal is preceded by an approval of the idea to go to Italy:

"Why don't you come to Italy with us?" Jerry asks Rose.

She looks at Julia standing in abject silence behind Jerry. ***"That would be nice, dear,*** *but I couldn't leave your father"* (R.C. Jones "Ten seconds from the sun", p. 69).

The illocutionary aims pursued by PRAISE speech act addressers are largely determined by the fact whether the interlocutor and the object of praise are one and the same person. If they are, the illocutionary aims of PRAISE speech act are the following:

1) the intention to qualify the evaluation object's actions or features as being adequate/good;

2) the intention to comfort and reassure the recipient, who is the object of evaluation, as well as to "save his/her face".

If the speaker praises a person who is not present at the moment of speech and thus the interlocutor is the recipient of a message, but not an object of praise, praise is still aimed at qualifying the evaluation object's actions or features as being adequate/good (1), but it also implies:

3) the intention to defend the third person, who is the object of evaluation, from the interlocutor's negative evaluative statements.

Here is a situation from a literary discourse illustrating the latter point: the speaker praises the third person, trying to save her face, the praise speech act being combined with the reproach speech act:

"It's no good, Simon," Alan said. "You can't write her off as a gold-digger or a marriage-wrecker or a legal groupie or a sex bomb. You can't write Dad off, either, as a classic male menopause victim wanting to reassure himself he could still double the world's population if he wanted to. ***She's the real thing. She's a proper person"*** (J. Trollope "Marrying the mistress", p. 85).

As for COMPLIMENT speech act, it is argued that it is aimed at establishing solidarity between the speaker and the recipient (Herbert 1989; Holmes 1988; Manes 1983; Wolfson 1983 and others). Manes states that, by offering compliments, the speaker expresses approval or admiration for the listener, and that solidarity between interlocutors thus is established (1983: 98). Wierzbicka remarks that compliments are usually intended to make others feel good and are performed for maintaining "good interpersonal relationships" (1991: 87). Wolfson suggests that compliments can be considered social lubricants that serve to "create or maintain rapport" (1983: 88).

I regard the illocutionary aims of COMPLIMENT speech acts as follows:

1) the intention to show the hearer kindness, to do them a courtesy or to reassure them, which is caused by politeness strategies or a wish to maintain good interpersonal relationships with them;

2) the intention to express the speaker's emotional state by qualifying the evaluation object's features as being adequate/good (the object of evaluation being the interlocutor or the people who are close to him/her);

3) the intention to express gratitude to the addressee for their actions;

4) the intention to comfort and reassure the object of evaluation, "save his/her face".

The former two of the listed aims are invariably present in compliment speech acts, while the latter two aims are determined by the extralinguistic context and are not always present in the compliment structure.

Thus, praise presupposes a certain impact upon the recipient, it stimulates his/her active behaviour. This act is felicitous if it is accepted by the addressee, while the main intention behind the compliment is to report the speaker's positive feelings and favour towards the addressee. The imperative semantics is less significant here; it is more important to say something pleasant and to become closer to the interlocutor.

The illocutionary aims pursued by FLATTERY speech act addressers who admit to their status or role dependence upon the addressee are the following:

1) the pseudosincere intention to please the addressee, to improve their emotional state by qualifying their own (or their relatives') traits or actions as being good;

2) the intention to persuade the addressee of the addresser's sincerity;

3) the latent intention to gain benefit, material or immaterial;

4) the latent intention to encourage the addressee to do things that are beneficial for the addresser.

5.2 Approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts: Evaluation objects and themes

In the course of dealing with the research data I made an attempt to define approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts in view of their evaluation objects, the correspondence between the recipient and the evaluation object, and their evaluation themes.

It should be clarified that an *evaluation subject* means a person who expresses evaluation, an *evaluation object* is a person or a thing that become evaluated, and an *evaluation theme* is the feature of a certain object which is evaluated.

I refer all the speech acts under analysis to expressive speech acts since they are aimed at "expressing the speaker's feelings about themselves or the world" (Searle 1969: 45).

I regard APPROVAL as a positive evaluative expressive syncretic speech act, its evaluation object being things, ideas, and phenomena that do not refer to the addressee's sphere of interests. The latter fact makes approval different from the other evaluative speech acts. Another difference lies in the fact that the recipient and the evaluation object of approval never overlap. Approval evaluation theme is that feature of the evaluated objects, which attracts the addresser's attention. These features are

determined by the speaker's evaluative stereotypes and presuppositions. Here is an episode in which the speaker is asked to explain a certain notion. She does not only explain that a woman's clothes brand is meant but also evaluates it positively, thus creating an approval speech act:

"Who's Agnes B.?"

*"Clothes," Carrie said. **"Classic but cool"*** (J. Trollope "Marrying the mistress", p. 210).

I regard PRAISE as a positive evaluative expressive syncretic speech act, its evaluation theme being the moral and intellectual traits, skills and actions of the interlocutor or a person who is not present during a speech exchange but is praised by the speaker. If praise is aimed at the interlocutor's traits or actions, its recipient and evaluation object overlap. If the person whose traits or actions are praised is not present at the moment of speech, the speech act recipient and the evaluation object are different. It must be taken into account that in the latter case a third person's *appearance* can also serve an evaluation theme. It would be unwise to assume that positive evaluation of the third person's appearance can be defined as a compliment.

Here are examples of a praise speech act directed at the hearer and a praise speech act directed at a third person who is not present at the time of speech:

1) *When she went back to the kitchen, the fan was spinning busily.*

"How clever of you, Charles, *" said Agatha. **"What a relief!** How did you get that big screw undone?"* (M.C. Beaton "Agatha Raisin and the wizard of Evesham", p. 29).

2) *"How was your work with Khaled?" Khader asked me when we walked back through the dock.*

"Very good. I like him. I liked working with him. *I'd still be with him if you hadn't put me to work with Madjid."* (G.D. Roberts "Shantaram", p. 486).

Another important fact about praise is that it is mainly directed from a senior (as to their age or social status) speaker to a junior one.

It is common knowledge that a praise addresser should have a moral right to praise another person's traits of character or actions. A praise speech act makes its addresser superior to the addressee: it is considered that the speaker should be some kind of authority in a certain sphere (Петелина 1988; Трофимова 2008).

I regard COMPLIMENT as a positive evaluative expressive syncretic speech act, characterized by the overlapping of the addressee and the evaluation object. The main fact about compliment is that it is always exaggerated, which is presupposed by the speaker's main intention: he/she wishes to please the recipient by means of positive evaluation of his/her appearance or accomplishments.

The subject of evaluation in a compliment speech act is the hearer's appearance, possessions, and accomplishments. It should be mentioned that the proportion of the compliment themes is strikingly unequal: the number of compliments on personal appearance, most particularly clothes and hairdos, is predominant, constituting over 80% of compliments in the research data.

It is noteworthy that compliments as positive evaluative speech acts tend to be exaggerated, whilst the exaggeration is anticipated and accepted on the part of the addressee as a natural component in the semantic structure of a compliment. Thus, almost any and every compliment can serve as an example of a different degree of intensity characteristic of an evaluative judgment and the corresponding evaluative utterance, e.g.,

*"I'll come with you. I'm ever so madly keen on antique dolls and I must say, that one you got is **the most fascinating and beautiful thing I've ever seen"** (M.C. Beaton "Agatha Raisin and the love from hell", p. 137).

I regard FLATTERY as a pseudosincere positive evaluative manipulative expressive syncretic speech act, characterized by forethought, by a certain strategy, and also, by its addressee and evaluation object being the same person. Flattery evaluation themes

are the addressee's appearance, their moral and intellectual traits, skills, accomplishments, and actions. The speaker flatters the addressee not being motivated by some feelings but wishing to gain some benefit. As far as the social status is concerned, the bulk of flattery speech acts is directed from a communicant of a lower status towards the one of a higher status, as it can be observed in the following example:
*Sheila knew that Jamie had a blinding hangover and that <u>Jamie despised Patricia's writing</u>, so she was surprised when <u>Jamie beamed at Patricia and said,</u> **"It's an honour to meet you**. Perhaps you'd like to come along with us until we fix up our business here and see how it all works, and then we can have a bite of lunch?"*
<u>*Patricia melted. "That would be very exciting*</u>*," she said* (M.C. Beaton "Death of a scriptwriter", p. 31).

Strictly speaking, the evaluation object in compliment and flattery speech acts can be actually not the hearer himself/herself (which is, of course, a most common case), but a relation of his/her. It can be explained by the fact that a positive evaluation directed at one's daughter, or mother, or wife, is usually as pleasant for the hearer as a positive evaluation of his/her own qualities or actions.

5.3 Approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts perlocutionary effect
As far as the perlocutionary effect of approval speech act is concerned, it is determined by the place of an approving utterance in a dialogue exchange. If an approval is expressed in the form of a responding move, the former completes a communicative exchange and does not need an explicit perlocutionary act. Nevertheless, a desired perlocutionary effect has been achieved: a ritual speech exchange has been performed in accordance with the etiquette regulations. If an approval is expressed as an initiative move, a typical response is agreement or disagreement. A disagreement may be caused by the impropriety or irrelevance of an approval, or by the speaker's wrong perception of a certain object or the recipient's antipathy towards the approval addresser.

The conducted research has shown that the perlocutionary effect of a praise speech act is determined by the praise focus: on the hearer or a third person. In the former case, the following perlocutionary acts are possible: gratefulness, embarrassment, praise escalation (bragging), pleasant surprise, denial (caused by the hearer's modesty), and unacceptance. In the latter case, a range of perlocutionary acts is rather narrow: acceptance or unacceptance.

It is a common truth that choosing to agree or disagree with an evaluative utterance can threaten the recipient's "face". It is noteworthy that the hearer's acceptance of praise attests that he/she is too self-assured or self-absorbed. Praise unacceptance does not mean a failure, but attests perlocutionary success, since unacceptance is caused, as a rule, by the hearer's modesty, as it is in the following example:

*"**You've put a lot of thought into this**," I commented, laughing, but **impressed** and genuinely glad that he wanted to give me the ontology of currency crime, and not just the ways I could go about committing it.*
*"Not really," he answered **self-deprecatingly**.*
"No, I'm serious. When Khaderbhai sent me here ..." (G.D. Roberts "Shantaram", p. 446).

In the example provided above, Khaled, an Indian, tells his new friend Lin, a former Australian who intends to live in India, about the black market in India. His speculations about the government's attitude to it and the people's greed as the main reason for the black market existing seem very profound to Lin, and he praises Khaled's reasoning. Khaled's response to being praised is unacceptance which the author qualifies as *"self-deprecating"*. The praise unacceptance is caused by the hearer's modesty.

Even if there is no verbal response to praise, the literary discourse reader is provided with the author's prompts revealing the perlocutionary effect of a praise speech act. Such literary discourse textual markers, as the praise addressee's inner speech, the

author's description of their non-verbal behavior as well as their thoughts and feelings, explicate the perlocutionary effect of a praise speech act:

*"I'll miss **my garden. Your mother. Her cooking. Your television shows**."*

<u>*I was **flattered** and embarrassed that he would put my work in the same league as his wife, his grandson and his garden*</u> (T. Parsons "Man and boy", p. 276).

On the whole, a successful impact of a praise speech act upon the addressee is determined by certain extralinguistic factors, such as the speech act participants' common background knowledge, implications and presuppositions, relevance of a positive evaluation in a given speech situation, the addresser's sincerity, and his/her non-indifference to the qualities and actions of the evaluation object.

Praise unacceptance by the hearer can be caused by the praise inappropriateness, the addresser's insufficient background knowledge, or the hearer's doubts concerning the addresser's evaluative competence. In the following speech exchange, the praise directed towards a third person is not accepted by the hearer (though she does not say it). The disagreement becomes evident to the reader since the recipient's inner speech is provided by the literary discourse author:

"Oh, that was Rose. She said no one south could understand me and sent me to elocution lessons."

"Didn't think of taking any herself?"

*"**Rose had a beautiful voice**," said Angus, looking at Agatha in surprise.*

<u>*Love is blind, thought Agatha, and deaf as well*</u> (M.C. Beaton "Agatha Raisin and the terrible tourist", p. 115).

Praise directed towards a third person can be rejected if the hearer is jealous or envious of the evaluation object, like Ali, who is jealous of Win:

*Ali looked back at the house. Win – real name: Windsor Horne Lockwood III – stood with arms folded, leaning against the doorframe. "Your friend Win," she said. "**He seems nice**."*

"He's not."

"I know. I just figured him being your best friend and all, I'd say that."

"Win is complicated."

"He's good looking*."*

"He knows" (H. Coben "Promise me", p. 18).

Another speech situation exemplifies praise for a third person (a wife's friend) rejected by the speaker. The unacceptance is caused by the fact that the wife is not an authority for the husband, an arrogant and conceited man:

Kate kissed her friend goodbye at the end of the evening, waving her off with a false cheeriness. She turned to Marcus with anger in her eyes, opening her mouth to speak. But there was something in his gaze, a coldness, a rigid set of the shoulders, that scared her, gave her pause.

"<u>No idea what you see in that one,</u>" he said flatly. "We won't be doing that again."

"She is a good friend*," Kate muttered, deflated.*

"<u>See her on her own time, but I think you might have outgrown her</u>" (L. Bagshawe "Destiny", p. 105).

As far as the perlocutionary effect of a compliment speech act is concerned, most typically it is framed as follows: full acceptance; mirror response, i.e. saying a compliment in response; ironical acceptance; changing the topic of the conversation or unacceptance. The main perlocutionary effect expected by the compliment addresser is the compliment acceptance (expressed verbally or non-verbally). The formal signal registering compliment acceptance is a smile, a nod or the addresser's embarrassment. Compliment acceptance is usually accompanied by gratitude or irony.

Compliment rejection is motivated by the recipient's modesty: a positive evaluation of self violates the Modesty Maxim and is socially unacceptable, as it is in the following speech exchange:

*Daniel shook Harry's hand and said, "**Ah. Diocesan Board of Finance couldn't do without you, I hear, Colonel Richardson**," and Harry said, as she knew he would, "<u>It's nothing. Nothing at all</u>. Like to do my bit"* (J. Trollope "The rector's wife", p. 120).

In the provided example, Daniel gives a compliment to Colonel Richardson at a village party. Daniel is of a higher social status than the colonel, he lives and works in London and is quite well-known in certain circles. Moreover, he provides the financial board's flattering opinion of the colonel's work which is sure to please the captain. Therefore, his negative response will deceive neither the reader, nor another communicant, Anna (*as she knew he would*): it is motivated by his modesty.

In literary discourse, the compliment recipient may verbally ignore the compliment, but the context analysis and the author's commentary help the reader recognize the recipient's positive attitude to the compliment. The literary discourse reader is sure of its success if a compliment is accompanied by the author's description of such non-verbal signals of pleasure on the recipient's face as a smile or a blush, as it is in the following literary discourse extracts:

1) *They watched the conductor turn the small silver handle on the ticket machine, <u>and both giggled and blushed</u> when he said, "**The sight of two pretty girls has warmed the cockles of me heart**"* (J. Jonker "I'll be your sweetheart", p. 372);

2) *He pauses, staring at me for a little while. "**You look different.**"*

"Do I?" I blush furiously.

*"**Exceptionally well.**"*

<u>*I grin despite myself. I can feel the grin getting wider and wider, slinging from earlobe to earlobe*</u> (P. Williams "How to be married", p. 199).

If, however, compliment unacceptance is caused by its inappropriateness, insincerity or the recipient's dislike for the addresser, it should be regarded as the perlocutionary effect undesirable for the speaker, as it is in the following episode:

"But go on, go on. You have not begun to satisfy me yet. You did not stop with finding a motive for the crime I am sure."

"Madam, you are a female Sherlock; you will have the whole of the bond or none*."*

<u>*"We are not here to draw comparisons," I retorted. "Keep to the subject, Mr. Gryce; keep to the subject"*</u> (A.K. Green "That affair next door", p. 296).

A mirror compliment, that is redirection of a compliment to its author in accordance with the Politeness Principle, allows the recipient to preserve the communicative balance and not to impinge on any of the participants' interests:

"You look wonderful*," she purred.*

He was in his standard black Armani suit.

<u>*"Thank you.* **Look who's talking, though. You're breathtaking***"*</u> (L. Bagshawe "Destiny", p. 323).

As for flattery, the realization of the speaker's illocutionary aims is a success if the flattery is well-thought and nicely shaped, with its object being self-absorbed and considering himself/herself a genius. The perlocutionary effect of flattery is achieved if the speaker is able to disguise an evaluation speech act type and pretend it is a-praise or a compliment. If the speaker manages that, the perlocutionary effect of flattery will manifest itself in the form of agreement (verbal or non-verbal), gratitude, pleasant surprise, mirror response or flattery rejection caused by false modesty. If the speaker's intentions are decoded as they should, the recipient's response will be negative: the flattery will be rejected.

Here is an example of flattery rejection. Viv has been waiting for her lover, Reggie, in the sun for half an hour. Seeking forgiveness, he flatters her appearance. The flattery is expressed in an indirect way: Reggie pretends she is a film-star and he is a fan asking for an autograph. The reader knows that their relationship is coming to an end: Reggie does not intend to leave his wife, he has recently made Viv go through an abortion.

After the abortion, Viv is not at her best. Thus, the flattery is decoded (*Just get going, will you?*):

"You look like a film-star," *said Reggie, as Viv got into his car. He made a show of looking her over.* **"Can I have your autograph?"**

"Just get going, will you?" she said. She'd been standing in the sun, waiting for him, for half an hour (S. Waters "The night watch", p. 61).

Therefore, the felicity conditions of evaluative speech acts are determined by such extralinguistic factors, as the speech act participants' common background knowledge, implications and presuppositions, relevance of a positive evaluation in a given speech situation, the addresser's sincerity, and his/her non-indifference to the evaluation object's qualities and actions.

Positive evaluation unacceptance by the hearer is caused by its inappropriateness, the speaker's insufficient background knowledge, or the hearer's doubts concerning the speaker's evaluative competence. A negative reaction to a positive evaluative speech act may be caused by the addressee's suspicions about the speaker's insincerity, the addressee's dislike for the speaker, inappropriateness of an evaluative utterance in a certain setting, a mistake in the choice of the evaluation theme, mockery, familiarity, envy, or jealousy of the evaluation object. All these facts become obvious to the reader not only due to the recipient's verbally explicit response, but also due to their thoughts, feelings, and non-verbal behavior, depicted by a literary discourse author.

As a summary of the taxonomy of positive evaluative speech acts, Table 1 below illustrates the objects and themes of evaluative speech acts.

Table 1. Taxonomy of positive evaluative speech acts

| | Positive evaluative speech acts | | | |
	approval	praise	compliment	flattery
Evaluation object	inanimate things, ideas, phenomena that do not refer to the addressee's sphere of interests	the hearer or a 3rd person, not present during the speech exchange	the hearer or (less often) a person related to him/her (by blood or by marriage) but not present during the speech exchange	the hearer or (less often) a person related to him/her (by blood or by marriage) but not present during the speech exchange
Evaluation theme	those features of the evaluated inanimate objects, which attract the addresser's attention	moral and intellectual traits, skills, and actions of the interlocutor or a 3rd person; appearance of a 3rd person	the hearer's appearance, possessions, and accomplishments	the hearer's appearance, moral and intellectual traits, possessions, and accomplishments

6. Discussion and conclusion

Thus, a new research methodology, the cognitive communicative axiology of reproduced discourse, has been offered. The methodology enables a study of the cognitive processes that occur in communicants' minds during production or perception of evaluative speech in reproduced discourse. While in real communication the communicants' thoughts and intentions remain unknown to the researcher, the author's comment and the communicant's inner speech in literary discourse as well as the speakers' non-verbal behaviour and the offscreen voice in film discourse tell the reader/viewer about the communicant's genuine purposes and feelings.

Furthermore, it has been helpful to present and analyse the opposition "evaluation – non-evaluation". If an object gets into a subject's zone of concern, the process of evaluating is sure to take place, and thus positive, negative, or mixed evaluation is produced. The observation of evaluative utterance production in reproduced discourse suggests that there is no such thing as neutral evaluation: if the speakers say they are indifferent to a certain object, it implies rather a negative attitude.

It has also been proved that an evaluative utterance does not necessarily equal the preceding evaluative cognitive judgment: they might differ in terms of their intensity, or even positive or negative character. Furthermore, an evaluative judgment formed in a person's mind might remain unvoiced, or, on the other hand, a certain evaluative utterance may be caused not by an evaluative judgment but rather be forced by a realized necessity of producing an evaluative utterance in a certain communicative situation.

Moreover, a taxonomy of positive evaluative approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts functioning in English literary discourse and film discourse has been put forward. The illocutionary aims, evaluation objects, and themes, as well as the perlocutionary effect of approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts have been outlined. Positive evaluative speech acts have been defined as syncretic illocutionary speech acts, since they realize simultaneously two or more illocutions. Their major illocutionary aims are to express positive evaluation of certain people, things, state of affairs, ideas, as well as to make a positive emotional impact upon the addressee. The illocutionary aims characteristic of each of the studied speech act types have been specified as well.

In terms of evaluation objects, approval stays apart from the rest of the researched speech acts, since its evaluation objects are inanimate things or ideas that do not belong to the addressee's sphere of interests. Compliment and flattery have turned out to be mainly directed at the interlocutor. Praise is aimed at the interlocutor or a third person.

Praise evaluation themes are moral and intellectual traits, skills, and actions of the interlocutor or a third person as well as appearance of a third person. The theme of evaluation in a compliment speech act is the hearer's appearance, possessions, and accomplishments. Flattery evaluation themes are similar to those of praise and compliment.

Another important finding is the identification of the perlocutionary effect of positive evaluative speech acts. As for approval, it often completes a communicative exchange and does not need an explicit perlocutionary act. Yet, if an approval is expressed as an initiative move, a typical response is agreement or disagreement. The perlocutionary effect of a praise speech act is determined by praise direction: towards the hearer or a third person. In the former case, the following perlocutionary acts are possible: gratefulness, embarrassment, praise escalation, pleasant surprise, denial (caused by the hearer's modesty), and unacceptance. In the latter case, it is acceptance or unacceptance. The perlocutionary effect of a compliment speech act may be full acceptance, mirror response, ironical acceptance, changing the topic of the conversation, or unacceptance. As for flattery speech act, the speaker's illocutionary aims are achieved if the flattery is well-thought and nicely shaped, and its object is conceited: then flattery is accepted. If flattery is decoded, it is unaccepted.

As a final point, the felicity conditions of evaluative speech acts have been determined and include the communicants' common background knowledge, implications and presuppositions; the relevance of a positive evaluation in a given speech situation; the addresser's sincerity and empathy for the evaluation object.

List of abbreviations

EJ – evaluative judgment

EU – evaluative utterance

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Résumé

The article offers the research methodology of a new branch of linguistics – cognitive communicative axiology of reproduced discourse. The article focuses on the cognitive pragmatic properties and regularities of communicatively manifested positive evaluation. The opposition "evaluation – non-evaluation" has been offered. If an object

gets into a subject's zone of concern, the process of evaluating is sure to take place and thus positive, negative, or mixed evaluation is produced. The author denies the existence of neutral evaluation: a voiced neutral or indifferent attitude to a certain object suggests rather a negative attitude. The article reports on pragmatic peculiarities of evaluative cognitive judgment formation and its transformation into an evaluative communicative utterance. It has been proved that an evaluative speech act will not always equal an evaluative cognitive judgment as to its intensity, or its positive or negative character. Genuine evaluative judgments become explicit to the reader of literary discourse through the author's description of the characters' thoughts and non-verbal behaviour. The article also provides a taxonomy of positive evaluative approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts functioning in English literary discourse and film discourse. The illocutionary aims, evaluation objects and themes, as well as the perlocutionary effect of approval, praise, compliment, and flattery speech acts have been outlined. Positive evaluative speech acts have been defined as syncretic illocutionary speech acts, since they realize simultaneously two or more illocutions. Their major illocutionary aim is to express positive evaluation of certain people, things, state of affairs, ideas, as well as to make a positive emotional impact upon the addressee. In terms of evaluation objects, approval has turned out to stay apart, since its evaluation objects are inanimate things and ideas that do not belong to the addressee's sphere of interests. Compliment and flattery have turned out to be mainly directed at the interlocutor. Praise is aimed at the interlocutor or a third person.

Key words: evaluation, evaluative judgment vs evaluative utterance, literary discourse, film discourse, speech act, approval, praise, compliment, flattery.

GENDER-SPECIFIC EMOTIVITY OF VICTORIAN FEMALE PROSE FROM A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: This study presents the results of a multidimensional analysis of the novels by Charlotte and Emily Brontë, the famous English writers of the 19th century, at different levels – genre, textual, conceptual, and communicative in order to reveal gender specificity of Victorian female prose emotivity. The analysis proved some deviations of the male and female literary characters' communicative and speech behaviour in emotional states of joy, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear from gender stereotypes accepted in Victorian society.

Key words: emotivity, gender specificity, Victorian female prose, emotionally marked context, verbal means of emotion representation, emotion concept, communicative and speech behaviour of the literary characters

1. Introduction

Emotions as an integral part of human life have attracted scholars' attention since ancient times. Aristotle (Аристотель 1976), for instance, believed that emotions were an essential component of cognition. Philosophers (Аристотель 1976; Spinoza 2002) and psychologists (Изард 2000; Экман 2010; Huang et al. 2018; Lindquist et al. 2015) considered the phenomenon of emotional state (feelings, affects, mood, emotional stress) as the axiological orientation of a person, and studied the functions of emotions in the process of controlling human behaviour (Rowe 2005). The scholars developed

various classifications of emotions, distinguished primary (basic, universal) and secondary emotions, and defined their functions.

Linguists (Вежбицкая 2001; Шаховский 2008; Lindquist 2017) use the term "emotivity" for the expression of emotions through the system of linguistic means. As a category of linguistics, emotivity is closely connected with such interrelated semantic categories, as "expressiveness" (Цоллер 1996) and "evaluation" (Вольф 2006; Нагель 2007), since emotivity consists of evaluative linguistic content and expressive verbal manifestation. When a person, using a certain type of vocabulary, shows his / her positive / negative emotions, some expressiveness (strength) necessarily accompanies this manifestation of feelings. The evaluation is materially substantiated by the natural, cultural, and historical specificity of the native speakers, whose social attitude to the environment is rooted in their language. The evaluation is determined not only by the social and cultural context, in which the norms and ideals of society and personality are interpreted, but also by the emotions of the individual, the type of his / her thinking, mental state, desires, and needs.

In the context of modern linguistics, the study of emotivity is not limited to the study of the role of multilevel linguistic means (phonetic, lexical, morphological, and syntactic units of the language) in expressing emotions. Modern tendencies in the linguistics of emotions cause the expansion of the spectrum of analysis of the implementation of emotions in the language by studying the specificity of their functioning in the texts. Nowadays linguists' focus is on the text-specific realization of emotions, since emotivity pervades an individual's speech being fixed in the meanings of words as an evaluation of people's various emotional states.

However, despite the comprehensive study of the emotional component of the language system (Brooks et al. 2017; Lindquist 2017), the problem of emotivity still remains the subject of discussions in linguistics. The absence of a single psychological concept of

emotion that could serve as a theoretical basis for the linguistic research of emotivity accounts for the difficulties in solving the fundamental problems of linguistics associated with the verbalization of emotions.

The emotional sphere of an individual, as well as the ways of its manifestation, is characterized by gender differentiation. Scholars in modern gender linguistics (Горошко 2002; Мартинюк 2004; Eckert 2003; Romaine 2000; Wodak 2015) highlighted a problem of gender specific expression of emotions in language. The feelings and emotions inherent in any individual, characterize a particular vitality of the individual's connections with the objective reality, which reflect the individual's subjective relations with the world. These relationships imply different evaluative reactions of the individual in his / her states of pleasure, anger, and joy, which greatly depend upon the individual's sex (Brody & Hall 1993; Davydyuk & Panasenko 2016; Eckert 2003). Although men and women may feel the same emotions, there is still some difference between these emotional outbursts, the reason for which being the differences between their expected gender roles (Stepanyuk 2016). The idea of scholars in modern gender linguistics about gender-determined verbalization of an individual's emotional state opens up new perspectives for studying this phenomenon in linguistics.

In cognitive linguistics, scholars accumulated significant empirical material while studying the emotion concept (Красавский 2001; Фесенко 2004; Bormann-Kischkel & Hildebrand-Pascher 1990; Kövecses 1990). Current studies (Atzil & Gendron 2017; Borghi et al. 2018; Halych 2018; Hoemann & Feldman Barrett 2019; Kövecses 2018) suggest that the emotion concept is a mental entity, which is ethnically and culturally specific, structurally and semantically complex, lexically and / or phraseologically verbalized. The emotion concepts include, besides some notions, culturally valued images, which cause "a passionate attitude to the objects (in the broad sense) of the world in the process of a person's reflection and communication" (Красавский 2001: 49). The emotion concept represents a global mental unit, encoded in the human

mind by units of universal specific code, which is based on individual and universal (ethnic) sensory images (ibid.)

Maliarchuk (Малярчук 2014) argues that the emotion concepts are highly abstract mental units that perform the function of mental regulation. The emotion concepts reflect people's ethnic experience in their linguistic consciousness. Characterizing people, their customs, and traditions, emotion concepts are crucial for understanding different peoples' worldviews.

The emotion concept is viewed (Вежбицкая 2001) as a kind of cultural concept that represents the linguistic consciousness of a particular society. Regardless of cultural differences, every individual experiences the same emotions, and it makes people of different cultures related. However, the nations of the world differ concerning the types and intensity of their emotional outbursts. This difference, as Maslova (Маслова 2008: 244) stresses, causes the uniqueness of each person.

Chesnokov argues that the emotion concept reflects a behaviour pattern that can be realized in the process of people's social interaction (Чесноков 2008: 37). Since emotion concepts arrange a world perception of both an individual and a whole nation by reflecting the emotion-specific phenomena that the words name, the most challenging is the study of gender-specific verbalization of emotion concepts.

Thus, a review of theoretical sources on the problem of emotivity proves that scholars concentrate their attention on various aspects of this phenomenon. They differentiate types of emotional states, determine the role of linguistic means in expressing emotions, study emotivity as an essential component of cognition, and elucidate gender-specific expression of emotions in the language. However, a thorough study of various aspects of emotivity presents this phenomenon only fragmentarily, not as a complex whole. The idea to apply an integrated approach (genre, textual, conceptual,

and communicative) to the analysis of literary text emotivity in order to present it as a multidimensional phenomenon seems the most challenging. The relevance of such research is sure to be strengthened if literary text emotivity is viewed as the realization of axiological orientations of literary characters, which depends upon not only their sex but also the gender specificity of the author of the literary text. The solution to the problem of gender-specific Victorian literary text emotivity greatly depends upon the material under investigation. The novels by Charlotte and Emily Brontë as good examples of Victorian female prose are invaluable in this respect.

The **aim** of the paper is to reveal the gender specificity of Victorian female prose emotivity at different levels – genre, textual, conceptual, and communicative by using methods of linguistic culturology, linguistic poetics, and cognitive linguistics.

2. Material and methods

For this purpose, social female novels of the 19th century, namely, "Jane Eyre" and "Vilette" by Charlotte Brontë (1816-1855) and "Wuthering heights" by Emily Brontë (1818-1848), supply invaluable **material** for investigation. From the point of women's worldview, such novels reveal the main ideas of Victorian age, the development of social movements in England in 1840s, and the moral principles of that epoch.

The **units of analysis** are considered to be the verbal means, which manifest any literary character's emotional state. Among them, there are lexical means (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs), expressive means (exclamations, rhetoric questions, repetitions), and stylistic devices (metaphors, similes, epithets). The total amount of the language material analysed is equal to **2979** verbal means of emotion representation obtained from **2280** pages of the Brontë sisters' novels.

The **hypothesis** of the research is as follows: the gender-specific emotivity of the Brontë sisters' novels is a multidimensional phenomenon, which is realized at different

levels of the literary texts – genre, textual, conceptual, and communicative. To reveal the gender specificity of Victorian female prose emotivity at every level, it is necessary to use methods of linguistic culturology, linguistic poetics, and cognitive linguistics. Such an integrated approach such as this requires a step-by-step analysis comprising three stages.

During the first stage, the summarizing of the results of the theoretical investigations in linguistic culturology (Колесникова 2010; Hall et al. 2000; Johnston 2001) made it possible to distinguish the specificity of the cultural, historical, literary, biographical, and purely linguistic contexts of Victorian age. During the same stage, the methods of linguistic poetics (*interpretive textual* and *contextual* analyses) were used to characterize the creative style of the English writers under study, as well as to establish the most typical features of the 19th century women's novels.

During the second stage, methods of linguistic analysis, *componential*, *descriptive*, and *linguistic stylistic* analyses in particular, were used to single out, describe, and systematize the verbal means of the literary characters' emotional outbursts in the novels by Charlotte and Emily Brontë as famous representatives of Victorian female prose.

During the third stage, methods of cognitive linguistics, namely, the *conceptual* analysis, turned out to be appropriate for the reconstruction of 38 emotion concepts (hereafter – EC). The method of *EC identification* takes into account the type of connections – either semantic, or associative – between the possible name of the EC and the means of its verbal representation in the literary texts (the procedures are illustrated in part 2). The procedures of *quantitative calculations* made it possible to establish a hierarchy of the reconstructed ECs and identify among them the five key ECs: JOY, ANGER, SURPRISE, DISGUST, and FEAR.

The method of *modelling the conceptual system* of female prose emotivity is aimed at the systematization of the 38 ECs on the basis of synonymic and antonymic relations between the names of the verbalized 38 ECs. This systematization resulted in presenting them as a **conceptual system**, i.e. a well-structured system of interrelated ECs. The further differentiation of the 38 ECs on the basis of hyper hyponymic relations between their names resulted in segmentation of the conceptual system of female prose emotivity into three conceptual domains as coherently organized segments of knowledge / human experience: "Positive emotions", "Negative emotions", and "Ambivalent emotions".

The method of *modelling the semantic associative fields* of the key ECs verbalization means aimed at presenting all the language material analysed as field structures with their nuclear zones, near and far peripheries. The differentiation of these structural components was based on the type of the verbal means of emotion representation. Means of direct lexical designation of the key emotional states made up the nuclear zones, means of indirect stylistic description formed the near peripheries, and the means of mediated lexical description represented the far peripheries. The analysis of the frequency parameters of the key ECs verbalization means demonstrated the gender specificity of the literary characters' communicative behaviour in the emotional states of joy, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear.

The special methods of linguistic culturology, linguistic poetics, and cognitive linguistics already mentioned were combined with general scientific methods (*observation*, *description*, *systematization*, *induction*, and *deduction*) and empirical methods (*analysis* and *synthesis*). Such an integrated approach to the problem of emotivity realization in the novels by Charlotte and Emily Brontë is similar to the analysis of the tragic in Shakespeare's plays (Ніконова 2007).

3. Results

The multidimensional analysis of the Brontë sisters' novels made it possible to provide a valuable insight into emotivity at different levels of the literary texts under study – genre, textual, conceptual, and communicative. The results obtained revealed the gender-specific verbal representation of the literary characters' emotional states in the female novels analysed in this research, which is determined by cultural, historical, literary, and purely linguistic contexts of Victorian age.

3.1 Brontë sisters' female prose in the context of Victorian age

The result of the *cultural, historical*, and *linguistic* analyses was the systemic description of historical, social, and cultural contexts in which the Brontë sisters lived and created their novels (Колесникова 2010; Hall et al. 2000; Johnston 2001). The results of these analyses elucidated that economic collisions and class struggle, which marked the social development in most countries of the world (including England) in the middle of the 19th century, greatly influenced the writers' psychological and emotional sphere forming the axiological guidelines of the female novels' authors. The social situation in England at that time was characterized by the peculiar position of women who remained dependent upon men. Such dependence was determined by the moral norms accepted in family life and in society. All the rights were given to men, and women were engaged only in family affairs and had no rights or freedoms in the society (Hall et al. 2000). The problem of "woman and society" was complex and multifaceted, and it still causes numerous discussions. This problem is at issue in various spheres, namely, in social, political, scientific, philosophical, sociological, historical, cultural, and even in economic and juridical (Johnston 2001). In the 1840s, changes began to occur in all the spheres of life in England. These changes also affected the literary process, primarily fiction as the most fundamental genre, which performed an educational function by representing the complexity of and contradictions in the spiritual life of society.

The *interpretive textual* analysis resulted in the systematization of the features of the so-called "female novel" of the Victorian age (Gilbert & Gubar 2000). Victorian writers, namely, sisters Charlotte and Emily Brontë, George Elliott, Jane Austen, Elizabeth Gaskell felt the need to show the emergence of a "new woman" in the English society of the 19th century. The role of women was becoming different due to some changes that were taking place in various spheres of society, among them being cultural (in women's behaviour), institutional (in education, family life, work), interpersonal (in male and female relations). In their novels, Victorian writers sought to objectively reflect the lives of their women-contemporaries, the problems of women's emancipation, and the emergence of feminism. While scrutinizing the peculiarities of the women's world, their worldview, and values, studying the role of women in various fields of social life, Victorian writers were eager to show the development of new priorities and social values (Шамина 2005), which allowed the consideration of their literary heritage as a kind of reaction to changes in the spiritual content of Victorian age.

The genre specificity of the Brontë sisters' female novels may be summarized as follows: 1) in the centre of a female novel is a woman; she is freedom-loving, independent, strong, determined, and daring; 2) the woman is ordinary, she does not stand out by having a bright appearance; being sometimes even plain-featured, she has a rich inner world; 3) the woman is not inferior to a man: she can do everything by herself without requiring anybody's help; 4) the woman is always polite, kind, well-educated, and honest; 5) the woman has her own point of view and always advocates it.

Thus, the Brontë sisters present a new woman, who is independent, freedom-loving, and is in no way inferior to a man. The heroines of the Brontë sisters' female novels are always polite and honest, and have a rich inner world.

3.2 Emotivity phenomenon textual realization in female prose

The result of the *contextual* analysis, which aimed at the investigation of the emotivity phenomenon textual realization in female prose (Stepanyuk 2016), was the extraction of **2307 emotionally marked contexts** (hereafter – EMC). These are the fragments of the literary texts, in which verbal means of emotion representation manifest any literary character's emotional state. Among such verbal means are nominative means (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs), expressive means (exclamations, rhetoric questions, repetitions), and stylistic devices (metaphors, similes, epithets). The size of EMC can be equal to:

a) one sentence, in which a literary character's emotional state is expressed by one word or phrase, e.g.:

(1) *He gazed steadily. "Do you need her services?" "I could do with them. You know I'm **disgusted** with Madame Swini"* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette");

b) a context consisting of two or three sentences, which not only shows the type of the literary character's emotional state but also describes the way this emotion is expressed by him / her, as, for example, the emotion of rage is in the following EMC:

(2) *"I did not touch you, you lying creature!" <u>cried</u> she, her fingers tingling to repeat the act, and <u>her ears red with</u> **rage**. She <u>never had the power to conceal her passion</u>, it always <u>set her whole complexion in a blaze</u>* (Ch. Brontë "Wuthering heights").

The gender specificity of the EMCs manifests itself in such gender markers, as:
1) the name or surname of a literary character, e.g.:

(3) *"What?" Said **Mrs. Reed** under her breath: her cold gray eyes became troubled <u>with a look like fear"</u>* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre");

2) a personal or possessive pronoun, denoting gender, e.g.:

(4) **He looked <u>disturbed</u>. "What?" what?" he** *said hastily* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre");

3) a common noun, which denotes the gender of a literary character ("father", "mother", "nephew", "sister", etc.), e.g.:

(5) *"Farewell, then. It's time to go." "Now? – right now?" "Just now." She held up <u>quivering lips</u>.* **Her father** <u>sobbed</u>, *but she, I remarked, did not* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette");

4) contextual markers, for example, the personal pronoun "I" in Jane Eyre's speech is sure to refer to a female gender, e.g.:

(6) **I** <u>felt glad</u> *as the road was shortened before me: <u>so glad</u> that* **I** *stopped once to ask myself what <u>that joy</u> meant: and to remind the reason that it was not to my home* **I** *was going* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

According to the *contextual* analysis results, the number of masculine emotionally marked contexts (hereafter – MEMCs) is much smaller in comparison with feminine emotionally marked contexts (hereafter – FEMCs). Compare: in Ch. Brontë's novels, there are 757 MEMCs and 1346 FEMCs; in E. Brontë's novels – 62 MEMCs and 142 FEMCs. These results vividly prove that the female literary characters are shown in the female novels analysed to be more emotional than the male (see Table 1).

Table 1. Gender-specific emotionally marked contexts in the Brontë sisters' novels

Gender type	Emotionally marked contexts in Ch. Brontë's novels		Emotionally marked contexts in E. Brontë's novels		Emotionally marked contexts in the Brontë sisters' novels	
	Contexts' number	%	Contexts' number	%	Contexts' number	%
Masculine	757	36	62	30.4	819	35.5
Feminine	1346	64	142	69.6	1488	64.5
Total	**2103**	100	**204**	100	**2307**	100

3.3 Emotivity phenomenon verbal representation in female prose

The *component* analysis of the semantic structure (i.e. the semes given in vocabulary definitions) of nominative means of emotion representation made it possible to distinguish such semantic components that denote the type of a literary character's emotional state. For example, in FEMC (7) the noun *joy* denotes the emotion of "happiness", which is confirmed by the corresponding seme in the semantic structure of the word *joy* given in dictionary definitions: "joy, *n* – great <u>happiness</u> and pleasure" (LDCE); "joy, *n* – a feeling of great <u>happiness</u>" (MED); "joy, *n* – a feeling or state of contentment and <u>happiness</u>" (MWD).

(7) *How <u>animated was Graham's face</u>! How true, how warm, yet how <u>retiring the **joy** it expressed</u>!* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette").

The methods of *descriptive* and *linguistic stylistic* analyses were used to systematize the scope of the verbal means of emotion representation picked out from all the EMCs in order to distribute the lexical units into two groups:

(a) nominative means (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs) that directly (in their semantic structures) refer to the type of emotional states, e.g.:

(8) *One day a letter was received of which the contents evidently <u>caused Mrs. Bretton</u> **surprise** and some **concern**. I thought at first it was from home, and trembled, expecting I know not what disastrous communication: to me, however, no reference was made, and the cloud seemed to pass* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette");

(b) expressive means (exclamations, rhetoric questions, repetitions) and stylistic devices (metaphors, similes, epithets) that indirectly show the type of the literary characters' emotional states, as, for example, the epithets *dirty* and *disagreeable* express the emotion of disgust in the FEMC:

(9) *I kept expecting that Miss Scatcherd <u>would praise her attention</u>; but, instead of that, <u>she suddenly cried out</u> –* "You **dirty, disagreeable** *girl! You have never cleaned your nails this morning!*" (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

Quantitative calculations clearly demonstrate that the literary characters' emotional states are most often represented in the EMCs by means of direct lexical designation (1783 representations, 59.8%), which directly refer to the emotional state type (10) or by means of an indirect lexical description (765 representations, 25.7%), which represent the literary characters' emotional states with the help of expressive means and stylistic devices, without naming them directly. Indirect lexical descriptions of the literary characters' emotional states make the narration more expressive and emotional, as, for example, do Mr. Rochester's exclamations of joy when he comes to know that Jane is ready to marry him (11):

(10) *One day a letter was received of which the contents evidently caused Mrs. Bretton* **surprise** *and some concern. I thought at first it was from home, <u>and trembled</u>, expecting I know not what disastrous communication: to me, however, no reference was made, and the cloud seemed to pass* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette").

(11) *"A poor blind man, whom you will have to lead about by the hand?"*
"Yes, sir."
"A crippled man, twenty years older than you, whom you will have to wait on?"
"Yes, sir."
"Truly, Jane?"
"Most truly, sir."
*"***Oh!*** <u>My darling! God bless you and reward you</u>!"*
"Mr. Rochester, if ever I did a good deed in my life – if ever I thought a good thought – if ever I prayed a sincere and blameless prayer – if ever I wished a righteous wish, – I am rewarded now. To be your wife is, for me, <u>to be as</u> **happy** *as I can be on earth."*

"Because <u>you delight</u> in sacrifice" (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

3.4 Emotivity phenomenon conceptualization in female prose

To study the conceptualization of the literary characters' emotional states in the female novels the research concentrates on methods of cognitive linguistics, namely, the method of *emotion concepts identification*, which is similar to the method of *literary concepts identification* (Ніконова 2012). The method of *emotion concepts identification* takes into account the type of connection between the possible name of the EC and the verbal means of its representation in the EMC. Such connections are revealed to be of two types: semantic and associative.

Semantic connections are defined to be **direct** if the emotion is expressed directly in the meaning of the verbal means of emotion representation, which belongs either to the same part of speech as the possible name of the EC, usually it is a noun, as, for example, the noun *sadness* to name the EC SADNESS (12), or to a different part of speech (a verb, an adverb, or an adjective) as, for example, the adjectives *angry* and *indignant* to name the ECs ANGER and INDIGNATION (13):

(12) *"Jane! Jane!" he said, in such an accent of bitter **sadness** it thrilled along every nerve I had; "you don't love me, then? It was only my station, and the rank of my wife, that you valued? Now that you think me disqualified to become your husband, you recoil from my touch as if I were some toad or ape"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

(13) *"You are **angry** just now, heated and **indignant**; you will think and feel differently to-morrow"* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette").

Indirect semantic connections are distinguished in the EMCs between the possible names of the ECs and the verbal means of emotion representation if the emotion is

denoted figuratively in the transferred meanings of the verbal means of emotion representation, which are usually expressive means and stylistic devices, e.g.:

(14) *"What can you mean by talking in this way to me!"* **thundered** Heathcliff with **savage vehemence**. *"How – how dare you, under my roof – God! He's mad to speak so!" And he struck his forehead with rage* (Ch. Brontë "Wuthering heights").

The combination of stylistic devices (the metaphor *thundered Heathcliff* and the epithet *savage* in *savage vehemence*) with syntactic expressive means (repetition *how – how* and the three exclamatory sentences – *What can you mean by talking in this way to me! God! he's mad to speak so! he's mad to speak so!*) represents the highest degree of Heathcliff's anger and makes it possible to identify the EC ANGER.

Associative connections between the possible name of the EC and of the verbal means of emotion representation are revealed in the EMCs if the emotion is expressed by the whole EMC, i.e. mediated lexical description of a literary character's emotional state, e.g.:

(15) *"Then why does he follow you so with his eyes, and get you so frequently alone with him, and keep you so continually at his side? Mary and I had both concluded he wished you to marry him."*
"He does – he has asked me to be his wife."
Diana *clapped her hands*. *"That is just what we hoped and thought! And you will marry him, Jane, won't you? And then he will stay in England"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

There are no lexical means (either direct or indirect) or expressive means (exclamations, repetitions, rhetoric questions) or stylistic devices (metaphors, similes, epithets) to denote a literary character's emotional state. But the behaviour of the literary character, John's in particular, who *follows* Jane *with his eyes* and *keeps her so continually at his side*, and Diana's: she *clapped her hands* when she found out that

John had *asked* Jane *to be his wife*, vividly testifies, as our life experience suggests, to John's love and Diana's pleasure. Hence, the mediated lexical description of the literary characters' emotional states makes it possible to identify the ECs LOVE and PLEASURE.

After establishing semantic (direct and indirect) and associative connections between the possible names of the ECs and the verbal means of emotion representation in the EMCs, 38 ECs were reconstructed and identified. Emotion concepts were not a mere collection or a hierarchical list of concepts. The method of *modelling the conceptual system* of female prose emotivity was used to present ECs as a well-structured conceptual system, segmented into three conceptual domains: "Positive emotions", "Negative emotions", and "Ambivalent emotions".

The method of *modelling semantic associative fields* (Бойко 2015) of the verbal means of the ECs JOY, ANGER, SURPRISE, DISGUST, and FEAR representation, which by *quantitative calculations* of these means were identified as the key ECs in the analysed female novels, made it possible to identify the gender-specific textual representation of such literary characters' emotional states, as joy, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear.

4. Discussion
The results obtained from the analysis provide the necessary basis for interpretation and evaluation of their theoretical and practical consequences.

4.1 Gender-specific emotivity textual realization in female prose
The results of the analyses of **emotivity textual realization** in the gender-specific EMCs in the female novels reveal the following.

A great variety of manifestations of the literary characters' emotional states (from positive to negative emotional states, with negative prevailing for both the men and women, see Table 2) is proved to be influenced by both the female prose genre

specificity and the stylistic manner of the Brontë sisters as bright representatives of the women's prose of Victorian age.

Table 2. Gender-specific emotionally marked contexts in the Brontë sisters' novels

Emotion type	Context type	Contexts' number	Total contexts' number	%
Negative emotions	Masculine emotionally marked contexts	607	1225	52.1
	Feminine emotionally marked contexts	618		
Positive emotions	Masculine emotionally marked contexts	332	785	33.3
	Feminine emotionally marked contexts	453		
Ambivalent emotions	Masculine emotionally marked contexts	155	345	14.6
	Feminine emotionally marked contexts	190		
Total		**2355**	**2355**	**100**

Although men and women may feel the same emotions, there is still a difference between these emotions, caused by the differences between their expected gender roles. The influence of the gender specificity of a literary character himself / herself, i.e. a literary character's sex – male or female, is manifested in the emotion designation type in MEMCs and FEMCs – either directly / indirectly in a character's speech, or directly / indirectly in the author's / narrator's commentary.

4.2 Gender-specific emotivity verbal representation in female prose

The results of the analyses of **emotivity verbal representation** in the gender-specific EMCs reveal the following.

The specificity of the verbal representation of the literary characters' emotional states is manifested at all levels of the literary texts, namely, on the textual level – in the structural and semantic specificity of the EMCs (see 3.2); on the linguistic level – in the multi-level means of the emotional state designation, which may be:

- language units (i.e. direct lexical designation: 1783 cases; 59.8%), for example, a noun and an adverb in the FEMC, e.g.:

(16) *Miss Linton considered her sister-in-law with **indignation**. "For shame! For shame!" She repeated **angrily**. "You are worse than twenty foes, you poisonous friend!"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre");

- speech units (i.e. indirect stylistic description: 765 cases; 25.7%), e.g.:

(17) *"Hold her arms, Miss Abbot: she's like **a mad cat"*** (Ch. Brontë "Wuthering heights");

- textual fragments (i.e. mediated lexical description: 431 cases; 14.5%), e.g.:

(18) *Graham forgot his impatience the same evening, and would have accosted her as usual when his friends were gone, but she wrenched herself from his hand; her eye is quite flashed; she would not bid him good-night; she would not look in his face. The next day he treated her with indifference, and she grew like a bit of marble. The day after, he teased her to know what was the matter; her lips would not unclose. Of course he could not feel real anger on his side: the match was too unequal in every way; he tried soothing and coaxing. "Why was she so angry? What had he done?" By-and-by tears answered him; he petted her, and they were friends. But she was the one on whom such incidents were not lost: I remarked that never after this rebuff did she seek him, or follow him, or in any way solicit his notice* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette").

The role of the multi-level means of the representation of the literary characters' emotional states is different:
- means of direct lexical designation (nouns, adjectives, adverbs, verbs) denote emotions in their direct meanings or, without naming the type of emotion, directly

express (by exclamations, interjections, rhetoric questions) a character's emotional state in his / her speech;

- means of indirect stylistic description either describe a character's positive / negative emotions figuratively (by lexical stylistic devices, such as metaphors, similes, epithets), or intensify the expressiveness and emotional colouring of a character's speech who is in a certain emotional state (by syntactic stylistic devices, such as repetitions, exclamations, and graphic expressive means, such as capitalization and hyphenation);

- means of mediated lexical description (i.e. textual fragments, which have no lexical or stylistic verbalisers of the literary characters' emotional states in their composition) describe emotionally charged situations that cause certain manifestations of emotional states.

4.3 Gender-specific emotivity conceptual system in female prose

The verbal representation of the literary characters' emotional states is conditioned by the nature of the Victorian writers' cognitive orientation embodied in the literary texts under study. The specificity of the female writers' consciousness determines the specifics of the conceptual system of Victorian prose emotivity. The results of **modelling the conceptual system** of female prose emotivity reveal the following.

In the conceptual system of female prose emotivity, the ECs coherently organized in the conceptual domain "Negative emotions" (1225 EMCs; 52.1%) are more numerous than in the other two conceptual domains, namely, "Positive emotions" (785 EMCs; 33.3%) and "Ambivalent emotions" (345 EMCs; 14.6%), combined (see Table 2).

Approximately the same number of MEMCs (607 cases) and FEMCs (618 cases), in which negative emotions are verbalised, proves that both men and women show negative emotions equally frequently. The significant predominance of FEMCs (453 cases) over MEMCs (332 cases), in which positive emotions are verbalised,

demonstrate the greater positivity of the female literary characters in the novels analysed as compared with the male ones. Ambivalent emotions of surprise and excitement are more often expressed by the women than the men in the novels analysed, as proved by a significant difference in the number of contextual actualisations of the ECs SURPRISE and EXCITEMENT – 155 MEMCs and 190 FEMCs, in which bipolar emotional states are implemented.

The specificity of the structural components of the **semantic associative fields** of the verbal means of the key ECs JOY, ANGER, SURPRISE, DISGUST, and FEAR representation (their nuclear zones, near and far peripheries) distinguished on the basis of either semantic or associative relations between the names of the key ECs and their verbalization means, as well as their frequency parameters reflects the specificity of female prose emotivity.

Gender specificity appears not only in the frequency of emotional outbursts by both men and women (as proved by the number of MEMCs (631 cases) and FEMCs (736 cases)), but also in the type of the emotions themselves. Although both the men and women are more likely to show emotions of joy and anger than other emotions, as proved by the contextual actualizations of the relevant ECs – JOY (16.9% FEMCs and 12.1% MEMCs) and ANGER (15.1% MEMCs and 12.6% FEMCs), the predominance of these emotions for each sex is different. Thus, the most characteristic type of the women's emotional state turned out to be joy – 231 (16.9%) FEMCs of EC JOY actualization, while the most representative for the men was the emotional state of anger – 206 (15.1%) MEMCs of EC ANGER actualization.

The analyses of the verbal means of ECs JOY and ANGER representation show that the women express emotion of joy with their actions (they kiss, hug, jump, run, etc.), while the men are more restrained (joy can be seen only in their eyes or on the face). MEMC (19) describes that Jane, who was very afraid of Rochester's having disappeared

forever, and she would never see him again in her life, did not tame her emotions and jumped for joy when Rochester came back or in MEMC (20) it is shown that Graham was more restrained while expressing his joy when he saw his beloved Polly, e.g.:

(19) *I obeyed:* **joy** *made me agile: I sprang up before him. A hearty kissing I got for a welcome, and some boastful triumph, which I swallowed as well as I could. He checked himself in his exultation to ask, "But is there anything the matter, Janet, that you come to meet me at such an hour? Is there anything wrong?" "No, but I thought you would never come. I could not bear to wait in the house for you, especially with this rain and wind"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

(20) *How animated was Graham's face! How true, how warm, yet how is retiring the* **joy** *it expressed! This was a state of things, <...> at once to attract and enchain, to subdue and excite Dr. John* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette").

The comparison of the verbal means of ECs SURPRISE, DISGUST, and FEAR representations in FEMCs and MEMCs showed the quantitative prevalence of the feminine representations of the corresponding emotional states over the masculine ones, which confirms the greater emotionality of the women as compared with the men.

4.4 Gender-specific emotional speech behaviour in female prose

The analysis of the literary characters' **gender-specific speech behaviour** in such emotional states, as joy, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear reveals the correlation between a literary character's gender specificity and the type of his / her speech behaviour. Such specificity of the literary characters' speech behaviour in the novels analysed manifests itself in the frequency of certain emotional outbursts by the men and women, in the type of the emotions themselves that are basic to each gender (for example, the basic male emotion is anger, and the basic female emotion is joy), as well as in the ways of emotional expressions by the men and women.

The emotion of joy is not shown openly in the men's direct speech, though it is expressed directly in the women's direct speech, which indicates their high emotionality, e.g.:

(21) "*Bessie! Bessie! Bessie!" That was all I said; whereas <u>she half laughed, half cried</u>* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

The emotion of anger also differentiates the men's and women's speech behaviour: the men often use emotionally coloured vocabulary in their direct speech, namely, such quarrelsome words, as "rat", "monster", "monkey", etc. The women in a state of anger rarely use quarrelsome words, often replacing them with evaluative adjectives and comparisons, as, for example, does Jane in response to John's humiliation and insults:

(22) *"**Wicked** and **cruel** boy!" I said. "You are **like a murderer** – you are **like a slave-driver** – you are **like the Roman emperors!**"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

The emotions of disgust and fear are expressed by the women in their direct speech by means of exclamations (23) or interjections (24), e.g.:

(23) *"**Disgusting!** The porridge is burnt again!"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

(24) *"I never cried for such a thing in my life: I hate going out in the carriage. I cry because I am miserable." "**Oh fie**, Miss!" said Bessie* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

The men's emotional states of disgust and fear are not realized in their direct speech but described in the authors' commentaries, e.g.:

(25) *Mr. Edgar seldom mustered courage to visit Wuthering Heights openly. He had a* ***terror*** *of Earnshaw's reputation, and* <u>*shrunk from encountering him*</u> (Ch. Brontë "Wuthering heights").

The emotion of surprise does not affect the literary characters' speech behaviour. The men and women similarly express their surprise in their direct speech by means of exclamations, interjections, repetitions, or questions. The difference between the male and female literary characters in their expressing surprise is determined by the reasons (positive or negative) that cause this emotional state. The research proves that the women are surprised by the positive moments of life, good deeds, and good attitude to them, as Jane was pleasantly surprised that Rochester offered to marry her, e.g.:

(26) *"*<u>*Are you in earnest? Do you truly love me? Do you sincerely wish me to be your*</u> <u>*wife?*</u>*" "I do; and if an oath is necessary to satisfy you, I swear it." "Then, sir, I will marry you"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

The men's surprise has a negative colouring, because it is often caused by someone's bad deeds, someone's bad behaviour. The men's surprise even borders on the state of anger, for example, Linton's surprise with Catherine's behaviour:

(27) *"*<u>*Catherine, love! Catherine!*</u>*" interposed Linton, greatly* ***shocked*** *at the double fault of falsehood and violence which his idol had committed* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

4.5 Gender-specific emotional communicative behaviour in female prose
The analysis of the literary characters' **communicative behaviour** in such emotional states, as joy, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear revealed the specificity of the female prose genre, namely, that the literary characters' communicative behaviour is determined not only by their gender, but also by the gender of the female prose authors of the Victorian age.

The men's communicative behaviour in the emotional states of joy, anger, disgust, surprise, and fear characterized by restraining, concealing, or disguising their emotions mainly coincides with the generally accepted gender stereotype of an Englishman, a true gentleman of Victorian England, who is known to be well-conditioned, well-bred, and gentlemanly. For example, it was only Mr. Rooster's face that revealed his disgust and fear, which he tamed while responding calmly, without manifesting any emotion:

(28) *I saw Mr. Rochester **shudder**: <u>a singularly marked expression of disgust, horror, hatred, warped his countenance almost to distortion; but he only said</u> – "Come, be silent, Richard, and never mind her gibberish: don't repeat it"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

However, in the female novels, the male literary characters seem to be not as impeccable as it was expected in Victorian society of that time. In the novels analysed, the men often behave like women – emotionally, verbosely, and uncontrollably, as, for example, Rochester does while proposing that Jane marry him:

(29) *<u>"Gratitude!" he ejaculated</u>; and added **wildly.** – "<u>Jane accept me quickly</u>. Say, Edward – give me my name – Edward – I will marry you"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

In the Brontë sisters' novels, the female literary characters in the emotional states of joy, anger, disgust, surprise, and fear are usually characterized by self-restraint, composure, disguise of emotions, and self-control, especially in the presence of the men. Yet such behaviour does not coincide with the generally accepted gender stereotype of women's communicative behaviour in such emotional states, according to which women are supposed to be highly emotional, nearly hysterical, often inclined to show their feelings, e.g.:

(30) *"Do you never laugh, Miss Eyre? Don't trouble yourself to answer – I see you laugh rarely; but you can laugh very merrily; believe me, you are not naturally austere, <...>. The Lowood constraint still clings to you somewhat; controlling your features, muffling your voice, and restricting your limbs; and you fear in the presence of a man and a brother – or father, or master"* (Ch. Brontë "Jane Eyre").

In the Brontë sisters' novels, which are vivid examples of Victorian female prose, there are already new trends in representing a woman who is emancipated, strong-willed, brave, and independent. In anger, the women, as described in the novels, are capable of unexpected and courageous actions. They are not afraid of anything and can bravely defend their position, e.g.:

(31) *"I grieve to say I could not quite carry out this resolution. For some time the abuse of England and the English found and left me stolid: I bore it some fifteen minutes stoically enough; but this hissing cockatrice was determined to sting, and he said such things at last – fastening not only upon our women, but upon our greatest names and best men; sullying, the shield of Britannia, and dabbling the union jack in mud – that I was stung. With vicious relish he brought up the most spicy current continental historical falsehoods – than which nothing can be conceived more offensive. Zelie, and the whole class, became one grin of vindictive delight; for it is curious to discover how these clowns of Labassecour secretly hate England. At last, I struck a sharp stroke on my desk, opened my lips, and let loose this cry: – "Vive l'Angleterre, l'Histoire et les Heros! A bas la France, la Fiction et les Faquins!" The class was struck of a heap. I suppose they thought me mad"* (Ch. Brontë "Vilette").

In his speech, Paul quite sharply expressed his attitude towards England and the women who lived there. Lucy became very angry, and her communicative behaviour was quite unexpected to all the people present because it violated the behavioural norms accepted in the society of that time. Lucy got up, banged on the table and courageously shouted:

"Long live England!" This exclamatory sentence as the means of the indirect lexical description of Lucy's indignation caused a real shock to the public.

5. Conclusion

The multifacetedness of the human emotional sphere causes the diversity of the phenomenon of literary text emotivity. The complexity of the phenomenon of Victorian female prose emotivity instantiated in Ch. Brontë's and E. Brontë's novels is due to the following reasons: 1) *extralingual* (the socio-historical and cultural contexts of Victorian England in the 1840s), 2) *genre* (genre specificity of female prose and the authors' individual style), 3) *textual* (the specificity of the contextual embodiment of the literary characters' emotional states in the emotionally marked contexts), 4) *lingual* (the variety of the verbal means of the representation of the literary characters' emotional states), 5) *lingual cognitive* (the specificity of the emotion concepts, which reveals the cognitive nature of the literary texts emotivity), 6) *gender* (gender-specificity of the emotion concepts determined by the gender differences in the literary characters' speech and communicative behaviour in the emotional states analysed).

In E. Brontë's and Ch. Brontë's female prose analysed, the predominant emotional states of the male and female literary characters appeared to be joy, anger, surprise, disgust, and fear. In these emotional states, the gender specificity of the male and female literary characters displayed itself in the differences of the literary characters' speech behaviour. The gender specificity of the male and female literary characters' speech behaviour manifested itself in the frequency of certain emotional outbursts by the men and women, in the type of the emotions themselves, which are basic to each gender, as well as in the ways these emotions are expressed.

The gender-specific communicative behaviour of the literary characters in the emotional states analysed, namely, the women's self-restraint, composure, disguise of

emotions, and their self-control, deviates from the gender stereotypes accepted in Victorian society.

The communicative behaviour of the literary characters in the emotional states analysed is likely to be determined by the personalities of the female prose authors. The gender-specific communicative behaviour of the literary characters is revealed in various deviations from the behaviour norms accepted in Victorian society. Such deviations are manifested, for example, in the loss of self-control by the men in a state of anger, which was considered inappropriate for a real gentleman. Quite different from the expected restraint and obedience of male-dependent women is the communicative behaviour of the emancipated women who, in a state of anger, were capable of courageous actions in defending their rights.

List of abbreviations

EC – emotion concept

EMC − emotionally marked contexts

FEMC − feminine emotionally marked contexts

LDCE − Longman dictionary of contemporary English

MED − Macmillan English dictionary

MEMC − masculine emotionally marked contexts

MWD − Merriam-Webster dictionary

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Résumé

The complexity of the problem under study determined by cultural, historical, literary, and purely linguistic contexts of Victorian age requires a multidimensional approach, which unites methods of linguistic culturology, linguistic poetics, and cognitive linguistics. Genre specificity of female prose emotivity is determined by the axiological guidelines of the female prose authors' psychological and emotional sphere. Textual representation of Victorian female prose emotivity discovers the influence of a literary character's gender specificity on the type and frequency, as well as the ways the emotions are expressed by the male and female literary characters. The gender-specificity of the conceptual system of female prose emotivity is manifested in the key emotion concepts JOY, ANGER, SURPRISE, DISGUST, and FEAR and the verbal means of

their contextual representation. The frequency of the verbal means of the key emotion concepts representation, which are organized as the structural components of the semantic associative fields, discovers the gender specificity of the communicative and speech behaviour of the literary characters in the emotional states analysed. In the Brontë sisters' novels, the female literary characters' self-restraint, composure, disguise of emotions, and their self-control, deviate from the gender stereotypes accepted in Victorian society.

Key words: emotivity, gender specificity, Victorian female prose, emotionally marked context, verbal means of emotion representation, emotion concept, communicative and speech behaviour of the literary characters

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CHARISMA & FEMALE EXPRESSIVENESS: LANGUAGE, ETHNOCULTURE, POLITICS

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Abstract: This paper represents a contrastive analysis of the verbal and paraverbal features of expressive female political speech in Latin America, Spain, and Ukraine. The corpus consisted of public speeches delivered by contemporary Spanish-speaking and Ukrainian female politicians. The article offers a novel multimodal analysis method for studying prosodic and gesture correlates of the expressive speech of female politicians in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine as a component of their charismatic image.

Key words: charisma, gender, contrastive analysis, political discourse, expressive female speech, verbal, paraverbal, prosodic, gesture, Latin America, Spain, Ukraine.

> *And then, of course, there's an emotional part of persuasion: charisma. It cannot be learned, but is a direct form of communicating from heart to heart. This communication does not have to go through your mind.* (Thilo von Trotha)

1. Introduction

Contemporary European and American political discourses are currently marked with a revived interest in the concept of *charisma* developed by renowned German sociologist

Weber (Schwinn 2016) and, consequently, a search for new political figures with the ability to be inspired by great ideas and to inspire others with these ideas. In this article, we summarize the results of 15 years of research in the field of linguistic charismatics (Петлюченко 2009a; 2010; 2018), in particular, the charismatic image of Yulia Tymoshenko (Петлюченко 2009b), as well as a Candidate's thesis in the political discourse of Spanish-speaking countries from a contrastive perspective (Чернякова 2014; 2016). In the pilot study for the first time we attempt to interpret the linguistics and computational phonetics spheres of the concept of political charisma in Spanish and Ukrainian based on expressive female political speech in Latin America, Spain, and Ukraine. Thus, two ideal types "charisma" and "gender" that originated in sociology are studied using linguistic methods.

In this paper, we dwell on the verbal and phonetic-gestural correlates of charismatic expressiveness in the speeches of Ukrainian- and Spanish-speaking female politicians using identification experiments and computational analysis. The main issue here is, which paraverbal means in the speech of female politicians are perceived as *charismatic* and later attributed to them by their supporters and opponents as *charisma*. Methodologically, there are two controversial approaches to determining the correlates of charisma: (1) Charisma is a *state of inspiration* of the speaker that can be described as a psycholinguistic phenomenon of emotional nature (Петлюченко 2009a), and (2) Charisma is the result of pure *attribution* according to Weber (2006), which depends on the expectations and projections of the followers, and is conditioned culturally and ethno-specifically in each specific case (Petljutschenko 2018). In our study, we use the former approach.

The prosodic specifics of charismatic discourse are characterized by intensification of all its dynamic, tonal, and temporal components. In phonetic studies, this acoustic effect is referred to as *prosodic intensity* understanding it as abrupt changes in pitch, loudness,

tempo variations, and pauses in important utterances containing addresses, appeals, and concepts with positive semantics (Петлюченко 2009a: 179). Charismatic rhetoric is also formed by the kinetic (gesture and mimic) component that is functionally related to the prosodic representation of speech making communication more effective. A gesture is the action or movement of the body through which one individual signals another individual about his presence, his intentions regarding objects (Petlyuchenko & Artiukhova 2015). Charismatic political communications are characterized primarily by accentuating or co-speech gestures that represent movements of the body, especially the arms/hands, by which the speaker explains, complements his words, highlights the key points, emphasizes or amplifies a verbal utterance. A gesture is perceived by the addressee as a *kinematic* form of verbal charismatic appeal through which the leader exercises his influence on his followers and/or opponents encouraging them to commit actions aimed at achieving a particular goal (ibid., 183).

This study follows current trends in modern sociolinguistics, which, on the one hand, accumulate the classical techniques (particularly experimental methods) of studying the gender-related specifics of oral female speech based on social standing, age, and professional affiliation, and on the other hand, reflect the latest approaches to the contrastive analysis of socio-political discourse both in the Spanish-speaking world (Spain and Latin America) and in Ukraine. This contributes to the study of gender (Anderson 2019), speech effect (Sendlmeier 2016), and comparative issues (Hock 2009; Kayne 2010).

We offer a novel audiovisual analysis method for studying voice and kinetic means used in the *expressive speech of female politicians* in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine generally recognized as 'charismatic personalities'. This allows determining the ethno-specific correlates of expressiveness in the speech of female politicians at the verbal and paraverbal levels and improving the integral "verbal + tone + gesture" model of

charismatic inspiration (Петлюченко 2009a: 184) and aggressive rhetoric (Petlyuchenko & Artiukhova 2015: 192).

We also discuss the analysis of synchronous and asynchronous *right hand co-speech gestures* in relation to prosodic emphasis in expressive public speeches of Spanish/Ukrainian-speaking female politicians. Waving the right hand, extending the right hand forward has a long historical and cultural semiotic background: at first, it was associated mostly with the *Roman salute*, but later received a negative connotation in the *Deutscher Gruß*. In modern political communication, this gesture is desemantisized: it plays the role of an accentuating gesture and is used by both male and female politicians as a way of strengthening their charismatic ecstasy (Petlyuchenko & Artiukhova 2015: 190).

2. Background and motivations

The concept of *gender* is studied in anthropology (Malo 2018), sociology (Weißmann 2017), sociolinguistics (Cheshire 2002), history (Lower 2016), literature (Hanisch 2005), and other humanities, and is used to distinguish *masculinity* and *femininity* as the sociocultural characteristics of the natural differences between a man and a woman.

In *linguistics*, gender is understood as *social gender* and is interpreted first and foremost in relation to the social status of the speaker (Cameron 1998; Eckert & McConnel-Ginnet 2004; Holmes & Meyerhoff 2001; Trudgill 2000), which is one of the main factors of linguistic variation and the most important component that should be taken into account in studying the phonetic organization of verbal male and female speech (Потапов 2002), the stereotypes of its perception in various linguistic cultures (Біловус 2011; Петлюченко 2009a; Levin & Sullivan 1995; Mouton 2000), and the formation of speech portraits of women and men in different types of discourse (Безбородова 2013; Федорів 2012; Bethany 2003; Fedoriv 2016; Marchyshyna 2017; Probst et al. 2018).

To various extents, verbal differentiation in terms of the speaker's gender is observed in many world languages depending on the specific social and cultural traditions of the society, in which a certain language is used. For instance, Japanese female speech is characterized by assimilation, reduction, and gemination, as well as ascending intonation and frequency tone increase at the end of the sentence with the melody of male Japanese speech being more neutral (Крнета 2003). Analysis of the peculiarities of modern-day English language drama has shown that female monologs in the form of reflections or narratives are an integral part of an English-speaking woman's conversation (Жигайкова 2004). The features of the female version of speech are clearly manifested in modern French-language journals, where the language is characterized by an increased degree of emotivity manifested in the active use of conversation intensifiers, metaphors, fashionable linguistic forms, Anglo-Americanisms, etc. (Есина 2006). It is also characterized by the use of refined vocabulary, short utterances, disjunctive questions, and conversation intensifiers (Потапов 2004). The extralinguistic markers of the female group are cooperativity and synthetism, hyper-correctness of pronunciation. Furthermore, in contrast to male speech, the speech of Russian-speaking women tends to use "prestigious vocabulary", neologisms, modal words, and concentrated associations (Schinnerl 2015).

Traditionally, female speech in various societies and linguistic cultures is more emotionally highlighted than male speech (Григораш 2012; Егорова 2008; Табурова 1999; Bonzi et al. 2014; Parsons 2009; Pépiot 2014). Women make extensive use of intonation to express such endocrine-based emotions as joy, anger, fear, etc. that have a pronounced expressive nature in certain southern ethnic cultures such as Greek, Italian, Latin American, etc. (Längle & Holzhey-Kunz 2008; Schonlau 2017: 268).

Phonatory features of female speech are typological and can be manifested in various linguistic cultures in *vocalism* (women have a special timbral coloring caused by a greater volume of the oral cavity during the articulation of sounds as compared to men),

consonantism (there is more stress during articulation as compared to men), *prosody* (extensive use of various means of intonational expressiveness) (Kehrein 2002), as well as such acoustic effects as aspiration, labialization, and nasalization that convey various shades of a woman's emotional state, her attitude to the subject matter of her utterance, to the interlocutor, the speech situation, etc. (Елемешина 2010). *Perceptively*, the female voice is generally perceived as higher than the male voice, which can be explained by purely physiological peculiarities of the vocal cords, with men's being generally longer and thicker than women's ones, and the shorter female vocal tract (Pompino-Marschall 2009: 35). Such female speech gives the impression of greater variation due to the "trimming" of the melodic pattern (i.e., a large number of pitch maximums on the voiced curve) caused by "*the desire to be appealing to the opposite sex*", mannerism, etc. (Шкворченко 2012).

A key feature of the contemporary political discourse is that both men and women are its equal participants (Alexiyevets 2017). The established gender-related differences in this area allow distinguishing female political discourse (Bethany 2003; Burns 2013), which is characterized by the use of a vocabulary with reality perception semantics at the level of feelings and emotions thus proving their widespread tendency to speak about their feelings and not hide them (Maravall 2015). Female politicians often use emotionally evaluative vocabulary, cries, words denoting doubt, uncertainty, probability, inaccuracy, a wide range of stylistically marked phrases – metaphors, epithets, lexical repetitions, oppositions, which are associated with the intentions of female politicians to inform the reader/listener about national and world events in an expressive form and characterize their political opponents more emotionally (Coates 2013; Stashko 2018).

The motivation and emotional state of Latin American women who are active in the political arena and usually project an "iron lady" image (such as Eva Peron, Michelle Bachelet, Lidia Gueiler Tejada, Rosalia Arteaga Serrano, Ertha Pascal-Trouillo) is most

adequately conveyed by such paraverbal speech components such as gestures, pauses, glances, silence, etc., as well as the constructed components of their image (clothing, appearance, gait, bad habits, health status, temperament, family attitude, etc.) (Kalyta 2014).

An important role in the modern *Ukrainian political arena* is played by Yulia Tymoshenko, Inna Bohoslovska, Olha Bohomolets, Nataliya Korolevska, Tetyana Chornovil, Lesya Orobets, Iryna Farion, and others, whose charismatic image is a mixture of a post-Soviet leader and a modern European businesswoman (Петлюченко 2009a). The younger generation of female politicians is more relaxed with greater freedom of expression and rhetorical skills, whereas female leaders of the older generations show features of a speaker strictly regulated by outside prescriptions, which was characteristic of the Soviet socio-political era (Федорів 2012).

Correct interpretation of the ethno-specific features of female speech in various forms of communication, particularly in political discourse, requires consideration of the *kinetic specifics* of the co-speech gestures that are included in the verbal message and are usually synchronized with the prominent sections of the message for visual highlighting purposes (Kendon 2004).

Radevych-Vynnyts'kyj suggests that in terms of gesticulation, Ukrainians hold an intermediate position in Europe between Italians and Finns (Радевич-Винницький 1997). Among the specific features of verbalization used in feminine strategies and tactics of non-verbal communication in modern Ukrainian, we can distinguish the following typical female gestures and poses associated with the relevant emotion: (1) stomping feet (anger), (2) flinging arms (surprise), (3) burying the face in hands (suffering), (4) folding hands (humility, reconciliation), (5) clutching the head (despair), raising hands (embarrassment, surprise, confusion), (6) hands on hips (fighting spirit) (Осіпова 2014).

Speaking of the kinetic peculiarities of the Spanish-speaking linguistic community, we note that gestures and facial expressions of both women and men are characterized by intensified expressiveness caused by the traditional high emotionality and southern temperament displayed by the inhabitants of this region (Hein-Kircher 2013). We should also consider the possible impact of the national-cultural code of Italian immigrants to Latin America who currently form the fourth largest ethnic group in Brazil and still retain their Italian identity and ties with Italian culture (Chaunu 1973). The typified kinetic portrait of representatives of Spanish-speaking linguistic cultures is formed by the following kinemes: (1) a gesture, in which a person seems to hold a bundle of something in his hand denotes "a lot of people, a crowd", (2) a gesture, in which a person brings his index fingers apart or together or knocks them one on the one is understood as "being together"; (3) a gesture, in which the palms are directed towards the interlocutor means "be calmer, calm down" for Spaniards, etc. (Фирсова 2000).

3. Subjects, methods and materials

This section presents the methods, corpus, program of the two-way comparative study of the spoken language of Spanish- and Ukrainian-speaking female politicians using scientific observation methods, a *tertium comparationis* model, perceptual and computation analysis, and the hypothesis.

3.1 Methods and program

This paper studies female political discourse in Spanish-speaking countries and Ukraine with a focus on contrastive lingual, prosodic, and kinetic means of expressing female speech in the political discourse of Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine against the background of the common feature of "expressiveness". Contrastive analysis of Spanish/Latin American and Ukrainian female political discourse required a common comparison platform – *tertium comparationis* based on the category of *expressiveness*,

which conveys the meaning with high intensity and results in an emotional or logical enhancement that may or may not be figurative (Petlyuchenko & Artiukhova 2015: 191).

The category of expressiveness is consistent with the communicative intentions of female politicians who are expressive (emotional) leaders and always try to communicate expressively in public oral discourse. Expressiveness is understood as an enhancement (or reduction) of the extent of a certain attribute, which leads to its more intense, brighter, more dynamic expression in language or speech. Expressiveness is not related to a specific communicative act; its lexical and syntactic *carriers* can be language structures that are heterogeneous in terms of semantics or language functions.

Thus, the choice of levels of the *tertium comparationis* constructed for the contrastive comparison of Spanish/Latin American and Ukrainian female political discourse correlates with the subject matter of the analysis and is formed by two levels of comparison: *the verbal level* (comparing utterances/phrases of female politicians containing verbal markers of gender-related feminine expressiveness) and *the paraverbal level* (comparing the prosodic and kinetic characteristics of female political speech in two languages that are not closely related) (Чернякова 2016: 71).

In general, the study was carried out using linguistic, computational, and comparative analysis. Audiovisual analysis of public speeches delivered by contemporary female politicians in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine included perceptual evaluation in terms of expressiveness, individual peculiarities of each woman, as well as a visual analysis of the co-speech gestures included in the expressive sections of their public appeals. The group of raters included: (1) Russian/Ukrainian-speaking faculty members specializing in Spanish and Ukrainian philology with experience in perceptual evaluation (5 listeners for each language group), (2) Spanish-speaking humanities students studying in Ukraine, as well as students from different universities in Spain and Latin America, whose native

language is Spanish (22 participants), (3) native Ukrainian-speaking students majoring in philology from the Ivan Franko Drohobych State Pedagogical University (38 participants).

3.2 Corpus

The study involved a general corpus consisting of the political speeches by Spanish-speaking (Eva Peron, Christina de Kirchner, Manuela Carmena – 147 minutes) and Ukrainian-speaking (Yulia Tymoshenko, Iryna Farion, Lesya Orobets – 226 minutes) female politicians, characterized by a high degree of appeal and emotional inspiration, perceived as charismatic (Петлюченко 2009a: 175).

3.3 Data analysis

The auditive analysis of the public speech of modern female politicians in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine included an audio-visual evaluation of (1) the perceived individual characteristics of the voice of each individual female politician by sets of qualitative and phonetic pairs of attributes, (2) the expressiveness of public speeches of Spanish-speaking and Ukrainian female politicians, and (3) the prosodic and kinetic correlates of expressive statements in female political speech perceived as charismatic.

Increased expressiveness of Spanish-speaking and Ukrainian female politicians was evaluated by the raters (Spanish and Ukrainian native speakers, as well as specialists in Spanish and Ukrainian phonetics with experience in auditive analysis) by the following attributes: (1) acceleration of speech periods, (2) lengthening of speech periods, (3) incoherence, (4) various violations of the grammatical system, (5) increased voice sonance, (6) increased voice volume, (7) pronounced tonal modulations, (8) transition to a falsetto, (9) transition to a loud, sharp voice, a scream, (10) transition to a muffled, soft, subdued voice, (11) excessive gesticulation, (12) expressive facial mimics (Петлюченко 2009a : 285).

The *visual analysis* and comparison of the kinetic component of female political discourse in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine required determining the co-speech kinetics in each subgroup of female politicians related to (1) nodding, (2) hand gestures, (3) body movements, (4) facial expressions, and (5) eye contact (Petlyuchenko & Artiukhova 2015: 192).

The *computational analysis* involved a narrow corpus of audio and video recordings of political speeches (60 minutes for each language group), from which we extracted audio and video clips containing phrasal units or utterances that were identified by the raters as female expressive microcontexts. The resulting files (90 units for each language) were then processed revealing 560 co-speech gesture units.

Using PRAAT 5.04.43 we performed a periodicity analysis of waveform, pitch, and intensity parameters building text grid annotations consisting of three tiers: (1) phrase, (2) phonetic word/tone-group and (3) gesture, and presented the results as a drawing object (Fig. 1):

Figure 1. Intonogram of the phrase "…el cambio que vamos a levar vale la pena. ¡Vale la pena!" / "…the changes we are going to make are worth it. They are worth it!" (Electoral speech of Manuela Carmena in Madrid on 24 May 2015). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7CkMRRaz1eY

The resulting data were saved as a consolidated spreadsheet for further statistical processing using the Statistica 8.0. Such complex parameters as speech tempo, pause factor, and mean pause duration of expressive phrases were also included. Frame-by-frame processing of the co-speech gestures was performed using Sound Forge 9.0.

The developed computational research program was aimed at identifying the following types of differences in the organization of female political discourse in Spanish/Latin American and Ukrainian linguistic cultures: (1) linguistic factors of the Spanish and Ukrainian languages themselves, which are manifested in verbal structures, (2) extralinguistic factors (gender-related, social, emotional, ethno-specific, etc.), which are more evident at the paraverbal level and have a greater number of interlevel differences.

3.4 Hypothesis

We assumed that the verbal and paraverbal (phonetic and kinetic) features of female speech are of typological nature and depend on the linguistic culture (in our case, Spanish/Latin American and Ukrainian) but due to the significant persuasive characteristics of political discourse, these typological attributes of female speech can be preserved partially or eliminated completely. It is likely that the preservation of ethno-specific features or their loss will depend on the degree of political tradition in each linguistic culture, as well as the individual oratorical style of each female politician.

4. Results

The results reported below will focus on common and distinctive conceptual, verbal, and paraverbal (timbral, prosodic, and gesture) correlates of the expressive speech of female politicians in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine as a component of their charismatic image.

4.1 Conceptual correlates of female expressiveness in Spanish/Latin American vs Ukrainian political discourse

Analysis of the conceptual correlates of female expressiveness in Spanish/Latin American political discourse revealed the prevalence of male concepts forming the conceptual field of "political struggle": (1) *homeland* (35.9%); (2) *strife* (27.9%); (3) *enemy* (17.9%); (4) *success* (13.6%); (5) *force* (8.9%); (6) *energy* (2.9%); (7) *courage* (2.9%). At the same time, we note that such concepts as *equality*, *female labor*, *rape*, etc. that are related to the conceptual field of "emancipation" and are important conceptual reference points for Latin American female politicians are not used by Ukrainian female politicians either in the strict sense or as a metaphor. This may be explained by the actual equality of male and female rights in the modern post-Soviet society.

4.2 Verbal correlates of female expressiveness in Spanish/Latin American vs Ukrainian political discourse

The contrastive analysis allowed concluding that there are a number of common and specific verbal features in the female political speech of Spain/Latin America and Ukraine. Spanish, Latin American, and Ukrainian women all make extensive use of hyperbolizers or intensifiers of feelings, epithets, metaphors, and comparisons. Spanish female politicians use harsh language quite rarely (1,1%), for example,

Sp. − "*Me avergoncé y no pude contestar, tuve que **cerrar la boca**" (Carmena 2015).

Eng. − "I was ashamed and I could not answer, I had **to shut up**".

In contrast, it is commonly used by Ukrainian female politicians, in particular, Iryna Farion who is not ashamed of gross rhetoric either at a rally or in parliament:

Ukr. − "*та **закрийте писок**" (Farion 2013).

Eng. − "and **shut your trap**".

Ukr. − "*а їхнє безлике і **тупе** гасло "Україна для людей*" (Farion 2010).

Eng. − "and their faceless and **stupid** slogan 'Ukraine for the People'".

Ukr. − "*пироги **пожирати** також навчилися*" (ibid.).

Eng. − "and they also learned to **stuff their faces** with pies".

Ukr. − "*Чи здатні **істоти**, які не уміють війну назвати війною, керувати цією державою*" (Farion 2015).

Eng. − "Are **creatures** who cannot call a war a war able to run this country".

Ukr. − "*Нагадаю, що коли ми з вами були у парламенті свободівці у кількості 37 осіб, то саме тоді, коли у порядок денний вносилися закони про особливий статус Донбасу і закони про амністію для злочинців, терористів, бандитів, українофобів… просто **почвар** і **потвор**…*" (ibid.).

Eng. − "Recall that while we were in the parliament, 37 MPs from Svoboda, when the laws were introduced on the special status of Donbas and the amnesty laws for criminals, terrorists, bandits, Ukrainianophobes… all kinds of **creeps** and **monsters**".

Full analogies of female expressiveness in the political discourse of Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine are traced at the syntactic level in the use of *anaphora:*

Ukr. − ***Хіба*** *я можу коли-небудь це зрадити?* ***Хіба*** *я можу схибити або відступити?* ***Хіба*** *я можу хоча б подумати про якісь речі, які вам не сподобаються?* (Tymoshenko 2016).

Eng. − **Can** I ever betray this? **Can** I err or retreat? **Can** I so much as think about some things you do not like?"

Sp. − *"**Me olvidaba también** de muchos radicales que se han incorporado también, **me olvidaba también** injustamente de muchos radicales que se han incorporado sin perder su identidad* (Carmena 2015).

Eng. − "**I have also forgotten** many radicals who have also joined, **I have also forgotten** many radicals who have joined without losing their identity".

The above-mentioned means also include *rhetorical questions*, which belong to rhetorical strategies in terms of their function and are responsible for effective influence on the addressee in oral political discourse:

Ukr. − "*Чи може все таки коли-небудь у цій державі стоятимуть інші задачі як, наприклад, підняття якості освіти і принаймні не дискредитація дітей з приводу їхнього місця народження і навчання*? (Orobets 2014).

Eng. − "Will it ever be possible in this country to set other tasks such as improving the quality of education and at least not discriminating children by their place of birth and education?".

Ukr. − "*Хочете конкретних цифр конкретних районів*?" (Orobets 2014)".

Eng. − "Do you want specific figures for specific areas?".

Ukr. − "*Чи здатні* ***істоти***, *які не уміють війну назвати війною, керувати цією державою*" (Farion 2010).

Eng. − "Are **creatures** who cannot call a war a war able to run this country".

Sp. − "*¿Quiénes de aquí son casadas?*" (Perón 1951).

Eng. − "Which of you is married?".

Sp. − "*¿Como pueden demonstrar nuestro gran valor?*" (ibid.).

Eng. − "How can we show our courage?".

In ethnospecific contrast, discursive tactics used in Latin American political discourse make extensive use of appeals to the Lord for support in political struggle (24 %):

Sp. − *Espero que Dios oiga a los humildes de mi Patria, para volver pronto a la lucha y poder seguir peleando con Perón* (Perón 1951).

Eng. − I hope that God will hear the humble of my homeland and soon return to fight for Peron.

Sp. − *Dios mío, si empezamos otra vez con la vieja historia de juntarse* (ibid.).

Eng. − My God, if we start the old story about the unification again…

Among Ukrainian female politicians, Iryna Farion often appeals to the Lord, the Bible, uses biblical allusions (14.3%), for example:

Ukr. – "***Іуда*** *буде завше…**Каїн і Авель** будуть завше …завше іде брат на брата…завше буде **Апостол Тома**, якій не віритиме… але завше буде **Христос**, який проповідувати правду*" (Farion 2015).

Eng. – "**Judah** will be there at all times… **Cain and Abel** will be there at all times… brother will always go against brother… there will always be **Apostle Thomas** who does not believe… but there will always be **Christ** who preaches the truth".

In their struggle, Latin American women rely on historical authority looking up to their national heroes, such as the national hero of Argentina Jose Francisco de San Martin, the leader of the Latin American Wars of Independence in 1810-1826, and Juan Manuel de Rosas who is part of the collective mythology of the Argentinians and is a cross-cutting theme of Argentinian artistic discourse and cinema:

Sp. − *Ustedes no saben, no se imaginan la cantidad de gente que no sabía que San Martín en su testamento le había legado, le había donado su sable corvo a Rosas* (Kirchner 2005).

Eng. − You don't know, and you can't even imagine the number of people who didn't know that Jose de San Martin left a will and gave his curved sword to Rosos.

It is also important for Argentinian politician Christina de Kirchner, for example, to include a reliance on Eva Peron and General Peron in her discourse to create a historical parallel between her and Nestor Kirchner:

Sp. − *No puedo salir a hablar desde el mismo balcón), en que hablaron Perón y Eva Perón...No me da el cuero, a mí sí que no me da el cuero, el balcón es de ellos de acá a la eternidad* (Kirchner 2005).

Eng. − I cannot but come out and speak from the same balcony from which Peron and Eva Peron spoke.

This fragment also highlights the historical locus – the famous balcony of the Pink House (Government House), from which Eva Peron once addressed the nation. The emphasis on historical loci in parallel with the present day gives the whole political speech of Christina de Kirchner a ritual character and contributes to the a certain charismatization of her image.

Thus, we arrive at the interim conclusion that the relations of congruent equivalents of female expressiveness in the political discourse of Spain, Latin America and Ukraine can be traced at the syntactic level, namely, in the use of anaphoras and rhetorical questions. Moreover, like their Spanish-speaking counterparts, Ukrainian female politicians speak directly about their feelings, give free rein to emotions, and do not hide them. At the same time, harsh language is quite rare in the political discourse of Spanish-speaking women (1.1%), while Ukrainians are inclined to use pejorative and non-normative vocabulary (8.6%).

4.3 Perceptive evaluation of individual expressiveness characteristics of Spanish- and Ukrainian-speaking female politicians

The charismatic image of any political figure, including a female politician actively presenting herself in oral public discourse, is largely shaped by her individual speech characteristics (Zheltukhina & Zyubina 2018). They reflect the physical, emotional, and mental state of the speaking woman, her social status, profession, type of speech activity, the degree of speech spontaneity, belonging to a particular linguistic culture, etc. The timbral peculiarities of the voice are an individual component of the charismatic discourse portrait of a political public figure (Петлюченко 2009a: 162) and represent the most recognizable feature that is associated by the listeners with a certain image (positive or negative) of the politician, especially a woman, and is part of her political charisma.

In this study, auditive analysis of the individual characteristics of expressive speech of Spanish- and Ukrainian-speaking female politicians was based on *qualitative* (subjective) and *phonetic* (objective) characteristics (Петлюченко 2009a: 288).

The following eight pairs were chosen as *qualitative* attributes: (1) ordinary/unusual, (2) young/old, (3) natural/unnatural, (4) pleasant/unpleasant, (5) confident/unsure, (6) energetic/non-energetic, (7) attractive/repulsive, and 8) sincere/fake.

The following characteristics were chosen as *phonetic* attributes assessed gradually: (1) voice pitch (very low, low, high, very high), (2) volume (too loud, loud, normal, quiet, (3) sonance (sonorous, noisy, normal), (4) hoarseness (hoarse, not hoarse), (5) nasality (exaggerated, normal), (6) timbre (vocal, muffled), (7) speech tempo (very fast, fast, normal, slow), (8) tonal variations (varied, monotonous).

In the group of Ukrainian female politicians, contrastive voice characteristics, which the raters found *positive*, are of particular interest. For instance, such subjective characteristics of Yulia Tymoshenko's voice as *confident*, *energetic* were rated as positive, while such characteristics as *ordinary*, *unnatural*, *unpleasant*, *repulsive*, *indifferent* were among the negatively perceived subjective characteristics of her voice. At the same time, in a pair *young*/*old*, the raters could not clearly determine the "age" of Yulia Tymoshenko's voice; however, they rated both the *old* and *young* voices as positive.

In turn, the raters found such subjective characteristics of Iryna Farion's voice as *confident* and *sincere* positive, while such characteristics as *unusual*, *unnatural*, *unpleasant*, *repulsive*, *indifferent* were among the negatively perceived subjective characteristics of her voice. At the same time, the attributes *old* and *non-energetic* do not prevent the raters from perceiving Iryna Farion's voice as positive (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Positive rating of qualitative voice characteristics (Ukrainian female politicians)

It should be emphasized that the qualitative subjective features of Lesya Orobets' *ordinary* voice were unanimously rated by all the raters as positive. Her voice was also perceived as positive, "typically female", and rated as *pleasant* and *attractive*, while the voices of

Yulia Tymoshenko and Iryna Farion were rated as *unpleasant* and *repulsive* in these pairs (Fig. 3).

Figure 3. Negative rating of qualitative voice characteristics (Ukrainian female politicians)

Considering the evaluation of individual speech characteristics of Ukrainian female politicians based on *phonetic* characteristics, we note the presence of differential features in the voice image of Yulia Tymoshenko, which are expressed in the negative rating of the attribute *sonority* (Fig. 4).


Figure 4. Negative rating of phonetic voice characteristics (Ukrainian female politicians)

At the same time, such characteristics of Yulia Tymoshenko's voice as height, loudness, and sonority, as well as lack of nasality and rhythm were rated positively. The perceived phonetic characteristics of Lesya Orobets' and Iryna Farion's voice were also generally rated as positive, with both voices being identified as low. A differential phonetic feature of Lesya Orobets is the rating of her slow speech tempo as positive (Fig. 5).

Figure 5. Positive rating of phonetic voice characteristics (Ukrainian female politicians)

Among the *Spanish* and *Latin American* female politicians, Cristina de Kirchner's voice quality was rated as *unusual* and *old*, Eva Peron's as *unpleasant*, and Manuela Carmena's as *old* and *non-energetic*. Such voice qualities of all Latin American female politicians as *natural*, *confident*, *attractive*, and *sincere* were rated as positive by all the raters who are professional phoneticians. The raters found that Eva Peron's voice was the most pleasant among the Latin American female politicians in question while they were equally unanimous and in their rating of the voice qualities of Eva Peron and Christina Kirchner as positive considering, however, Manuela Carmena's voice as the most *natural* (Fig. 6).

Figure 6. Positive rating of qualitative voice characteristics (Spanish-speaking female politicians)

Only few of the Spanish-speaking raters described Eva Peron's voice as *old* and *non-energetic* and rated both qualities as negative with the remaining six pairs of attributes lacking any negative ratings. Analysis of the negative ratings of the qualitative voice characteristics of Spanish-speaking female politicians shows that Manuela Carmena's voice has the highest number of negative reactions in each pair of attributes (Fig. 7).

Figure 7. Negative rating of qualitative voice characteristics (Spanish-speaking female politicians)

The auditive analysis also revealed a particular reaction of one of the raters who described the *sincerity* of Manuela Carmena's voice as "difficult to differentiate" and accompanied his rating with a "I don't believe" comment, which rather indicates a negative perception of this subjective attribute of her voice portrait. It should be emphasized, however, that in general, the *old* attribute in the voice portrait of Madrid Mayor Manuela Carmena who is the oldest (72 years old) in the sample of Spanish-speaking female politicians was perceived positively by most of the raters.

A common feature of all three Latin American female politicians are such voice qualities as *natural*, *confident*, *attractive*, and *sincere*, which all the raters found to be charismatic.

In the auditive analysis of the individual features of the speech of Spanish-speaking female politicians by *phonetic* characteristics, we note the presence of differential features in the "voice" image of Eva Peron expressed in a positive rating of the attributes "noisiness" and "monotony". In contrast to the group of qualitative features, the raters generally perceived the phonetic characteristics of Manuela Carmena's voice as positive, while the absence of hoarseness in the timbral coloring of her voice was rated as most positive in attribute pair 4. (Fig. 8).


Figure 8. Positive rating of phonetical voice characteristics (Spanish-speaking female politicians)

In turn, all the raters evaluated the timbral attribute "hoarse" in the phonetic characteristics of Christina Kirchner's voice as negative. This stands out against the general background of her positive perceptual rating and requires additional interpretation or rechecking of the data. Nasality did not receive a single negative response from the raters (Fig. 9).


Figure 9. Negative rating of phonetic voice characteristics (Spanish-speaking female politicians)

A comparative analysis of the perceptual ratings of the qualitative and phonetic characteristics of the speech of Spanish- and Ukrainian-speaking female politicians revealed *similarities* and *differences* in each of the language subgroups. For instance, the relations of coincidence were noted in the group of qualitative attributes of *old* and non-energetic perceived as positive. The distinctive features in the individual characteristics of female politicians in Spain and Latin America are the attributes *unusual* and *unpleasant* rated as positive.

Common for all Spanish- and Ukrainian-speaking female politicians is the qualitative attribute *confident* and the phonetic attribute *non-nasal*, which were perceptively identified by the raters as positive and can be considered as integral components of the individual speech characteristics of female politicians in non-congenital languages

(Spanish, Ukrainian). The subjective voice attribute *confident* is also a differential characteristic of all the women belonging to the political oral discourse (Fig. 10).


Figure 10. Comparative analysis of the perceptual ratings of the qualitative characteristics of the speech of Spanish- and Ukrainian-speaking female politicians

In the group of phonetic voice characteristics of Spanish-speaking female politicians, the raters noted contrasting attributes associated with the parameters of sonority (*noisiness*) and tonal fluctuations (*monotony/variability*), which were perceived as positive, as well as the timbral voice parameter of *hoarseness*, which was perceived as negative (Fig. 11).

Figure 11. Comparative analysis of the perceptual ratings of the phonetic characteristics of the speech of Spanish- and Ukrainian-speaking female politicians

Thus, we can make an extra-linguistic contrastive observation that Lesya Orobets sounds most feminine in the Ukrainian political discourse as her voice was rated as *pleasant* and *attractive*. This works in favor of the theory of old and young (in the sense of modern) women in Ukrainian politics, who do not "hide" their gender in political discourse, while Yulia Tymoshenko and Iryna Farion want to be more like men whose voices are usually characterized as *confident*, *energetic*, which intentionally corresponds to the goals and objectives of persuasion in political discourse.

In turn, the raters found the voice of Eva Peron as the most pleasant among the Latin American female politicians in question being equally unanimous in their positive rating of the voice quality of Latin Americans Eva Peron and Christina Kirchner. These findings suggest that the linguistic and cultural differences between Latin Americans and Spaniards should be taken into account when interpreting the gender specificity of Spanish-speaking female political discourse and testing the hypothesis.

4.4 Prosodic and gesture correlates of female expressiveness in Spanish/Latin American vs Ukrainian political discourse

Periodicity analysis allows concluding that there are a number of contrasting features in the prosodic organization of female political discourse in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine.

For instance, Spanish female politicians are characterized by more intense tonal and dynamic highlighting of the most important feminine concepts (family, homemakers' rights, strong female work ethic) using impulsive gestures of the right and left hands with the configuration of the hand in the form of an open palm with an index finger. The prosodic characteristics of the speech of Spanish-speaking female politicians include contrasting attributes associated with the parameters of sonority (noise) and tonal variations (monotony), which are perceived positively, as well as the timbre voice parameter of hoarseness, which are perceived negatively. The contrasting prosodic attributes of Ukrainian female political speech are high expressiveness reflected in the acceleration of speech periods, pitch variations in the final part of the utterance, transitions to a loud sharp voice phonation.

Gesture correlates of female speech in the political discourse of Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine are also characterized by a number of contrasting features, which are determined, above all, by the individual oratorical style of each female politician. Latin Americans (Christina de Kirchner), for example, use multiple gestures of one or both hands with a wide span, as well as head nods and inclinations of the whole body towards the audience to reinforce verbal expression and underline the feminine concepts (family, homemakers' rights, strong female work ethic).

For instance, an effective expressive highlighting technique is Christina de Kirchner's use of a short stop before the semantically loaded section of her answer to a question that she

herself asks, e.g., "…va a pasar lo que ustedes quieran [328 mc] que pase! / …only what you want [328 ms] will happen!" followed by a storm of applause. Some raters described this fragment as "convencidad", i.e., expressing that Christina Kirchner was confident about what she was saying. The expressiveness of this fragment is also enhanced by the accentuating gestures of the left hand highlighting the segment that contains the question *¿qué va a pasar?* (left hand at chest level, fingers folded in a pinch), as well as the ending of the *que pase* answer (a sharp movement of the left hand towards the audience with the index finger extended, as shown in Fig. 12):

1 – straight arm pointing index finger towars the audience   2 – "pinch" gesture   3 – fist with index finger

Figure 12. Extracted video frames of accenting co-speech gestures of Christina de Kirchner at a rally on 25 May 2015 dedicated to an anniversary of the May Revolution. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ek3s2gXzRV4

In their appeals to the public, *Spanish female politicians*, in turn, highlight rational arguments and facts emphasizing them with one-time gestures of the right or left hands directed towards the listeners with fingers folded into a fist or wide open, "pinch" gesture, or hand wave towards the audience (Fig. 13):

| 1 – pinch gesture | 2 – wide palm | 3 – hand wave towards the audience |

Figure 13. Extracted video frames of accenting co-speech gestures of Manuela Carmen during her electoral speech in Madrid on 24 May 2015. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7CkMRRaz1eY

For instance, strong expression is noted by the raters in the final part of Manuela Carmena's speech at the rally on the occasion of her victory in the elections of the mayor of Madrid, which is particularly manifested in the repeating segment "…vale la pena. ¡Vale la pena! / …they are worth it! They are worth it!". The increase in expressiveness is also reflected in increased pitch (F_{max} 388 Hz) and intensity (I_{max} 83.3 dB) throughout the final phrase of her speech.

The set of kinetic-mimic means involved in the expressive highlighting of the most important segments (petitions, appeals, addresses to like-minded people and opponents) in the public statements of *Ukrainian female politicians* are determined by extensive use of single-handed accentuating hand gestures with the configuration of the hand into a fist with an index finger or wide open palm, as well as gestures of one or both arms thrown backwards or sharply thrown forward in the direction of the public and synchronized with accent-intonation emphases of repetitions, inversions, rhetorical questions, etc.

For example, in Iryna Farion's speech delivered at a protest rally against social anti-Ukrainian sentiments on 7 September 2010, the raters found the fragment "*Бо …якщо би*

вони сказали Україна для українців ...бо це почався крах царсько-більшовісткої Росії…/ Because… had they said 'Ukraine for Ukrainians'… because it would lead to the end of the Czarist-Bolshevik Russia…" highly expressive due to the use of two dynamic emphases on the conjunction *бо/because* where there is a sharp increase in the duration of the vowel [o] to 700 ms accompanied by a sharp gesture of extending both arms towards the audience (Fig. 14):

1 – Roman salute imitation   2 – Double pinch gesture   3 – Both arms thrown backwards

Figure 14. Extracted video frames of accenting co-speech gestures of Iryna Farion at the protest rally near the Verkhovna Rada on 7 September 2010. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYJEW93gxKU

In the word *українців/Ukrainians* the raters not only noted the emphasis but also a shift of the main stress from the syllable [їнц] to the unstressed syllable [цiв], where the vowel [цiiiв] is exaggeratedly stretched to 550 ms and accompanied by an accentuating gesture of the left hand. The whole expressive section is pronounced at a very high pitch of 417 Hz with a melodic ending of the phrase at a high level of 254 Hz on the [цiiiв] syllable. These frequencies indicate Iryna Farion's state of charismatic ecstasy, which is reflected at both the suprasegmental and segmental levels and is reflected in the duration of unstressed vowels being more than doubled.

The auditive analysis of the individual features of Lesya Orobets' voice showed that it is characterized as the most positively perceived female voice, the components of which are beautiful Ukrainian pronunciation, clarity, expressiveness of speech, slow speech tempo, low tone modulations creating a perceptual effect of sincerity and amenity. Such attributes support the image of soft feminine charisma.

Lesya Orobets' oral public discourse is characterized by extensive use of images and metaphors aimed at creating the maximum effect of persuasion. As one of such strong metaphoric images, Lesya Orobets chooses "*рятівне коло/ring buoy*" when speaking at a press conference at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center in Kyiv on 23 June 2014 and proposing the idea of uniting on the basis of values for the sake of Kyiv (*ми зараз сюди прийшли з ідеєю об'єднання... ідеєю об'єднання на основі цінностей...заради Києва.../we came here with the idea of uniting... the idea of uniting on the basis of values... for the sake of Kyiv...*). The unification semantics are realized through two attributes – *єдине/united* and *спільне/common* (ring buoy), which are opposed to its separate parts (*кожна окрема частина нікого не врятує / each separate part will not save anybody*) (Fig. 15).

1 – Left hand with a part of a ring bouy 2 – Right palm formed into a fist with an extended index finger 3 – Smile and direct look at the listeners

Figure 15. Extracted video frames of accenting co-speech gestures of Lesya Orobets at a press conference at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center in Kyiv on 23 June 2014. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbaaFa-Sy9A

At the same time, Lesya Orobets illustrates her words by bringing parts of a ring buoy from under the podium and connecting them together to form a ring thus visualizing the metaphor. The entire section is pronounced at a slower speech tempo (299.4 syllables/min) at the lowest frequency level of F_{min} 118 Hz. The pausing factor is high K=1.41, which indicates high hesitation and deliberation of each word when arguing for the idea of unity. The "value for Kyiv" segment is accompanied by a gesture of the right hand drawing a circle, the palm being formed into a fist with an extended index finger (see Fig. 5). Also in the last segment of the phrase "єдине спільне рятівне коло / one common ring buoy" Lesya Orobets accentuates her words with a right hand gesture drawing a circle with the palm wide open (Fig. 16).


Figure 16. Intonogram of the phrase "… кожна окрема частина нікого не врятує … цінність для Києва має тільки єдине спільне рятівне коло/Each separate part will not save anybody … only a common united ring buoy has value for Kyiv!" (Speech of Lesya Orobets at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbaaFa-Sy9A

At the end of her speech, Lesya Orobets demonstrates her readiness to compromise and abandon her ambitions for the sake of the greater goal of saving Kyiv. Lesya Orobets conveys confidence in the rightness of her actions by falling tone prosody from a low frequency level of 226 Hz and a speech tempo rate of 155 syllables/min, which is the

average tempo of all her public speeches. An important mimic ending to her speech is a smile and a direct look at her listeners indicating her female type of a speaking politician capable of remaining a pleasant communication partner even in a tough political struggle for power in the capital of Ukraine.

Thus, being a young representative of Ukrainian female political discourse, Lesya Orobets builds her rhetoric tactics and strategies preserving the female/feminine component under the conditions of high persuasion and struggle for power. The prosodic features of Lesya Orobets' oral speeches are characterized by low frequency and dynamic bands with Lesya Orobets pronouncing the most expressive parts of her public speeches at a fast speech tempo even in its final part, which is the most informative and influential.

Kinetic and mimic means used in the expressive arrangement of the most important parts of Lesya Orobets' public speeches are determined by extensive use of (1) approving head nods, (2) accentuating co-speech gestures of one hand with hand configuration in the form of a fist with an index finger or a wide open palm, and (3) direct looks and smiles.

5. Discussion

Based on an analysis and generalization of the existing theoretical views and experimental data regarding the interpretation of the specific features of oral female speech, particularly in political discourse, we note its *differential characteristics*, which are classified by verbal, paraverbal, and discursive criteria.

Verbal attributes of female political speech are associated with exaggerated expressiveness and manifest themselves stylistically (metaphors, epithets, lexical repetitions, contrasts) and in specific syntactic constructions (rhetorical questions and repetitions). *Paraverbal* attributes of the speech of a woman actively presenting herself in political discourse are provided by prosodic expressiveness, tonal and dynamic emphases,

active use of gestures, direct contact with the audience, and a smile. *Discursive* attributes of female political speech are represented by the use of non-conflict strategies, contact-setting, and mitigating tactics, as well as the tactics of using personal experience or the experience of the inner circle.

With reference to our findings, we conclude that there are a number of differences in the organization of female political discourse in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine.

For instance, the public speech of *Latin American female politicians* is characterized by increased expressiveness reflected in the acceleration of the speech periods, increased voice sonority, increased sound audibility, tonal variations in the final part of the statement, transitions to a vocal sharp voice phonation, shouting, and enhanced gesticulation, as well as expressive facial mimics characteristic of southern ethnic groups in general. This can also be explained by the fact that females are present in all Latin American institutional discourses and Latin American women behave in a feminine way in terms of arguments, emotions, kinetics, bright clothes, etc. At the same time, *Spanish female politicians* are guided by the European cultural code requiring gender neutralization in all formal spheres – in the success rating of Spanish female politicians, their democratic character, appeals to facts, and social significance of events are in the forefront.

Like its Latin American counterpart, Ukrainian female public speech is characterized by high expressiveness manifested in the acceleration of speech periods, tonal variations in the final part of the statement, transitions to a vocal sharp voice phonation. Ukrainian female politicians of the younger generation are characterized by greater emancipation, freedom of expression, and higher rhetorical skills, while older female politicians take the liberty of using harsh speech at the point of maximum expressiveness, which contradicts Labov's tendency towards frequent use of standard forms by women (Labov 1972).

We also made a general observation that the linguistic chain is not a decisive factor in determining gender-related differences in the female political discourse of Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine. The contrasting aspect in the comparison of gender-related factors in the public speech of female politicians is formed by paraverbal and discursive means that are most closely related to linguistic culture and ethnos (Latin American / Spanish / Ukrainian linguocultures) and reflect them.

Thus, the discourse portraits of contemporary Spanish, Latin American, and Ukrainian female politicians in question will be formed with an emphasis on their phonational specifics analyzing which will allow receiving the contrastive characteristics of the female Spanish, Latin American, and Ukrainian *voice portraits* in the three linguistic cultures. At the same time, it is necessary to consider the intralingual timbral differentiation of the voices of Spanish and Latin American women, which is associated with such individual voice parameter as *hoarseness*.

The motivation and emotional state of Latin American women involved in active political struggle and usually displaying the image of "iron ladies" (Eva Peron, Michelle Bachelet, Lydia Gayler Tejada, Rosalia Arteaga, Erta Pascal Truilot) is most adequately conveyed by the paraverbal components of speech, such as gestures, pauses, looks, silence, etc., as well as the components of their charismatical image (clothes, appearance, gait, bad habits, health, temperament, attitude to the family, etc.).

6. Conclusions

Thus, we arrive at some important conclusions that the elimination of the feminine factor in contemporary Ukrainian political discourse is related to the androcentric dominant political discourse of the Soviet era, in which women did not enjoy the appropriate status and in their presentation style resembled men or women with a hidden feminine gender.

Therefore, we can say that gender-related political discourse in Ukraine is currently in the formation phase and has a personality-discursive dominant (for example, the discourse of Yulia Tymoshenko and Iryna Farion has prominently masculine aggressive charisma, while Lesya Orobets is marked with soft feminine charisma).

It should also be emphasized that representatives of the three linguistic cultures (Latin American, Spanish, and Ukrainian) use expressive kinetic highlighting of both the key words of the arguments (concept words with value-related semantics, imperatives, inclusive "we", rhetorical questions, metaphors, etc.) and semantically inseparable words (conjunctions, pronouns, link verbs, articles, etc.).

This shows that female expressiveness is not focused on the semantic structure of the utterance, but has kinetic dynamics independent of this structure. This approach is indicative of the autonomy of female expressiveness in Spanish-speaking and Ukrainian political discourse and allows building an updated *model of female charismatic expressiveness* based on the integrity of its verbal and paraverbal categories.

Notes

All the translations of the examples have been performed by the author Valeria Chernyakova.

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Résumé

This paper represents a contrastive analysis of the verbal and paraverbal (prosodic and gesture) features of expressive female political speech in Latin America, Spain, and Ukraine. The language corpus consisted of public speeches delivered by Spanish-speaking female politicians Eva Peron, Christina de Kirchner, and Manuela Carmena, and Ukrainian female politicians Lesya Orobets, Iryna Farion, and Yulia Tymoshenko, who are attributed political charisma in public discourse. The article includes an overview of theoretical approaches to female speech studies and follows current trends in modern sociolinguistics, which, on the one hand, accumulate the classical methodology of

studying the gender-related specifics of oral female speech based on social standing, age, and professional affiliation, and on the other hand, reflect the latest approaches to the contrastive analysis of socio-political discourse both in the Spanish-Speaking World (Spain and Latin America) and in Ukraine. We offer a novel method of multimodal analysis for studying voice and kinetic means of the expressive speech of female politicians in Spain, Latin America, and Ukraine. This allows determining the ethno-specific correlates of expressiveness in the speech of female politicians at the verbal and paraverbal levels and building an updated model of female charismatic expressiveness based on the integrity of its verbal and paraverbal categories. Charismatic rhetoric originates in political communication in times of crisis and is characteristic of politicians whose stand is not consistent with the majority position. Charismatic enthusiasm and inspiration are ethnically colored and are reflected in prosodic and gesture emphasis accompanying both independent and dependent parts of speech indicating the autonomy of charismatic rhetoric as a model. The results of this research can be used in discourse studies, applied phonetics, comparative linguistics, and political communication.

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MARKETING TERMINOLOGY THESAURUS:

THE *COMPETITION* SEGMENT

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Abstract: This paper presents the results of applying contemporary scientific methodologies of Free Associative Experiment and Semantics of Lingual Networks to the analysis of the concept COMPETITION instantiated in marketing terminology. It aims at singling out its thematic components in order to compile an English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology. The research will also facilitate capturing the concept by Business English learners.

Key words: thesaurus, free associative experiment, semantics of lingual networks, marketing terminology, competition, concept.

1. Introduction

Compiling thematically arranged terminological thesauri is one of the topical tasks of lexicography. The methodology of conceptual analysis applied in cognitive linguistics aims at modelling different conceptual spaces, which contributes into optimizing the process of compiling thesauri. In solving this problem, modern cognitive linguistics applies logically built conceptual models. The paper sets forth the principles of compiling a terminological thesaurus underpinned with the conceptual model of COMPETITION.

Contemporary methodologies applied in cognitive linguistics contribute to professional competence of students whose future job is connected with teaching

foreign languages as well as that of interpreters, translators, marketers, and entrepreneurs. In the paper, we rely on the methodology of corpus studies that integrates insights of Free Associative Experiment (FAE) (Леонтьев 1999) and Semantics of Lingual Networks (SLN) (Жаботинская 2011; 2013; Zhabotynska 2010) applied in analysing the concept COMPETITION that underlies an important segment of marketing terminology. The research pursues the interdisciplinary approach that may be integrated both into teaching Business English and Marketing.

The **aim** of the papaer is to demonstrate how to apply FAE and SLN in compiling a terminological thesaurus. To achieve this aim, the following objectives have been set forth:

- to clarify the principles of compiling a thesaurus;
- to reveal the content of the concept COMPETITION in marketing terminology;
- to determine structural features of collocations with the lexemes *competition*, *rivalry*, *battle*, *fight*, and *attack*;
- to suggest a semantic stratification of the collocations under study;
- to compile a thesaurus of the analysed collocations with the lexemes *competition*, *rivalry*, *battle*, *fight*, and *attack*;
- to measure the degree of prominence of different sections of the conceptual matrix model offered.

This research is the first study to apply the methodology of conceptual analysis to thematic stratification of English collocations underpinned with the concept COMPETITION and to compile the English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology. The collocations under study have a variety of meanings, which suggests that the concept COMPETITION is a conceptual subdomain structured into several parcels, which are defined as "informational foci within a subdomain" (Жаботинская 2009: 77). Each subdomain consists of thematic parcels and subparcels that contain concepts verbalized by substantive, verbal, prepositional, and predicative collocations (Радченко 2012).

2. Material and methods

2.1 The method of Free Associative Experiment

The study takes into consideration the results of FAE conducted with 230 respondents, aged 17 through 22, students of the Department of Economics majoring in marketing and studying the marketing terminology in English.

FAE is applied in teaching foreign languages not only to learning new words in a foreign language but also to the study of bilingualism and monolingualism that are of great importance in compiling terminological thesauri.

The reason why FAE has gained popularity is because investigation of associative fields allows one to explore elements of consciousness, systems of images, motifs and assessments, semantic and grammatical relationships in the verbal memory of an individual, other fragments of language and speech knowledge (Петренко 2005: 6).

FAE allows a researcher to build an associative field that has its own structure, in which the **core** (the most frequent reactions) and the **periphery** (Караулов 1995; Стернин 2007) are distinguished. Therefore, the core embraces the main meanings of linguistic expressions that come to mind first and are acquired first by learners.

2.2 The method of Semantics of Lingual Networks

In our research, we also use the SLN methodology based on frame semantics (Bara 2010; Manerko 2016: 157-158; Minsky 1988; Prihodko 2016; Wendland 2010), cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987), conceptual analysis (Davydyuk et al. 2016; Halych 2018; Kövesces 2018; Prihodko et al. 2018; Uberman 2018) and developed by Zhabotinskaya (Жаботинская 2011; 2013; 2018).

The SLN methodology developed for conceptual analysis of linguistic meanings uses basic propositions for constructing conceptual networks. Such basic propositional schemas represent fundamental categories of thought and provide a highly schematic

arrangement of information about things in the experiential world (Жаботинская 2009). The SLN hierarchy is explained in the following way (Zhabotynska 2010: 75):

Conceptual models are represented by multidimensional "networks-in-the-network" structures that consist of the whole conceptual sphere of a concept with its own network of domains; each domain is a network of parcels; and each parcel includes synonymous/antonymous concepts, the content of which is similarly arranged as a network of properties. At each of these dimensions, evolving in-depth, the networks are structured by a limited set of iterative propositional schemas that belong to five "basic frames" – the Thing, Action, Possession, Identification and Comparison frames.

SLN is a theoretical conception the propositions of which are applied to the analysis of diverse linguistic data.

2.3 The thesaurus of marketing terminology

The problem of planning and constructing thesauri was explored by Aitchison, Gilchrist, Bawden (Aitchison et al. 2005), Bally (Balli 1955), Broughton (2006), Dextre, Stella (Dextre et al. 2016), Karaulov (Караулов 1981), Morkovkin (Морковкин 1970), White (2016), and others. According to the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, a **thesaurus** is "a controlled and structured vocabulary in which concepts are represented by terms, organised so that relationships between concepts are made explicit, and preferred terms are accompanied by lead-in entries for synonyms or quasi-synonyms" (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, *s.a.*). Karaulov defines a thesaurus as a semantic dictionary with the arranged list of terms that reflect human knowledge inside some field; it keeps the list of concepts together with their interpretations and relationships (Караулов 1981: 220).

A terminological thesaurus represents a cognitive model of some field of human activity, containing all the information about specific items of professional language; it is charasterized by informativity, monosemanticity, accuracy, and expressive neutrality. I meet all these demands in constructing the model of the English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology, in particular, systematizing collocations that verbalize the concept COMPETITION.

Marketing takes a special place among realities that have become a characteristic feature of modern business. **Marketing terminology**, as represented by a set of notions and processes of marketing activity studied by marketing as a science, has become the object-matter of numerous studies (Радченко 2018; Danilchuk 2018; Epure et al. 2019;). It was shown that collocations that specify already existing concepts and serve to name new ones prevail in the up-to-date terminologies, their share being up to 70% (Симоненко 2000: 631). Such collocations are widespread in English terminology of marketing, where they make up to 72% (Гутиряк 1999: 8), and in Ukrainian terminology of marketing, where they approach 60% (Шапран 2005: 1).

3. Research results

3.1 The word "competition": Frequency of use

According to the Collins dictionary, the word *competition* is very common in English and is one of the 4000 most frequently used words. The tendency for using this word has shown a stable increase over the past 300 years:

1) it started with 0.63 points in 1708 and became 10 times more frequent in 2008 with 11.39 points;

2) in the past 50 years considered in the dictionary (from 1958 to 2008), its use increased twofold;

3) in the past 10 years considered in the dictionary (1998-2008), the dynamic of growth is 1.3 times (from 8.6 points to 11.39 points) (Collins dictionary, *s.a.*).

Such trends indicate that the word is one of quite frequently used words in English and its numerous meanings are applied now in diverse spheres of human activities: sport, business, marketing, management, psychology, ecology, etc.

3.2 Competition: Dictionary definition

The 4th edition of Webster's new world college dictionary gives the following definitions of the word *competition*:

1) the act of competing; rivalry;

2) a contest, or match;

3) official participation in organized sport;

4) opposition, or effective opposition, in a contest or match;

5) rivalry in business, as for customers or markets;

6) the person or persons against whom one competes;

7) *ecology* the struggle among individual organisms for food, water, space, etc. when the available supply is limited (*s.a.*).

3.3 Competition: Definition in marketing

As the paper concerns the concept COMPETITION verbalized in marketing terminology, one has to consider its specialized definition. **Competition** is "the rivalry among sellers trying to achieve such goals as increasing profits, market share, and sales volume by varying the elements of the marketing mix: price, product, distribution and promotion" (Common language marketing dictionary, *s.a.*). It means that market competition penetrates the whole sphere of marketing as it deals with the key concepts of price, product, distribution, and promotion, thus it is ubiquitous in marketing.

It is very important for marketers to know and understand their competitors, as it is a critical step in designing a successful marketing strategy. If they are not aware of who the competitors are and are not knowledgeable about their strengths and weaknesses, other firms are likely to enter the market and provide a competitive advantage, such as product offerings at lower prices or value added benefits. Identifying the competition and staying informed about their products and services is the key to remain competitive in the market and it is crucial to the survival of any business. That is why the concept COMPETITION is often instantiated in English marketing terminology, being verbalized in numerous collocations.

3.4 Concept COMPETITION: Results of Free Associative Experiment

The FAE methodology allowed me to elicit the following associations of the concept COMPETITION (the figures in brackets show the frequency of use):

- ✓ **tough / stiff / severe** *competition (29)*;
- ✓ **cut-throat / keen / hot** *competition (25)*;
- ✓ *rivalry (20)*;
- ✓ *competition* **motivates** *(17)*;
- ✓ **to fuel** *competition (16)*;
- ✓ **strong** *competition (15)*;
- ✓ **unfair / dishonest** *competition (14)*;
- ✓ **to stand** *competition (13)*;
- ✓ *competition* **affects** *(12)*;
- ✓ **honest / fair** *competition (11)*;
- ✓ **to be in** *competition (9)*;
- ✓ **intense** *competition (8)*;
- ✓ **to meet** *competition (8)*;
- ✓ **to face** *competition (7)*;
- ✓ **to win** *competition (7)*;
- ✓ *competition* **grows** *(6)*;
- ✓ **to meet with** *competition (4)*;
- ✓ **active** *competition (3)*;
- ✓ **weak / low** *competition (2)*;
- ✓ **direct** *competition (2)*;
- ✓ **market** *competition (1)*;
- ✓ **international** *competition (1)*.

The results above are listed in accordance with the frequency of associations that accompany the concept COMPETITION. For a better grasp of the content of the concept, these data call for systematization. The results obtained by applying FAE show that there are four main thematic groups:

- **Strong rivalry** (128): *tough / stiff / severe (29), cut-throat / keen / hot (25), rivalry (20), strong (15), to stand (13), honest / fair (11), intense (8), to win (7)*;

- **Operations of competition** (82): *motivates (17), to fuel (16), affects (12), to meet (8), to be in (9), to face (7), grows (6), to meet with (4), active (3)*;
- **Weak rivalry** (16): *unfair / dishonest (14), weak / low (2)*;
- **Kinds of competition** (4): *direct (2), market (1), international (1)*.

Table 1 shows the results of FAE in figures, where the semantic cluster of collocations verbalizing the concept COMPETITION includes such components as "strong rivalry", "operations of competition", "weak rivalry", and "kinds of competition".

Table 1. Thematic parcels of the COMPETITION subdomain:
The data of Free Associative Experiment

Thematic parcel	Per cent of collocations	Examples of collocations
Strong rivalry	56%	*tough competition* *hot competition*
Operations of competition	35%	*competition motivates* *to fuel competition*
Weak rivalry	7%	*unfair competition* *dishonest competition*
Kinds of competition	2%	*market competition* *international competition*

The component "strong rivalry" (56%) is the core of the associative field while the rest form its periphery. In fact, the number of such components may be larger. In other words, the content of the concept COMPETITION may be represented in the form of layers revealed with the help of both psycholinguistic and conceptual analyses.

3.5 Concept COMPETITION as a subdomain of the MARKETING conceptual domain

Having applied the SLN methodology for singling out the main concepts of the marketing terminology, I found out that:

a) MARKETING as the conceptual domain has 11 key subdomains: (1) COMPANY, (2) PRODUCT, (3) DISTRIBUTION, (4) STRATEGY, (5) PROMOTION, (6) CONSUMER, (7) NEEDS, (8) RESEARCH, (9) MARKET,

(10) PRICE, and (11) COMPETITION. Here is the model of the network of MARKETING as a conceptual domain (see Fig. 1).


Figure 1. MARKETING as a conceptual domain: The network model

b) These subdomains differ in the degree of complexity depending on the number of parcels, subparcels, and concepts that constitute them, e.g., the STRATEGY subdomain consists of 21 concepts while the COMPETITION subdomain contains five concepts.

c) Each parcel is represented by some close concepts that are denoted by a term, e.g., the parcel COMPETITION is represented by four concepts COMPETITION, RIVALRY, BATTLE, and FIGHT verbalized in the terms *competition, rivalry, battle, and fight.*

d) The connection between the subdomains of the entire conceptual domain as well as between the parcels within each subdomain is determined by conducting the combinatorial analysis of the propositions that make the basic frames.

e) The given abbreviations denote the following: AG – Agent, PT – Patient, WH – Whole, PR – Part, ID – Identifier, CL – Classifier, IN – Instrument, AR – addressee.

The model of the conceptual domain is represented by the "outer" network of subdomains connected with one another; each subdomain has its own "inner" network of concepts. The outer network is underpinned with three action schemas of contact activity. Their integration is possible because of a common agent, which is COMPANY. Three action schemas represent its actions: COMPANY sells (DISTRIBUTES) PRODUCT to CONSUMER, using for this end some STRATEGY; in order to succeed in its marketing activity, COMPANY RESEARCHES (or analyses) PRODUCT, CONSUMER, and MARKET; while distributing a product, COMPANY tries to overcome another company – its COMPETITOR:

- Contact action schema (1)

    AG-agent (**company**) affects (**distributes**) PT-patient (*product*) to AR-addressee (**consumer**) with the help of IN-instrument (**strategy**);

- Contact action schema (2)

    AG-agent (*company*) affects (**researches**) PT-patient (**product**), (*consumer*) / (**market**);

- Contact action schema (3)

    AG-agent (*company*) affects (overcomes) PT-patient (**competitor**-*company*).

Contact action schema 1 joins an identification schema: STRATEGY as an instrument in product distributing becomes the classifier-type one that contains the identifier-kind PROMOTION:

- classification schema

ID-identifier/kind (***promotion***) is CL-classifier/type (*strategy*).

Besides, contact action schemas 1 and 2 as well as the identification schema join possession schemas represented in two versions: a) the wholes, which are CONSUMER and MARKET with their NEEDS as a part; b) the wholes, which are PRODUCT, STRATEGY, PROMOTION, and RESEARCH that have PRICE as a part:

- possession schema (1)

   WH-whole (*consumer*, *market*) has PR-part (***needs***);
- possession schema (2)

   WH-whole (*product*, *strategy*, *promotion*, *research*) has PR-part (***price***).

The thing and action subdomains given in rectangular and oval frames respectively (see Fig. 1) that constitute the MARKETING conceptual domain are further structured into inner networks specified by the concepts represented in the parcel.

The model of the MARKETING conceptual domain built in accordance with the "networks-in-the-networks" principle becomes the basis for the English-Ukrainian-Russian terminological thesaurus where the terms are organized on the basis of universal conceptual models. Every subdomain contains its parcels; the ties between them are represented by the network that is formed by the propositions of the basic frames.

3.6 Semantics of Lingual Networks: the COMPETITION subdomain

From the SLN standpoint,

- MARKETING is a **conceptual domain** as it is the entire information space. By way of example, I will demonstrate the procedure of analysing the concept COMPETITION that contributes to compiling the English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology.

- COMPETITION is a subdomain, in other words, it is the informational focus within the conceptual domain MARKETING.

- The COMPETITION subdomain consists of two **parcels** (COMPETITION and ATTACK), the informational foci within the subdomain.

- Every parcel is represented by concepts. **A concept** is a constituent of a parcel represented by one lexeme or more, e.g., *competition*, *rivalry*, *battle*, *fight*, and *attack*. These lexemes and their collocations were obtained from explanatory and translational dictionaries and texts in economics.

- In our study, the COMPETITION parcel is represented by such coreferential concepts as COMPETITION, RIVALRY, BATTLE, and FIGHT; the ATTACK parcel is formed by the concept ATTACK.

- In marketing, RIVALRY is a state, in which two companies are competing for the same thing; BATTLE is a competition between companies trying to win power or control; FIGHT is a battle of companies, especially for a particular place or position in the market; ATTACK is a means of competitor's pressure.

- So, the "inner" network of the COMPETITION subdomain integrates a possession schema as its concepts COMPETITION, RIVALRY, BATTLE, FIGHT, and ATTACK stand in part-whole relations. Here is the hierarchy of the COMPETITION subdomain (see Fig. 2).

Figure 2. The possession schema of the conceptual subdomain COMPETITION

Concepts COMPETITION, RIVALRY, BATTLE, and FIGHT serve as the whole to the concept ATTACK as a part. The lexeme *competition* verbalizing concept COMPETITION is the most numerous one in our study (69%) because it has a wider sphere of usage in the terminology of marketing than *rivalry* (12%), *battle* (10%), fight (5%) of the whole number of collocations, and *attack* (4%) (see Fig. 3).

- competition 69%   - rivalry 12%   - battle 10%
- fight 5%   - attack 4%

Figure 3. Lexemes *competition, rivalry, battle, fight, attack:* Frequency of usage

Besides, lexemes *competition*, *rivalry*, *battle*, *fight*, and *attack* of the COMPETITION subdomain differ in the number of collocations they are verbalized in, which testifies to the fact that concepts participate in terminology forming processes in varying degrees.

The parcels that constitute the COMPETITION subdomain contain the concepts that underpin the meaning of hyponymous collocations. In agreement with the data of this research, such collocations are formed according to the following models:

- A + N (*hot competition*)
- Prep + N (*in the competition*)
- N + prep + N (*strength of competition*)
- N + V/VP (*competition grows*)
- V + N (*to meet the competition*).

Syntactic structures of the collocations coordinate with the propositional schemas joined into **the network that structures a concept** where the the whole list of abbreviations looks as the following:

- AG – Agent
- PT – Patient
- AF – Affective
- FT – Factitive
- C – Cause
- CR – Causator
- CT – Content
- CN – Container
- WH – Whole
- PR – Part
- OW – Owner
- OD – Owned
- P – Place (see Fig. 4).

Figure 4. Model of a concept

I have found out that the conceptual network structuring the information about the analysed concept includes thing schemas (qualitative and locative), possession schemas (partitive, inclusive, and ownership), and action schemas (of state/process, contact action, and cause).

Thing schemas characterize the concept in accordance with its qualitative features; besides, they present the concept as a place that contains another concept:

- the qualitative schema: SOMETHING (concept) is SUCH (quality), e.g., *fair competition, unfair competition, brave fight, strong attack, head-to-head competition*;
- the locative schema: SOMETHING is THERE-place of existence (concept), e.g., *in the competition, in the battle.*

Possession schemas demonstrate relationships between the POSSESSOR and the POSSESSED. In the analysed collocations, the concept performs the role of the POSSESSOR and underpins the meaning of "of-phrases" where the POSSESSOR (whole, container, owner) becomes a secondary semantic focus:

- the <u>partitive schema:</u> WH-whole (concept) has PR-part → PR-part of WH-whole (concept), e.g., *strength of competition, risk of rivalry, weakness of competition, spirit of competition, degree of competition*;
- the <u>inclusive schema:</u> CT-content (concept) has CN-container → CN- container of CT-content (concept), e.g., *area of competition, field of battle, brick wall of competition*;
- the <u>ownership schema:</u> OW-owner (concept) has OD-owned → OD-owned of OW-owner (concept), e.g., *portfolio of the competition*.

In action schemas of state/process, the CONTACT ACTION and CAUSE concepts may perform the role of the ACTION EXECUTOR (agent), the SUBORDINATOR at whom the action is directed (patient), or the RESULT of action (factitive):

- the <u>state/process schema:</u> AG-agent (concept) acts, e.g., *competition thrives, competition grows, competition spreads, battle continues, rivalry migrates, rivalry flares up*;
- the <u>contact action schema (1):</u> a) AG-agent (concept) acts on PT-patient; e.g., *competition affects smth, competition offers, competition requires, competition includes smth, competition poses threat, fight distracts*;
- the <u>contact action schema (2):</u> a) AG-agent acts on PT-patient (concept); e.g., *to face the fight, to pick the fight, to motivate the rivalry, to encourage rivalry, to escalate rivalry;* b) AG-agent acts on AF-affective (concept), e.g., *to destroy the competition, to revitalize the fight*;

- the <u>cause schema:</u> CR-causator makes FT-factitive (concept), e.g., *to build the competition, to clone the battle.*

The conceptual network that structures the content of the COMPETITION concept determines the main directions of term formation and results in the combinability of the lexeme with adjectives, prepositions, nouns, and verbs. Such collocations are arranged in the combinatory English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology (Radchenko 2009; 2012; 2016). The collocations including the concept name are arranged in accordance with the kinds of conceptual features.

Figure 5 includes the following notations: ● a concept that has a qualitative feature (the qualitative schema); ▲ a concept referential to the owner of something (the possession schema); ■ the concept referential to an act (the action schema-1); ◙ a concept referential to the entity, at which the action is directed (the contact action schema-2). As as example, an abridged conceptual model of the concept COMPETITION is given below:


Figure 5. Abridged conceptual model of the COMPETITION subdomain

3.7 Thematic stratification of the COMPETITION subdomain

I apply the SLN methodology not only for singling out the main subdomains of the MARKETING conceptual domain and parcels, subparcels, and concepts of COMPETITION subdomain but also for thematic stratification of English collocations underpinned with the key concepts. As an example, I analyse collocations containing the concept COMPETITION as the most widespread in the marketing terminology (69% of the total number of concepts) and establish its thematic stratification.

Different meanings of the collocations give grounds to consider the concept COMPETITION as a subdomain structured by five parcels. Each parcel consists of thematic subparcels that contain concepts presented with the help of substantive, verbal, predicative, and prepositional collocations (see Fig. 6).

- Substantive 53%   - Verbal 37%
- Predicative 8%   - Prepositional 2%

Figure 6. Lexemes *competition, rivalry, battle, fight, attack:* Types of collocations

According to the quantitative data, substantive collocations dominate, constituting 53%. It is explained by the tendency of English speakers to describe numerous kinds of competition and give assessment to it. Verbal collocations are 1.4 time more scarce than substantive ones (37%). Predicative and prepositional collocations are the least numerous ones, constituting 8% and 2% respectively. Syntactic structures of collocations coincide with propositional schemas that are further connected into a network that structures the concept COMPETITION.

The COMPETITION subdomain contains five parcels: 1) COMPETITION AS IT IS, 2) DEVELOPING COMPETITION, 3) OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION,

4) INCREASING COMPETITION, 5) DECREASING COMPETITION. The greatest number of collocations belong to the COMPETITION AS IT IS parcel, which constitutes 45% of the total number of terminological collocations, which represent general characteristics and kinds of competition. The collocations that name the process of INCREASING COMPETITION, DEVELOPING COMPETITION, and DECREASING COMPETITION are almost equal in number (17%, 16%, 14% respectively), while the OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION parcel is represented by the smallest number of collocations (see Table 2).

Table 2. Parcels of the COMPETITION subdomain:

Instantiation in collocations

Parcels of the COMPETITION subdomain	Number of collocations	%
COMPETITION AS IT IS	100	45
INCREASING COMPETITION	39	17
DEVELOPING COMPETITION	36	16
DECREASING COMPETITION	32	14
OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION	17	8
Total	**224**	**100**

The parcels mentioned above are complex hierarchic unities that include subparcels – knot-domains of a lower level that also have their own constituents – elements of the lowest level. The concepts are verbalized in collocations grouped according to their form and meaning. Thus, substantive phrases (NP) represent kinds and general characteristics of competition; verbal phrases (VP) deal with the actions connected with the COMPETITION concept; predicative phrases (NV) indicate the actions performed in competition.

3.7.1 The COMPETITION AS IT IS parcel

COMPETITION AS IT IS parcel consists of four subparcels: 1) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPETITION, 2) KINDS OF COMPETITION, 3) COMPETITION has PARTS, 4) AGENT. Parcel 1 represents a qualitative characteristic of the concept. Parcel 2 reflects the type-kind relationships within the concept; parcel 3 shows whole-part relationships, where the concept is a whole. In

parcel 4, competition is an agent and represents the process schema. All the parcels are complex as they consist of subparcels.

1.1. The subparcel GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPETITION includes three subparcels:

1.1.1. "Competition is appropriate", e.g., NP *appropriate competition, credible competition, sufficient competition*;

1.1.2. "Competition is fair", e.g., NP *equal competition, explicit competition, fair competition, healthy competition, honest competition, just competition, open competition, peaceful competition, pure competition, perfect competition, reasonable competition, sincere competition, true competition*;

1.1.3. "Competition is unfair", e.g., NP *dishonest competition, imperfect competition, unbridled competition, unclear competition, unfair competition, unjust competition.*

1.2. The KINDS OF COMPETITION subparcel contains 25 subparcels:

1.2.1. "Direct competition", e.g., NP *direct competition, head on competition, head-to-head competition, straight competition, straightforward competition, outright competition*;

1.2.2. "Indirect competition", e.g., NP *indirect competition, latent competition, opaque competition*;

1.2.3. "Discriminatory competition", e.g., NP *discriminatory competition*;

1.2.4. "Illegal competition", e.g., NP *illegal competition*;

1.2.5. "Short-term competition", e.g., NP *short-term competition*;

1.2.6. "Long-term competition", e.g., NP *long-term competition*;

1.2.7. "Retail competition", e.g., NP *retail competition*;

1.2.8. "Wholesale competition", e.g., NP *wholesale competition*;

1.2.9. "Quantity competition", e.g., NP *quantity competition*;

1.2.10. "Horizontal competition", e.g., NP *horizontal competition*;

1.2.11. "Vertical competition", e.g., NP *vertical competition*;

1.2.12. "Collaborative competition", e.g., NP *collaborative competition*;

1.2.13. "Budget competition", e.g., NP *budget competition*;

1.2.14. "Economic competition", e.g., NP *economic competition, business competition*;

1.2.15. "Domestic competition", e.g., NP *domestic competition*;

1.2.16. "Global competition", e.g., NP *global competition, international competition, foreign competition, import competition*;

1.2.17. "Monopolistic competition", e.g., NP *monopolistic competition*;

1.2.18. "Oligopolistic competition", e.g., NP *oligopolistic competition*;

1.2.19. "Brand competition", e.g., NP *brand competition*;

1.2.20. "Form competition", e.g., NP *form competition*;

1.2.21. "Industry competition", e.g., NP *industry competition*;

1.2.22. "Generic competition", e.g., NP *generic competition*;

1.2.23. "Market competition", e.g., NP *market competition*;

1.2.24. "Price competition", e.g., NP *price competition*;

1.2.25. "Non-price competition", e.g., NP *non-price competition*.

1.3. The subparcel COMPETITION has PARTS includes seven subparcels:

1.3.1. "Competition has quality / degree / extent / level", e.g., NP *quality of competition, degree of competition, extent of competition, level of competition*;

1.3.2. "Competition has importance / sense / spirit", e.g., NP *importance of competition, sense of competition, spirit of competition*;

1.3.3. "Competition has an effect", e.g., NP *effect of competition, result of competition, outcome of competition, impact of competition, benefit of competition*;

1.3.4. "Competition has dynamics / intensity", e.g., NP *dynamics of competition, intensity of competition*;

1.3.5. "Competition has an amount / abundance", e.g., NP *amount of competition, abundance of competition*;

1.3.6. "Competition lacks something / crisis", e.g., NP *lack of competition, crisis of competition*;

1.3.7. "Competition has a brick wall", e.g., NP *brick wall of competition*.

1.4. The subparcel AGENT has five subparcels:

1.4.1. "Competition happens", e.g., VP *competition happens, to be in competition, competition coexists, competition plays a function*;

1.4.2. "Competition includes", e.g., VP *competition includes, competition consists, competition aligns*;

1.4.3. "Competition tends", e.g., VP *competition tends to, competition leads, competition motivates, competition draws, competition attracts, competition harmonizes*;

1.4.4. "Competition offers", e.g., VP *competition allows, competition offers, competition spreads*;

1.4.5. "Competition affects", e.g., VP *competition affects, competition causes, competition exerts, competition requires, competition charges prices, competition keeps goods affordable, competition shifts*.

The degree of prominence of the COMPETITION concept components may be defined by the quantitative analysis of the collocations in the parcel COMPETITION AS IT IS (see Table 3).

Table 3. Subparcels of COMPETITION AS IT IS parcel:
Representativeness in collocations

Subparcels	Number of collocations	%
KINDS OF COMPETITION	36	16.4
AGENT	23	10.1
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPETITION	22	9.9
COMPETITION has PARTS	19	8.6
Total	**100**	**45**

According to the quantitative analysis, the KINDS OF COMPETITION subparcel is the most prominent one in the COMPETITION AS IT IS parcel as it is represented by the greatest number of terminological collocations (16.4% of the total number).

3.7.2 The DEVELOPING COMPETITION parcel

The DEVELOPING COMPETITION parcel is represented by nine subparcels: 1) ANTICIPATING, 2) CREATING, 3) APPLYING, 4) DEALING WITH,

5) DEVELOPING, 6) ENCOURAGING, 7) RESTORING, 8) FIGHTING, 9) WINNING. All these parcels reflect the process of development of a competition, which begins with anticipating it, goes on to dealing with it, and ends with winning it:

2.1. The subparcel ANTICIPATING, e.g., VP *to anticipate competition*;

2.2. The subparcel CREATING, e.g., VP *to create competition, to establish competition, to launch competition; NV competition arises*;

2.3. The subparcel APPLYING, e.g., VP *to apply competition, to exercise competition;* NP *explicit competition*;

2.4. The subparcel DEALING WITH, e.g., VP *to be in competition with, to be mindful of competition, to deal with competition, to enter competition, to go to competition, to meet with competition, to face competition, to lean toward competition, to withstand competition*;

2.5. The subparcel DEVELOPING, e.g., VP *to facilitate competition, to foster competition, to achieve sth by means of competition; to keep up with competition, to stay ahead of competition; NV competition succeeds*;

2.6. The subparcel ENCOURAGING, e.g., VP *to draw into competition, to encourage competition, to fuel competition, to heat/heat up competition, to promote competition;* NV *competition intensifies*;

2.7. The subparcel RESTORING, e.g., VP *to restore competition, to stabilize competition*;

2.8. The subparcel FIGHTING, e.g., VP *to curb competition, to hinder competition, to inhibit competition, to outflank competition*;

2.9. The subparcel WINNING, e.g., VP *to win competition.*

The results of quantitative analysis indicate the prominence of the COMPETITION concept components in the DEVELOPING COMPETITION parcel (see Table 4).

Table 4. Subparcels of the DEVELOPING COMPETITION parcel:
Representativeness in collocations

Subparcels	Number of collocations	%
DEALING WITH	9	4
DEVELOPING	6	2.6
ENCOURAGING	6	2.6
FIGHTING	4	1.7
CREATING	4	1.7
APPLYING	3	1.3
RESTORING	2	1.3
ANTICIPATING	1	0.4
WINNING	1	0.4
Total	**36**	**16**

In accordance with the quantitative analysis data, the subparcel DEALING WITH represented by nine terminological collocations is the most prominent in the DEVELOPING COMPETITION parcel.

3.7.3 The OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION parcel

The OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION parcel includes seven subparcels: 1) MEETING, 2) SUBSIDIZING, 3) LINKING, 4) PROTECTING, 5) BUYING UP, 6) MONITORING, 7) SEEING OFF. All the subparcels represent actions where the concept COMPETITION is referential to a patient undergoing different actions:

3.1. The subparcel MEETING, e.g., VP *to embrace competition, to endure competition, to meet competition, to stand competition, to take competition, to temper competition*;

3.2. The subparcel SUBSIDIZING, e.g., VP *to subsidize competition*;

3.3. The subparcel LINKING, e.g., VP *to link sth to competition*;

3.4. The subparcel PROTECTING, e.g., VP *to protect competition, to shelter against competition*;

3.5. The subparcel BUYING UP, e.g., VP *to buy up competition*;

3.6. The subparcel MONITORING, e.g., VP *to assess competition, to monitor competition, to pay attention to competition, to watch competition*;

3.7. The subparcel SEEING OFF, e.g., VP *to fend off competition, to see off competition.*

The degree of prominence of the COMPETITION concept components is established by the quantitative analysis of the colloctaions in the parcel OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION (see Table 5).

Table 5. Subparcels of the OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION parcel: Representativeness in colloctaions

Subparcels	Number of collocations	%
MEETING	6	2.9
MONITORING	4	1.8
PROTECTING	2	0.9
SEEING OFF	2	0.9
SUBSIDIZING	1	0.5
LINKING	1	0.5
BUYING UP	1	0.5
Total	**17**	**8**

In accordance with the quantitative analysis data, the concept MEETING represented by six terminological collocations is the most prominent in the OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION parcel.

3.7.4 The INCREASING COMPETITION parcel

The INCREASING COMPETITION parcel includes four subparcels: 1) COMPETITION IS ACTIVE, 2) COMPETITION IS STRONG, 3) COMPETITION IS HOT, 4) INCREASING. The first three subparcels demonstrate qualitative features of the concept, while the last one deals with the contact propositional schema. These subparcels reflect the process of increasing competition and changes that occur with this concept:

4.1. The subparcel COMPETITION IS ACTIVE, e.g., NP *active competition, effective competition, viable competition, vibrant competition, vigorous competition, unfettered competition*;

4.2. The subparcel COMPETITION IS STRONG, e.g., NP *determined competition, firm competition, heavy competition, intense competition, stiff competition, strong competition, stubborn competition, tense competition, tight competition, tough competition*;

4.3. The subparcel COMPETITION IS HOT, e.g., NP *absolute competition, cut-throat competition, extreme competition, fierce competition, harsh competition, hot competition, insuperable competition, keen competition, predatory competition, severe competition, steep competition, stern competition*;

4.4. The subparcel INCREASING, e.g., VP *to enhance competition, to extend competition, competition grows, to increase competition, competition increases, to lift competition, to step up competition, to outperform competition, to overtake competition; NV competition thrives, competition widens.*

Table 6 shows the results of the quantitative analysis aimed at bringing to light the degree of prominence of the COMPETITION concept in the INCREASING COMPETITION parcel.

Table 6. Subparcels of the INCREASING COMPETITION parcel:
Representativeness in colloctaions

Subparcels	Number of collocations	%
COMPETITION IS HOT	12	5.2
INCREASING	11	4.8
COMPETITION IS STRONG	10	4.4
COMPETITION IS ACTIVE	6	2.6
Total	**39**	**17**

The quantitative analysis data indicate the highest degree of prominence in the COMPETITION IS HOT subparcel as a true competition between companies is always hot and even cut-throat. The INCREASING and COMPETITION IS STRONG subparcels are also numerous as they deal with collocations denoting the increasing tension and the battle taking place in the market.

3.7.5 The DECREASING COMPETITION parcel

The DECREASING COMPETITION parcel includes four subparcels: 1) COMPETITION IS WEAK, 2) COMPLICATING, 3) DECREASING, 4) ELIMINATING. All these subparcels illustrate the way the competition evolves through complications to destruction and negative consequences of the process. The first parcel is an illustration of the qualitative propositional schema, the three ones to follow represent both contact and state schemas:

5.1. The subparcel COMPETITION IS WEAK, e.g., *fettered competition, low competition, minor competition, moderate competition, reduced competition, small competition, weak competition*;

5.2. The subparcel COMPLICATING, e.g., VP *to abandon competition*, *to disregard competition, to dissipate competition, to fear competition, to hamper competition, to harm competition, to lag behind, to limit competition, to lose influence over competition, to suppress competition;* NV *competition attenuates, competition lowers prices, competition poses threat*;

5.3. The subparcel DECREASING, e.g., VP *to curtail competition, to decrease competition, to diminish competition, to distort competition, to lessen competition, to reduce competition*;

5.4. The subparcel ELIMINATING, e.g., VP *to destroy competition, to eliminate competition, to fight off competition, to knock smb out of competition, to stifle competition;* NV *competition eats into one's profit.*

The degree of importance of subparcels can be seen in Table 7.

Table 7. Subparcels of the DECREASING COMPETITION parcel:
Representativeness in collocations

Subparcels	Number of collocations	%
COMPLICATING	13	5.7
COMPETITION IS WEAK	7	3.1
DECREASING	6	2.6
ELIMINATING	6	2.6
Total	**32**	**14**

The DECREASING COMPETITION parcel is represented by numerous collocations as texts in marketing focus on competition problems and ways of solving them. That is the reason why the COMPLICATING subparcel is rich in collocations and is represented by 13 collocations.

3.7.6 An entry in the thesaurus of marketing terminology

Beside thematic stratification, each collocation in the English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology contains an entry, which consists of:

  a) a collocation;
  b) its translation into Ukrainian;
  c) its translation into Russian;
  d) its illustration (its use in the sentence taken from a text in marketing), e.g.:

cut-throat ~ запекла конкуренція / ожесточенная конкуренция: "*Cut-throat competition is the situation when competitors use predatory pricing and heavy promotion to eliminate or undermine their rivals*" (Business dictionary, *s.a.*).

It is worth mentioning that the number of entries in the thesaurus may vary from year to year: non-used collocations fall into oblivion, new ones are introduced.

4. Conclusions

To sum up, the results of FAE and SLN showed the existence of similar thematic components of the concept COMPETITION in English though they differ in number, e.g., such component as "kinds of competition" represents the least numerous associations while in the thesaurus the same component is the most numerous one. FAE made the process of perceiving and interpreting the concept COMPETITION easier and helped to systematize the frequency associations of the concept into thematic fields with the component of "strong rivalry" as a core. Thematic fields "strong rivalry", "operations

of competition", "weak rivalry", and "kinds of competition" revealed with the help of FAE became the basic ones for marketing thesaurus.

The methodology of SLN allowed to analyse terminological collocations of marketing and find out all the main aspects and establish ties between them both in the MARKETING conceptual domain and the concept COMPETITION. Besides, the study defined the hierarchic structure of marketing terminology, its most prominent constituents, and the factors that influenced concept stratification.

The research demonstrated that the COMPETITION subdomain may be represented in thesaurus by five thematic parcels. The most numerous one is the COMPETITION AS IT IS parcel with its subparcels, among which the most prominent one is the *KINDS OF COMPETITION* subparcel representing the type-kind relationship in most collocations. The DEVELOPING COMPETITION parcel relates to the way of *dealing with competition*. The OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION parcel is associated mostly with *meeting competition*. INCREASING COMPETITION-parcel focuses on the qualitative characteristics, that is on the degree of how *hot* the competition may be. The DECREASING COMPETITION parcel is filled with collocations denoting the problems that make the competition *complicated*. The degree of prominence of the term analysed represents the way English speakers understand the COMPETITION concept that is an inseparable part of marketing as well as its terminology. It is worth mentioning that marketing terminology, as any other, is a flexible medium: it is constantly developing, changing, being enriched with new terms and terminological collocations that may result in the expansion of thematic parcels and subparcels as well as the appearance of new ones.

All the methodologies applied here helped structure the concept COMPETITION, make its understanding easier for learners of Business English, single out the thematic components for compiling the English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology that will be of practical value for students, marketers, translators and for

teaching Business English. The results of this interdisciplinary research may be used for analysing concepts of any terminology, compiling its thesauri, and integrating the respective data into the courses of economic sciences.

Abbreviations

FAE − Free Associative Experiment

SLN – Semantics of Lingual Networks

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Résumé

This paper focuses on the procedure of compiling a terminological thesaurus as one of the topical tasks of lexicography. The paper presents the results of applying such contemporary scientific methodologies as Free Associative Experiment and Semantics of Lingual Networks to the analysis of the concept COMPETITION in marketing terminology. The main result is singling out the thematic components for compiling the English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology. The research will also facilitate capturing the concept by learners of Business English and will be of practical use for marketers, economists and translators. The research is the first one to apply the methodology of conceptual analysis to thematic stratification of English collocations underpinned with the concept COMPETITION and compiling the English-Ukrainian-Russian thesaurus of marketing terminology. Various meanings of the collocations under study allow one to consider the concept COMPETITION as a conceptual domain that is structured by five thematic parcels: COMPETITION AS IT IS, DEVELOPING COMPETITION, OPERATIONS WITH COMPETITION, INCREASING COMPETITION, DECREASING COMPETITION. The most numerous one is the COMPETITION AS IT IS parcel with its subparcels among which

the most prominent one is the *KINDS OF COMPETITION* subparcel representing the type-kind relationship in most of the collocations. Each parcel consists of subparcels that contain concepts verbalized by substantive, verbal, prepositional, and predicative collocations. The methodologies applied helped to determine the degree of prominence of different parcels, subparcels, and concepts. The results of this interdisciplinary research may be useful in analysing concepts of any terminological field and compiling its thesauri. The prospects for further research lie in applying the theoretical scheme of data analysis for compiling thesauri of other terminological spheres.

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CONCEPTUALIZING THE MENTAL SPHERE IN DISCOURSE: FROM ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY TO MARK TWAIN[1]

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Abstract: The systemized attempts to elaborate on the human mind were made in the works of the Enlightenment project. John Locke and David Hume influenced greatly the American Enlightenment as well as the American public discourse. Through embracing the major constructs of European tradition by Thomas Paine and other writers, the influence extended to Mark Twain. We introduce the key notions connected with *mind* through linguistic, cognitive and discourse analysis.

Key words: linguistic analysis, conceptual metaphors, image schemas, Enlightenment philosophy, discourse of Mark Twain, mind, consciousness, reason.

> *Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe.*
> (David Chalmers "The conscious mind")

1. Introduction

How to understand the way the human brain works and consciousness evolves, what constitutes an individual mind and forms knowledge – these are the perplexing questions that have been challenging the humanity for centuries. Every new period in evolution of ideas brought into limelight certain thoughts and conceptions about the

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essence of mental entities, organizing language means and their meanings with the reference to a particular language personality and socio-cultural context.

In this respect, the most decisive attempts to penetrate into the human mind were made in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The thinkers of that period not only proposed the first comprehensive system of consciousness, but also transformed the meaning of the words of everyday language to match the transformations in understanding the human mind. Their philosophical ideas gradually paved the way from a scientifically oriented discourse to a common image of the world. They spread to non-scientific journals, fiction, reaching the hearts and souls of the reading public. Finally, they were 'distilled' in the mode of day-to-day thinking. We **aim** to scrutinize these putative stages and linguistic consequences of 'evolution of ideas' in our article.

In the present paper we address philosophical discourse of the Enlightenment and its linguistic and cognitive legacy with special attention to social and cultural aspects of language, which "can be heralded as a re-turn" in cognitive linguistic studies (Langacker 1994: 3). The Enlightenment conception of mind is justly acknowledged to have "shaped first generation cognitive science" (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 308), the first writings in psychology (Васильев 2010; Bazerman 1987: 131), and to a certain extent – the origin of modern cognitive linguistics (Chomsky 2009). In the paper, we scrutinize the treatises of the most prominent figures of the British and American Enlightenment who influenced greatly the fiction works of the succeeding decades. In particular, we analyze the works of John Locke (1632 – 1704) and David Hume (1711 – 1765). As their construal of the world punctuated the American philosophy, we also included into our analysis the philosophical legacy of Thomas Paine (1737 – 1809), the outstanding American essay writer. Here we harness an integrative **approach,** embracing linguistic, cognitive, and discourse analysis to reveal how the most essential cognitive entities and mechanisms describing the human mental sphere originated in the philosophy of the British and American Enlightenment, then further developed and

spread into those types of discourse far remote from the philosophy pure and simple – such as the fiction of Mark Twain (1835 – 1910). He most naturally embraced the philosophical issues in his writings.

2. The thread of thought: From Enlightenment philosophy to public rhetoric

The turn to the most profound scholarly interest addressing human intelligence can be traced to the philosophy of the Enlightenment, whose success made it "an independent force with the power and authority to challenge the old and construct the new, in the realms both of theory and practice, on the basis of its own principles" (Bristow 2017). Alexander Pope summarized the mood of the epoch in "An essay on man: Epistle II" by the following words "A proper study of mankind is man" (Pope), indicating the necessity to understand a human being and the pathways of achieving knowledge before turning to nature.

John Locke was the first figure of the Enlightenment and one of the most influential scholars in the Western history, who claimed that a person is neither a soul nor a body, but *a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it Self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and ...essential to it* (Locke 2008: 208). He noticed that a person *belongs only to intelligent agents capable of law, and happiness and misery* (ibid., 218). This definition had a huge impact even on contemporary analytic metaphysics (Ayers 1993; Mackie 1976; Perry 1976: 67; Strawson 2011), especially on the psychological approach to personal identity popular among professional philosophers nowadays (Bourget & Chalmers 2014).

David Hume was also a key figure of Western philosophy belonging to the Scottish Enlightenment. He devised several brilliant theories based on extraordinary elegant arguments: the so-called regularity theory of causation, psychological associationism in philosophy of mind and personal identity. Hume was also a great writer, well known

for his bright style, thus creating several metaphors influential in the Western philosophy.

In America, the ideas of the Enlightenment proceeded throughout the 18th century (Arneil 1996; Flower & Murphey 1977; Kuklick 2001) and had a huge indelible impact on the intellectual audience sometimes morphing into a viable political force. The Enlightenment ideas yielded certain images and cognitive constructs becoming universally acknowledged vision of the world nearly akin to self- and national identity. The intellectual world of the 18th century became "the time of assimilating these ideas" introducing the thoughts of "the founders of the new European metaphysics to a broad reading public" (Васильев 2010: 7).

The Enlightenment helped unite Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson as the key contributors to the new state. Locke's political claims underlined the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. They became a tool for a secularization of intellectual life, because Locke's theory was "fundamentally incompatible with the Platonic doctrine of American Puritans" (Flower & Murphey 1977: 68), which dominated in the New World during the 17th century. Locke's philosophy was at the heart of American education and science (Brent 1998: 28). Hume's contribution to American philosophy and ideology was not equal to Locke's, yet his thoughts and life were deeply connected with America. Hume met Franklin during his visits to Scotland in 1759 and 1771 and became his pen-friend (Atiyah 2006). Though Hume died in the year when the Declaration of Independence was adopted, he was one among a few writers on the British Islands claiming that the colonies should be independent.

If we bear in mind the need to formulate the foundations for a new state and order in America, this intellectual pathos was linked with the religious toleration most naturally mingled with a social one closely tied with moulding the ideas into an institutionalized

form. Paine, having received his education in England, became the leader of this pathos and the single most influential political writer in America. He embodied the very spirit of Enlightenment movement and absorbed the ideas of British and French writers of his time (Ryder 2004: 31). Three of his main works became bestsellers to ultimately morph into cultural memes. The "Common sense" was a source of inspiration for the U.S. Declaration of Independence, "Rights of man" – the universal declaration of human rights, "The age of reason" became a name for the age of Enlightenment itself (Hampshire 1956).

Paine was not a profound philosopher himself, but "… he had a power of expression that has exceeded that of almost any political thinker in the English language" (Kuklick 2000: xi). He was strongly influenced by Locke. Moreover, some political thoughts expressed in "Common sense" indicate a close reading of Hume, though he was even criticized that his "Rights of man" was not like Hume's "Idea of a perfect commonwealth" (Paine 1945b: 447). Paine's explanation of the origin of government and various ways of maintaining monarchies is identical to Hume's standpoints as expressed in the essays "Of the original contract" and "Of the origin of government" (Werner 1972: 450).

Thus, the importance of Locke's and Hume's ideas for the American revolution cannot be underestimated. After the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788, Benjamin Rush proclaimed that it was the "triumph of knowledge over ignorance, of virtue over vice, and of liberty over slavery" (1951: 471). As it is noted by Wood, "with the break from Great Britain complete and the Constitution ratified, many Americans in the 1790s thought that the United States had become the "most enlightened" nation in the world" (2006: 159). Moreover, a number of works highlighted that even "in the early decades of the 19th century America was heir to an Enlightenment notion of human nature" (Quirk 2015: 22). The Enlightenment spirit became flesh and blood of American culture with a passionate belief in scientific progress and human reasoning.

The philosophical ideas spread to American newspapers, magazines, and fiction, such as the novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court" by Twain, published in 1889. It is a vivid example of artistic and philosophical worldviews combined, satire accompanied by profound reflections on human nature dating back to the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The book clashes the mythological view of an outdated Britain embodied by King Arthur as a typical image and a Yankee armed with the latest conceptions of *progress* as well as *mind*, *reason*, *knowledge*, and *consciousness*, and he is eager to transform the world employing them. This novel among others is "half and half admixture of fun and seriousness" (Paine 1912: 1100) viewed as a fictional verbalization of several philosophical concepts and a profound speculation on all their pros and cons as well as their limits.

Critics have justly noted that the "distinctive features of his [Twain's] thought come from Paine, or, possibly, from Hobbes, *Locke*, *Hume* and Mandeville" (Waggoner 1937: 358). Brashear tentatively remarks that "Mark Twain's thought was not much touched by 19th century speculative philosophy. It remained within the limits of the narrower experiences of the preceding age" including Locke and Hume (2017: 250). Besides that, Twain was influenced by some American political writers and thinkers. There is evidence that he got acquainted with Paine's book "The age of reason" early enough. Twain wrote in his diary in 1908, "I read it first when I was a cub pilot, read it with fear and hesitation, but marvelling at his fearlessness and power" (Britton 2011: 563). This book cultivated in Clemens a fundamentally secular outlook and criticism over church and mythological mysticism. The others mention the impact of a representative of freethinkers – Ingersoll (Lewisohn 1932), who became his friend (Schwartz 1976) and thus influenced his views on religion, belief in science and progress being clearly visible in Twain's writings.

Therefore, the thread of influence runs as follows: Locke and Hume → Paine → Twain, which moves from special discourse to public political rhetoric and fiction. This thread

seems to be most probable and is taken as a working hypothesis in the present paper, leaving the minor influences from other sources beyond. Tracing the exact links of Mark Twain with philosophical works may be rather challenging as we may not have any references left either in the form of notes in his "Notebook" or letters. So, it is impossible to obtain the exact direct evidence of him reading a particular book or being acquainted with a particular way of reasoning. Waggoner pinpoints that "he was neither a systematic student of science, nor a persistent and profound thinker; and he had nothing of the scholar's love of documentation and reference" (1937: 361).

Thus, in our research we turn to the methodology of cognitive linguistics, which is able to reveal mutual influences on a deeper analytical level – the cognitive one. This is the level, where not particularly the semantic, but the conceptual structure of the language personality is outlined. Moreover, Twain's works here serve not as a peculiar example for a detective-like story of the succession of influences on a particular human, but the experience of both a thinker and writer amounts to the experience of a generation. Artists and scientists are usually believed to be addressing the ever-perplexing questions concurrently, but from different perspectives. As Lehrer marks, "As scientists were beginning to separate thoughts into their anatomical parts, …artists wanted to understand consciousness from the inside" (2007: 13).

3. The methodology of linguistic and conceptual analysis in the study of socio-cultural specificity of discourse

It is beyond scholarly doubt nowadays that we think and talk from within the established intellectual tradition, accepted discourse, and the cultural paradigm fundamentally grounded in sensory and physical experience common to all human beings. The successive chain of processing the information in cognition leads human consciousness from observation of **reality** to **sensations**, then to the **perception** becoming "representations of a perceptual conglomeration of visual, auditory, haptic, motoric, olfactory and gustatory experience" (Oakley 2007: 216). The "objectification

of thought" (Выготский 2014) turns to be consisting of simpler perceptual images or "conceptual representations" (Manerko 2016: 145) reflecting the properties of separate objects in space.

Linguistic forms representing cognitive mechanisms in human consciousness are used and created in their interaction (Loginov 2016). Cognitive mechanisms are better revealed on the derivational level of nomination in the process of conceptualizing new experience, when the primitive images get transformed and/or united to form more complex structures (Кубрякова 2004: 406), e.g., from *reason* to *reasoning*, *reasonable*, *unreasonable*; from *to know* to *knowledge*, *knowledgeable*; from *to understand* to *understanding*. Cognitive mechanisms directing human thought depend on categorization and conceptualization and represent the knot, tying the semiotic, semantic, onomasiological, and syntactical characteristics.

The dynamic character of communication involves also the use of units undergoing semantic changes, in which the direct and transferred meanings of a word reflect embodied cognition (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Our bodily experience serves an anchor for abstract thought "emergent from patterns of interaction or derived from perceptual experience" (Clausner 2005: 100-101) and further proceeds on to high-level cognitive operations. The basis of this conception in understanding human thought is **image schemas.** They form the methodological core of contemporary cognitive linguistics unveiling complex problems of conceptualization being the "dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs" (Johnson 1987: xiv-xvi). They include but are not limited to the following set: BALANCE, BLOCKAGE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, COLLECTION, CONTACT, CONTAINER, COUNTERFORCE, CYCLE, FULL-EMPTY, ITERATION, LINK, MATCHING, MERGING, NEAR-FAR, OBJECT, PART-WHOLE, PATH, PROGRESS, SCALE, SPLITTING, SUPERIMPOSITION, SURFACE (Johnson 1987: 26). Image schemas are based on the power of abstract reasoning implying the ability to form symbolic structures (Lakoff 1987). They preserve the conceptual core and allow for linguistic

modifications, numerous transformations "as *recurring cognitive structures* which establish patterns of understanding and reasoning, often elaborated by extension from knowledge of our bodies as well as our experience of social interactions" (Sharifian 2017: 36).

Therefore, the image schemas once contextualized are combined and clustered in a way peculiar to a particular cultural and historical setting verbalized with a recurrent linguistic plane of expression. Still, the understanding of the world in human brains represents certain cognitive constructs dominating every particular epoch. They may become the object of comparison, being transformed slowly until they are influenced by paradigmatic shifts in Kuhn's understanding. These transformations influence human communication at all levels in a definite cultural-historical period. These complex mental representations of the social and cultural perspective are on the crust of the wave of linguistic endeavour (Комова 2005; 2013). They are studied in cognitive linguistics, where it is stressed that "while meaning is identified as conceptualisation, cognition at all levels is both embodied and *culturally embedded*" (Langacker 2014: 33).

Image schemas may manifest themselves through conceptual metaphors as the source and target domains, because they are based on the most basic images and the supraschematic structure (Grady 2005: 47). These images scaffold linguistic expression as Turner marked, "We can invent new metaphors by figuring out the image-schematic structure of the target and finding a source that matches it" (1991: 174). This cognitive ground for the linguistic expression plane is indirectly delivered by the congenial commonality between the schemas we obtain from the linguistic analysis. In Plato and Aristotle's philosophical works, a wax plate, a memorizing form, an object, or a soul revealed the concept of MIND, while HEART was understood as the container of the soul and SOUL – the container of knowledge (Манерко 2017). Linguistic and gesture studies (Chienki & Müller 2008), the studies of infants

(Wagneret al. 1981), and multimodal representations (Forceville 2008; Kövecses 2018) – all point to the image schemas being fundamental to conceptualizing experience.

Thus, cognitive linguistics and the proposed methodology help to reveal not only what is universal about the language lying at the core of a plethora of interpretations, but also what is particular about its construal grounded in the socio-cultural interaction.

4. Conceptualizing mind during the period of the Enlightenment

Two main tendencies in the human mind description were prevailing in the Enlightenment philosophy in Europe. On the one hand, the mechanistic approach to the mind was in full accord with the worldview of the epoch when animal and human bodies were compared to machines. On the other hand, swift advances in natural sciences where the laws of nature were formulated opposing the external world as space and its properties (Sharapkova & Komova 2014) to the internal one – the human mind and thinking. Practically all major philosophers of those times excluding Leibniz claimed that there were no unconscious states of mind. The so-called "official doctrine" of the Enlightenment philosophy was that "minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanical laws. The workings of one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is private" (Ryle 2009: 3) and is rather difficult to penetrate. These two collateral histories may be described through the mirror of "nature" or "ocular" metaphor, as Rorty put it (1979: 11-12). Trying to understand how inner mechanisms (i.e. of memory, corresponding to physical experience, ideas' formation, human emotions, and feelings) could be presented by scholars, we look at words describing human thinking. It is quite clear now that the linguistic legacy of the Enlightenment is substantial, because 60 per cent of the "cognition" family terms appeared between the 17th and 19th centuries (Chaney 2013). This spreading might have been due – among other things – to the clarity and vividness of both rhetoric as well as conceptual constructs through which the philosophical ideas of that period were explicated.

In the next part of the article, we are going to analyze the image schemas realized by the lexemes under scrutiny. We are going to start with the word *mind* as the most general one and proceed with *consciousness*, *reason*, and *understanding*. The linguistic analysis, including the etymological origins of the words, will be combined with the conceptual analysis.

4.1 The etymology of mind, *its semantics and development in the early periods of English*

The word *mind* belongs to the Anglo-Saxon vocabulary in the form of *gemynd / ʒemynd / imunde / ymunde.* It was used with a prefix *ʒe-/i-/y-* in different dialects of Old English in the meaning "memory, remembrance, state of being remembered" as the Oxford English dictionary states (OED). Since the understanding of the human being was, to a large extent, holistic and undivided, it designated all mental abilities sometimes including the soul in the semantic structure of the word. The prefix ceased to exist in the middle of the 14th century altogether with the meaning of the word, which became wider denoting "any mental faculty", e.g., in Trevisa's text of 1387 this meaning is apparent: "*He was so myʒty of* **mynde** [L. tanta memoria viguit] *þat he rehersed two þowsand names arewe by herte*" (OED). By this time, the emotional shade of the meaning was enforced in *mood*, leaving the opportunity to be at the same time enhanced in *mind* and to gravitate towards "rational/spiritual self" (Kiricsi 2010). This meaning was naturally ousted by two French loan words, *memory* and *remembrance*, having appeared in the 11th and 13th centuries correspondingly. *Mind* replaced the Anglo-Saxon *wit* or *gewit* that meant "mind, reason, intelligence".

Thus, *mind* "became the basic lexeme referring to the mental faculties" (Kiricsi 2010: 283). Since it had the widest and most prototypical meaning of all the *mind* words, allowing for the wealth of context to be used, it became endowed with the specific terminological connotations. The word *mind* will be studied further in Locke's major work.

4.1.1 The description of MIND *in Locke's "An essay concerning human understanding"*
The key paper for Locke's philosophical conception is "An essay concerning human understanding" (1689). His representation of *mind* is within the general scope of the Enlightenment reasoning yet exhibiting some notable peculiarities. These allowed to name Locke the one "who more than any other philosopher established the stereotype for the popular view on the mind in the 18th century" (Abrams 1958: 57). In his work, *mind* occupies a privileged position – 1,223 examples. Locke stresses that God is the guarantor of everything in the external world; he is *that eternal infinite mind, who made and governs all things* (Locke 2008: 405). In the essay, Nature has no conscious perception and the process of getting knowledge is conscious: *the soul, during sound sleep, thinks, say these men. Whilst it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble, as well as any other perceptions; and it must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions* (ibid., 59). The external world is represented by a number of bodies – these are animals and human beings. If animals have *self-perception* and *self-enjoyment*, a person is characterized by the internal world given by God to him.

Locke clearly creates a well-organized system of descriptions of the *thinking activity* of a human being. The word *thinking* is used 156 times in the essay, including several specific notions. Locke starts his description with sensations as the first step of the thinking process. He writes: *But as I call the other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the **ideas** it affords being such only, as the mind gets by **reflecting on its own operations within it self*** (ibid., 55). He underlines that the term *reflection* arises on the basis of sensations, while the word *perception* is used in identifying *conscious perception*.

The word *mind* is part and parcel of thinking and underlines that men HAVE minds and they are conscious, while animals *do not have* the same features. The mind is presented as the container of ideas preexisting their language expression: *men have **in***

their minds several ideas, *such as are those expressed by the words 'whiteness',* *'hardness', 'sweetness', 'thinking', 'motion', 'man', 'elephant', 'army', 'drunkenness', and* *others* (ibid., 54). Starting to write the essay, Locke did not want to speak about words in language, but then he understood that this aspect was necessary. He stresses that *words in the primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing, but the ideas in the* *mind of him that uses them* (ibid., 257). These ideas are private and individual, though the bigger part of the word meaning arises from the common perception of the world, in which we as people live with our abilities to reason. He repeats the preposition *in* fascinating the readers of the essay with one of the most prominent metaphors – MIND is A CONTAINER. In the introductory and explanatory passage to the essay, Locke writes that *when **ideas are in** our **minds**, we consider them as **being** actually there* (ibid., 72). Notably, the famous concept of "tabula rasa" Locke is known for is represented not as a blank page, but an empty cabinet: *The senses at first let in particular ideas, and* *furnish the yet **empty cabinet**: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of* *them, they are **lodged in** the Memory, and Names got to them* (ibid., 23). Viewing mind through cabinet, being a piece of furniture – a repository with drawers – is of crucial importance as it obviously implies categorization: "Locke might well have thought that this structure was the result of innate psychological mechanisms" (Ott 2003: 71). The mind is represented as a spacious container like some *mind's presence-room* full of ideas understood as a suitable means of explaining the work of mind in general. Still, this representation does not imply all the characteristics of space: *the actions of the* ***mind** are performed. For, as itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension;* *so its actions seem to require no time* (ibid., 85).

The PERSON conceptual metaphor is also used very often in the essay, because mind is given the ability to act like human beings. Locke underlines that for the mind there are no borders outside in reaching any location in reality and thinking it over. Thus, the physical world, even one with diamond-hard walls, cannot stop the progress of mind. *Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to*

expatiate in, which takes its **flight farther than the Stars**, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; **that extends its thoughts often**, even **beyond the utmost expansion of Matter,** and makes **excursions into** that incomprehensible Inane (ibid., 73).

The frequency of occurrence of MIND AS A CONTAINER in Locke's paper is relatively higher (45 %) comparing to the use of the schema MIND AS A PERSON (30 %), both represented in red colour (Fig. 1). Moreover, in many cases these interpretations blend in the most natural way, indicating operations of mind, which can *narrow, blot out, come into, void,* and *unfurnish things.*


Figure 1. A comparative representation of conceptualizing *mind* in Locke's and Hume's works

Since 90 percent of all visual information comes in our brains through eyes, the personification of mind is elaborated further and mostly combined with a CONTAINER:

The perception of the mind, *being most aptly explained by words relating to sight, so we shall best understand what is meant by 'clear' and 'obscure' in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call 'clear' and 'obscure' in the objects of sight* (ibid., 226); *When the **mind turns its view inwards upon itself**, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs* (ibid., 134). Personifying mind seems to be as natural as perceiving it as a container – the mind is rarely considered to be a total abstraction detached from the major owner and user – the human being: ***The mind receiving*** *the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, when **it turns its view inward** upon itself, and **observes** its own **actions** about those **ideas it has**, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things* (ibid., 69-70). The MIND AS A PERSON ***has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts***, *infinitely beyond what Sensation or Reflection furnished it with: but all this still confined to those simple ideas, which it received from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions* (ibid., 97); it ***has thus to order*** *the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will* (ibid., 142). It has the ability *to consider several of* [simple ideas] *united together, as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external Objects, but as it self has **join'd** them* (ibid., 97). It adjusts to the grandeur of the topic or object: ***their minds be overlaid*** *by an object too large and mighty **to be surveyed and managed by them*** (ibid., 132). In verbalizing MIND AS A PERSON we can also infer some qualities and characteristics of human beings: *how **covetous the mind** is, to be **furnished** with all such ideas* (ibid., 84). Since the mind embraces and considers all possible objects from the real world, it is only natural that the container is enlarged up to the world itself. The ideas are compared to the shadows of clouds in the ground, thus the schema is enriched with metaphors, cf.: *ideas **in the mind** quickly **fade**, and often **vanish quite out** of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining characters of themselves than*

*shadows do flying over fields of corn; and the **mind** is as **void** of them as if they had never been there* (ibid., 88).

A complex blend arises in a combination of the CONTAINER schema with the MIND AS A MACHINE that is not evident in the text of Locke's work and forming a fraction of all the examples mainly combined with a noun *operation* or a verb *to operate*. The mind basically works not as a mechanism, but as a plant or a factory (being the container as well) aiming at operating on various kinds of evolving simple or complex ideas, e.g.: *These simple ideas, **the materials of all our knowledge**, are suggested and **furnished to the mind,** only by those two ways above mentioned: viz. sensation and reflection* (ibid., 64).

Surprisingly, the image Locke is famous for – the human mind is a sort of a BLANK SLATE or WHITE PAPER, on which experience writes – was not that renowned but rather vivid. The examples in the text verbalizing these metaphors are united under the SURFACE image schema with paper being the metaphoric realization of the general cognitive pattern dating back to Plato, cf.: the other examples of this kind: *Let us then suppose **the mind** to be, as we say, **white paper,** void of all characters, **without any ideas.** How comes it to be furnished?* (ibid., 54); *but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and so **imprinting** no idea on the mind, there follows no sensation* (ibid., 83).

Finally, we can conclude that the general representation of *mind* in Locke's work relies on two major schemas: a CONTAINER and a PERSON. They get combined with and influence each other as they most naturally intermingle.

4.1.2 The description of MIND *in Hume's work "A treatise of human nature"*

Hume developed the conception of the mind viewed as a 'commonwealth of perceptions' in his paper "A treatise of human nature" (1738-40). Due to the discoveries in the field of natural sciences, like many other scholars the philosopher aspired to become the "Newton of the mind" (Schliesser 2007). He wanted to outline and develop the basic or universal laws of consciousness and to show how it functions. Hume proposed the way of "the organization of the mind" seeing the problems through "the sharp eye of mind", and speaking about how ideas get into the mind by means of sensory representations: "the only way in which an idea can get into the mind" (Morris & Brown 2001).

He starts his work with outlining the classification of ideas as the basic elements of human consciousness, setting the tune for the whole book and relying on the complex image of a CONTAINER with the ideas like animate beings getting into the mind or consciousness: *All the **perceptions of** the human **mind** resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call **'impressions' and 'ideas'**. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees **of force and liveliness** with which they **strike upon the mind**, and make their **way into our thought or consciousness*** (Hume 1960: 1). Here, the mind is represented as the first kind of the CONTAINER with its enclosed space of surface and to a certain extent opposed to thought and consciousness. Human thought and consciousness form the inner domain of the second CONTAINER as they use the already established ideas and do not form the new ones. Impressions enter the mind with a greater power, yet ideas get into a thought or consciousness in a milder way. The ideas have force and getting into the mind is pictured in a physical way, yet by ideas he means *the faint images of these in **thinking and reasoning*** (Hume 1960: 1) applying force to the container boundaries. This example reveals that though the container is the predominant scheme, much more complex relationship between the schemas and shifts of focus arise in the discourse.

We analyzed all the 610 contexts of the word *mind* in Hume's text and tried to classify each case according to a particular image schema. Sometimes, the mental model reconstructed on the basis of Hume's text is very complicated, inter-contradictory, yet several basic image schemas could be outlined: MIND AS A CONTAINER, A SURFACE, AN OPERATING MACHINE, A PERSON, A SURFACE, A MOVING OBJECT, PART-WHOLE, and A SUPER FORCE. However, we should note that in many cases it is difficult to decide on a particular image schema as they are so tightly related to each other and get transformed into each other in one and the same passage. The reason for it might be that image schemas are dynamic and they are still in a state of mutual interrelation in discourse. In Hume's treatise, the most numerous are three schemas – MIND AS A CONTAINER, A PERSON and A SURFACE represented in figure 1 in blue colour. They seem to work synergistically together, making the task of distinguishing one from another sometimes complicated.

Our analysis shows that MIND AS A CONTAINER is the most abundant schema. This is the most general interpretation, yet in different parts of the book and in different passages, it is featured differently. Mind could be as big as the whole world, or a commonwealth, or a country/empire, or medium as the stage in a theatre: *Nor is the **empire of the will** over our **mind** more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the cause, and cou'd not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction. **We have command over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond that lose all empire over it*** (ibid., 632). It is capable of embracing the whole physical world. The ideas get "spread out" to the full in the MIND-CONTAINER, reaching the hypothetical boundaries of the container: *'Tis evident I can never account for this phœnomenon, conformable to my experience in other instances, without **spreading out** in my **mind** the whole sea and continent between us, and supposing the effects and continu'd existence of posts and ferries, according to **my memory and observation*** (ibid., 196). A peculiar blend arises from a combination of two metaphors based on a CONTAINER image schema: MIND AS A WORLD and WORLD AS A THEATRE. The ongoing succession

of perceptions is compared to a theatre performance, which will become one of Hume's most popular ideas: *The **mind is a kind of theatre**, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; **pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle** in an infinite variety of postures and situations* (ibid., 253).

The mind is viewed as a CONTAINER filled not with some stuff, but certain ideas moving in the human mind point at categorization process represented by inanimate objects: *That we may fix the meaning of the word, figure, we may **revolve in our mind** the ideas of circles, squares, parallelograms, triangles of different sizes and proportions, and may not rest on one image or idea* (ibid., 22). Therefore, it can be medium in volume as a stage in a theatre or as small as a camera in some apparatus. The analysis shows that a greater volume of the *mind* corresponds to its greater capacity as a CONTAINER and may be transformed into a SURFACE and even shrink to a POINT, when it stops fulfilling its function. Interestingly, being a point the *mind* can still be a sphere without boundaries as we observe in the following example: *they* [new probabilities] *must equally subvert it, and by the opposition, either of contrary thoughts or sensations, **reduce the mind to a total uncertainty*** (ibid., 184). This dynamic character of image schema allows the polyphony of interpretations and two image schemas may start working together. The CONTAINER merges with MACHINE schema making it a distinct subcategory: *There **enters nothing into** this **operation of the mind** but a present impression* (ibid., 101).

Within this commonwealth, the mind itself may move and work with certain objects. On the intersection of MIND AS A PERSON and MIND AS A MACHINE appears MIND AS A FORCE with *creative power* (ibid., 84).

The mind being mainly a CONTAINER, it has the interior that allows the movements inside it. Moreover, the mind can become a moving object – a TRAJECTOR itself and: *the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other* (ibid., 99). The mind

is conceptualized as a PERSON: *this uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude, that without it **the mind cannot join two ideas**; for nothing is more free than that faculty* (ibid., 10).

All the mentioned conceptual metaphors as well as image schemas are presented in Fig. 2. The lines stand for the established correlations and arrows show the changes the image schemas can experience.

Figure 2. The development in schematic representation of *mind* through image schemas in Hume's work

All the results of both Locke and Hume taken together allow us to draw the following conclusion. The conceptual representation of *mind* in philosophical works of the two great intellectuals is generally similar, but at the same time having notable peculiarities determined by the socio-historical changes in the society and a greater importance of industrialization with the growing role of machines in the times of Hume. A significant redistribution of frequency of occurrence in schemas happens in the sphere of MIND AS A CONTAINER, MIND AS A PERSON, and MIND AS A MACHINE.

4.1.3 The description of MIND *in Paine's works*

Paine's "The age of reason" represents a curious blend of what he took from the earlier writers on the human mind. Yet, he is concerned with religion first and foremost, therefore the pathos of his work is less philosophical and more political. The basic image schemas are naturally very similar to Locke's and Hume's respective schemas, but the focus of his writing is different. Paine criticizes religion and tries to prove it to be redundant in the period when science takes over. Therefore, the science is described as a natural preoccupation of a human being and mind takes the leading role in determining the human morals and actions: *My own mind is my own church* (Paine 1945a: 464). This is a non-conventional realization of the CONTAINER image schema, as in the text it is accompanied with the metaphoric expression. He distinguished between two types of ideas – those *we produce in ourselves by reflection and the act of thinking, and those that **bolt into the mind** of their own accord* (ibid., 497).

Some other ideas about mind that shaped the American discourse were the natural interest of any human being in science: *The human **mind** has a natural disposition to scientific knowledge and to the things connected with it* (ibid., 492). Or *the **natural bent of my mind** was to science* (ibid., 496).

4.2 The semantics of the early use of CONSCIOUSNESS *and its description in the works of Locke and Hume*

The Latin adjective *conscious* was used as far as in "Merlin" (1465) prose romance in opposition to the concepts of appearance and mind: *yef thi conscyence be soche as the semblaunce…* (MED). English adopted it for broad use in 1600. In 1632, Massinger wrote in "The maid of honour": *The **consciousness** of mine own wants, alas! sir, // We are not parallels; but, like lines divided, // Can ne'er meet in one centre* (1813: 24). English started to use the word *consciousness* in 1630 in the meaning of "internal knowledge", and in 1670 the "state of being aware of what passes in one′s own mind"(OED). The philosophical thought gradually developed the meaning registered

in the Oxford English Dictionary: "5a. The totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings, which make up a person's conscious being" (OED). But the noun *consciousness* in its philosophical terminological sense appeared somewhat later. As far as we can see, the English term *consciousness* is strongly connected with the terminology of Plotinus' philosophical psychology, being a linguistic calque from Greek *συναίσθησις* (*Sunaisthêsis*) in Latin. The term is "the most ubiquitous type of consciousness in Plotinus' psychology...The fundamental role of sunaisthêsis is to produce unity by constituting the subject as a coherent and structured whole" (Hutchinson 2018: 41). The Cambridge Platonist Cudworth translated *συναίσθησις* as "consciousness" or "con-sense" and claimed that "the essence of cognition consists in express consciousness" (1678: 160; Carter 2010).

A unique contribution to the understanding of what makes an ordinary person a reasoning human being is Locke's theory of consciousness (91 examples in the essay). It eventually serves the foreground for high-order theories of consciousness when the subject is aware of his mental operations such as thinking and reasoning. A Lockean person *is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that* **consciousness***, which* **is inseparable from thinking***, and as it seems to me* **essential to it** (ibid., 208). The unique feature of Locke's conception is that all mental states for him are conscious, thus it is central to his further description of thinking capacities. This is, roughly speaking, some kind of meta-perception, i.e. the perception of perception: **Consciousness** *is the perception of what* **passes** *in a man's own mind* (ibid., 61). Moreover, consciousness fundamentally lays the ground for individual identity: **Consciousness** *always accompanies* **thinking***, and 'tis makes every one to be, what he calls 'self'; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things* (ibid., 208).

Thiel summarized the theory of consciousness: "for Locke, 'being conscious' denotes an immediate awareness that is an integral part of all acts of thinking as such… According to Locke, the mind relates to itself in the sense that it observes its own operations and produces ideas of them..." (2011: 114-115). Locke is even more straightforward in putting consciousness at the foundation of personal identity in the following passage: *For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances* (ibid., 209).

Speaking about the image schemas linguistically evoked in the scrutinized text, we could say that the general picture seems to be rather predictable given its importance of personal identity. It is the OBJECT image schema that is predominant in Locke's essay when the concept of consciousness is seen as some kind of object you can *have, transfer, relocate* and you can have the *lack of* (Fig. 3). At the same time, it is still conceptualized as a PERSON with consciousness that can accompany the human, be present and perform certain actions such as uniting ideas. This conceptualization takes the second place in Locke's work as well as the dominant position in Hume's treatise. The CONTAINER image schema represents *consciousness* with space within, through which you can do something and it is capable of changing its volume, i.e. extending.

Consciousness

Figure 3. A comparative representation of *consciousness* in Locke and Hume's works

Hume albeit famous for his claim that *self or person is not any one impression* (Hume 1960: 251), because "*when **I enter most intimately into what I call myself**, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. **I never can catch myself** at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception*" (ibid., 252); he also connects self with consciousness. The philosopher writes, that *pride and humility, tho' directly contrary, have yet the same object. This object is **self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions**, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness* (ibid., 277) and *the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always **intimately present with us**, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it* (ibid., 317). This is but apparently a contradiction: in fact, Hume rejected a bundle theory of the 'self', verbalized in the first claims and further stated that "*all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our **thought or consciousness.** I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head*" (ibid., 636).

Yet, Hume made the connection between consciousness and other capacities clearer, and there are numerous contexts where he specifies his ideas by bringing together the following words: *thought or consciousness, consciousness or memory, consciousness or sensation, memory and consciousness*. Like in: "*But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions **in our thought or consciousness**"* (ibid., 637).

The concept of consciousness in Paine's writing does not occupy a prominent place. It is mainly connected with acknowledging the existence of a human being, and is supposed to provide the basis for immortality: *But all other arguments apart, the **consciousness of existence** is the only conceivable idea we can have of another life, and the continuance of that **consciousness is immortality*** (Paine 1945a: 591). Practically, the only schema realized in a few examples is a CHARACTERISTIC feature.

4.3 UNDERSTANDING*: from a concept in ordinary speech to a term in philosophy*

The spatial conceptualization of mental entities verbalized in the words representing mental sphere and cognitive capacities, that we have seen in numerous examples scrutinized above, is naturally not the invention of the Age of Reason. Rather, it is primarily connected with the most archaic conceptualizations of the cognized and non-cognized space. Understanding or cognizing the object means placing it into the focus of attention in space. The etymology of the verb *to understand*, which originated from the Old English *understandan*, which meant "comprehend, grasp the idea of", which in its turn was related to the verb *-standan* "to stand" and the prefix *under-*, and that is why "stand in the midst of" (OED). This is a much more general semantic principle accounting for certain regularities in cognitive information processing. Some other examples of the kind might include *suppose* – from Latin "put or place under", *intend* – from Latin "stretch out, extend", and many others. Even in Middle English, the lexeme *understanding* had positive connotations, as in the following example of 1440 being used with truth: *so trouthe is receyued in-to our **vnderstandynge*** (MED).

The general meaning of "power or ability to understand; intellect, intelligence" was widely used in English, yet further through this meaning the word *understanding* got endowed with certain terminological connotations. This semantic shift in the meaning soon influenced the everyday language use as those "capable of understanding, intelligent, capable of judging with knowledge" (OED) were called *the men of understanding*. The newly coined phrase came into the public discourse in the following centuries. In 1772 Boston Gazette of 3 August, we find the following example: **Men of understanding** *view the Governor's Speech as an impertinent sophistical Piece of Toryism* (OED).

4.3.1 The description of UNDERSTANDING *in Locke's "An essay concerning human understanding"*

In the philosophy of Enlightenment, the term *understanding* was quite popular and meant comprehension as one of the aspects of human mental activity. Locke wrote in his "An essay concerning human understanding" that his primary goal was to show *whence the **understanding** may **get** all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees **they may come into the mind*** (Locke 2008: 54).

Still, based on the analysis of all the 308 examples from the text, we could outline three major image schemas: a PERSON (104 tokens), a CONTAINER (107), and an OBJECT (41). As for the other words elucidated, we reveal that in many examples personification of mental processes is revealed in the verbs usually used to denote people rather than abstract notions and a combination of several schemas is noted. In many cases, the example becomes rather complex through the use of metaphors and with *understanding* this metaphorical load turns out to be more pronounced than with the other words studied.

In the example below, we observe a dynamic representation of *understanding* seen as a world (interpreted as a CONTAINER schema) with mental operations and visions

floating and an individual simultaneously performing the actions. Moreover, the abstract notions become creatures of this world: *And hence we see the Reason, why 'tis pretty late, before most children get **ideas of the operations of their own minds***; and some have not any very clear, or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet like **floating visions**, they make not deep impressions enough, to leave in the mind clear distinct lasting ideas, **till the understanding turns inwards upon it self***, reflects on its own operations, and **makes them the object of its own contemplation** (ibid., 57). The understanding of a human is finite *in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion* (ibid., 121).

So, the understanding can be active or passive in acquitting materials processed into knowledge. This is realized through a PERSON image schema: *In this part, the **understanding is merely passive***; and whether or no, it will have these beginnings, and as it were materials of knowledge, is not **in its own power** (ibid., 63). Through the PERSON image schema the metaphor of UNDERSTANDING AS A HUMAN BEING is realized, thus it can have an eye, and thus *see, judge, make acquaintance, obey, and perceive*. Viewing it as an OBJECT makes it possible to use it right or even use as a metaphor of the dress that can go well with the cognized things: *things to which our **understandings** are not suited* (ibid., 14).

The intrinsic duality of the processes of understanding is based on the fact that we operate with mental entities being the reflections or signs of the actual events or objects of the real world. This semiotic duality is the key challenge as well as the source of inspiration for various metaphors in Locke's text. The UNDERSTANDING AS A MIRROR, capable of reflecting the real world with a certain precision, is a metaphor gaining a special significance in the text: *These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the **Understanding** can **no more refuse** to **have**, nor **alter**, when they are **imprinted**, nor **blot** them out, and make new ones in it self, than a **mirror** can **refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas, which, the objects set before it, do therein produce** (ibid., 63).

Another rather conventional way of portraying understanding as a CONTAINER is as follows: *These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room. For, methinks, the Understanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from light, with only some little* **openings** *left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without; would the* **pictures coming into such a dark Room** *but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them* (ibid., 96). Here Locke uses the metaphor of a drawer with numerous blocks and minor containers as a particular case of the CONTAINER image schema. This metaphor works as a constituent part of a complex metaphor, i.e. comparing the process of understanding to the light reaching some of the inner spaces of the drawer. This image is not particularly frequent yet rather consistent as in another context where we read about *the light infused into their understandings* (ibid., 452).

Vision and seeing becomes the ground for various image schema blends like PERSON and SURFACE: *to make the* **understanding** *see, what is originally engraven in it* (ibid., 20) (Fig. 4).


Figure 4. A schematic representation of *understanding*
in Locke's and Hume's works

The quantitative analysis demonstrates the difference between Locke's and Hume's conceptualization of *understanding*. While Locke prefers PERSON and CONTAINER image schemas, Hume focuses on other characteristics, leaving personification to *reason*.

4.3.2 The description of UNDERSTANDING *in Hume's work "A treatise of human nature"*
The concept of understanding was of particular importance to Hume, so he even changed the focus of the title. His work "An enquiry concerning human understanding" of 1748 appeared nearly a decade later than the work we mainly subject to our analysis – "A treatise of human nature". This was the first philosophical work that used the term *understanding* in its title, presuming it to be the most important concept that seeks further detailed elaboration. Yet as his lengthy treatise arose little interest from the reading public, Hume understood that it needed a more succinct verbalization.

The work under scrutiny opens up with a chapter on the understanding and starts with defining the object of study – the man through his capacity to reason. Along with the established tradition, *understanding* in Hume's text can be generalized in a CONTAINER image schema: *I am afraid, that such an enterprise **is beyond the reach of human understanding,** and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses* (Hume 1960: 64). Interestingly enough, invoking the CONTAINER schema (Fig. 4), Hume pays more attention to its boundaries and even outside, beyond the moderate capacities of pure reasoning as passions and actions leave the distinct territory of understanding: *Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, 'tis supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to **go beyond** the calm and indolent judgments of **the understanding*** (ibid., 457).

Two representations are prominent in Hume's work "A treatise of human nature": the personification of the processes of understanding and building up its characteristics.

The understanding thus can be *perfect* or *full* and it is possible to talk about the nature of understanding, its principles, faculties, efforts, and force: …***wherein the nature of our understanding***, *and our reasoning from the first probability become our objects* (ibid., 182).

The most striking thing is that the schema SOURCE is more prominent in Hume's text compared to Locke's: *we shall find upon examination, that they are at the bottom considerably different from each other, and that this inference **arises from the understanding**, and from custom in an indirect and oblique manner* (ibid., 197).

The nature of understanding is presented as something stable and at the same time ambiguous and vague which is indicated several times: *The imagination or **understanding**, call it which you please, fluctuates betwixt the opposite views; and tho' perhaps it may be oftner turn'd to the one side than the other, 'tis impossible for it, by reason of the opposition of causes or chances, to rest on either* (ibid., 440).

As Paine largely elaborated on the notion of *reason* rather than the other philosophical notions, we cannot state that he suggested any distinguishing vision of *understanding*. The few examples found in his text are closer to the ordinary linguistic use rather to some philosophical discourse. Yet, some interesting cases of CONTAINER schemas are highlighted: *their* [of principles] *place of mental residence is the understanding* (Paine 1945a: 497).

4.4 REASON *as the key concept of the Enlightenment in Locke's, Hume's, and Paine's works*

Etymologically, the noun *reason* originated from the Latin *rationem* (nom. *ratio*). It appeared in the English language in the 13th century and comes from Old French *reisun* as "a statement of some fact (real or alleged) employed as an argument to justify or condemn some act, prove or disprove some assertion, idea, or belief" (OED). In the second meaning, the word was used quite often: "A statement, narrative, or speech; a

saying, observation, or remark; an account or explanation of, or answer to, something" (OED). Chaucer used this word without an article and meant "talk or discourse": *But I se now that þou art weerey with the lengthe of my* **reson** (OED). Originally, *reason* had neither separate nor supreme value of all cognitive abilities it gained further: "In the Middle Ages, to be sure, *reason* stood as a sort of junior partner to a higher source of truth, "revelation," which operated to guide and correct it. And the exercise of reason depended on training in a large body of philosophical and theological writings that "conveyed the truths that reason and revelation had accumulated over the centuries" (Smith 2006: 19).

These two meanings were frequent up to the 17th century when they gradually became rarely possible due to the prominence of another meaning *reason* acquired in the works of Enlightenment. The Oxford English Dictionary registers the following meaning highlighting that it is fixed in logics: "one of the premises in an argument; esp. the minor premise when placed after the conclusion" (OED). It manifested a considerable shift from a material fact potentially exploited in argumentation to an abstract 'object' valid to be used in argumentation conforming to the principles of logic. Rationality devoid of "superstition, mythology, fear and revelation, which is often based on mathematical 'truth', which calibrates ends to means, which is therefore technological, and expects solutions to problems which are objectively correct" (Outram 2013: 6).

Reasoning is thus the process of gaining knowledge of a higher order. It does not emerge on its own, but results from the development of logical thinking as long as animals and children do not exhibit this kind of mental activity. *He that attentively consider the state of a child, at his first coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge* (Locke 2008: 56). Since reasoning was suggested as an antidote for all possible kinds of authorities and beliefs, it is defined *as contradistinguished to faith, <…> which the*

mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection (ibid., 445).

Reason and *reasoning* were not yet the key terms to unite all the philosophical ideas in Locke's theory, despite he paid considerable attention to them. In our analysis, we have identified 667 examples with the main meaning similar to an argument in a discourse of proving the point advocated by the writer, thus pointing to the image schema of CAUSE. When he talks about what reasoning is and how to comprehend it, Locke uses the words connected with space, thus evoking the image schema of CONTAINER with the profiled bounding surfaces. Interestingly, considering that reason may instrumentally refer to an OBJECT, that could be used, employed, the person could have, be with, or deprived of.

The most important thing about reasoning is that it pertains only to human beings and is largely lacking in animals, thus stressing the high level of abstraction in processing various types of ideas: *And therefore I think we may suppose, That 'tis in this, that the species of brutes are discriminated from man; and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For if they have any ideas at all,* **and are not bare machins** *(as some would have them) we cannot deny them to* **have some reason** (ibid., 95).

The metaphor that we outlined, though it was not particularly abundant, is REASON IS LIGHT (7 instances). In Locke's text, *reason* is closely connected with understanding and all the other investigated words. They refer to mental capacities and image schemas behind the verbal plane, forming a cohesive structure with clear interrelations. Given that *understanding* is viewed as a cabinet (drawer) that is difficult to see into, *reason* is a lamp emitting light, making the process of cognizing the human being easier. The light *dispels darkness* and the human compared to *a dim candle* is in opposition to *the sun, celestial ray* of eternal mind-God. Light and particularly the light of reason

became the cornerstone metaphor for further discourse about the Enlightenment period itself. In the following example we identify a well-developed metaphor: *reason is lost upon them, they are above it: they see the **light infused into their Understandings**, and cannot be mistaken; 'tis clear and visible there; like the light of bright sunshine, shews it self, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence* (ibid., 452). *Understanding* for Locke has the superior level and in this respect is close to *reason* (Fig. 5) and they are both used in the same contexts.

Figure 5. Schematic representation of *reason* in Locke's and Hume's works

The first thing that immediately strikes when we start analyzing Hume is the drastic quantitative discrepancy in using this term compared to his predecessor. The word *reason* is used 665 times in his "Treatise" that is more than ten times higher (Fig. 5) then in Locke's essay. In many contexts, it still fulfils the same function of ordinary language – serving as a cause in an argumentation. Still the discourse analysis reveals that it gradually amounts to a key term and the over-arching concept for other mental capacities, verbalized by the words *mind* and *understanding*. Hume set out to investigate "the role that reason plays in belief and action" (Winters 1979: 20). Reason

can influence our actions and beliefs by informing us of causal relations between the objects of thought and on the real world: *All kinds of **reasoning** consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other* (ibid., 73). Together with Locke, Hume thinks that animals have some other kind of reason that is fundamentally different from the human capacity. Therefore, the OBJECT schema is recognizable too – human being can have it as some kind of an object or tool (instrument) to reveal these causal relations (Fig. 5). The metaphor of building with reason being the source of ideas and judgments is also quite prominent: *certain ideas, which are the true foundation of all our reasoning* (ibid., 53) or *the foregoing reasoning had no just foundation* (ibid., 91).

Investigating into the issue of reason would be useful for further research. Moreover, reason becomes endowed with a special importance that is enhanced with the help of the metaphor: *that can come before **the tribunal of human reason**, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them* (ibid., xvii). The metaphors of a strict judge and a queen appear in numerous contexts. These images are united by the same authority: *Reason first appears in possession of the **throne, prescribing laws, and imposing maxims**, with an absolute sway and **authority**. Her enemy, therefore, is oblig'd to take shelter under her protection, and by making use of rational arguments to prove the fallaciousness and imbecility of reason, produces, in a manner, a patent under her hand and seal* (ibid., 186).

Based on our analysis, we could state that some blended schemas like SOURCE and PERSON emerge in the discourse: *But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals* (ibid., 458).

The CONTAINER schema is rather frequent in Hume's works, especially verbalized by the word *reasoning*. According to Hume, humans may have errors: *any error in our*

reasoning (ibid., 452). Probably, since the early writings of the first philosophers the human cognitive life was considered too complex to be seen as a separate world: *the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty* (ibid., xxi). Reasoning conceptualized in terms of a CONTAINER can work with the ideas within and even beyond its boundaries: *the same* **reasoning** *extends to identity* (ibid., 74).

The examples with metaphoric expressions reveal the particular features of the reasoning process with a greater precision. The conceptual metaphors like REASON AS A CURRENT or REASON AS A FLOW each complement the basic image schema employed. Since reason and reasoning are perceived as dynamic processes, the PATH schema is evoked more often than GOAL or SOURCE in SOURCE– PATH – GOAL schema: *they follow more directly the current of reason and good sense* (ibid., 525). *Few persons can carry on this train of reasoning* (ibid., 552). Blended schemas like SOURCE combined with PERSON also appear to be prominent in the text: *But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not* **the offspring of reason**. **Reason** *is wholly inactive, and can never* **be the source** *of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals* (ibid., 553).

The vital importance of reason was specially verbalized in the American discourse precisely because "the whole point of 'reason' was to free us from the moral and epistemic corruption that pervades culture and received tradition" (Smith 2006:16). In other words, reason had to liberate from the accepted and widespread beliefs in all spheres of human activity including the mental constructs of social inequality and freedom.

The notion *reason* was brought to an unprecedented importance in America in Paine's book "The age of reason" in 1794. The author viewed reasoning not only at pure logical reasoning as the basis of human cognitive and thus governmental processes, but also

introduced the rhetoric of struggling with tenets and rules of the older age. This highly polemical and controversial work criticized religion and the contemporary organization of church. Moreover, it proclaimed the superiority of the human mind capable of making life better in all spheres: be it social or religious, not simply personified, but deified: *It is only by the **exercise of reason**, that man can discover god. **Take away that reason**, and he would be **incapable of understanding** anything* (Paine 1945a: 484). For Paine, reason was conceptualized by means of a military metaphor REASON AS A WEAPON. Thus it enriched and complemented the image schema of an OBJECT used by the writers of the Old World. Reason was a special, supreme power, conquering and harmonizing all social and even religious fallacies, so in the preface to the treatise he wrote Reason with a capital letter: *The most formidable **weapon** against errors of every kind is **reason*** (ibid., 463): *The Christian theory is little else than the idolatry of the ancient mythologists, accommodated to the purposes of power and revenue; and it **yet remains to reason and philosophy to abolish the amphibious fraud*** (ibid., 467). It is possible to sum up that Paine follows the pathway of the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Still, in his writing many image schemas are enriched, accompanied by novel metaphors, and the discourse of opposition and fight is brought to the fore.

4.5 Summarizing the major representations in Enlightenment philosophy: on the crossroads of European and American thinking

The philosophers of the British Enlightenment – Locke and Hume – represented their views on the problems of the human mind and thinking. They are revealed mostly by some common and prominent image schemas that we reconstructed based on the analysis of the contexts where all the studied language units denoting cognitive capacities were observed. The image schema of a CONTAINER is the most frequent among other schemas in the writings of Enlightenment philosophers. This trend could be explained by the fundamental role of the category of space in human psychological and mental sphere. Space is highly anthropocentric. As an ontological entity, it includes a human being and those things he tries to perceive in the reality with the help of

language as "the play of verbal symbols" implying the wealth of physical experience we find "in our mind's eye" (Palmer 1996: 3). This play is provided by special mental and naming structures, operations and mechanisms in the human brain, which work in dynamics and serve the purpose of communication.

The other prominent image schemas based on conceptual metaphors included PERSON, MACHINE, GOAL, OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, SOURCE, and PROCESS. These schemas "capture the structural contours of sensory-motor experience, integrating information from multiple modalities" (Hampe 2005: 1-2). They are recurrent patterns within "typological neural maps for various sensory and motor areas of the brain" (Johnson 2005: 19) getting transforms from simpler images to more complex and abstract ones that are realized in each new context being culturally and historically dependent on powerful conceptual metaphors used by scholars in a slightly different way.

Figure 6. Quantitative analysis of the target words crucial for understanding of the influence of Enlightenment on further developing discourse

Due to these easily understandable basic image schemas accompanied by conceptual metaphors, philosophical ideas were spreading across various types of discourse and were used for further reasoning in American public discourse. The basic terms belonging to the cognitive sphere demonstrated a steady rise in the Corpus of Historical American English especially in the 1820-40 (Fig. 6). As Johnson stressed, "the metaphysics of mind, which has become the common sense of much contemporary

philosophy of mind, is like all metaphysics, metaphoric, and its metaphors are very much with us today" (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 308).

5. Conceptual representations of mind in Twain's "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court"

The choice of Twain's work in our paper is not accidental, because the author tried to exemplify the huge impact of Enlightenment philosophy. We have already claimed above that his experience of interpreting the philosophy may amount to the experience of a generation. Scrutinizing the economic and political thought of the Twain's time, Rowe argues that though some ideas are represented in his works that are difficult to pin down to exact influences, it seems that something "had been telegraphed by the cultural unconscious that worked so fantastically through Twain" (1995: 215). Moreover, Twain's influence on American literature let some ideas sediment even further, accompanied by the bright artistic solutions and his personal attitude. Clements under the penname of Twain was most justly proclaimed to be "the first truly American writer" by Faulkner who stated that, "all of us since are his heirs" (1957: 88). Twain's works, invariably recognized by the lightness, irony, and satire, raised important historical as well as philosophical issues as he was not but influenced by the political and social issues burgeoning in his lifetime. The belief in human thought and nature were taken for granted in those times. The revolutionary passion with the notions of *reason, knowledge*, and *equality* were proclaimed to have worn away, yet many unsettled questions remained and were brought to social and political stage of the time. The long-standing tradition of anti-imperialism, first targeting Great Britain, a century later flourished in America itself. Here it was reflected in 'uses and abuses' of the 'new civilization' based on (or probably exquisitely covered by) the concept of reason.

A world-known novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court" by Twain is a hilarious and witty parody on an outdated way of social organization and a battle with old superstitions approached through mythology. King Arthur is not only a

mythological hero, but a manifestation of Britishness and its monarchy, the American society has been in a vehement opposition to. Thus, Twain pictured king Arthur as a quintessence of everything resonating with the feudal society without liberty. It was the embodiment of imperialism as the "greatest influences on nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American Arthuriana was the British laureate Alfred, Lord Tennyson" (Lupack 1999: xi), being the poet of Imperia both read and mocked. In this respect, Twain follows the tradition of making fun of Arthuriana idleness, yet he also read Malory's text. "A Connecticut Yankee…" was published in December 1889, but the intention to create a new book appeared much earlier – in 1884, while travelling with his friend – Washington Cable. During the trip, they bought a copy of Malory's original "Morte D'Arthur". After reading it, they both were inspired by the convoluted, archaic, and magnificent style of the author. Despite being too complicated and too idealizing, the reality of Medieval England and Arthur himself, the book possessed a certain charm. They started humorously to talk and send notes to each other in the imitation of Malory's language. By getting used to the language and the events narrated in the book, Twain understood the comic potential of blending the two worlds and started to "make notes in [his] head for a book" (Twain 2008: ix). Some passages "language and all" (Morris 2009:164) are even borrowed from Malory's work.

5.1 The Twain's novel in socio-historical and philosophical context

Going deeper, we may claim, that not only the worlds, but different conceptual worldviews with various conceptual constructs were challenged and clashed in the text. Given the rise of American literature and the public debate over the issues dating back to the Enlightenment, the novels of Twain seem to be a far more complicated source of thoughts and ideas than the opposition to the outdated Arthurian kingdom by perverting the classical image of knighthood (Komova & Sharapkova 2017) with a weak ruler. Hank Morgan being an innovator arrives to the kingdom and aims to associate the country with the glory of robust reasoning. Apart from the well-known plot lying behind the narration, the ideas concerning mind and intellect as well as Man

and the limits of his reason are being investigated, discussed and challenged in the artistic form. Twain had brought the philosophical ideas to the model world (Arthurian kingdom): what could happen if they were followed down to the last detail? Upon a close inspection, the novel turns out to feature some notable reflections into the power of reason as verbalized by Morgan. This literary situation unlocks putative problems of adopting this philosophy at face value. Turner stressed that:

> *narrative imagining – story – is the fundamental instrument of thought. Rational capacities depend upon it. It is our chief means of looking into the future, of predicting, of planning, and of explaining. It is a literary capacity indispensable to human cognition generally* (1996: 5).

So, Morgan, this 'Yankee of the Yankees', arrived to King Arthur's court and tried to change it in accordance with his position based on the cornerstones of practical reason and technology. Morgan conformed to the ideal manifested by de Crevecoeur: "He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient *prejudices and manners*, receives new ones from *the new mode of life* he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds" (de Crevecoeur, *s.a.*). Moreover, "the American is a *new man*, who *acts upon new principles*; he must therefore entertain new ideas and form new opinions" (ibid.).

Yankee is an attempt to elucidate the typical American with all the characteristics of a common representative of a newly born nation. Morgan begins his story by saying: *I am an American. I was born and reared in Hartford, in the State of Connecticut – anyway, just over the river, in the country. So I am a Yankee of the Yankees – and practical; yes, and nearly barren of sentiment, I suppose – or poetry, in other words* (Twain 2008: 10). Putting the word "Yankee" to the title of the book was a well-grounded decision providing both a social and historical marker. Yankee was first recorded in 1765 as a name for a settler of New England descended from the original English settlers of this region and afterwards used in the 18th century in this meaning. The first recorded use of the term by the British to refer to the Americans in general appears in the 1780s, in a letter by Lord Nelson. During the American Revolution,

American soldiers adopted this "term of derision as a term of national pride" (AHDEL): it referred to a citizen of New England. In other words, a Yankee has a definite link with the Old England. This name possesses certain historical connotations and helps to orient ourselves in American history. It also named a soldier who fought on the side of the Union during the American Civil War in 1865. In this war, people of the northern states were fighting against the southern states in order to stop slavery in the country. It left bitter memories and caused terrible destruction in the country. The conflicts were solved to some extent, but some questions remained. The notion of slavery had been put to its end and it was declared that the United States was one nation. Still the opposition of ideas and interests, if not military groups, continued for a long time.

Another issue brought to the fore in the novel is the attitude to science and technological progress. Twain wrote that science "is also the inner world of our thoughts and ideas" (Salomon 1961: 21). This 'inner' world was not always charitable and progressive in fact. And as industrialization was expanding, the disillusionment grew stronger and stronger. In the book, not only the Yankee's scientific miracles are almost as trivial as those of Merlin, but modern technological civilization in general is sharply satirized foreshadowing the prospective crisis.

This complex intellectual and social background makes the opposition in the book multidimensional. As a result, Twain's novel seems to be lacking a "single worldview," having "inconsistencies in the narrative strategy" (Mitchell 1999: 232), and Morgan's speech was thought to be too heterogeneous, like a "palimpsestic manuscript" (Morris 2009: 172). This perception arises as he verbalizes one worldview, mainly Enlightened and republican, yet with the action, unfolding it manifests Hank's will for despotic power culminating in becoming the Boss. In fact, through making Hank the speaker and "negotiating this fundamental division in his protagonist's character" (Rowe 1995: 205), Twain anticipates further criticism of American policy as bringing light to the 'hearts of darkness' of the last decade of the 19th and (early) 20th century. In other words,

he makes the disclosure of misinterpretation and even overinterpretation of ideas at the foundation of Yankee's actions acute and drastic not intervening with the reader's personal opinion.

Choosing the conceptual domain of mental capacities as the major focus, although not limiting to it, is also significant since the tactics of winning hearts and *minds* is shown in dynamics: as Rowe pinpoints, "controlling people's attitudes and values, either by encouraging their superstitions as the Church and Merlin do, or by manipulating public opinion, as Hank and Clarence do with their newspaper" (1995: 206).

Though Morgan speaks with many short and simple sentences filled with words belonging to jargon and colloquial language, the argument of exceptional simplicity of this character is controversial. The linguistic and conceptual analysis of his speech indicates that the discourse of Morgan abounds in many ideas about man, his mind, and reason – all formulated during the Enlightenment. Some key image schemas and conceptual metaphors about mind and reason are repeated through key words. Moreover, as we infer from the analysis, the words like *mind*, *reason*, and *understanding* play a special role in the text, marking the clash of worldviews. These words belonging to the domain of cognitive functions are usually found in Hank Morgan's direct or inner speech.

5.2 The representation of MIND *in Twain's novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court"*

In the novel, *mind* is conceptualized through the CONTAINER image schema. *Mind* in the novel is a special place uniting the characteristics of both a world and a machine, where ideas revolve, emerge, and get shaped. The central part of mind is the one where the brain's work takes place, while the periphery is where some ideas may be left to be returned further. *Meantime there was one thing, which had **got pushed into the background of my mind*** (Twain 2008: 39). It would be even more precise to interpret

mind not just through a CONTAINER schema but through the metaphor of MIND AS A WORKSHOP, where all reasoning proceeds allowing the ideas to get further onto the consciousness: *Wherefore, **the "deal"** which had been for some time **working into shape in my mind** was of a quite different pattern from the Cade-Tyler sort* (ibid., 94). The image schema of a CONTAINER is usually accompanied by the GOAL – ideas get into it to be further processed: *You see, it was the eclipse. **It came into my mind** in the nick of time, how Columbus, or Cortez, or one of those people, played an eclipse as a saving trump once, on some savages, and I saw my chance* (ibid., 35). Mainly the interior of this schema is profiled and not the borders, yet the person is capable of changing what is going to be processed in the mind by means of casting it out of it: *now shoved this whole problem clear out of my mind* (ibid., 18). Thus, we have specified the representation of the CONTAINER with more attention paid to the exterior (Fig. 7). More complex ideas merge with the simpler ones such as the set expressions – to be in one's right mind, make up the mind, change the mind.


Figure 7. The frequency of word occurrence of *mind, consciousness, reason*, and *understanding*, and image-schemas in Twain's novel

In accordance with the conceptions about mind, verbalized by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and mostly resembling Locke, Twain writes: ***Across my mind*** *flitted the dear image of a certain hello-girl of West Hartford, and I wished she could see me now* (2008: 310). Mind is susceptible to change, it sees the world, the commonwealth, or country with a set order that could still be revolutionized: *This was not the sort of experience for a statesman to encounter who **was planning out a peaceful revolution in his mind*** (ibid., 141).

Taking into account the fiction character of the text, the PERSON image schema is rather prominent and *mind* can *be present*, *humble, could attack and approach*, *miscarry and encounter some new ideas*. *Mind* undergoes the metonymic change from a part to the whole that could be smitten like the person himself: *God hath surely smitten the mind of this farmer* (ibid., 271).

As it follows from the text, the minds of native inhabitants of Arthurian kingdom have outdated working areas which need reshaping or modernization of the machinery. That is what Morgan intends to do in the kingdom, e.g.: ***Old habit of mind*** *is one of the toughest things to get away from in the world. It transmits itself like physical form and feature; and for a man, in those days, to have had an idea that his ancestors hadn't had, would have brought him under suspicion of being illegitimate* (ibid., 163). Mental capacities of the habitats of Arthurian kingdom are valued very low and their mind is considered either at rest or as a not properly working machine: *Well, I was stunned; partly with this unlooked – for stupidity on his part, and partly because his fellows so manifestly sided with him and were of his mind – if you **might call it mind;** She walked indolently along, **with a mind at rest**, its peace reflected in her innocent face* (ibid., 14). Since mind could be compared to a machine, it could break: *Weeks dragged by, she watching, waiting, hoping, her mind going slowly to **wreck** under the burden of her misery* (ibid., 285).

One crucial thing that appeared in the works of the Enlightenment is distinguishing mind from other forms of mental capacities, such as reason and consciousness, which are closer connected with personal identity: *I had something **on my mind** that my **conscience** kept prodding me about, and wouldn't let me forget. If I had the remaking of man, he wouldn't have any **conscience*** (ibid., 128). Viewing the mind as a substance and as a container was in close connection to the major ideas of the Enlightenment.

In Twain's later work "What is man?" (1906), he just puts some ideas clearer and presents them as another indirect proof of being greatly inspired by the ideas circulating in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Twain even thinks that a human can hardly change the way his mind-machine works as it is designed in a way that is difficult to manipulate. The reason that it is operated by outside forces does not always follow the will inside. It automatically obeys the laws it dwells on. In the essay, the image schema of mind as a CONTAINER is combined with a metaphor of MACHINE, which is developed further. This idea was not by any means original. Moreover, it was fully within the discourse of what Enlightenment philosophers thought about the human mind. The representation of MIND AS A MACHINE is discussed in the form of dichotomies in a dialogue between the old and a young man having a lot in common with Hume:

> *Personally you did not create even the smallest microscopic fragment of the materials out of which your opinion is made; and personally you cannot claim even the slender merit of putting the borrowed materials together. That was done automatically by your **mental machinery**, in strict accordance with the **law of that machinery's construction**. And you not only did not make that **machinery yourself**, but you have **not even any command over it**.*
> *I am sorry, but you see, yourself, that your **mind is merely a machine**, nothing more. You have no command over it, it has no command over itself it is worked solely from the outside. **That is the law of its make; it is the law of all machines*** (Clements 1973: 128-129).

We can also find this deterministic or automatic view of mind in Twain's letter to Sir John Adams in 1897, in which he wrote that "mind originates nothing, creates nothing, gathers all its materials from the outside and weaves them into combination automatically" (Harris 2013: 512).

5.3 The role of CONSCIOUSNESS *and* UNDERSTANDING *in Twain's novel*

The constituent elements of human nature, namely *consciousness* and *understanding* are personalized in the text. Moreover, a Yankee shows awareness over various phenomena in human thinking like consciousness and reason. Thiel concludes the semantic analysis of the word in the 17th century by stating that "consciousness is a separate reflective act of the mind directed toward one's own mental states providing some sort of knowledge of those mental states" (2011: 85).

Within the context of the novel, *consciousness* is represented in a different way comparing to *reason* or *mind. The* CONTAINER becomes the most dominant schema: *I seemed to believe the boy, I didn't know why.* ***SOMETHING in me seemed to believe him – my consciousness***, *as you may say; but* ***my reason didn't*** (Twain 2008: 16); *I knew, then, how a mother feels when women, whether strangers or friends, take her new baby, and close themselves about it with one eager impulse, and bend their heads over it in a tranced adoration that makes all the rest of the universe* ***vanish out of their consciousness*** *and be as if it were not, for that time* (ibid., 210).

It should be stressed that philosophical ideas did not influence much the understanding of *consciousness* in the novel. Apart from some examples, where Morgan claims *consciousness* to be different from other mental capacities and tied with personality, we cannot find anything pointing at a distinct philosophical legacy. Probably this fact can be explained by the fact that the theory of conciseness was better elaborated by Locke and partially by Hume, but it was not adopted by American writers like the concept of *reason* was. The latter turned out to be more popular in American interpretations. This is why Yankee uses it to describe the process of understanding of those living in Arthurian kingdom: *But presently one man looked up and asked me to state that proposition again; and state it slowly, so it could* ***soak into his understanding*** (ibid., 94). Again, the understanding is viewed as a container where the information is absorbed and processed slowly. *Gradually, as the time wore along,* ***one***

annoying fact was borne in upon my understanding *– that we were weather-bound* (ibid., 85).

5.4 The description of REASON *and its linguistic peculiarities in Twain's novel*
Reason constituted the most important notion for the linguistic portrayal of Yankee and for depicting the opposition of the worlds and worldviews laid down in the title of the novel. The notion of rational thinking is verbalized by *reason* as the personification of the capacity to think, to know, and then to act.

According to the views of Enlightenment philosophers, the presence of logical reasoning or thinking according to strict rules distinguished a human being from an animal. Animals were given some type of reasoning, yet it was not compatible with humans. Archaic civilizations at their dawn were believed not to have this type of thinking, so they were compared to children. And this is how Yankee describes the inhabitants of medieval England. In his inner monologues, we find the collocations such as: 'white Indians', 'mere animals', 'children', 'donkeys': *These animals didn't* ***reason****; that they never put this and that together; that all their talk showed that they* ***didn't know*** *a discrepancy when they saw it; Why,* ***her eyes*** *were as grateful as* ***an animal's,*** *when you do it a kindness* ***that it understands*** (ibid., 112). The inhabitants of Arthurian kingdom were perceived as stubborn and deprived of reasoning capacity: *It was the stubborn unreasoning of the time* (ibid., 111); when Morgan describes them the lexeme *reason* is mainly used in the contexts with lexical or grammatical negation: *THEY have served other people so in their day; it being their own turn, now, they were not expecting any better treatment than this; so their philosophical bearing is not an outcome of mental training, intellectual fortitude,* ***reasoning****; it is mere animal training; they are white Indians* (ibid., 22).

This kind of discourse was deeply rooted in American history, and was firstly and successfully used against the Indians to justify their conquering and their further

investigation. Cass, an American politician and military officer, being the Secretary of War, assisted in implementing Jackson's policy of Indian removal through pushing them to modern Oklahoma in the 19th century. He stated the importance of myths to understand the causes and logic of Indian actions most naturally unwilling to flee from their homelands and understand the new civilization. Cass wanted to explain how they perceive the world and the only construct he could oppose to the Reason was Myth. He wrote:

Why was the Indian so childish and so impulsive? Why was he so resistant to change? Why did he seem never to employ reason? Cass attributed these defects in mentality to unknown, unsurmountable obstacles that made the Indian unbending in his habits and fantastic in his attitude to Life. Since Cass saw civilization as the product of reason, he concluded that the rejection of civilization was unreasonable. Was the Indian's mind so paralyzed that it could not reason and thus accept civilization, or was the rejection of civilization caused by something else? (Bieder 2003: 169).

The Arthurian kingdom is depicted as the land of myths and superstitions lacking laws of reason. In the second half of the 19th century the Indian question became pronounced in public debate. Twain tries to represent two different mental models of the narrative world opposed to each other – the unreason of the naïve citizens of the Arthurian kingdom with slow understanding and worshipping, mostly associated with the Enlightenment philosophy, to the reason of the Yankees, who are able to bring new changes in the society. The writer grants a nearly equal power to both of them in the context of the novel: *The worship of royalty being founded in unreason* (Twain 2008: 316). This concept of reason is personified by acting, informing, and guiding Hank Morgan in his deeds: *My **reason** straightway began to clamor; that was natural* (ibid., 17). The linguistic analysis of the novel shows that Reason is close to the author of the "Yankee...". It is the Reason with the capital letter that gives the inner impetus to Morgan's actions who reconstructs England in accordance with it: *I was the champion of hard unsentimental **common-sense and reason*** (ibid., 306). Notably, the concept of common sense appeared in American discourse together with other ideas of the Enlightenment, particularly from the Scottish one, and was fully incorporated in other

philosophical ideas. Kloppenberg digging into the fundamental ideas shaping liberalism argued: "The recent emphasis on the pervasiveness of Scottish common sense philosophy in the American Enlightenment has been as important as the recognition that natural law provided the screen on which Locke projected his political ideas" (1987: 17).

It appears in the contexts of criticizing the social order of monarchy, thus being in full accord with the pathos further added by Paine's interpretation of reason as an instrument of action. Thus, in the text of the novel, the adjective *reasonable* combines mainly with the action verbs – *do*, *act*, and *change*: *It is enough to make a body ashamed of his race to think of the sort of froth that has always occupied its thrones without **shadow of right or reason**, and the seventh-rate people that have always figured as its aristocracies – a company of monarchs and nobles who, as a rule, would have achieved only poverty and obscurity if left, like their betters, to their own exertions* (Twain 2008: 54). Obeying to monarchy is thus compared *to loyalty of unreason*.

Nevertheless, Twain feels that this undoubted belief in reason, coupled with progress, industrialization, will not lead to the moral improvement of mankind. The old Britain, no matter how improved it may be after the reforms of the Yankee, is still made up of real people with feelings and emotions. A human being is not only a MIND – machine-like CONTAINER with reason to analyze external impulses, but a more complicated whole.

The human mind is a complex conglomerate of ideas more or less systematically arranged. The inner self is viewed as an empire with a supreme ruler. Twain calls it "I" in the common language in the text, and it may correspond to *ego* in the philosophical language. Here he goes beyond mental capacities and amounts to viewing a human with his mind and soul combined. Twain, being not a pure theoretician, but a writer, who thought over and created vivid, living characters, went further in understanding

human nature by interpreting Hume's claims on the importance of emotions for human nature, or, maybe, returning to earlier philosophical ideas of the heart as a container for a human soul (Манерко 2017). He exploits the mechanism of projection into the created world of his narrative (Turner 1996) serving a tool for cognizing the human being in its full complexity.

Twain is concerned with the individual mind, thus probably implying that pure logical reasoning makes all humans virtually identical thinking objects. This, unfortunately, does not prevent them from mistakes arising from personal emotions and bodily experience. Building a human civilization rooted in the noble ideals of reason only and dismissing human emotions was a noble endeavour, yet a mistaken one. In a later generation of cognitive science and American philosophy (Prinz 2012), these ideas were summarized and tailored to embodied cognition and anthropocentric perspective in cognitive linguistics stating that human emotion and interpretation constitutes an essential part of our bodily experience.

Hank Morgan feels himself the root of the contradiction between reason and feeling, wisdom and morality, mind and heart. This is the precipice of a reductionist approach: "the Cartesian impulse to worship the brain and ignore the body" (Lehrer 2007: 19). This kind of character allows the author to oppose the reduction of the human thought processes to producing information and logical thinking as a reduction of the complicated real one: *My heart got to thumping. You can't reason with your heart; it has its own laws, and thumps about things which the intellect scorns* (Twain 2008: 348). This is a clear reminiscence to Pascal (1623-1662) – one more writer from the Enlightenment period who was opposing its framework and anticipated the protoexistential one. The original phrase runs as follows: "Le cœur a son ordre, l'esprit a le sien qui est par principe et demonstration" and translates as "The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know". It is used in the debates on whether faith is compatible with reason. Thus, reason and faith were considered equal in their capacity

of perceiving fundamentally different things – natural and divine, none being given preference. The same opposition yet verbalized differently is found in the final scene of the novel: *We have tried to put **reason** before **sentiment**, duty before love; our **minds** approve, but our **hearts** reproach us* (Twain 2008: 341).

Reason is tied to knowledge through thinking. Otherwise stated, knowledge is gained through reasoning as a process. The substantial quality of mental entities is reflected also in personification of knowledge. Knowledge is viewed as an inner issue, that is why it can inform, teach, or speak with its recipient: *I have mysterious **knowledge** which teaches me* (ibid., 180); *My **knowledge** informs me that* (ibid., 179). The text of the novel proves that the knowledge exists by itself. Yankee sees knowledge as power, yet it is useless unless embodied in action, deed, production, or social reform. All the words analyzed in the novel of Twain are presented in Fig. 7.

5.5 The reflection of HUMAN NATURE *in Twain's novel*

When Twain died, many newspapers summarized the significance of his writings in the following way: "How keen he was in his knowledge of human nature" (April 22, 1910, Hartford Courant) (Quirk 2005). Moreover, his writings "go to the very heart of human nature and sound the depths of its aspirations, aims, and hopes" (April 22, 1910, Los Angeles Times) (Quirk 2005). This interesting fact lends to a twofold interpretation within the context of the present paper that any thoughts on human nature finally lead to formulating a conception of what a human being is with his feelings and mental capacities taken together. And that was exactly the thing the philosophers of the Enlightenment tried to do first and the generations of succeeding centuries took to dig further. That is why it is critical to understand how these ideas sedimented in other types of discourse. "Twain's humor is what makes his own, more general thinking on human nature memorable and important" (Quirk 2005: 11).

At the same time, it was a word of the ordinary language and probably even a word most naturally applied by a writer portraying the life of his characters. Being a humorist author, Twain was professionally keen on noticing funny things in humans. On the other hand, it evokes a noble tradition of studying human nature in philosophy of the previous period. For example, the collocation *human nature* appeared on the basis of a terminological sense in Hume's "A treatise of human nature".

Several competing or contradictory explanations of human nature (what the human creature is and how it came to be that way) coexisted, somewhat uneasily, in the 19th century mind. Various attempts were formulated to explain it through various positions ranging from a stable resilient nature to the volatile one. Spencer, whom Twain was supposed to have read, stressed:

> *The difficulty of understanding that human nature, though indefinitely modifiable, can be modified but very slowly; and that all laws and institutions and appliances which count on getting from it, within a short time, much better results than present ones, will inevitably fail* (1972: 110).

In the novel, we also find several peculiar examples of Morgan talking about human nature in the context of thinking about church and the possibility to change the minds through changing the religion worldview into *Presbyterian*. However, Morgan understands that human nature is rather resistant to changes, and its laws are so powerful that breaking them at once is nearly impossible: *but that would have been to affront a law of **human nature*** (Twain 2008: 69). Morgan exploits his understanding of what makes the inhabitants of Arthurian kingdom human – they believe in miracles and do not want to alter them into solid knowledge. Thus, in the duel with Merlin, Morgan acknowledges: *I know the value of these things, **for I know human nature.** You can't throw too much style into a miracle. It costs trouble, and work, and sometimes money; but it pays in the end* (ibid., 172).

This skeptical misanthropic vision proceeds nearly by the end of the story. Morgan explains illogical actions simply saying that the reason is human nature far from being ideal: *It was some **more human nature**; the admiring little folk imitating their elders* (ibid., 242). Moreover, he can observe it in himself as well: *I was beginning to have a base hankering to be its first president myself. Yes, there was more or less **human nature in me; I found that out*** (ibid., 131). Still, there is a possibility of training and changing the human nature as Yankee thinks contradicting himself earlier. *Training – training is everything; training is all there is TO a person. We speak of nature; it is folly; there is **no such thing as nature**; what we call by that misleading name is merely heredity and training. **We have no thoughts of our own, no opinions of our own; they are transmitted to us, trained into us*** (ibid., 127).

This is in clear correlation with Twain's idea in his essay entitled "What is man?", in which he was still talking about the diversity of people comparing them to various precious metals like gold, silver, and iron. The old man talking seriously to a young man in the form of a dialogue explains: *That it shows the value of **training** in right directions over training in wrong ones. Inestimably valuable is training, influence, education, in right directions – training one's self-approbation to elevate its ideals* (Clements 1973: 130). The latter might have derived from Locke viewing nature as empty from the very beginning and filled with influences onwards.

The importance of education and training verbalized in Twain's works was also 'transmitted' from cultural surrounding of the period as the Americans of the 18th century vigorously embraced the idea that only education and cultivation separated one man from another inherently equal and made it politically important. For Morgan, "civilization" involves *training a crowd of ignorant folks into experts*, changing their minds. The latter he aimed to perform with his own schools, and publishing a paper seems as a great tool of propaganda.

The Enlightened vision of reality was reflected in it: "In no other country on earth, not even in Great Britain are Newspapers so generally circulated among the body of the people, as in America" (Wood 2006: 166). People were hungry for knowledge:

by 1810 Americans were buying over 22 million copies of 376 newspapers annually – even though half the population was under the age of sixteen and one-fifth was enslaved and prevented from reading. This was the largest aggregate circulation of newspapers of any country in the world (ibid., 166).

As "The corpus of historical American English" shows, the collocation *human nature* experienced a steady rise from the 1840s up to 1910 (Fig. 8), when the philosophical ideas got fully assimilated by the general public. It is noteworthy, that this proverbially vague notion – a human nature – could be represented as some theory of the human being in the complexity of its biological, mental, and social aspects. This complexity was widely discussed by the intellectual spectrum in America. In 1899, Channing called special attention to this notion and placed it to the core of all possible speculations. He states, "All our inquiries in morals, religion, and politics must begin with human nature" ("The principles of moral, religious, and political science", included in William H. Channing). The mental aspect of the human nature was considered to be of utmost importance and even as the fundamental feature defining the human being as such. Nevertheless, as we see, Twain's work represented and transformed the philosophical ideas already circulating in the intellectual life of America and expressed his own warnings coming from mechanistic rational view of a human being. Twain points:

It is not worthwhile to try to keep history from repeating itself: for man's character will always make the preventing of the repetitions impossible. Whenever man makes a large stride in material prosperity and progress he is sure to think that he has progresses whereas he has not advanced an inch; nothing has progressed but his circumstances. He stands where he stood before. He knows more than his forebears knew but his intellect is no better than theirs and never will be (Voto 1940: 66).

Figure 8. The frequency of use of *human nature* in the corpus
of historical American English (CHAE)

This profound knowledge of human nature and an undogmatic attitude towards philosophy allowed Twain to foresee the possible crisis in future. Thus, the humorous experiment had the seeds of the real problems to grow. The problems lied partially in the uncritical attitude to reason, nearly making it a religious belief. And the reference to Pascal about the importance of human heart in opposition to reason used only once in the text becomes a very powerful statement allowing Twain to make fun of the supremacy of reason, not to make it absolute. Twain wrote down in his notebook: "Have a battle between a modern army, with gatling guns – (automatic) 600 shots a minute, with one pulling of the trigger, torpedoes, balloons, 100-ton cannon, iron-clad fleet..." (Twain 2008: ix). One more citing from his diary proves the ongoing complication of the ideas, emerging in the text:

He mourns his lost land – has come to England and revisited it, but it is all changed and become old, so old – and it was so fresh and new, so virgin before. Winchester does not resemble Camelot, and the Round Table... is not true one. Has lost all interest in life – is found dead next morning – suicide (Twain 2008: ix).

The sharp contrast between the hilarious beginning of the book and the tragic ending was the reason why the novel was criticized and even considered a failure as "earlier critics probably regarded the horrific ending either as a type of tall-tale exaggeration or as the hyperbole of the adventure story genre itself" (Baetzhold 2013: 178). This is an ending in which "the novel depicts its hero's "progress" as a circular or gnostic experience, showing how every step he takes ostensibly in the name of the Enlightenment merely hastens the beginning" (Morris 2009: 165).

6. Concluding remarks: From Enlightenment philosophy to reshaping Twain's discourse

The present study aimed at revealing the possible stages the ideas of the Enlightenment moved through by navigating various types of discourse. Starting with the philosophical professional essays, the ideas proceeded then to public and political treatises and, at last, to fiction, each decreasing the complexity and increasing the metaphoric load as well as evaluation of the ideas. More than a century passed for the ideas to find their way from philosophically minded circles to the minds of ordinary people with their complete assimilation, adaptation to well-defined social and political needs, and, to a certain extent, simplification.

The conceptions on how the human mind works and what constitutes human consciousness became an indispensable part of the legacy of the Enlightenment period. The conceptions are prominent in common knowledge not in the form of direct or indirect citations, but as semiotically meaningful and typical ways of thinking, reasoning, and discourse construal.

Through a kind of reversed engineering procedure (going from the result to the origin) and having analyzed the linguistic structures of key terms of the mental sphere including *mind, consciousness, understanding*, and *reason*, we made an attempt to penetrate into the etymology of the studied lexemes, we also paid attention to their

linguistic context and showed specific features of their lingual expression and the cognitive structures associated with these conceptual entities in human thinking. To fulfil our aim, we applied the method of image schematic analysis to the works chosen for the purpose of the linguistic analysis in our research. The latter implies that image schemas organize our experience and ground meaning and its development. In each case we provided the quantitative analysis of all the schemas and conceptual metaphors characterizing the discourse of a particular author.

Therefore, the study comprised 3 stages: the cognitive linguistic analysis through the study of image schemas in the works of two eminent philosophers – Locke and Hume, which was further employed in the texts of philosophical insights of Paine. Finally, the representative text of Twain's novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court" was subjected to a similar linguistic and cognitive analysis in combination with socio-cultural comment as well as the reference to his other texts where necessary.

The philosophical works we scrutinized revealed that all the discourse material is to be structured according to several major schemas. In Locke's "*An essay concerning human understanding*", the most frequent schemas in depicting the human mind are MIND AS A CONTAINER, MIND AS A PERSON, and MIND AS A SURFACE. In Hume's "*A treatise of human nature*", the conceptual entities of a CONTAINER, PERSON, MACHINE, OBJECT, and WHOLE-PART relations are illuminated. The CONTAINER is the most prominent schema for both Locke and Hume probably due to the centrality of space for human perception. There are numerous instances in the works of British philosophers when the investigated words are viewed as a separate world having the reflections or 'mental' copies of real things with the inner space profiled rather than the outer, yet the container can extend its bounding surface, embracing new things for consideration. The conceptual metaphors in the form of extended ones at the discourse level are used in full accord with the dominating image schema. Thus, the image schema of a CONTAINER was realized through the metaphors of a theatre, machine, the world, and

the drawer. These metaphors in contrast to image schemas are not universal but culture specific, revealing the difference between the two philosophers and the periods of writing. Thus, the metaphor of the cabinet and a mirror in case of Locke is succeeded by a chamber within some machine in Hume's works, and further with a church for representing mind and reason in Paine.

The famous Locke's metaphor of 'tabula rasa' is not a sheet of paper, but an empty cabinet with numerous inner minor containers filled with the categorized entities. Since Locke's work is grounded around understanding of the human individuality, he essentially personalizes mind and other cognitive functions. Yet, the mind is viewed as a container where new experience, sensations, and ideas get into and are further transformed. Locke clearly understood the difficulty to penetrate into human understanding and at the same time the semiotic duality of mind viewed as a container for impressions gathered from the outer world, thus becoming reflections or shadows of real things. Reason is seen as light-emitting – the influential metaphor to become over-arching for the whole period of Enlightenment.

Cognitive mechanisms directing human thought in information processing and naming according to the aims of communication greatly depend on the set of categorization and conceptualization mechanisms representing semantic, semiotic, onomasiological, and syntactical characteristics. In analyzing Hume's works, we revealed that understanding mind significantly shifted towards MACHINE we outlined in a separate category, although it has the features of the general CONTAINER schema. The reason serves as a SOURCE for other thoughts and ideas. Besides that, he created several metaphors, very influential in the history of Western philosophical thought: mind as a heap of perceptions, soul as a republic or commonwealth, mind as a theater. Here several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. Reason is given a more

prominent, philosophical interpretation in Hume's treatises and is personified through images of a judge or queen.

Paine was among the first authors who transformed the philosophical complex ideas into politically charged interpretations bringing reason among other notions to the fore. Not changing essentially the distribution of image schemas and borrowing deeply from the philosophical works, he interpreted the major concepts with greater simplicity and several original metaphors. With the anticlerical pathos, he made *mind* his church and reason – the supreme rule and governor of all actions.

Twain was a well-read and highly intelligent writer serving as a 'transmitter' of more complex ideas of the Enlightenment through his fiction. Probably grounded in his interest in the humorous aspect of human personality, his discourse led him to deeper insights into human nature, partially dating back to the diverse philosophical background. Morgan mainly verbalizes the set of Enlightenment ideas about human nature and advocates a high position of reason among other cognitive functions of a person. Yet, at the same time he serves as an example foreseeing the negative outcome of believing in reason purely and solely.

Notably, this novel also allowed to incorporate the technological and scientific domains into the Arthurian myth being important for further interpretations of the 20th century and establishing the possible blend of archaic or medieval culture and the contemporary one based on Enlightenment. This sort of historical and linguistic endeavour provides valuable insights on how mind, consciousness, and other related mental entities have been conceptualized throughout time, thus revealing a lot about what makes us human beings. This pertains to elucidating the basic cognitive mechanisms of conceptualizing, categorizing, interpreting, and re-categorizing the world as well as assigning meaning to its phenomena and transferring it through signs of language and culture.

Abbreviations

AHDEL – The American heritage dictionary of the English language

CHAE – Corpus of Historical American English

MED – Middle English dictionary

OED − Oxford English dictionary

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Résumé

Human mind and the mechanisms it works by have challenged scholars for centuries. The most profound attempts to elaborate on the human mind were made in the works of the greatest European intellectuals of the Enlightenment – Locke and Hume. The impact of their philosophical ideas was so huge that they influenced profoundly the American public discourse and ideology, especially Thomas Paine. Paine further transformed his thoughts to broad public, thus influencing the American citizens' way of thinking, their democratic and anti-authoritarian spirit. Embracing the major constructs of these authors, the key concepts MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS, UNDERSTANDING, and REASON are revealed. These conceptual entities are explicated on the basis of linguistic and conceptual analysis including conceptual metaphors and image schemas as a part of discourse analysis. The list of conceptual metaphors and image schemas is various: in Locke's principal work "An essay concerning human understanding" and Hume's "A treatise of human nature", the fundamental role of the category of space in human psychological and mental sphere of MIND is explicated through its comparison with the CONTAINER, PERSON and MACHINE and other metaphors. *Consciousness* refers to the general picture characterizing the personal identity and *reason* is closely connected with understanding. In Paine's papers all the key words appear to be closely intersected with mind. The line of influence is further observed in Mark Twain's works including the fictional novels. The linguistic and cognitive analysis of Twain's discourse in the novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court" shows that the author adopted many of the philosophical ideas of the British and American philosophy concerning human experience and knowledge interpretation. A closer look at the linguistic and conceptual patterns of discourse of Twain and the ideas verbalized by Morgan, being the protagonist in the novel, reveal the succession of influences of the Enlightenment upon the personality of the writer and his philosophical background in individual way of expressing his thoughts. Furthermore, we demonstrate that it was the preoccupation with reason and knowledge that was used in opposition to the Arthurian

England and all kinds of myths and superstitions. Twain's writings not only transmitted the ideas further, but also uncovered the potential crisis in overinterpreting them.

INNER CIRCLES, GOODNESS, AND LIES IN "A WORD CHILD"
BY IRIS MURDOCH: A COGNITIVE FACET
OF LITERARY ANALYSIS

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Abstract: This article offers a cognitive perspective to a literary analysis of the novel "A word child" by Iris Murdoch, illustrating how the well-preconceived elements of the text have prompted our interpretation of the author's philosophical concept. Conceptual, semantic, and structural features of the novel imply the idea of meaningful circularity of the protagonist's life, which is transformed from immature spirituality to awareness of the universal Good.

Keywords: circularity, cognitive construing, cycle, intertextuality, mental representations, textual concept.

1. Introduction

Iris Murdoch was one of the most sophisticated and prolific English writers of the 20th century. She created a congruent mixture of realism and symbolism in her literary works written to bridge elite and mass cultures. Following her interest in philosophy and psychological patterns in human relations, she placed her characters in dramatic situations full of gruelling moral conflicts. Yet, Murdoch's readers are unlikely to find

a clear moral comment on these conflicts. Instead, they observe the lives of her characters, which develop in a kind of a predestined pattern determined by the author's philosophy. Her deep philosophical and psychological works have been a popular subject of literary reviews and research for several decades, but experts, as well as readers in general, are far from finding common ground in their interpretation, which makes it an enjoyable challenge.

Most studies of Murdoch's novels have focused on their genre, psychological, and philosophical aspects, outlining the novelty of the form and intricacy of the major ideas of the texts (Михальская & Аникин 1985; Толкачёв 1999; Урнов 1984; Heusel 2001). We suggest shifting the focus from the question, "What is stated in the text?" to the perspective, "How can one realize what is stated in the text?" In this way, we turn some subjective claims about our reading experience into a metacognitive analysis of how we perceive some elements of narrative as preconceived and bearing communicative value, and how we deploy this information while interpreting the novel "A word child" by Iris Murdoch.

Our objective falls in line with two major approaches of cognitive narratology to research on links between narrative and mind. The first one, Herman (2013) states, views narrative as a target of interpretation and studies how "interpreters use various kinds of semiotic affordances to engage with narrative worlds." The other approach treats narrative as resource for making sense, an instrument of mind used for structuring and understanding situations and events.

The first approach is adopted in cognitive poetic analysis, which focuses on the creative dialogue among writers and readers that leads to poetic experience, and which entails discovery of covert configurations of knowledge that underlie individual or collective interpretation of the literary text (Воробйова 2009b; Stockwell 2002). Despite a large theoretical body of works on literary meaning, most views of literary cognition can be grouped into text-centered and reception-centered (Popova 2014). Text-centered

theories dwell on the issues of form and content: textual features, temporal and causal ordering (Jakobson 1960; Todorov 1971), internal structures (schemata) that foster interpretation of narratives (Rumelhart 1975). The recent development of text-centered theories can be found in corpus based cognitive poetic studies (Hoover, Culpeper & O'Halloran 2014; Toolan 2008). Reception-centered theories (Ryan 2015; Sternberg 1978) are often based on pragmatic understanding (Walsh 2007) and explore the reader's ability to construe and maintain mental representations of textual world (Cook 1990; van Dijk & Kintsch 1983; Fauconnier & Turner 2003).

These theories are now undergoing re-evaluation in order to address such issues as narrative's universal triple effect (suspense, curiosity, and surprise); difference between real-time communication and represented communication; asymmetry of perspective between knowing speaker and groping addressee (Vandaele & Brône 2009). The functional stance adopted in these issues promotes the idea that narrative understanding is an interactive experience.

Popova (2014: 6-8) suggests taking a more radical turn and defines narrative understanding as a form of enactive cognition, i.e. experiential, intersubjective sense-making that appears in a literary act of communication between the reader and the narrator. The latter is thought to be the reader's mental representation of a fictional agent who, nevertheless, is perceived as psychologically real due to such features as agency, intentionality and physical perspective. However, the hypothesis that the reader enacts "a particular narratorial consciousness" (ibid., p. 11) raises the question of the extent to which textual clues or specific storytelling strategies potentiate or scaffold the reader's response (Herman 2013).

We agree with Chugu (2017) in her reasoning that the form and the content of a fiction text are intentionally paired by the author in such a way that some specific cognitive patterns are framed and triggered. Moreover, authors sometimes intentionally hamper text processing by providing specific contexts, thus evoking certain mental operations

in the reader's mind (Ермакова 2010: 63). Fiction as any other form of art can be regarded as a specific kind of "cognitive engineering", which is intended to influence the minds of an audience by invoking emotions, memories, shaping public response, and even behavior (Donald 2006: 4-5).

Thus, we will side here with those who also stress the author's part in dialogue with the reader (Caracciolo 2012; Dancygier 2012; Schmid 2010). As Dancygier (2012: 10) states, the meaning of a story is negotiated by the author and the reader within the boundaries of the artistic model of the world, which is created in fiction. In a similar vein, Ryan (2007: 28) claims that "narrative is the outcome of many different mental processes that operate both inside and outside stories." This idea builds a bridge to the second approach to cognitive narratology studies.

The second approach allows us to look at narrative as a cognitive tool kit. The text is then viewed as a psychological reaction of the author to the surrounding world, which is revealed in multiple shades of intellectual, emotive, and aesthetic content (Ткачук 2009). By studying a literary text, we are able to reconstruct (to some extent) "the workings of the writer's mind as the initial source of multiple sense generation" (Vorobyova 2009a: 75). This idea is essential for analysis of Murdoch's fiction as most researchers indicate fusion of its literary and philosophic functions (Jacobs 1995; Jerončić 2013).She developed her unique dialogue of philosophy and fiction on Wittgenstein's claim that life could only be shown, not explained (Heusel 2001). Therefore, Murdoch's novel can be viewed as the author's quest for philosophical insights.

Though cognitive poetics offers a vast range of means to explore "an authorly version of the world", as well as "a readerly account" of what is textually manifest, its major concern is literary effect and value of a particular text (Stockwell 2002: 5-7). In the case of "A word child", we find its literary value in versatile insights that readers may

get by participating in a thought-provoking linguistic, artistic, and intellectual game preconceived by the author.

2. Cognitive construing as an interpretative clue to Murdoch's "A word child"

Conceptualization in the process of interpretation of a literary text, as well as its creation, essentially involves the operation of linguistic structures and mental representations (van Dijk 2006: 169). We define cognitive construing as a process of deliberate elaboration of particular patterns of thought, which serve as a basis for conceptualizing the meaning of the text.

The main **aim** of this paper is to investigate how our comprehension of the author's philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic ideas develops due to our construing of meaningfulness of semantic, semiotic, and narrative planes of the novel. Our research **material** is the novel "A word child" by Iris Murdoch. In this study, we use semantic, conceptual, semiotic, cognitive poetic analysis, narrative analysis, and elements of pragmatic analysis as **methods** of research.

The research deploys the theory of conceptual blending by Fauconnier and Turner (2003), complex analysis of textual concepts by Kahanovska (Кагановська 2018), cognitive metaphor theory by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Schmid's (2010) model of double communication in fiction and his idea of the possible iconicity of the verbal plane of the text (Schmid 2014: 722), Sternberg's (1978) notion of two narrative temporalities, and cognitive semiotic analysis of fiction by Volkova (2018).

Firstly, our narrative analysis will concentrate on interplay between two temporalities: "the represented time" (the time of the narrated) and "the communicative time"(the time of narrating), which as Sternberg (2001: 117) puts it, result in the universal narrative effects of suspense, curiosity, and surprise. Prospective narration generates suspense; curiosity is referred to an instance of retrospection, and surprise is attributed to recognition. Constant monitoring of not only *what* is narrated, but also *by whom*, *in*

what sequence, *in what way*, etc., is one of the reader's processing strategies that leads to "thickening" of the narrative world (Herman 2013), i.e. to its conceptualization. This idea of the reader's forays between several temporal planes is to some extent akin to van Dijk and Kintsch's (1983) description of text interpretation as a recurrent movement from local propositional structures to macrostructures of literary discourse. Emergence of the general message of the text can be viewed as the moment of collision between hypothetical projections that readers make and the actualized basic projection of the meaning of the text (Ермакова 2010: 62).

The idea of intricately mixed narrative temporalities inevitably leads us to the notion of double communication system (Schmid 2014: 33). The author's communication involves the concrete author and addressee, who are contemplating fictive represented world. Represented world includes the narrator's communication, in which narrated world (part of represented world) is presented in the act of narration. This double communication allows the reader to view the narrative from two perspectives (the author's and the narrator's) and perceive him/herself as a participant of both communicative acts. Thus, literary cognition essentially involves collecting and interpreting data from both planes, as well as their scrupulous comparison and search for plausible explanations in case of discrepancies.

The fact that the reader seems to be participating in conversation not only with the real author, but also with a fictional essence (the narrator) is possible due to the mechanism of mental simulation (Ryan 2015: 83), a special type of imagination or mental mimicry that allows our mind to create a rich three-dimensional environment on the incomplete script of the text. Our ability to place ourselves in a specific imaginary situation, live its evolution moment by moment, adopt the outlook of the characters, and anticipate possible denouement (Ryan 2015: 84) is largely attributed to the plasticity of the mirror neuron system responsible for our social cognitive skills (Воробйова 2009b; Popova 2014).

We should also point to a specific ability of our brain to complement the visual with the virtual. Imagining physical objects and visual environments provides true sensational experiences (Seif 2014: 59). This ability of human mind to construct a fictional world is most obviously exploited in computer games where a player's mind is wandering around a virtual world, scarce elements of which are shown on the screen. The player is partly unaware of this incompleteness of virtual world because his/her "inner eye" (his/her mind) sees not only what is designed graphically, but also what is implied. The same is true about any reader. To follow the ongoing narrative reader builds fictional spaces combining what is shown explicitly and what the reader's consciousness replenishes due to some minute cues supplied by the author or his/her general background knowledge. While some empirical research is still to be conducted to clarify the matter, we may see how this assumption finds its way into the theory of conceptual integration, because the sources of inputs for mental simulation seem to be certain mental spaces.

Mental spaces, their configuration and integration are essential aspects of cognitive construing (Fauconnier & Turner 2003; Stockwell 2002: 96-97). Fauconnier and Turner (2003: 58) define mental spaces as "small conceptual packets", "very partial assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive models". As the narrative unfolds, various mental spaces are construed, modified and connected to each other in multiple ways. A network of blended mental spaces integrates content from various inputs, often in unexpected ways, giving rise to a new meaning (Fauconnier & Turner 2003: 210). Conceptual integration helps us deal with the ever-changing circumstances of a real or fictional world (Langacker 2008: 528).

Vorobyova (Воробйова 2009b: 37) presents a four-dimensional model of conceptual integration networks claiming that important insights occur at the intersection of symbolic, textual (compositional, intertextual, interdiscursive), and gnoseological planes, which are viewed through cognitive lens. The major merit of this model lies in the shift from the 'flat' representation of imagery and symbolism of a literary text to a

multifaceted analysis of their role in defining the conceptual base of the narrative. Thus, semiotic cues are deployed in a more extended and versatile analysis.

Semiotics constitutes a framework of understanding of how humans use sign-interpretation to "shape raw sensory information into knowledge-based categories" (Seif 2016: 2). In text analysis, the symbolic code is viewed as the second cipher of a literary workalongside with the language system (the first cipher) (Лотман 1992). The reader has limited prior knowledge of the second cipher and gets some clues only through reading. Identification of the symbolic meaning of the literary image and its interpretation via an appropriate code enhance the reader's ability to understand the narrative as coherent and meaningful (Volkova 2018: 366).

The cognitive metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) explains symbolic decoding as mapping the source-domain schema onto the target-domain schema, which helps to retrieve similarities recognized consciously or subconsciously by readers. Such analysis serves as a powerful tool for reconstructing conceptual patterns and connecting superficially dissimilar linguistic expressions as manifestations of a single underlying logic (Kimmel 2011).

Another kind of semiotic analysis is based on discovering the narrative iconicity that reifies different symbols at the texture of literary narrative (Schmid 2014; Volkova 2018). We side with Volkova (2018: 472) in her claim that iconicity can be revealed by focusing on the narrative structure in general, as well as on definite syntactic and lexico-semantic features of the text.

The analyses mentioned above contribute to interpretation of the general conceptual scope of the literary text. Presently, we can speak of different definitions of concepts in reference to a literary text. According to Nikonova (Ніконова 2008), *literary concepts* exist within a particular idiosphere as part of the image of the world, invoked by the author's associations, and hinting at possible meanings, the echo of previous

linguistic and cultural experience, which expresses the author's individual comprehension of objects and phenomena. In contrast to the variable content of linguistic and cultural concepts, the scope of the literary concept is fixed (ibid). Yet, multiple layers of the literary concept (e.g., notional, image- and sense-bearing (Davydyuk & Panasenko 2016) have much in common with structural division of linguistic concepts, which are lingo-mental representations, accompanied by emotional and evaluative content (Приходько 2008; van Dijk 2006: 169). The fact that emotive, evaluative and symbolic planes of the literary concept serve sense-bearing function (Davydyuk & Panasenko 2016) prompts the ways of discovering" an extensive and multifaceted conceptual substrate" (Langacker 2008: 463) that largely remains implicit.

Kahanovska (Кагановська 2018: 40) suggests looking for the idea of the literary work as expressed through the system of explicit and implicit literary meta-images, accessed through verbalised concepts that make up *textual concepts*. The latter are defined as mental and speech essence of the contextual plane characterized by intensity of multiple senses and supercategorization, which implicate certain features of meta-images of the fiction text that are explicated in the text. The pyramid hierarchy of metaimages in the literary text presents subordinate relationships between the megaconcept and mezoconcepts, macroconcepts, cataconcepts and their conceptual components (ibid.). Scrupulous semantic and cognitive analysis of textual concepts can illustrate how the sense of the text is "thickened" with discovery of different layers of meta-images. In our opinion, textual concepts are lingo-psychological phenomena that are the basis for construing the meaning of the literary text.

2.1 Murdoch's "A word child" (1975): The plot

Nicol (2004: 109) describes Murdoch's novel "A word child" as an "obsessional close-up novel", typical "Murdochian Gothic", in which heroes, provoked by fatal passion, descend to a particular kind of underworld – the destructive mechanisms of the unconscious. We agree with this interpretation only up to a point. Our claim is that the

author shows the protagonist's spiritual growth in a painful and complicated way making him cope with perplexing moral predicaments.

The general plot of the novel runs like this. Hilary Burde, a talented polyglot, fights his way up from a miserable childhood to work at Oxford University. His future, as well as his sister's, is full of alluring prospects. Hilary is greatly encouraged by Prof. Gunnar Jopling and his wife, Anne. Unfortunately, he falls in love with Anne. His rage, his unrestrained passion and overwhelming desire to be "lovable" made him partially guilty of her death. Although the man was "crashed and unmanned for years", he experienced neither repentance nor redemptive suffering, but simply grieved over his frustrated hopes, having made recluses of himself and his sister, Crystal. After 20 years, Gunnar Jopling unexpectedly becomes Hilary's senior at the office. Gunnar's new wife, Lady Kitty, meets Hilary several times asking him to help her to "cure" Gunnar of his agonizing past. A tiny hope for reconciliation appears. Yet, Hilary fatally falls in love with Kitty. This time, Gunner's wife proposes that they have a secret love affair and a baby. Hilary faces an excruciating moral dilemma, which he resolves in this way: "*I can't deceive Gunnar a second time. If I've helped him and if this is a service to you, I'm glad and joyful and this is a kind of blessing I never thought I'd have in my life any more. I must be content with that. And I've held you and kissed you and that is the gift from the universe, which will bless and gladden me forever. ... I've got to go, Kitty, absolutely and forever, and I've got to go now*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 370).

That very moment Gunnar appears and starts a fight giving Hilary no chance for an explanation. Kitty accidentally falls into the river and dies of exposure. Christmas comes. Hilary's friend Clifford commits suicide. Crystal finally marries her friend, Arthur Fisch. Tommy, Hilary's lover, does not marry another man and decides to rekindle his love. Is Hilary's life an entire catastrophe? Or is it, probably, the beginning of a new life? Murdoch lets the readers draw their own conclusions according to their understanding of her text.

2.2 "Inner circles" in "A word child"

All Murdoch's novels belong to intellectual prose. Yet, many of them are criticized for their repetitions and coincidences. However, we are going to show that perceived circularity in Murdoch's novel is not a drawback of the author's style. It patterns the readers' interpretation of the narrative in such a way that the open end of the novel, as well as its seemingly unresolved conflicts, acquires a clear moral judgment in retrospection.

Circularity is traditionally sustained by means of syntactic parallelism, repetition, and tautology. From a cognitive point of view, they represent "a mechanism of mapping the structures of knowledge <…> onto the syntactic structure of literary text" (Volkova 2018, p. 449). Speaking about metastructural organization of the text, Hoey points out the importance of repetitions, because they are mentally compared by the reader and classified as compatible or contrasting (The linguistics encyclopaedia 1991: 546). Repetitions that seem trivial and boring can actually be triggers (Volkova 2016: 365) to the mental activity of comparing and provoke readers to construe certain mental models or reframe the previous ones (Cook 1990: 231-232) in order to find plausible interpretations of a given narrative.

The following extract shows a string of repetitions, which (if we bear syntactic iconicity in mind) resembles a chain (a-b – a-b – a-a – a-c – a-c – a-b – d-a-a-d), whereas the stylistic figure of chiasmus reverses the order (d-a-a-d) and represents a symbolic loop that locks the chain: *I worked* **(a)** *to a man called Duncan, now* **(b)** *briefly seconded to the Home Office, who worked to a Mrs Frederickson, now on maternity leave, who worked to Freddie Impiatt, who worked to Clifford Larr, who worked to someone too exalted* **(c)** *to be in question here, who worked to someone more exalted still, who worked to the head of the department Sir Brian Templar-Spence, who was now about to retire. Arthur* **(d)** *Fisch worked to me. Nobody worked to Arthur* (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 8).

After restoring the logical sequence of relationships among the referents, we see that the chain is circular: in the interim between "*Arthur Fisch worked to ...*", and "*Nobody worked to Arthur*" the narrator mentions his own persona (*me*); so the previous information about the organizational hierarchy (*I worked to ...*) can be easily incorporated here. In this case, the information is restructured in the following sequence: d-a – [a-b – a-b – a-a – a-c – a-c – a-b] – a-d. The symbolic meaning of this 'locked chain' can be related to the image of a convict kept in chains. This image, in its turn, activates the IMPRISONMENT concept. The concept is sustained further by the image of captives, which refers to the employees of the office: *In our daily bondage what can be more preoccupying and ultimately influential than the voices of our **fellow captives**? How they go on and on: nothing perhaps, in sheer quantity, so fills up the head* (ibid., p. 33). Thus, at the very beginning of the story we prospectively become aware of Hilary's attitude to his drudging job as a form of captivity, or punishment, which – as we will learn later – is self-imposed and futile.

Circularity becomes even more accentuated by the combination of lexical, syntactic and stylistic cues due to the effect of "accumulative homology", which is defined by Tseng (2004: 4) as structural and/or semantic resemblances at various linguistic levels, mutual reinforcement of linguistic devices that contributes to the meaning expressed, e.g.: *And I reflected too, as I walked and walked **around** London, on the absolute doneness of what was done* (ibid., p. 201). Brooding over the past mistakes, "his crime", the main character roams the city, literary in circles, visiting his favourite locations. He is locked in his desperate mind as a prisoner in a cell, and his physical movements are also restrained by invisible boundaries, which make him walk around London as an enclosed space or ride along the inner circle of the underground. The persuasive power of the text is amplified here by metaphoric iconicity joined with accumulative homology (Tseng 2004: 7). Physical activity imitates mental activity, and the narration imitates them both.

Further, readers are bound to spot circularity and cyclicity of the narrative (see Fig. 1). Advocating the usefulness of graphic representation of our ideas, we can cite Langacker's (2008: 10) claim that "we are witnessing the emergence of "scientific visualization" and the growing recognition of its importance to theory and research". Stockwell (2002: 14), in his turn, states that the circle serves as a "superforegrounded figure" – a dominant that influences the dynamic organization of the text. In our scheme, every cycle denotes situations that occur several times in the novel until a crucial moment breaks the cycle. Meanwhile, the narrative circle (Inner circle – A word child) is a schematic presentation of a more complicated process of our subjective perception of the author's, the narrator's, and the reader's communication. Let us analyse this circle first.

Figure 1. Narrative circularity and cyclicity in "A word child"

The notion of circularity is first introduced by the narrator who is also the protagonist of the story, Hilary Burde. By imparting his previous intentions to entitle the novel *The inner circle* or *The memoirs of an underground man* (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 38), he claims the authorship of the novel. He does it several times by means of prospective narration and direct address to the readers, e.g.: "I may have seemed in these pages (*so far: and there will be no improvement*) to be a monster of egoism" (ibid., p. 68); "It was now Monday afternoon (*it looks as if nothing ever happens on Sundays, but just wait a while*)…" (ibid., p. 137). Yet, the readers are well aware of the fact that Iris Murdoch, the real author of the book, has entitled it *A word child*.

Thus, at the beginning of the story Murdoch presents an unusual collision to the readers: the fictional entity seems to be contemplating and finally accepting its creator's idea of naming the story:

Iris Murdoch – the real writer – names the story *A word child*;

Hilary – the fictional writer – intended to name the story *The inner circle* or *The memoirs of an underground man*, but entitles it *A word child*;

Hilary – the narrator – tells the story and already knows its end;

Hilary – the protagonist – "lives in the story".

This moment raises several questions: 1) Why should Hilary be the narrator of the story? 2) Why are the other suggested titles unsuitable? 3) Why does it matter that Hilary agrees to present his story as that of a word child, not that of the underground man? The answers become evident only at the end of the story when the intricacies of the spiritual growth of the main character are traced and deciphered by the readers. However, the open end of the story (marked by the question: Will Hilary live through the second disaster?) demands returning to that very moment when the narrator is leaving out unsuitable titles, because now this moment should be revised to confirm the reader's interpretation of the narrative.

Therefore, the beginning of Hilary's narration in fact presents a chronological end of the story: Hilary is not only alive, but also capable of telling his story, speculating on certain assumptions or arguing with his own previous thoughts, even amicably addressing the readers. Hilary's ability to become such a narrator shows that he is not a ruin, he is a word child rather than an underground man trapped in the inner circle of his destiny (the symbolic meaning of these images will be discussed further). We shall also see further that the Inner Circle signifies the notions of fatalism and punishment characteristic of Hilary's state of immature spirituality. This symbolic meaning will clash with another meaning of a circle as a symbol of revival, second chance, and victory over spiritual death.

The notion of circularity is sustained further on in a set of cycles in the narrative structure of the novel. They connect different events and situations within themselves and correlate with each other.

Cycle 1. The first cycle represents Hilary's lifeline, which seems to follow some predestined pattern. We represent it as a scenario (see Fig. 2) because of the dynamic character of this mental model. One can see that apart from some minute details, two identical events take place in the interim of about 20 years.

Name of the scenario: "Hilary's life"

Agents: Hilary, Gunnar, Anne, Kitty

1. Hilary meets Gunnar Jopling and Anne	6. Hilary meets Gunnar Jopling and Kitty
2. Hilary falls in love with Anne	7. Hilary falls in love with Kitty
3. Hilary has an affair with Anne	8. Hilary meets secretly with Kitty
4. Anne tries to leave Hilary	9. Hilary tries to stop meeting with Kitty
5. Anne dies	10. Lady Kitty dies

Figure 2. The scenario "Hilary's lifeline"

Points 1-5 form a kind of a frame (Hilary Burde falls in love with Gunnar Jopling's wife and the woman dies in an accident). It is also recognizable in points 6-10. The greatest difference between them lies in points 4 and 9: whether Gunnar's wife decided to leave Hilary or Hilary decided to leave Gunnar's wife. If we take into consideration only cycle 1 (i.e. only the general plot of the book), we are prone to conclude that no matter what Hilary's decision would be, both women were destined to die. That is why we find it important to analyze the other four cycles.

Cycle 2. The second cycle represents Hilary's daily routine – "routine that discourages thought" and saves him from "the hell of freedom" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 27). Each day of the week is prescribed for some kind of activity. He has dinner with the Impiatts every Thursday. Friday is Tommy's day (his lover). Saturday is his day for his sister, Crystal. Every Monday Hilary visits his friend, Clifford Larr. On Tuesday he has supper at Arthur Fisch's place (his subordinate and Crystal's boyfriend). The regularity of events is very clear, even the chapters are named according to the days of the week.

Meanwhile, various sets of mental models are quickly formed and evoked in readers' minds. These models are dynamic and experientially developing (Stockwell 2002: 79). They are not based on abstract knowledge of stereotypical events or objects, but on the personal knowledge of the readers of the text (van Dijk 2006). Murdoch's narrative circles remind us of circles on the water after a pebble has been thrown into it (it is worth noting, Hilary constantly mentions water): every coming circle is wider than the previous, widening our knowledge of Hilary's life and his inner conflict.

For instance, Hilary's visits to Clifford Larr are mentioned five times in the book. The script can be the following:

Name: "Visit to Clifford Larr"

Agents: Hilary, Clifford

Time: Monday evening

Scene 1: Clifford prepares dinner.

Scene 2: Clifford touches Hilary's hand.

Scene 3: Clifford mocks Hilary and they have a row.

Scene 4: Hilary goes away saying that he will never come back.

Of course, there are some adjustments in each separate case, for example, the cause of the quarrel. Yet, the implied regularity makes us feel that we can easily guess what will happen next time.

One more repeating cycle is evident in Hilary's visits to his sister (Table 1): the same time of meeting; the same topic of discussion; the same mutual dependence and opposition. Crystal is probably the most important person for Hilary. Therefore, the development of their relationship can signify the changes in Hilary's personality. In the course of the narrative, they become more straightforward and capable of making their own decisions. Hilary overcomes his egoism and, despite his own grief, tries to make Crystal happy.

Table 1. Hilary's relationship with Crystal

Agents	Hilary and Crystal					
Time	Saturday evenings					Christmas eve
Place	Crystal's flat					Church
Event	the discussion of the idea of marriage in general	the discussion of Hilary's relationship with Gunnar	the discussion of Hilary's relations with Kitty	Crystal retells the story of her sexual encounter with Gunnar	the discussion of Hilary's decision concerning Kitty	Crystal gets married to Arthur
Hilary feels	uneasy	exasperated	"naïve faith", love	shaken	firm	stunned, "the decision came like a bombshell"
Hilary acts	pretends to be calm and indifferent	accepts Arthur as his future brother-in-law	tells about his love for Kitty	stumbles out of the door and runs out into the street	decides to go to the last meeting	"feigned pleasure at the marriage, enthusiasm towards Arthur, happy anticipation of nephews"
Crystal feels	anxious to know Hilary's opinion	vulnerable	resentful	frustrated	resentful; resolute	firm, apologetic
Crystal acts	hesitates	stops crying, some hope appears	breaks her engagement; decides to tell her secret	cries	warns Hilary; decides to resume her relationship with Arthur	goes to Yorkshire with Arthur; remains unaware of Hilary's disaster

Thus, Murdoch deliberately imposes on us the idea of the cyclicity of time and life. However, the more confident we are of what is going to happen next, the more unexpected the end of the novel seems to us. In the end, after the collapse, the days of the week are no longer mentioned. Instead, the chapters are entitled Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. Crystal gets married. Clifford Larr commits suicide. The effect of defeated expectancy achieved here involves construing conflicting mental spaces, in which a set of operations that take place in real space (in this case narrator's world) are not relevant to a certain set of operations that take place in a hypothetical or expected space (Kupchyshyna & Davydyuk 2017).This conflict cannot but alert the reader to the fact that the cycle is broken and that it presumably means that Hilary's real life, as well as his spiritual life, will never be the same.

Cycle 3. If we consider spatial characteristics of the text, we shall see that Hilary spends much time outdoors, in the parks, near the water. The conventional belief is that descriptions of nature reflect the mood, the inner state of the characters. Yet, a set of situational models connected with the description of nature supplies us with additional information (Table 2).

Table 2. Descriptions of recurrent natural phenomena

Event	Hilary meets Biscuit for the first time	Hilary goes for a walk with Tommy (reconciliation)	Hilary meets Lady Kitty	Hilary meets Kitty for the second time
Time	Saturday morning	Saturday morning	Monday morning	Tuesday morning
Agents	Hilary, Biscuit (Lady Kitty's maid)	Hilary, Tommy (the girlfriend)	Hilary, Kitty, Biscuit	Hilary, Kitty
Place	Kensington Gardens: the Serpentine "a great diffused brightness", "asphalt paths", "distant dogs ecstatically raced"	Round Pond "a vivid russet yellow light diving ducks, swans, Canadian geese, sparrows excited dogs mad with canine joy"	Kensington Gardens: the Serpentine "the chill mist, a few cold fluffed-up ducks"	Kensington Gardens: "near the river the trooping clouds were lighter, sandy track no one, not even a duck"

These descriptions are short, commonplace, without much poetic eloquence. Frankly speaking, they claim our attention more by their recurrence than by the things, which they portray. Despite the content, the descriptions invariably contain such features, as water, atmosphere, ground, and living-beings. We assume that such accounts dwell on the philosophy of agrarian cult: nature has a circular character – day by day, year by year, changes take place but the main elements (water, air, and ground) remain. Every sign of decay is the beginning of a revival. No wonder the main character gets a chance for spiritual revival at the end of the book.

Cycle 4. Big Ben is a mysterious and versatile image, which seems to be haunting the main character throughout the book being mentioned at least 14 times. Its symbolism is not transparent at once. To comprehend the link that exists between Hilary and Big Ben, the readers need to trace the changes in Hilary's perception of Big Ben throughout the story. In Figure 3 we show the conceptual integration network that represents only a few of the diverse links, which we draw between mental spaces related to Hilary and Big Ben (Note: *BS* means "blended space" in Fig. 3).


Figure 3. Conceptual integration network: A link between Hilary Burde and Big Ben

Big Ben serves as a mirror that reflects Hilary's feelings and actions. Whenever his mood changes, his perception of Big Ben changes as well: Hilary has met Gunner after many years, and feels ashamed and enraged – Big Ben is "a kind of reddish blur high above people" (a sign o blushing or/and rage); he has taken petty revenge on his colleagues – Big Ben is visible even through mist; Hilary starts thinking about his reaction to Crystal's decision to get married – there is a power cut and Big Ben's face is forcefully extinguished (the man subconsciously refuses to face the fact that his sister can leave him); he is at a loss what to do – Big Ben is faintly visible (no solution is visible); Hilary gets a second chance with Kitty, he is "almost happy", he believes that "all will be well" – Big Ben strikes the quarter hours, has "a bright hazy face". Big Ben is described as a clock, a bell, a tall construction, and a landmark in the story. Yet, what is it to Hilary Burde?

We assume that Big Ben represents a kind of mystical, supernatural power. For example, we read, "*Promise me, swear to me. Swear by – By Big Ben*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 56), so it is something sacred. "*I will miss it*" – Hilary says this about Big Ben, as if it is something dear and always present, customary. This mystical power (probably, fate) displays itself then and now in Hilary's life until Big Ben strikes for the first and the last time in the book. We realize at once that the crucial moment has come: Hilary will soon have to make the hardest decision ever. At the end of the novel, Big Ben vanishes from Hilary's narration. This can imply that he has regained control over his life. The chiming of church bells mentioned in the last lines of the story seems to replace this image, but the meaning of this change is often overlooked by readers who criticize Murdoch for a weak, obscure ending of the brilliant novel. We shall speak about our interpretation of this ending further in the article.

Cycle 5. We have illustrated that everything in Hilary's life (objective reality, relations with other people, natural and supernatural powers) is of a circular nature. We believe that the last cycle – Hilary's spiritual life – is the most important because of the author's philosophical concept that lies at the heart of the text. The images used to describe

Hilary's spiritual life – the underground man, Peter Pan, the Christ Child, Word, the Good – are actualised in multiple ways in the text. We believe that this system of images sustains the global coherence of the text by outlining its conceptual nucleus– the SPIRITUAL GROWTH concept.

2.3 The SPIRITUAL GROWTH concept

The nucleus of the SPIRITUAL GROWTH concept comprises two features: growth and spirituality. According to Kahanovska's (Кагановська 2018) hierarchy of textual concepts, they are "mesoconcepts" contributing to the "megaconcept". GROWTH as a personal way of developing (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, *s.a.*; Macmillan Dictionary 2002) is manifested in transition from the state of immaturity (childhood) to maturity. There are three child figures in the book: Peter Pan is a child, Jesus Christ is persistently called the Christ Child, and Hilary considers himself a word child. These images constantly appear in the course of narration, serving as a semiotic and semantic thread that makes the notion of growth prominent. Like a child, Hilary needs to grow, not physically or mentally, but spiritually. SPIRITUALITY as the capacity relating to the human spirit, soul, incorporeal, ecclesiastical, or supernatural phenomena (Macmillan Dictionary 2002; Merriam-Webster Dictionary, *s.a*; Oxford English Dictionary, *s.a.*) is associated with religion, morality, guilt, punishment, redemption, love, and forgiveness (a set of textual "cataconcepts") in the text.

All these textual concepts are recurrently verbalised and explicated through a set of images, which make a complex contribution to the major concept (textual "megaconcept") of SPIRITUAL GROWTH. It is the encapsulated meaning of the whole text that reveals the intricate way of the protagonist's gradual transition from spiritual immaturity to higher awareness of his capacity to be good and to do good. By combining the evaluative features of the concepts GROWTH and SPIRITUALITY (high (+) vs. low (-)), we can describe Hilary's gradual moral development as a three-stage process, each of the stages being represented by a set of images (see Fig. 3).

Figure 3. Three stages of the protagonist's spiritual growth

The conceptual network is verbalized through a vast range of lexico-semantic means, as well as activated on the semiotic plane of the text. In the text, significant concepts are voiced by different speakers, embodied in sculpture and pantomime, evoked in reminiscences and even mentioned in a case of pure grammatical drilling. Meanwhile, the real comprehension of each of them, of their multiple symbolic facets and depth, can only be possible within the framework of the whole text.

2.3.1 Immature spirituality: Underground man

Hilary Burde calls himself an undergrounder (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 38). Being the narrator of the story, he even contemplated entitling the story *The memoirs of an underground man* or just simply *The inner circle*. He spends much time in the London underground and considers it his natural habitat. To interpret its symbolic meaning, one should resort to the intertextual ties that exist between the novel "A word child" and Dostoyevsky's (1864) "Notes from Underground" (Глембоцкая 1996; Клименко 1989). Conceptual network of mental spaces that present Hilary and the man from underground replenishes some information about Hilary's state of resentment and misery.

Figure 4. Conceptual integration network: Hilary as an underground man

The image of the underground man corresponds to the lowest stage of spiritual growth: it is a frustrated, lonely, enraged person who leads a close, miserable, aimless life (like going around the Inner Circle again and again). For almost twenty years, Hilary has lived as the underground man obsessed by a sense of guilt, rage, and self-pity. He fails to succeed and punishes himself by destroying his and his sister's lives ("*For the world was lost indeed and I had lost it not only for myself but for Crystal*") (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 126). He is a violent and destructive man, unable to see the humble truth, but this man suffers greatly (Михальская & Аникин 1985).

In general, Dostoyevsky's influence is quite perceptible in the novel. Murdoch raises the same universal themes of good and evil, guilt and redemptive suffering, and conflict between faith and intellectualism. She also makes Hilary speculate on the problem of crime and punishment. His words, "*I knew I had killed Anne … almost as surely as if I had hit her with an axe*" and "*every crime is The Crime*" clearly refer to Dostoyevsky's novel "Crime and punishment" ("Преступление и наказание", 1866). Naturally, Hilary is not Raskol'nikov – the protagonist of Dostoyevsky's novel who commits an

ideologically driven murder; the motives of their crimes are different, but they both gradually realize their guilt and grow spiritually through redemptive suffering.

2.3.2 Immature spirituality: Peter Pan

Hilary's immaturity, weak will, and fears are embodied in another figure as well. His office is going to stage the skit "Peter Pan" for their Christmas party. In the novel, Peter Pan is considered to be an "*immature spirit*", "*a sinister boy*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 203) who wishes time stopped and he never grew old, which means he would never have to face problems. Yet, they fail to find someone who will play his part. The fact is not surprising for us because we realize that Hilary is Peter Pan.

The image of Peter Pan originates from Barrie's novels (Barrie 2003) "The little white bird" (1902) and "Peter Pan and Wendy" (1911). Eventually, they were adapted into the play "Peter Pan", which became known worldwide. Originally, Peter Pan was a symbol of a sunny innocent soul, a freedom-loving childish personality capable of breaking the norms of society. He became so popular that his statue soon appeared in Kensington Gardens (the statue is often mentioned in the novel I. Murdoch "A word child"). Since the time of its first publication, this image has appeared in more than 34 novels. Today various interpretations of the image exist. Yet, Murdoch prompts the readers at once that neither Freudian criticism (the meaning of a literary work lies in the psyche of the author), nor Marxist criticism (literary works reveal the state of the struggle between classes in the historical place and moment) explain the image correctly. "*Why not a Christian interpretation?,*" asks Hilary Burde in the book, outlining the possible interpretations for the readers of the novel.

Considering this, we find it difficult to agree with Bove's (2011: 154-155) interpretation of the image of Peter Pan as a projected Oedipus complex that Hilary develops while falling in love with the wife of Gunnar Jopling, who is a "father" figure for him. In the course of narration, Peter Pan turns out to be the embodiment of an

irresponsible, careless, immature personality who cannot surrender his pretensions and avoids facing any problems, especially those of moral character.

The novel provides numerous hints for the fact that Hilary is Peter Pan. It is he who wishes time would stop ("*The notion that there was for her, a time limit filled me with anguish and with the kind of irritated disgust*") (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 36). He does not know his parents and always needs someone to play the role of his mother, e.g.: his lover Tommy – "*Tommy held my hand and I let her, feeling myself like a child*" (ibid., p. 177), "*I feel as connected with you as if I were your mother*" (ibid., p. 282); his friend Laura – "*I know you want me to mother you, but I won't*" (ibid., p. 51); his lover Anne – "*She enjoyed giving little presents and* "*mothering*" *the younger bachelor dons*" (ibid., p. 117); or Crystal – "*My younger sister had to be my mother, and I had to be her father*" (ibid., p. 18).

Hilary wants someone to decide everything for him: "*The final thing I thought before I fell asleep was that now, at last, in the end, Lady Kitty had taken over and she would dispose of everything in the best way possible. Lady Kitty would arrange it all*". He is so afraid of facing his guilt and pain that he "*tries to hide in a childhood, a refuge, a pure sullied place*" (ibid., p. 257). That is why he is reluctant to let Crystal get married because loss of Crystal's innocence will mean that the tie with childhood is broken. At the same time, Hilary admits that aging is one of his secret sorrows – "*I'm getting old*" (ibid., p. 12).

"Peter Pan" is Hilary's favourite play (ibid., p. 10). Peter Pan lives in Never-Never Land, Hilary "*likes to live in other people's worlds and have none of his own*" (ibid., p. 8). Peter Pan lives with a few boys on the island; Hilary has a lodger Christopher Cather who always invites friends over. When Hilary, finally, drives them all away he has to admit that "*the house seems empty and sad without the boys*" (ibid., p. 365). Other characters compare Hilary to a child: Clifford – "*Poor Child*" (ibid., p. 358),

Kitty – "*You were so honest and so helpless like a child*" (ibid., p. 313), Gunnar – "*Deaf and dumb child*" (ibid., p. 267).

In the story of Peter Pan we find such a description: "*The lost boys were looking for Peter Pan, the pirates were looking for the boys, the Indians were looking for the pirates, the wild animals were looking for the Indians to eat them. They all went circle by circle with the equal speed*" (J.M. Barrie "Peter Pen", p. 81). This circularity of narration matches the circularity of Hilary Burde's life in the novel "A word child".

Using Gunner Jopling as her spokesman, Murdoch explains this image in such a way: "*Peter personifies a spirituality which is irrevocably caught in childhood and which yet cannot surrender its pretensions. Peter is essentially a being from elsewhere, the apotheosis of an immature spirituality*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 227). However, the author does not trap her main character in this state and pushes him to shift his ground. First he regards himself as a "*simple unsophisticated boy from the province*", later regrets that he is "*no longer a young man with an unspoilt life*", then states that he is "*already old and cold… quite a mature adult*" and at last realizes that "*an era is ending*". This mental shift leads to further transformations of Hilary's personality.

2.3.3 Religious beliefs

The image of Peter Pan has a kind of direct opposite in the book – the Christ Child who is, on the contrary, ready to face anguish to save the world. The question of Hilary's religious beliefs is quite controversial. He claims that he has "*no religion and no substitute for it*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 28), he does not believe in God (ibid., p. 367). He did an awful thing in his youth, and the burden of it ruins his life. He realizes that crime and punishment are inextricably mixed. "*Misery and sin are inextricably mixed and only repentance can change sin into pure pain*" (ibid., p. 126), "*Sin and pain are inextricably mixed*" (ibid., p. 108) – again and again he returns to this idea.

Eventually, Hilary comes closer to the Christ Child. At first, he supposes that the Christ Child could relieve him of pain. Then he asks Crystal to pray for him. He is full of self-pity, and considers himself "*a martyr, pierced and pinned, writhed in agony*" (ibid., p. 117). Then the cycle repeats: once again, he falls in love with Gunnar's wife, but this time he does not betray him, and he does his best to rescue the woman. It is obvious that though there are no great changes in the objective reality, there are obvious changes in the inner world of the character. Suddenly he makes a stunning discovery. All the previous years he experienced no "*repentance, penance or redemptive suffering. As often... guilt sprang from the punishment rather than from the crime*" (ibid., p. 38). What really impressed him was not the crime itself but the instant and automatic nature of the first retribution, the loss of Oxford, his position and the fruits of his labour. He realizes that his previous selfish suffering has not purified him.

Suddenly the second disaster and the consequences become meaningful. No matter how distressing the situation is, this is a great opportunity to correct his previous mistakes, repent for them, and even have a chance for consolation: "*I wondered about the future... Did not the same crime twice committed meant more than double retribution? Or was it now quite a different scene? I was older, I lacked the recklessness of youth and its generosity ... would such a desperation or such a mean carefulness ... guard me from the self-destruction to which I had earlier doomed myself?*" (ibid., p. 367).

At last Hilary is convinced that "*Everything **is** in the light of God*" (ibid., p. 340) and comes to the Christ Child "*who was leaning from his mother's arms to bless the world. At the other end he hung dead, cut off in his young manhood for me and for my sins*" (ibid., p. 380).

The Christian God is often represented in the novel by the powerful image of the Word. The notion of "the Word" is rather complex; its direct and implied meanings appear simultaneously and interact all the time in the novel. On the one hand, being a polyglot

Hilary deals with real words all the time. On the other hand, we realize that "the Word" is a biblical allusion. Let us look at these notions in detail.

Active verbal thinking is typical of Murdoch's narrators. They are usually eloquent and loquacious and use their language to influence other people. All these features also characterize Hilary Burde – "a word child". His profound linguistic skills have secured him a job and prevented him from becoming a criminal. Words are the only sphere where he feels confident. He knows that he is a talented polyglot, and this idea flatters his "touchy pride". Words are his "salvation", his "hiding-place" and grammar-books are his "books of prayers". To some extent, words acquire some metaphysical power for Hilary: "*He [his teacher Mr. Osmond] inculcated in me a respect for accuracy, a respect, to put it more nobly, for truth*" (ibid., p. 22) – right words become true words.

Hilary frequently resorts to foreign and unusual words, or coins his own ones to communicate his ideas more precisely: "*I reflected on the absolute **doneness** of what was done*" (ibid., p. 201); "*We watched the diving ducks diving and the swans **swanning**" (ibid., p. 178); **accidentalness** (ibid., p. 391); **Londonish** (ibid., p. 68); **London-pink** (ibid., p. 293), etc. Hilary also makes up different variants of names, which shows his bright linguistic imagination: *Thomasina – Tommy*, *Tomkins*, *Thomas*; *Biscuit – Biscuitling*, *Biscuitine*, *Biscuitula*, *Biscottina*, *Biscottinetta*.

Apart from characterizing Hilary as a linguist, the choice of lexemes reveals some of the author's intentions. Therefore, the words "wolfish" and "to wolf" contribute to the animalistic image of Hilary, describing his fury, on the one hand, and his solitude, on the other hand. The author uses the verb "to mother" instead of "to take care of" or "love" because it is essentially important to stress Hilary's need of a mother.

There are numerous words and expressions pertaining to the sphere of religion. Some of them appear when the characters speculate on the problems of faith, e.g., *God, Virgin Mary*, *the Christ Child*, *saint*, *the Messiah*. Others are mere exclamations that Hilary

Burde uses (we find 14 variants of these), such as *Oh, God!, Christ, Christ! For God's sake! Thank God! Thank Heaven! For Christ's sake! Jesus! Oh Christ in heaven! Sweet Christ help me!* Despite the colloquial character of the expressions and Hilary's claim of disappointment with Christianity, the constant mentioning of divine names suggests that religion is present not only in his consciousness, but also in his subconsciousness. These displays of his psyche are very important. The author shows us that what Hilary says does not necessarily fit with what he feels. Besides, it may also suggest that one day Hilary will be able to accept religious beliefs as true.

Another group of words, which Hilary seems to be keen on, is connected with the military sphere: *combative, operation, campaign, retreat, the interval was annihilated, war memorial, commands, enemy, parley, intervene, war, warfare kit, combat, struggle, trophies, battle, battlefield*, etc. The cognitive metaphor, which is evidently construed here, is LIFE is WAR (see Table 3).

Table 3. Examples of mapping between the domains LIFE and WAR

Source: WAR	Target: LIFE
the consequences of war are wounds afflicted on the battlefield, or even death	1) mistakes in life cause psychological wounds: "*For a moment light can fall upon an obscene and awful **wound***" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 221); 2) the end of romantic relations can result in psychological wounds, if not death: "*I may be yours. You're certainly not mine, thank God! Look, Tommy, let me go. Let's have **a clean slice** not **a bloody massacre***" (ibid., p. 39)
the cause of war is invasion that disrupts the habitual way of living	one's life can be destroyed by someone's actions (intrusion): "*Gunnar's **life had been ripped apart**, and I had done it, entering from outside as a cruel ruthless **invader***" (ibid., p.38)
combatants need some shelter while being attacked	if someone feels at risk he/she looks for safety: "*You're always hiding*" (ibid., p. 51)
- attacks as well as defensive actions are carefully planned and organized; - inability to advance results in periods of rest and recouping one's strength; - meeting an adversary involves a violent confrontation	- communication with an opponent is carefully thought out; - absence of heated arguments brings relief; - facing an opponent may involve a violent conflict: "*That at least, amidst all the dread, presented itself as a humane and consoling **operation**. I did not try myself with ideas of*

	*seeing her again. But I did so much want, and felt I somehow deserved, **the relief** of writing to her and explaining myself to her before I decided what **my plan of campaign** should be in regard to Gunnar. There was a kind of strange holy safety, as if I were in **'retreat'**, in the existence of the **interval**, the **interval** between my receipt of Lady Kitty's instructions and the unpredictable **battle scene** between me and Gunnar*" (ibid., p. 152)
- heroic fighting requires self-sacrifice; - war is followed by peace	- good actions often mean renunciation of one's own happiness for the sake of other people; - the final choice of the life path brings turmoil to an end: "*She clung to me till the last moment <...> I play-acted **heroically**. The last thing I could do for her was to send her to her fate with some **peace** of mind* " (ibid., p. 380)

Hilary is always at war: with himself, with his past, with Gunnar Jopling, with the universe. Nonetheless, he is personally unaware of this. Through Arthur Fisch's words "*It's better to forgive than to hate*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 152), Murdoch states that the combative and wrathful Hilary will not reach a higher spiritual level until he becomes humble and forgiving.

The notion of "the Word" as a biblical allusion refers us to St. John when Hilary quotes him: "*In the beginning was the Word*", and we can continue "and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (The Holy Bible 2002). Now the question is whether we may consider the title of the book once again and replace "a word child" with "one of the children of God"?

The Bible appears to be the most prolific source of allusions, reminiscences and other forms of intertextuality. Most of them are well known and recognizable, e.g.: *prodigal son* (ibid., Luke 15:11-32), *the Tower of Babel* (ibid., Genesis 11:1-9), *a new heaven and a new earth* (ibid, Revelation 21:1). Sometimes the characters of the novel quote them directly "*In the beginning was the Word*" (ibid., John 1:1) or paraphrase them in their own words: "*Forgiving equals being forgiven*" – "*Forgive and you shall be forgiven*" (ibid., Luke 6:37). We see that Christian doctrines and atheistic views are

intricately interlaced in Hilary's mind. His ideas lack unity. Still these reflections about religion become the driving force behind Hilary's evolution.

Some of the reminiscences are rather tricky. When Peter came to Jesus and asked, "*Lord, how many times shall I forgive my brother who sins against me? Up to seven times*". Jesus answered, "*I tell you not seven times, but seventy times seven*" (ibid., Mathew 18:21-22). The numbers appear in the conversation between Hilary and Kitty. He asks: "*How long would you let me make love to you if you didn't become so [pregnant]? Seven times? Seventy times seven?*" At first, his words may seem a blasphemy to us. However, they show Hilary's indignation, not his perversion. He has already discovered that forgiveness is the secret of the universe; it is his only "escape route" from the "darkness" of his life. So we may suggest that what Hilary really intends to ask is "*How many more times do you want me to betray Gunnar? How many times will he have to forgive me?*" Therefore, Hilary's deliberate use of Biblical reminiscences is a marker of his spiritual growth.

Many researchers suppose that despite the sophisticated formulation of Murdoch's philosophical views their core remains quite traditional – they are all based on Christian beliefs. We consider as proof of this idea the fact that three characters of the novel (Hilary, Crystal, and Gunnar) quote a line from St. Paul's message, which Murdoch herself mentioned in some of her philosophical works: "*Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just ... think on these things*" (The Holy Bible 2002: Phil 4:8). Nevertheless, faithful to her philosophical views Murdoch leads her character further than the conventional Christian revelation – to the third spiritual level.

2.3.4 The Good

If we continue looking for references to St. John in "A word child", we shall soon come to the words: "God is light; in him there is no darkness at all" (The Holy Bible 2002). Love, happiness, everything positive is presented as light in the book: "*For a moment

light can fall upon an obscene and awful wound" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 221); "*There was, however, one glint of light and I was blessed to have it amid these fruitless burdens*" (ibid., p. 150); "*Your good wishes are as prayers in the light of which I can almost pray myself*" (ibid., p. 220); "*I think it is a memory of a state of being loved, a sense of some lost brightness, an era of light before the darkness started*" (ibid., p. 56). The image of "light" is always present in Hilary's thoughts as a symbol of happiness, truth, and good.

Despite their philosophical beliefs, many characters in the book are united by the notion of Good that rules the world. Here are some quotes:

- "*You realize you are everything, then you love everything and you are good automatically*" – the Buddhist Christopher (ibid., p. 47);
- "*This in itself will do a tiny bit of good in the world*" – the cynic Clifford Larr (ibid., p. 143);
- "*There's truth and trying to stay there, I mean to stay in its sort of light and trying to do a good thing*" – the atheist Arthur Fisch (ibid., p. 290);
- "*Oh, be good!*" – the Christian Crystal (ibid., p.19);
- "*Looking up words in the dictionary was for me an image of goodness*"; "*Your good wishes are as prayers in the light*" – the moral wreck Hilary Burde (ibid., p. 222).

The author eventually leads us to an appreciation of Good as the highest value, so the word is persistently used by all the characters. Murdoch even invents words, which contain the stem "good", e.g., *goodness* (ibid., p. 381) instead of kindness; *the goodest little mouse* (ibid., p. 339) instead of the best; *goods* (ibid., p.335) in the meaning of different kinds of "good". This stresses the importance of the notion of Good, which is at the core of the author's model of moral maturing.

Murdoch shows that her understanding of God differs from the Christian idea of this divine power. She leads the readers to the idea expressed in her philosophical works:

"Good represents the reality of which God is the dream" (Murdoch 1992: 496). Here we need to make a brief digression on philosophy to make our point clear.

Murdoch's philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic views, which evolved from existentialism from Plato to Christianity and non-traditional religions, make up a robust background of her literary works. Her philosophical works "The sovereignty of Good" and "Metaphysics as a guide to moral" may serve as a point of departure into the multiple layers of thought in the novelist's works. Murdoch persistently seeks to discover in what way our fallacies, biases, and instincts make us unaware of truth and moral goodness (Jerončić 2013: 110-111). We are generally trapped in misconceptions and illusion about our true condition, and one's search for Good may be a case of self-deception of "fat, relentless ego" (Murdoch 1970: 51). Morality, consequently, is a conscious effort to see rightly: "I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of *see* which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort" (ibid., p. 37). Murdoch repeatedly calls for "morally disciplined attention" stressing, though, that it surpasses the basic logic of cognition in pursuit of "the cloudy and shifting domain of the concepts which men live by" (Murdoch 1992: 122).

Murdoch tries to replace the personal Christian God with the notion of the impersonal Good stating that the Good illuminates the moral world as the sun illuminates the natural world (Jacobs 1995). In Plato's words, the Good is, "the end of all endeavour, the object on which every heart is set, whose existence it defines, though it finds it difficult to grasp just what it is" (Murdoch 1970). Murdoch believes that Buddhism can teach Christianity to create a non-supernatural religion, that is, without the notion of a personal God or personal immortality in the familiar sense.

In "A word child", for instance, the Buddhist Christopher criticizes Christianity for its notion of a personal God but, strangely enough, gets the name that means "Christ bearer". Traces of the author's religious ideas can be found in the utterances of other characters of the book – Gunnar: "*I suppose in the end all things must be forgiven*"

(I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 327), and Crystal: "*If we're gone wrong we've misused our religion*" (ibid., p. 338).

Jacobs also argues that nostalgia for the Christian faith is palpable throughout Murdoch's philosophical and literary works (1995):

> *The narratives of Christ's redemptive acts touch Murdoch because they reveal a God who, in the Apostle Paul's formulation, came to save us while we were yet sinners, before we had loved him. The Platonic Good can be, like the Jewish and Christian God, lovable; "however, God sees us and seeks us, Good does not".*

Redemption, in Murdochian sense, is aspiration for gradual spiritual growth away from selfishness. Even though she cannot find the way to accept the personal God, Murdoch concludes her book "Metaphysics as a guide to morals" (1992) with these words from Psalm 139:

> *Whither shall I go from the spirit, whither shall I fly from the presence? If I ascend into the heaven thou art there, if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.*

In the novel "A word child", the main character can be saved from self-destruction only through his moral effort and discovery of the Good. It is clear that understanding of good and being good is the highest level of spiritual growth, which the main character should strive for.

We can identify two driving forces behind the spiritual growth outlined in the novel. They are **love** and **forgiveness**. In his early childhood, Hilary considered himself unlovable, and that idea was the major source of his pain and anger. Later he understood that love had always been "*an ignis fatuus (a fatal sparkle)*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 213) for him. When he speaks of words as his salvation, he conjugates the verb to love – *amo*, *amas*, *amat*. His love for Kitty is his "*song of praise to the world*" (ibid., p. 339). In the long run, he comes to the conclusion that "*being in love has its own certifying universality, it informs and glorifies the world with an*

energy which, like a drug, becomes a necessity of consciousness" (ibid., p. 335). Eventually, he discovers the second, equally important, secret of the universe – forgiveness: "*I could forgive. I could be forgiven. I could forgive. Perhaps that was the whole of it after all. Perhaps being forgiven was just forgiving only no one had ever told me. There was nothing else needful. Just to forgive. **Forgiving equals being forgiven**, the secret of the universe, do not whatever you do forget it. The past was folded up and in the twinkling of an eye everything had been changed and made beautiful and good*" (ibid., p. 298).

Forgiveness gives Hilary hope that someday he will find reconciliation with himself and the rest of the world, and that idea changes his perception of everything from evil to good and full of meaning. To see how love and forgiveness serve for the good in the novel, we need to speak about the truth and lies that surround Hilary.

2.4 Good, absurd, and true lies in "A word child"

Schneiderman (1997) gives an important insight into Murdoch's literary works stating that "her novels often are intended to illustrate the difficulties involved in arriving at a "true" reading of what transpires in human relationships, and how, in the absence of *truth* her self-deceived protagonists are debarred from the pursuit of *virtue*". The main character of the novel "A word child" also has to make several discoveries concerning truth, lies, and self-deception.

Yermakova (Ермакова 2010: 176) makes an interesting observation about psychological fiction, which tends to address prototypical scenarios. On the one hand, it prompts readers' interpretation of the text; on the other hand, if the prototypical scenario is diverted, it multiplies the conceptual layers of the text. We believe this is the case with the novel "A word child", which explicitly actualises the LIAR concept and completely reinterprets it.

First, let us point out that the core of LIAR concept comprises the following prototypic features of the person who tells lies: 1) intentional distortion of the true meaning of expression; 2) latent intentions, insincerity of their expression; 3) double mental space; 4) knowledge of conventional forms of expressing lies; 5) self-identification as a liar; 6) secret character of all the features mentioned above (Терещенко 2013: 147). It is important to note that these objective features are accompanied by profound negative evaluation and a vast range of unfavourable associations (ibid., p. 172).

So is Hilary Burde a bald-faced, incorrigible liar? Definitely, not. Hilary is called a liar numerous times in the novel, but there is nothing conventional about it. At the beginning of the story, Hilary is a very straightforward person, sometimes too forthright for a polite person. This trait secures him respect and friendly treatment among eccentrics and intellectuals, but no warm feelings from mediocre office workers. Toward the end of the story, lies and revelations of truth grow exponentially making Hilary realize the consequences of both.

Let us consider several lies that Hilary tells. He conceals the most dramatic events of his past from most of his colleagues and some of his friends; even when his former friendship with Gunner is brought up in a conversation, he avoids any details. This is not a prototypical lie, but the so-called "lie of omission" that saves his and Gunner's reputation.

When his girlfriend, Tommy, accuses him of falling in love with a married woman, Hilary denies it without being completely sure whether he is telling lies or not. The fact of the matter is that Tommy thinks this married woman is Lora Impiatt, though in reality it is Kitty Jopling. The situation becomes even more absurd when nobody believes Hilary who swears that he is not in love with Lora Impiatt (which is completely true), and many people trust his blatant lies about moving to Australia, which he told in a half-jocular way to avoid any further inquiries about his future. Tommy also calls Hilary a liar when he truthfully admits that he is interested in her only sexually. After

some speculation, he cannot but agree with Tommy that his previous truthful words were in fact incorrect (he really appreciates her wit).

Thus, Hilary is different from a typical liar because of the way his lies are expressed and because of the absence of intentions to deliberately mislead the others. Before we speak about one more peculiarity of Hilary's lies (who benefits from them), we would like to outline the consequences of some of his "truths".

First of all, he admits to Gunner that Anne wanted to stay with her family, thus, relieving him of the painful suspicion that Anne may have been killed in an effort to escape from him. Having done this good, Hilary has to conceal the fact that he has fallen in love with his second wife from Gunner.

Most of his revelations, however, cause pain. Out of spite, Hilary tells Clifford about Crystal's sexual encounter with Gunner, but after that Clifford (who is a latent homosexual, but loves Crystal in his own special way) commits suicide. He also impulsively tells Kitty that Anne was pregnant when she was killed in the accident, which prompts Kitty to think up some unreasonable plans. His fierce denial of an affair between Lora and him almost reveals her real adultery with Christopher. His perpetual state of breaking up with Tommy made her embittered and prompted her jealous letter to Gunner that "*had brought about the encounter which killed Kitty, and married Crystal and brought double-intensified eternal damnation into my life and Gunnar's*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 391).

Eventually, Hilary discovers that truth can be deadly. Crystal's truth about her love for Gunner shatters him, but it is he who reveals the truth to Clifford and unwittingly provokes his suicide. At the end of the book, we find Hilary sitting in St Stephen's Church "*crying for Clifford as I had not cried for Kitty, and just then his death seemed even more awful than hers*"; he also weeps for Kitty, for Gunner, for Anne, and "in some quieter way" for himself (ibid., p. 380).

What happens next shows the complete transformation of Hilary's personality. Through real grieving for the people whom he loved, Hilary realises his self-deception, the absolute futility of his previous sufferings and self-imposed punishment, which has victimised his sister Crystal, his lover Tommy and other people as well. So this time he tells a lot of lies, "white lies", which will benefit others, not him (we define him as a beneficial type of a liar in the fictional discourse, see more about this type in (Терещенко 2013).

Love turns out to be more important than truth, lies may serve the Good: "*This time I had pretended and pretended... I feigned pleasure at the marriage... The last thing I could do for her [Crystal] was to send her to her fate with some peace of mind*" (I. Murdoch "A word child", p. 388). Hilary does not let Crystal know that he has just survived a terrible blow and needs her dearly; he finally lets her go. Nor does Hilary reveal to Tommy that her letter had fatal consequences for several lives: "*She must never know. Another lifelong secret*" (ibid., p. 391). What is even more important is that he feels strangely relieved that the tragedy was purely accidental and not unleashed by anyone whom he has suspected. He does not find the idea of forgiveness impossible.

What about the end of the novel? Murdoch is praised as one of the very few contemporary novelists who go on troubling one's thoughts when the last page is done. The interpretations of the ending are as varied as the readers' viewpoints. The protagonist raises this question himself: "*I wondered about the future. Was another cycle of misery, intensified, more dense, beginning for me?... Then I had raged at the accidental but had not let it in any way save me from my insistence upon being the author of everything. Now I saw my authorship more modestly and could perhaps move in time towards forgiving myself, forgiving them all*" (ibid., p. 381).

In our interpretation, he undoubtedly sees the possibility of breaking the spell of his second cycle through redemption, love, and forgiveness. The bells of the nearby church

are chiming declaring the birth of the Christ Child, and Hilary is walking along the street with Tommy, joking in response to her promise to get him marry her.

3. Conclusion

Catastrophism is a characteristic of Murdoch's novels, and at first sight the plot of the book "A word child" seems to be immensely tragic and obscure. It imposes a sense of fatality about Hilary's life on us. Yet, we argue that the novel is a valuable piece of intellectual prose, which involves readers in a thought-provoking linguistic, artistic, and intellectual dialogue with the author in the quest for philosophical insights.

We aimed to illustrate how our comprehension of the author's philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic ideas develops due to our construing of meaningfulness of semantic, semiotic, and narrative planes of the novel. The effect of accumulative homology allowed us to see some of the features of these planes as foregrounded – circularity of the narrative and cyclicity of the protagonist's life. Our scheme of the narrative circle (Inner circle – A word child) presents a complicated process of our subjective perception of the author's, the narrator's, and the reader's communication, which presents an unusual collision to the readers: the fictional entity seems to be contemplating and finally accepting its creator's idea of naming the story. Further on, we use situational models and scripts as mental representations of a set of cycles, which we also detect in the narrative structure of the novel. They connect different events and situations within themselves and correlate with each other. The semiotic and conceptual analyses reveal a clash of possible interpretation of circularity of the protagonist's life as a symbol of fatality that haunts Hilary Burde or as a symbol of revival and a vital chance of moral development. The plausibility of the second interpretation is sustained by the results of our further conceptual, semantic, and semiotic analyses.

Conceptual integration is deployed to demonstrate our interpretation of some of the main textual images. To the latter we refer the underground man, Peter Pan, the Christ

Child, Word, light, and Good. They constitute the symbolic and evaluative planes of the textual concepts GROWTH and SPIRITUALITY, which make a complex contribution to the SPIRITUAL GROWTH concept – the textual "megaconcept". By combining the evaluative features of the concepts GROWTH and SPIRITUALITY (high (+) vs. low (-)), we describe Hilary's gradual moral development as a three-stage process, which involves transformation from immature spirituality to the religious idea of redemption, and philosophical acclaim of love and forgiveness as the cornerstones of the universal Good.

Finally, the results of conceptual and literary analyses show that due to his moral transformations, Hilary becomes a "white" liar, having discovered in the end that truth can be deadly and lies can serve the Good.

Further research of the topic may include analysis of the role of tell-tale names in the novel, Shakespearian and other important reminiscences, other cases of intertextuality, as well as the author-narrator opposition present in the text.

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Résumé

This article offers a facet of cognitive perspective to the literary analysis of the novel "A word child" by Iris Murdoch. It illustrates how the peculiarities of compositional, semantic and semiotic features of the text promote our construing of circularity of the narrative and draw our attention to cyclicity of the protagonist's life. Our scheme of the narrative circle (Inner circle – A word child) presents a complicated process of our subjective perception of the author's, the narrator's and the reader's communication. Further on we use situational models and scripts as mental representations of a set of cycles, which we detect in the narrative structure of the novel. They connect different events and situations within themselves and correlate with each other. The semiotic and conceptual analyses reveal a clash of possible interpretation of circularity of the

protagonist's life as a symbol of fatality that haunts Hilary Burde or as a symbol of revival and a vital chance of moral development. Conceptual integration is deployed to demonstrate our interpretation of some of the main textual images. To the latter we refer the underground man, Peter Pan, the Christ Child, Word, light, and Good. They constitute the symbolic and evaluative planes of the textual concepts GROWTH and SPIRITUALITY, which make a complex contribution to the SPIRITUAL GROWTH concept – the textual "megaconcept". By combining the evaluative features of the concepts GROWTH and SPIRITUALITY (high (+) vs. low (-)), we describe Hilary's gradual moral development as a three-stage process, which involves transformation from immature spirituality to the religious idea of redemption, and philosophical acclaim of love and forgiveness as the cornerstones of the universal Good. Contrary to existing pessimistic interpretations of the novel, we show that the story of Hilary Burde is an artfully conceived and deeply inspiring piece of intellectual prose that prompts a philosophical dialog between Iris Murdoch and her readers.

FROM CORPUS-ASSISTED TO CORPUS-DRIVEN
NSM EXPLICATIONS:
THE CASE OF FINNISH *VIHA* (ANGER, HATE)

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Abstract: NSM researchers have not used corpus data very systematically thus far. One could talk about corpus-assisted rather than corpus-based or corpus-driven research. This article suggests a way to not only base research on corpus data, but also to let it guide us in defining words in terms of NSM. It presents a new method, which we have developed. Our data come from the *Suomi24 Sentences Corpus* and concerns the Finnish emotion words *viha* ('anger, hate'), *vihata* ('to hate') and *vihainen* ('angry').

Key words: anger, emotion, the Finnish language, Natural Semantic Metalanguage, semantics.

1. Introduction

The introduction begins with discussing previous research on anger. It then specifies the aims of the current research and introduces our data and method.

1.1 Previous research on anger

Anger has been a popular topic in emotion studies ever since Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) posited a central metaphor for it in American English: ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER. Since then, many studies have been written on metaphors of anger in other languages (cf., Yu 1995). However, the conceptualization of anger-like emotions across different languages has also been studied in other theoretical frameworks, such as the NSM framework (cf., Durst 2001), where NSM stands for Natural Semantic Metalanguage. This is a mini-language consisting of about 65 words, developed by Wierzbicka and her collaborators in order to define all remaining words of any language. These 65 words are called semantic primes (see Wierzbicka 1996; the NSM homepage[1]).

Previous research by Tuovila (2005: 71) has established that *viha* 'hatred, anger' is cognitively the most salient emotion for speakers of Finnish. However, while the Finnish *viha* differs from the English *anger*, for example, there is little research to suggest what the exact difference is. The aim of this paper is to suggest an inter-subjective, corpus-based definition of the Finnish word *viha* and its derivatives in terms of NSM. However, suggesting definitions is not our only aim. Our primary aim is to develop the semantic methodology.

1.2 Aims of research

The main purpose of the project was to investigate two methodological questions. One was how the NSM method could be combined with corpus linguistics. The other was what happens if three linguists conduct an analysis together. The latter question seems particularly relevant given that analyses are rather rarely replicated by peer semanticists, although inter-rater agreement is sometimes measured (Zeschel 2010).

We chose the Finnish root word *viha* 'hatred, anger' as our topic for several reasons. Firstly, this emotion is potentially of interest to people from many different fields, including those doing research on or otherwise working with issues related to hate

speech (in Finnish, *vihapuhe*). People in this field seem more likely to define *hate speech* than *hate*, although there is an important connection between the two words or concepts (Vitikka 2014: 2-3, 9-15; Weber 2009: 3-5). Secondly, anger has been the focus of many linguistic semantic studies (Durst 2001; Lakoff & Kövecses 1987; Maalej 2004; Ogarkova et al. 2016; Yu 1995). Thirdly, *viha* seems to be a Finnish cultural keyword (Tuovila 2005: 71). Moreover, it seems to differ from anger words in other languages because the same root, *viha**, can be used to express emotions ranging from anger to hate (the asterisk indicates that *viha** is the root, the stem, so to say, of many other words). However, it is difficult to pin down exactly what the difference is between, for example, *viha* in Finnish and *hate* in English.

1.3 Introduction to relevant methodological issues

It is particularly useful to combine the NSM method with the corpus method in the case of *viha* because emotions are a favourite topic among NSM researchers (Harkins & Wierzbicka 2001; Wierzbicka 1999). The strength of NSM is its semantic differentiating power. It allows us to differentiate, for example, between such English words as *pleased*, *contented,* and *delighted* (Wierzbicka 1999: 54-57). Furthermore, NSM research on words for emotions suggests that the emotion lexicon of each language is culturally bound rather than universal, beginning with such basic words as *feeling* (Wierzbicka 1995).

However, there is a call for anchoring NSM research in clearly specified, authentic data in a way that would allow the research to be replicated. So far, most of the work on NSM has not been explicitly based on systematically collected corpus data. For example, Wierzbicka (1999: 49-121) does not document where she obtained the data to define English emotion words, including the adjective *angry*.

Increasingly, NSM researchers seem to mention that they have used corpus data while writing definitions for words, but they seldom explain in what way this was done. It seems that corpora have mainly been used to find examples to illustrate definitions that

have already been created instead of the corpora explaining the definitions to begin with. The former kind of corpus use could be called corpus-assisted research, while the latter could be called corpus-driven research.

The term *corpus-driven* was introduced by Tognini-Bonelli (2001: 85) who described the corpus-driven approach as one in which "[t]he corpus ... is seen as more than a repository of examples to back pre-existing theories", the result being that "[t]he theoretical statements are fully consistent with, and reflect directly, the evidence provided by the corpus". Corpus-driven research is usually associated with large sets of data or at least refined statistical methods. In this article, we will mainly use it to refer to a "nitty-gritty manual analysis of semantic features of a small corpus sample", which does not yet represent but could be developed into multivariate research (Glynn 2010: 17).

A third term, *corpus-based*, has also been used. According to Tognini-Bonelli (2001: 65), it has sometimes been used rather vaguely. She recommends that it be used "to refer to a methodology that avails itself of the corpus mainly to expound, test or exemplify theories or descriptions that were formulated before large corpora became available to inform language study" (ibid., 65).

1.4 Introduction to our data and method

We wanted to approach the meaning of *viha* in an innovative way. We therefore used clearly specified corpus data to define our term, but we also aimed at an inter-subjective definition. The idea was to use the judgements of three native speakers rather than that of a single researcher to arrive at a definition of *viha*. We focused on three words beginning with the stem *viha**: *viha* (the noun), *vihata* (a verb), and *vihainen* (an adjective).

Our data came from a corpus called *Suomi24*, which "contains all the discussion forums of the Suomi24 online social networking website from January, 1 2001 to September

24, 2016 available in the Suomi24 API" (the Suomi 24 Sentences Corpus webpage[2]). This means that our relatively small-scale semantic analysis can be compared to research on big data in order to highlight the differences between the findings in differently sized data sets. A project called *Citizen Mindscapes* is working on the same data right now but in a different way, considering it as a whole, as big data. It includes a subproject called "Kansakunnan tunneaallot" ("Waves of citizens' emotions") (Lagus et al. 2016).

There are at least two ways of using corpora to create NSM-based definitions of words. One is to read the corpus data on a given word and then formulate an NSM-based definition of it (Fabiszak 2000). The other is to write NSM-based definitions of the different senses of a word such as *viha* and then analyze how often these senses occur in a corpus. We decided to combine these two approaches by starting from a set of fixed definitions and adding to them on the basis of our analysis. However, eventually we developed a completely new method of creating NSM-based definitions. In brief, we began to do corpus-based research on *viha*, but ended up doing corpus-driven research. In other words, our data eventually began to inform us as to the best way to analyze the material.

2. Our inter-subjective method: The process

Here, we will explain what we planned to do and how the plan changed in the middle of the process. This research was supposed to be conducted in two stages to begin with, but the second stage was not realized in the way it was originally planned.

2.1 The starting point

One of us had been working with Cliff Goddard on an NSM-based definition of the Finnish word *viha* even before we began to collaborate on this topic. The other two researchers had worked on the difference between the psychological representations of *viha* in Finnish and Estonian. The Finnish and Estonian words for *viha* share the same root, but do not use it in exactly the same way (Realo et al. 2013). Two of us (Siiroinen

2001; Tissari 2003) had also worked on words for emotions in Finnish and in English respectively. In addition, another two of us had worked on translating the Natural Semantic Metalanguage from English into Finnish (Vanhatalo et al. 2014). This seemed like a good team to continue working on *viha*.

Etymologically, the word *viha* entered the Finnish language from Proto Aryan *viša* meaning 'poison, bile', and until very recently its meaning has actually been 'bitter' or 'acrid' (Etymological Dictionary of Finnish 2000, s.v. *viha*; here the asterisk means that this is an assumed proto-form that does not exist in any natural language). Many present-day Finnish words begin with the root *viha**. There are a number of compounds, like the previously mentioned *vihapuhe* 'hate speech', and derivatives such as *vihaaja* 'hater'. After discussing the representation of such words in several dictionaries, we chose the three basic words on which we focussed: *viha* (noun), *vihata* (verb), and *vihainen* (adjective).

The main reason for using corpus data in our research was that we wanted to base our definitions on authentic modern Finnish. There were many corpora to choose from. We chose the *Suomi 24 Sentences Corpus* as our data set because the material was recent and because we assumed that the language of internet discussion forums would be close to spoken Finnish. That would allow us to investigate people's everyday language rather than professional vocabularies, such as legal or newspaper language. The caveat of course remains that we only deal with one type of everyday discourse. The contexts which we gleaned from the corpus by creating Excel tables with random examples of words were rather short, usually only one-sentence long.[3]

As mentioned above, the plan was to write NSM-based definitions of the different senses of *viha* and then analyze how often these meanings occur in the corpus. The data for this purpose consisted of 900 random instances, 300 occurrences of each word. The idea was to measure whether three linguists would agree on which instances would correspond to each definition. We started from a relatively short list of seven

definitions, assuming that we could use the same three definitions for the verb and noun. The list included three definitions for the verb and noun, which we assumed would mean approximately the same thing, one additional definition for the verb, and three for the adjective. These definitions can be found below in section "3.1. The first round". Each of us was also allowed to create new definitions in the course of analyzing the data.

It should perhaps be mentioned that we did not use the NSM-based definition of the Finnish *viha* presented by Tuovila (2005: 100). The reason is that it does not particularly differ from Wierzbicka's definitions of the English word *anger*. It can be compared, for example, with Wierzbicka's (1992: 569) definition of *anger*:

anger
X feels something
sometimes a person thinks something like this:
this person did something bad
I don't want this
because of this, I want to do something
I would want to do something bad to this person
because of this, this person feels something bad
X feels like this

In effect, what Tuovila (2005: 100) did was to eliminate the idea that anger needs to be directed towards another person. Therefore, her definition simply suggests that something bad happened and that X did not want this. Even in Tuovila's (2005: 100) definition, X wants to do something. Moreover, she added the idea that *viha* lasts for a long time, which could be a characteristic of the Finnish word, in particular as compared to the English *anger*.

2.2 The sequel

The original plan was for the researchers to discuss the analysis of the 900 examples together in order to arrive at final definitions for each word and then re-analyze the data to test whether the rate of agreement would be higher in the second round. However, analyzing and discussing the data proved to be more challenging than anticipated. The analysis took longer than we expected. After the analysis had been conducted, it was possible for us to discuss the definitions each of us tended to favour and what kinds of details were missing from the initial definitions, but it was impossible to discuss every occurrence of each word. At the same time, it was clear that we could discuss single sentences at length and that each of us would notice different things. We ended up discussing the kinds of features that should be added to the definitions and opting for a new method of analysis.

In the new plan, the starting point was a list of features in the style of "someone X feels very bad" and "someone X does something", which each of us then tried to apply to our first one hundred random examples of the one word allotted to her. The idea was to see how often each feature would occur and let that inform our definitions of the noun, verb, and adjective. In other words, we dismissed the idea that each of us should continue to analyze the very same data, although we began the second round by analyzing together ten examples of each word to ensure that we understood the features in the same way. In the process of analysis we nevertheless realized that it was more difficult to decide whether some features appeared than others; we also found that we did not fully agree on what was easy and what was difficult to decide.

In addition, it should be mentioned that our analysis was possibly influenced by the fact that the same person who collected the data for a particular word also analyzed the word in the second round. The decision was a good one in that the person was the most familiar with the data, yet the outcome of the analysis could have been slightly different if each of us had analyzed data with which we were less familiar.

Finally, we discussed the outcome of the analysis and also showed it to a fourth person who commented on how it could be developed using statistics. However, instead of proceeding to a third analysis, we stopped there to define what the noun, verb, and adjective mean in present-day, online Finnish and to consider how the method could be developed. Note, however, that this article already suggests a significant development in corpus-assisted research and helps us to make NSM analyses more reliable and replicable than before.

3. Findings

This section discusses the first and second stages of our research separately. They will then be summarized and compared.

3.1 The first round

This section will begin by introducing our seven preliminary definitions for the noun, verb, and adjective forms of *viha*, and will continue by discussing what happened when each of us decided which occurrence of each word corresponded with which definition and also when a further definition was needed. I will include an example from our data if at least two of us agreed on which category it fits. As regards two definitions of the adjective, we did not in fact reach an agreement between any two of us about any instance of a particular word. One of us found the adjective so difficult to analyze that she only finished analyzing seven examples. Another created seven new definitions of her own for the adjective. It is also good to mention at this point that we considered the meaning of the word to vary both according to the intensity of the emotion and according to its target being human or non-human.

To begin with, the following definitions for the verb *vihata*, which we also used for the noun *viha*, had already been written by Ulla Vanhatalo and Cliff Goddard (each definition will be accompanied by an example; all examples were translated by Mari Siiroinen):

First definition of the verb *vihata*:
someone X vihaa(1) someone Y
someone X thinks like this about someone Y for some time:
this someone Y is someone very bad
I want something bad to happen to this someone
I can't not do something / I want to do something
because of this, this someone X feels something very bad towards this someone Y
many people think about other people like this
many people think it is very bad if someone thinks like this about someone

(1) *Näi-den asio-i-den peittelijö-i-tä kohtaan tunne-n **viha-a**.*

these-GEN thing-PL-GEN coverer-PL-PAR towards feel-1SG hatred-PAR

'I feel *hatred* towards people who cover up these things.'

Second definition of the verb *vihata*:
someone X vihaa(2) something Z
someone X thinks like this about something Z for some time:
something Z is something very bad of this kind
I don't want to do anything with this something Z
at the same time, I know that I can't not do something with this something Z
because of this, this someone X feels something very bad towards this something Z
many people can think about many things like this
many people think it is not bad if someone thinks like this

(2) *Ei, taistolainen **viha-a** kaikke-a läntis-tä.*

no communist *hate*-3SG everything-PAR western-PAR

'No, a communist hates everything that represents the West.'

Third definition of the verb *vihata*:
someone X vihaa(3) someone Y / something Z
someone X feels very bad
this someone X thinks like this
I feel very bad because of someone Y / something Z
because of this,
this someone X thinks something very bad about this someone Y / something Z
this someone X can say something very bad about this someone Y / something Z
many people think like this:
it is bad if someone thinks like this
you cannot think bad about someone if you don't know you feel bad because this someone did something

(3) *mutta Ben ei ole suosittu ja pidetty joten ei ole syytä*

but Ben not+3SG be popular and liked so not+3SG be reason -INF1

*kadehti-a ja **vihat-a** vaikka on-kin hyvän-näköinen*

envy--INF1 and hate-INF1 even be+3SG-CLT good-looking

'But Ben is not popular and beloved so there is no reason to envy and *hate* him, although he is good-looking.'

We wrote a fourth definition for the verb alone. It suggests that sometimes a person can hate something rather lightly and that it is not considered a bad thing:

Fourth definition of the verb *vihata*:
someone X vihaa(4) someone Y / something Z
someone X thinks like this about someone Y / something Z
I feel bad because of someone Y / something Z
because of this,
this someone X thinks / says something bad about this someone Y / something Z

many people think like this:
you can sometimes say this, it is not bad

(4) *Tais-i-t* **vihat-a** *myös koulu-ssa*

might-PST-2SG hate-INF1 also school-INE

äidin-kiele-n-tunte-j-a?

mother-tongue-GEN -lesson-PL-PAR

'I guess you also *hated* Finnish lessons at school?'

The difference between our first two initial definitions of the adjective was that a person is angry either with another person or at a thing. The third definition suggested the possibility of being angry with someone without an objective cause, simply because that person unintentionally irritates the experiencer of anger. The definitions were the following:

First definition of the adjective *vihainen*:
someone X is vihainen$_{(1)}$ at/with someone Y
someone X thinks like this about someone Y at this time
this someone Y did something at some time before
this someone Y could know at this time that something bad can happen because of this
this is bad
I feel something bad now because of this
because of this, this someone feels bad towards someone Y at this time
many people can think like this at many times about many people

(5) *Älä ole* **vihainen**.

no+IMP be angry

'Don't be *angry*.'

Second definition of the adjective *vihainen*:
someone X is vihainen$_{(2)}$ at/with something Z
someone X thinks like this about something Z at this time
something Z is bad now
this is bad
I feel something bad because of this
I can't do many things
because of this, this someone feels bad towards something Z at this time
many people can think like this at many times about many things

Third definition of the adjective *vihainen*:
someone X is vihainen$_{(3)}$ at/with someone Y
someone X thinks like this now
I feel bad because of someone Y
I know that this someone Y did not do anything bad
because of this, this someone feels bad towards someone Y at this time
many people think that it is bad if someone thinks like this

In brief, we acknowledged that we did not agree in our analysis of the data, although we did agree that most of the instances of the verb corresponded to our basic definition of *vihata*. Two of us also seemed to agree about which definition was best for the noun. However, we also created many new definitions for the words, containing new features. For example, one of us wanted to distinguish between non-religious and religious anger in the case of the noun and between angry people and angry animals in the case of the adjective. Another one of us wanted to distinguish between anger or hatred directed at single persons as opposed to groups of people, such as those professing certain religions or sexual orientations. The analyst who created seven new definitions for the adjective later summarized the adjective in three short definitions, suggesting that a

person can be *vihainen* ('angry') (1) in general, (2) at a person, and (3) about a thing. In the first case, the focus is on the fact that a person is unhappy and wants to say something negative or even shout.

Table 1 shows our analysis of the noun *viha*. Although the plan was to analyze 300 instances of the word, in fact we did not each analyze exactly the same number of examples. Analysts A and C analyzed 327 examples, but then realized that some of them actually represented some other word or occurred several times ("a mistake"). The table shows that two of us, A and B, thought that definition number three corresponded to the meaning of the noun in approximately two-thirds of the cases. However, analyst C favoured definition number one. She also used additional definitions of her own in 35% of the cases. Analyst A added her own definitions in 16% of the cases, while analyst B was almost satisfied with the existing definitions. However, A considered about one-fifth of the instances unclear and did not categorize them at all. If we consider the analysis of the noun in terms of a chi square analysis, it suggests that it is extremely unlikely that the differences among the three analysts are random (P = 4.4E-100).[4] In other words, each of us seemed to analyze the data on the noun in an idiosyncratic way.

Table 1. The analysis of the noun *viha*

Analyst (number of instances analyzed)	Definition 1	Definition 2	Definition 3	Additional Definition	Unclear	Mistake
A (327)	9 %	4 %	62 %	16 %	9 %	0 %
B (301)	26 %	4 %	67 %	1 %	2 %	1 %
C (327)	61 %	1 %	1 %	35 %	0 %	2 %

Table 2 presents our analysis of the verb *vihata*. It shows our agreement that more than half the instances matched definition number one. However, we disagreed about the remaining definitions. A categorized almost all the data under definition one or two

and considered the rest of the data as unclear. B and C disagreed about how best to categorize the data that did not fall under definition number one. Analyst C considered it best to create additional definitions, which in her view applied to one-fifth of the data. Analysts A and B, however, did not see the need to create additional definitions. A chi square test comparing these analyses again suggests that it is extremely unlikely that these differences among the three analysts are random (P =2.35E-55).

Table 2. The analysis of the verb *vihata*

Analyst (number of instances analyzed)	Definition 1	Definition 2	Definition 3	Definition 4	Additional definition	Unclear
A (308)	72 %	26 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	1 %
B (308)	51 %	17 %	28 %	3 %	0 %	1 %
C (308)	64 %	7 %	6 %	2 %	19 %	1 %

Table 3 shows that the analysis of the adjective *vihainen* proved to be the most difficult. One of us found it impossible to match the definitions with the data. Another created categories of her own, while a third thought that definition one applied to most of the examples. Given the lack of congruence in all of these areas, the task of creating better definitions together in order to streamline the analysis seemed overwhelming and accounts for why we decided to continue in a different way.

Table 3. The analysis of the adjective *vihainen* (which also included the form *vihanen*)

Analyst (number of instances analyzed)	Definition 1	Definition 2	Definition 3	Additional definition	Unclear	Mistake
A (7)	1 %	1 %	1 %	0 %	98 %	0 %
B (243)	8 %	7 %	7 %	78 %	0 %	0 %
C (298)	62 %	9 %	2 %	26 %	0 %	1 %

However, one more thing should be pointed out here. We also noticed that in two cases, the person who had collected the data on a particular word decided to include many additional definitions. B, who collected the data on the adjective, created seven additional definitions, and C, who collected the data on the noun, created eleven additional categories, which she thought would apply both to the noun and the verb. A, who collected the data on the verb, also had many comments pertaining to the verb and the noun. To summarize this section, in the first round we categorized the data according to the definitions that we had created in advance, but this did not work very well, because we ended up adding many definitions and disagreeing about which definition applied to which occurrence of a word in the data.

3.2 The second round

In the second round, the starting point was completely different. The analysis was based on a list of features created on the basis of our discussion in the first round. The term *feature* here refers to approximately one line in a potential definition, for example, "the subject thinks like this: I feel bad". The subject here is the experiencer of the emotion. The word *subject* is not a semantic prime, but rather should be seen as a so-called molecule, which could be defined separately for the purpose of this analysis (Goddard 2011: 194-195).

The list we used in the second round consisted of around thirty features, depending slightly on which word was in question, and each of us focused only on the first one hundred random examples of one of the words. We also used a scale from 1 (a very reliable criterion) to 4 (a very unreliable criterion) to evaluate how challenging it was to use the feature in the analysis. The result was that each word received a profile of its own, consisting of features in the order of their frequency and a reliability assessment. The list of features we used and the profiles can be found in the appendices. This section will supply comments on the analysis of each word. It will contain the definitions we created as a result of the feature analysis.

The features in the list in Appendix 1 were created using the NSM language as presented on the NSM homepage, adding the molecules *subject* and *object*. Molecules are usually marked with the subscript *[m]* but, in order to keep the features easier to read, we did not use the subscript. We also used the word *but*, even though it is not a semantic prime. Further information explaining the features was added in parentheses. For example, features which were used for only one or two words are followed by the word class(es). In addition, the analyst who dealt with the adjective marked every metonymy in her data. We did not manage to define metonymy in terms of NSM.

Appendix 2 contains three graphs showing how often each of the features occurred in our final analyses. Here, we will discuss the main findings. The numbers in brackets after each feature in the definitions show how often that feature occurred in the data, in other words, how many times the feature occurred in a set of one hundred examples. Boldface suggests that the analyst was uncertain about the applicability of the feature. We used a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 marked the most reliable criterion. The feature is italicized if the analyst chose the number 3 or 4 for reliability.

To begin with the noun, the analyst recommended three definitions. The first definition suggests that someone feels hatred towards a group of people ("the same kinds of people"), that other people notice and do not approve of this attitude and that the commentator is one of the other people:

First revised definition of the noun *viha*:
the subject is people (91)
***the subject thinks like this: I feel bad** (80)*
the subject is someone other than the one who says the word (65)
many people think they know why the subject thinks like this (19)

there is an object (70)
the object is a part of the same kinds of people (34)
many people think like this: the subject thinks something bad about the object (34)
many people think like this: it is bad if someone thinks like the subject thinks (73)
the subject says something bad about the object (23)
***the subject does or can do something bad** (17)*
the subject does this for a long time (32)

The following is an example of this kind of hate:

(6) *Samaa **vihaa** sekä **juutalaisviha**,*

same *hatred*-PAR also jew-*hatred*

homoviha ja islamistiviha,

gay-*hatred* and islamist-*hatred*

ensin kiihoittamista noita ryhmiä vastaan joko taloussyillä tai vääräuskoisuussyillä tai muilla tekaistuilla syillä ja sitten vaan toimeksi tilanteen muuttamiseksi jos hallinto tai suuri äänekäs os [sic] ihmisistä niin vaatii.

Hatred of Jews, gays and Muslims is the same; first someone incites other people to act against those groups for economic or religious or other fictitious reasons, and then if the government or a loud majority of people so requires, it is time to act to change the situation.

The second definition suggests a similar kind of hatred, but this time towards an individual person or persons who do not form an ethnic, religious or comparable group:

Second revised definition of the noun *viha*:
the subject is people (91)
***the subject thinks like this: I feel bad** (80)*
the subject is someone other than the one who says the word (65)
many people think they know why the subject thinks like this (19)
there is an object (70)
the object is someone or some people (25)
many people think like this: the subject thinks something bad about the object (34)
***many people think like this: it is bad if someone thinks like the subject thinks** (73)*
the subject says something bad about the object (23)
***the subject does or can do something bad** (17)*
the subject does this for a long time (32)

Example (7) shows this kind of hatred:

(7) *Mitäs sitä suotta **vihaasi***

what PRT in+vain *hatred*-PAR-2SGPX

kasvatat Jasminia kohtaa [sic].

grow-2SG Jasmin-PAR against

Why do you unnecessarily cause your hate for Jasmin to grow?

The third definition could even consist of one feature: the word is the subject (26). It would suffice to distinguish it from other kinds of hate. However, it is clear that other features are also involved, although which features is less clear. An example is the following:

(8) *Tuo **viha** perustuu täysin*

that *hatred* is+based-3SG entirely

valheeseen ja juoruihin, joita

lie-ILL and gossip-PL-ILL which

kukaan ei viitsi tarkistaa, miten pitävät

no+one not bother check how hold

paikkansa.

place

Such hate is entirely based on lies and gossip, and no-one bothers to check if such things are true.

The analyst who worked with the verb *vihata* recommended two definitions for it. Here is the first one, which probably gives the main or prototypical sense:

First revised definition of the verb *vihata*:
vihata₁
*there is someone X (98) **who thinks something bad** (76) about someone Y or something else (90) for all time (89)*
many people think like this
***X feels bad** (81)*
I know why X feels bad (27)
it is bad if someone thinks like X thinks (78)
***X doesn't want to be near Y** (40)*
it is not X who says the word "vihata" (80)

Example (9) shows a case where the object of hate is not a person:

(9) *Pelaaja-t **vihaa-vat** ruotsi-a, koska hei-lle*

player-PL *hate*-3PL swedish-PAR because they-ALL

kiele-stä ei ole hyöty-ä.

language-ELA not be use-PAR

The players hate Swedish, because that language is of no use to them.

In example (10), the verb is used for an emotion occurring between people:

(10) *Luulet ihmisten **vihaa-va-n** sinua mutta se ei*

think-2SG person-PL+GEN *hate*-PCP-GEN you-PAR but it not

pidä paikka-a-nsa vaan on sinun oma-a mielikuvitus-ta-si

hold place-PAR-3PX but be+PRS+3SG you-GEN own-PAR imagination-PAR-2SGPX

kuten tarina-si.

like story-2SGPX

You think that people hate you, but it is not true. Rather, you imagine it like you imagine your story.

The second sense of *vihata* in the current data is surprisingly frequent as well, because the hatred seems to be directed towards a group of people in almost half the cases. The definition is as follows:

Second revised definition of the verb *vihata*:
vihata₂
*there is someone X (98) who **thinks something bad** (76) about someone Y for all time (89)*
Y is a part of the same kind of people (48)
many people think
***X feels bad** (81)*
I know why X feels bad (27)
it is bad if someone thinks like X thinks (78)

X doesn't want to be near Y (40)
it is not X who says the word "vihata" (80)

The writers of examples (11) and (12) used the verb *vihata₂* in this sense:

(11) *Joo ja muslimi rasisti on täydellinen*

yes and Muslim racist be+3SG perfect

*vaikka hän kuinka **vihaisi** meitä*

even (s)he how *hate*-COND+3SG us

vääräuskoisia.

unbelievers

Yes, and a Muslim racist is perfect, regardless of how much s/he would hate us unbelievers.

(12) *Ensin **vihaa** homoja ja*

First *hate*-3SG gay-PL-PAR and

sittten [sic] pariin otteeseen rinnastaa

then 'a couple of times' compare-3SG

ne ja niiden puolustajat

them and they-GEN defender-s

naisiin.

woman-PL-ILL

First, he hates gays and then he compares them and their defenders to women a couple of times.

This round also produced a definition of the main or prototypical sense of the adjective *vihainen*:

<mark>**Revised definition of the adjective *vihainen*:**</mark>
<mark>**vihainen**</mark>
there is someone X who is feeling bad (73)
it is not X who says the word "vihainen" (55)
there is a reason for X's feeling bad (34)
many people think it is bad if someone thinks like X thinks (23)

The adjective *vihainen* occurs in this sense in example (13):

(13) *Suomessa ei toivottavasti päästetä*

Finland-INE not hopefully let-PASS

*ikinä **vihaisia** maahanmuuttokriitikoita*

ever *angry*-PL-PAR immigration-critics

päättämään nuorten

decide-INF young-PL+GEN

tulevaisuudesta.

future-ELA

Hopefully, nobody will ever let angry immigration critics decide the future of young people in Finland.

There are also examples in the data, which attest to less serious anger or attest to the kind of hate that seems to be accepted by the writer, as shown by examples (14) and (15):

(14) *Äiti on vähän **vihainen***

mother be+3SG little *angry*

kun on niin paljon tavaraa kadoksissa.

when be+3SG so many things missing

Mother is a little angry because so many things are missing.

(15) *Kansa on todella **vihainen** näi-lle päättäj-i-lle*

people be+3SG really *angry* these-ALL decider-PL-ALL

ja varsinkin niille taho-i-lle ja henkilö-i-lle jotka

and especially those-PL-ALL party-PL-ALL and person-PL-ALL that

eniten o-vat syyllis-i-ä tähän hulluute-en.

most be-3PL guilty-PL-PAR this-ILL madness-ILL

The people are really angry with these decision-makers and particularly with those parties and persons who are most guilty of this madness.

3.3 Summary

To sum up the first round, we did not agree on how to analyze the adjective *vihainen*. We agreed the most on the definition of the verb *vihata*. The first definition was favoured in all three analyses, covering a minimum of half the data. Two of us also agreed that the third definition covered a major part, around two-thirds, of the occurrences of the noun *viha*. (See section 3.1. for the definitions.)

There seem to be three main differences between these two definitions. Firstly, some features, which characterize the verb, do not seem to characterize the noun. They are as follows: the subject thinks that the object of hate is very bad, and the subject wants that something bad will happen to the object, but cannot do anything even though s/he wants to. Secondly, the hate expressed by the noun could be described in less concrete terms. The subject simply thinks something bad about the object and may therefore say something very bad about the object. Furthermore, in the case of the noun, the object is not necessarily a human being.

Interestingly, it is possible to consider our agreement even in the second round. We all agreed that some features characterized each of the words. Those were in fact the features that sum up the main meaning of the adjective: someone is feeling bad and there is a reason for it; however, it is not that someone himself or herself who reports the feeling, and, in many people's opinion, that particular someone thinks in the wrong

way about the object. In other words, the feeling that is reported is evaluated negatively; it is the wrong feeling.

Two of us also agreed on one point as regards the reliability of analyzing the features in the final definitions. The agreement concerned the feature that suggests that the person who feels *viha* or is the subject of the verb *vihata* feels bad. It seemed to us that feeling bad is part of feeling *viha*. However, at the same time we realized that the contexts gave us few clues as to whether that was actually the case. This was especially so because it was usually not the angry people themselves who reported *viha*.

To follow this up, it should be mentioned that it was difficult to decide whose point of view the analysis should reflect: Should we try to evaluate what someone is feeling or should we instead rely on the reporter's judgement? Can we do that without adding our subjective interpretation? How much do all of these rely on general opinion? Should we try to assume a general point of view? We attempted to solve these problems by using formulations such as "the subject thinks like this" and "many people think like this", but this discussion should be continued.

That the definitions presented above were not formulated exactly in terms of our final list of features in Appendix 1 reflects the fact that the discussions concerning both the perspective and the formulation of the features and definitions continued to the very end of our project. We decided that everything need not be fixed at this point.

4. Discussion

Many issues concerning the process and its outcome could be discussed here. We decided to focus on four things: what the process tells us about inter-subjective semantic analyses, what it tells us about the coupling of the NSM method with the corpus method, what it tells us about the use of the words in question, and how it relates to issues that concern a broader audience. The words *broader audience* refer not only to semanticists who use different methods and other linguists, but also to non-linguists.

4.1 The inter-subjective process

There were two things in particular that came as surprises regarding the inter-subjective process. The first was that 900 examples were too many for the kind of two-stage process that was initially planned to measure inter-rater agreement. The other was that we thought differently not only about the data, but also about the process. In other words, it was not only inter-rater agreement that was the issue, but also how best to conduct the analysis. However, it was the solution to this dilemma that eventually led us to see the data in a new way. Consequently, the inter-subjective process can be regarded as rather fruitful, not in spite of our differences as analysts, but exactly because of them. It was good that we had to explain and at times even question our analyses, because it led to a learning process for all of us.

The number of examples was too high for two reasons. Firstly, it took us much longer to conduct the analysis than we had planned. In fact, the entire analysis of 900 instances was never performed by all of us. This showed, above all, that each of us had a different approach to semantic analysis, which was in fact the second issue. One of us thought that it was normal to analyze such a number of instances in corpus linguistics, while the two others would have liked to restrict the set of data and pay more attention to detail. It was exactly such detail, which then proved to be impossible to discuss in a limited number of hours when we met to talk about the first round of analysis.

One way to go forward in the second round would have been to pay more attention to grammar, but we chose to focus on the features included in the definitions. It was much easier to discuss the second analyses face-to-face, because the data set was so limited. We could in fact print out an analysis of one hundred examples, take a look at it and discuss it. This showed the whole in a completely new light. We can therefore recommend that anyone attempting to reach inter-rater agreement in an NSM-based analysis should begin with a relatively small set of data.

4.2 Coupling the corpus method with the NSM method

The main finding was that our view of optimal NSM-based definitions would be likely to change if everyone based their analyses on authentic data. Traditionally, NSM researchers have based their definitions of words for emotions on so-called templates (Goddard 2011: 105-107). Although such templates also formed the basis for our preliminary definitions, we moved away from the templates in the second round when considering which features actually occurred in the data. A middle way would be not to abandon the idea of templates, but to improve previous templates with the help of authentic data, or to develop new ones. That would allow us easier comparisons between different words and languages.

There are at least two advantages of continuing work on how to base an NSM definition of a word on authentic data, such as, for example, corpus data. One is that semanticists will be less likely to pay attention only to things that have been noticed before, which always involves the risk of missing something important. We ended up discussing questions we had not read about in previous research, such as the length of context required to identify a particular feature in the definition of a word and the grammatical variation in the sentences attesting the words. On the other hand, we also noticed that NSM definitions of emotions are likely to include features that are not based on how people actually use the words for those emotions. Another advantage is that semanticists will be obliged to explain in more detail what kinds of data they used and why. This will add to the replicability of the research and also to reliability, because their peers will then have the chance to check whether they agree with the analysis.

However, we also encountered issues in the corpus analysis, which we have not yet resolved. Firstly, a short corpus context did not tell us as much as we expected. Either we would have needed a larger context or people did not tend to verbalize all the features that we were interested in, for example, what angry people do when they use the *viha* words. We would have liked to know more about the features "the subject does something", "the subject does or can do something bad" and "the subject does

something very bad", but it was usually impossible to say whether the subject did something or not, let alone whether that something was bad or very bad. At the same time, the sentences included many characteristics that we were not able to capture in our analyses.

Moreover, we realized in our oral conversation with Mietta Lennes[5], a phonetician accustomed to working with such features, that, while our list of features could be used as a basis for further studies, it could also be developed further. Above all, it was not an optimal list for statistical analyses. For example, while the applicability of features was designed to be answered in terms of "yes-no" questions, their formulation could have been more logical: the features were not exactly the same for all the words, and they overlapped to some extent. We had also not considered the possibility that the answer to whether a feature would apply to an example might not be "yes" or "no" but rather "not relevant". Furthermore, we had not considered the notion that some features were likely to be dependent on each other. In other words, the features probably form groups and hierarchies. All these matters could be taken into account in a future project. Such a project could also develop the valuable idea that some features (or semantic criteria) can be evaluated in a more reliable manner than others.

4.3 The use of the words

Above all, there were two main findings concerning the use of the studied words that we did not know at the start. One was that, when Finnish people use the *viha* words online, they usually are not referring to their own emotions. Instead, they are interpreting other people's behaviour. The other was another main difference between Wierzbicka's (1992: 569) definition of the English *anger* and our definitions of *viha*, namely that Finns tend to have a negative attitude towards someone manifesting *viha*. Usually, this had to do with the fact that people regard someone as hating people whom they should not hate.

While it could be assumed that the adjective *vihainen* 'angry' is closer to the English

concept of *anger* than the verb and noun *viha(ta)* 'hate', the negative attitude towards anger or hate seemed to characterise even the use of the adjective. Wierzbicka's definitions of the English *angry with* and *angry at* (1999: 88-89) do not include any such feature.

At this point, we need to acknowledge Tuovila's (2005: 100) observation that the Finnish *viha* tends to last for a long time. Although this feature was not included in our preliminary definitions, it ended up in our definitions of the noun and verb *viha(ta)* in the second round. It is nevertheless not unique to Finns. Kornacki (2001: 269) uses it to define the Chinese concept of *sheng/qi*. It would be interesting to investigate other languages in which this meaning occurs.

It is likely that the length of anger rather than its quality distinguishes the adjective *vihainen* from the two other words: someone who is *vihainen* is assumed to experience something similar to someone who feels *viha* or expresses *vihata*, but this feeling or expression will not last for a long time. This could be considered a third important finding. Our data were also somewhat more likely to suggest a reason for a person's being *vihainen* than for them to experience *viha* or show *vihata* (the numbers in the second round were 34 as opposed to 19 and 27 respectively).

A further difference between Wierzbicka's (1992: 569) definition of the English *anger* and our definitions concerning the noun and verb *viha(ta)* can also be noted. It was that in our definitions, *viha* tended to be directed at representatives of a group at least as often as at individuals.

If we compare our definitions of *viha* with Durst's (2001) definitions of the German words *Ärger*, *Wut* and *Zorn*, we find that the same features of referring to other people's emotions, criticizing their anger or hate and hating representatives of a group are also missing. The same applies to Kornacki's (2001) definitions of the Chinese words for anger.

The question is whether the differences between the above-mentioned languages have to do with the languages themselves, the data analyzed or the methods used. In other words, it is possible that people have not paid attention to such features because they are missing in the templates used.

It could also be assumed that since anger and hate are negative emotions, people will always have a negative attitude towards them. Such an assumption is nevertheless contradicted by Kornacki's (2001: 277) data on the Chinese anger word *fen*, because his definition suggests that it can sometimes be good for a person to feel it. Even our own data include examples in which the emotion is not evaluated negatively.

Interestingly, Bardzokas (2004: 8, 12) includes the feature "people could see X felt like this" in his definitions of the English adjectives *irate* and *mad*. His definition of *mad* also includes the feature "people could see X did something bad because of this" (ibid. 12). He also includes the feature "people could see X felt like this" in his definitions of the Greek verbs *nevriase* 'to get angry' and *eknevristike* 'to be angered' (ibid., 20-21). It is therefore possible that his knowledge of the Greek language has influenced his understanding of the English adjectives. It is also possible that there are similarities in meaning and usage between these English and Greek words and the *viha* words investigated in this article, since we came to the conclusion that other people's judgements play an important role in identifying and evaluating *viha*. However, while Bardzokas (ibid., 8) emphasizes that people can see anger when it leads to a "visible vigorous reaction", it was difficult for us to identify such reactions in our data.

4.4 Message to a broader audience

While the findings so far mainly have to do with semantic analysis and definitions of words, they also have broader relevance. To begin with, a Google search for the words *viha(ta)* and *vihainen* only gives us indirect information about what people feel. It tells us more about what people think about anger. People tend to use these words to report what they think other people feel, and they tend to evaluate such emotions negatively.

In other words, if we find a great number of these words online, it does not specifically tell us that many people are angry or hate someone or something. Rather it is likely to suggest that many people have interpreted someone else's behaviour as angry or interpreted someone else as hating other people or things. To declare that one is feeling angry or that one hates someone or something may even be something that Finnish people tend not to do.

It is interesting to consider the idea that *viha* is a cultural keyword in light of the suggestion that talking about one's own anger or hate is, at least to some extent, something one does not do in Finnish society. The question then becomes whether *viha* can be considered as a cultural keyword, even if people do not want to say that they feel it. It is possible if we consider the likelihood that they nevertheless notice other people experiencing and manifesting *viha*. It should also be taken into account that Tuovila's (2005: 17) subjects did not report their own emotions, but rather listed words for emotions. In such a situation, it was less likely that they felt inhibited to mention *viha*.

However, at least two things should be taken into account. Firstly, Finns can express their anger very effectively without saying that they feel it. Secondly, Finns can be made to talk about their *viha*, as suggested by a piece in the newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat*, on June, 17 2017. It reported that a theatre group was successfully interviewing people about whom or what they hated, for example, themselves, the government, poverty and being alone (Dahlblom 2017). An important question is whether it is more acceptable in Finnish society to say that one hates a public person or a group of people than to say that one hates a person one normally interacts with apart from one's self.

It is also noteworthy that, although the target of anger or hate was often some group of people such as representatives of another religion, people in our data were relatively unlikely to report a clear cause for the emotion. While the contexts, which we read

remained short, this may mean that people consider it sufficient to mention the target of the emotion, either because everyone is supposed to know why such anger or hate occurs or that people consider it unnecessary to specify the reason for anger and hate in general. Should that be correct, it is an interesting finding and one that is relevant to discussing the phenomenon of anger and hate in society.

Further questions also emerge. These include the following: To what extent can we actually trust people to be able or willing to report their own emotions? Are we in fact equally good at reporting other people's emotions? People often seem to assume that people themselves are the best reporters of their own emotions and feelings. However, if it is usually other people who report at least a part of the emotions, we need to take this into account when we investigate the emotions people tell us that they are feeling, because in that case it is likely that they prefer not to talk about certain emotions. To take this to an extreme, it may even be the case that they do not recognize some emotions in themselves, but that such emotions are easier for other people to see.

Moreover, we may ask what the relationship between words and deeds actually is. In our data, people were unlikely to say what kinds of deeds, if any, the emotion *viha* led to, although this seems to be a central question, for example, when we consider the risks of hate speech. Again, it is possible that people do not mention all the relevant deeds because we are supposed to know how *viha* affects people. However, it is also quite possible that, although the language of *viha* seems to be relatively far from a serious crime in our data, its accumulation always involves the risk of violence.

To mention a rather different issue, if we are able to define emotion words in a good way in terms of the NSM, such definitions, or even sets of features, could be used, for example, in questionnaires used by sociologists or psychologists. It is important to note that there is no complete overlap between words for emotions in different languages. Instead, some languages have words for emotions that are not even recognized by speakers of other languages. These are important considerations when questionnaires

are translated from one language to another. In addition, because NSM definitions consist of rather basic words, they should be easy for various kinds of people to understand.

5. Conclusion

To conclude, a combination of the NSM method with the corpus method proved to be fruitful in our project. The findings not only concern the issue of how best to define the words *viha*, *vihata*, and *vihainen*, but also concern the development of the NSM method and semantic methods more generally, as well as even broader issues, such as what a potential accumulation of *viha* words online is likely to mean: it is indirect rather than direct evidence of what people feel, at least if we consider that people themselves are the most reliable sources of what they actually feel.

According to our final definitions so far, all three of the *viha* words share a conceptual core, which consists of the following notions: someone is feeling bad and there is a reason for it; however, it is not that someone himself or herself who reports the feeling, and, in many people's opinion, that particular someone thinks in the wrong way about the object. At the same time, we need to note that the reason is often rather vague or is not mentioned. The main difference between the adjective *vihainen* and the other two words seems to be that the emotion, which it expresses does not tend to last long. The emotion expressed by the adjective also seems somewhat more abstract or elusive than the emotion expressed by the other two words. To be more precise, there seems to be a continuum from the most concrete meaning of the verb to the less concrete meaning of the noun and the most elusive meaning of the adjective. This finding appears to agree with the characteristics of these word classes in general and could be studied further from that perspective[6].

The original methodological focus on measuring agreement among three linguists shifted to how corpus data could best be used to create NSM-based definitions. It is unlikely that any of us would have thought about such a final solution on their own.

When we started from the definitions, which we had created before analyzing the data, we realized that the definitions did not seem completely accurate. The definitions we created after reading and analyzing the data included completely new features, such as the idea that people report what they think others feel. It is likely that, if future NSM-based definitions are based more and more on clearly defined authentic data, they will change both in form and content. It is likely that the templates will also change as a result. In some cases, people may even want to work without a predefined template.

One way to do this would be to use a list of features, as we eventually did. Although we noticed deficiencies in our list after we had completed the second round of analysis, the list was a useful starting point and one that could be developed further. A natural continuation would be to develop the list of features so that it would facilitate more advanced statistical analyses. It is also important to realize that some features are easier to identify in the data than others and that this can be taken into account in the analysis. Discussions concerning whose perspective the analysis represents and how the definitions should be formulated should also be continued. Lastly, it would be good to collect data representing various text types to ensure coverage of as many contexts as possible.

Abbreviations and notes

[1] NSM – Natural Semantic Metalanguage. Available at: https://intranet. secure.griffith.edu.au/schools-departments/natural-semantic-metalanguage

[2] The Suomi 24 Corpus. Available at: http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:lb-201412171

[3] We thank Imre Bartis and Jyrki Niemi for advice concerning the use of the *Suomi 24 Sentences Corpus*.

[4] The categories *unclear* and *mistake* were combined in this analysis, so that no zeros would occur. All those instances had something in common; the analyst thought that they were somehow "out of place".

[5] We thank her cordially for her expert advice.

[6] We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.

[7] This web page is no longer available.

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Appendix 1: List of features used in the second round of analysis

there is a subject (verb)

the subject is people (= human, noun and adjective)

the subject is someone, not like people (noun and verb)

the word is the subject (where *word* refers to the noun)

the subject thinks like this: I feel bad

the subject is someone other than the one who says the word

many people think like this: I know the subject thinks like this because of something

many people think like the subject thinks (suggesting that many people would feel the same emotion in the same situation, noun and verb)

there is an object (where *object* = the cause[r] of the emotion)

the object is someone or some people

the object is the same as the subject

the object is a part of the same kinds of people / things (the idea here being that someone hates a group because of some of its characteristics)

the object is a living thing, not someone

the object is not a living thing

the object does something (noun and adjective)

many people think like this: the object is someone/something very bad

some people think like this: the object is someone/something very bad (verb)

many people think like this: the object has done something bad

many people think like this: the object knew what happened/will happen

many people think like this: the object does not do something good

many people think like this: the subject feels bad because something happened / something did not happen

many people think like this: the subject does not want to do anything with the

object

many people think like this: the subject knows this: I can't not do something with the object (in other words, the subject knows that s/he cannot avoid interacting with the object)

many people think like this: the subject thinks something bad about the object

many people think like this: the subject wants something bad to happen to the object

many people think like this: the subject wants to do something but can't

many people think like this: it is bad if someone thinks like the subject thinks

the subject says something bad about the object (where says includes writes, which is not a semantic prime)

the subject does something

the subject does / can do something bad (this would include things like hitting someone)

the subject does something very bad (this would include hurting someone seriously or killing them; however, we did not precisely define the borderline between *bad* and *very bad*)

the subject does this for a long time

Appendix 2: The word profiles

   1. Viha

The first fifteen features are (with reliability 3-4, i.e. uncertainty, indicated by italics):

1. the subject is people (= human, noun and adjective)

2. the subject thinks like this: I feel bad

3. many people think like this: it is bad if someone thinks like the subject thinks

4. there is an object (where *object* = the cause[r] of the emotion)

5. the subject is someone other than the one who says the word

6. the object is a part of the same kinds of people / things (the idea here being that someone hates a group because of some of its characteristics)

7. many people think like this: the subject thinks something bad about the object

8. the subject does this for a long time

9. the word is the subject (where *word* refers to the noun)

10. the object is someone or some people

11. the subject says something bad about the object (where *says* includes *writes*, which

is not a semantic prime)

12. many people think like this: I know the subject thinks like this because of something

13. *the subject does / can do something bad (this would include things like hitting*

someone)

14. the subject does something

15. many people think like this: the object has done something bad

2. Vihata

The first fifteen features are (with reliability 3-4, i.e. uncertainty, indicated by italics):

1. there is a subject (verb)

2. there is an object (where *object* = the cause[r] of the emotion)

3. the subject does this for a long time

4. many people think like this: the subject thinks something bad about the object

5. the subject is someone other than the one who says the word

6. the subject thinks like this: I feel bad

7. many people think like this: it is bad if someone thinks like the subject thinks

8. the object is a part of the same kinds of people / things (the idea here being that someone hates a group because of some of its characteristics)

9. *many people think like this: the subject knows this: I can't not do something with the object (in other words, the subject knows that s/he cannot avoid interacting with the object)*

10. many people think like this: I know the subject thinks like this because of something

11. the object is someone or some people

12. the object is not a living thing

13. *many people think like this: the subject does not want to do anything with the object*

14. some people think like this: the object is someone/something very bad (verb)

15. many people think like the subject thinks (suggesting that many people would feel the same emotion in the same situation, noun and verb)

3. Vihainen

The first fifteen features are (with reliability 3-4, i.e. uncertainty, indicated by italics):

1. the subject is people (= human, noun and adjective)

2. the subject thinks like this: I feel bad

3. *the subject is someone other than the one who says the word*

4. many people think like this: I know the subject thinks like this because of something

5. *many people think like this: it is bad if someone thinks like the subject thinks*

6. *the subject does this for a long time*

7. there is an object (where *object* = the cause[r] of the emotion)

8. many people think like this: the subject feels bad because something happened / something did not happen

9. many people think like this: the subject thinks something bad about the object

10. metonymy

11. the object is someone or some people

12. the object does something (noun and adjective)

13. the object is a part of the same kinds of people / things (the idea here being that someone hates a group because of some of its characteristics)

14. *the subject does / can do something bad (this would include things like hitting someone)*

15. *many people think like this: it is bad if someone thinks like the subject thinks*

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Résumé

Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) has proven to be a useful tool for analyzing meanings of abstract words such as those for emotions. NSM researchers often use corpus data to illustrate various meanings of words. However, their use of corpus data has not been very systematic. One could talk about corpus-assisted rather than corpus-based or corpus-driven research: corpora have been used to provide examples rather than to guide the research. This article suggests a way not only to base research on corpus data, but also to let it guide us in defining words in terms of NSM. It presents a new method, which we developed in our attempt to evaluate and improve inter-rater agreement in NSM-based corpus analysis. Our data come from the Suomi24 Sentences Corpus and concern the Finnish emotion words *viha* ('anger, hate'), *vihata* ('to hate') and *vihainen* ('angry'). The article contributes to our understanding of anger and hate and their role in contemporary Finnish by defining these words. We first report how we defined these words without Suomi24 corpus data and evaluated our inter-rater agreement. Then we allowed the data to guide us in our analysis. We list two sets of

definitions, which can be compared with each other and which inspire several questions about the nature of *viha*, as well as anger and hate more generally. Simultaneously, we discuss how NSM-based semantic research could be developed through systematic use of corpus data. We present several ideas as to how to collect and analyze such data. We suggest that corpus-driven definitions will lead to excluding information that tends to be irrelevant in authentic texts and include new types of information. We acknowledge that our observations remain tentative. We suggest where and how the development can start instead of providing the reader with definite answers.

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FRAME OF KNOWLEDGE

IN ENGLISH AND POLISH: PRELIMINARIES

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Abstract: The discussion aims at presenting the frames of KNOWLDEGE and WIEDZA as specified by native speakers of English and Polish. The concept of knowledge is briefly presented from the general perspective and different types of knowledge are listed. The notion is also introduced with reference to sematic primes. A frame is characterised as a cognitive construct also encompassing scripts, also including cultural scripts available in different language and culture communities.

Key words: KNOWLEDGE, WIEDZA, semantic prime, metaphor, cognitive frame, cultural script

1. Introduction

Knowledge is a broad and omnipresent concept, which can be interpreted from a variety of viewpoints. Wierzbicka (2007: 49) rightly points out that:

> every society has certain evaluative words that provide a framework of orientation in daily life and guide people's judgement and behaviour. Sometimes speakers are conscious of some of these words and regard them as a badge of belonging. Sometimes, however, a "guiding word" is so ingrained in the thinking of the speech community that it is not perceived as distinctive, but rather taken for granted like the air that people breathe.

Knowledge in English seems to be this kind of 'guiding word' and a cognitive concept that indeed is often taken for granted.

This paper aims to investigate how the perception of *knowledge* is conceptualised by English native speakers and how it is perceived as distinctive from the Polish point of view using the analysis of associations with the concept within the framework of frame semantics.

The discussion opens with the analysis of what is meant by 'knowledge' (section 2 entitled *Deciphering knowledge*), how it is defined, and what types of knowledge are specified in expert literature.

It is worthy of note that from the Natural Semantic Metalanguage viewpoint KNOW is a universal prime present in human languages the world over. As such a common concept, it is interesting to find out to what extent it is conceptualised differently in diverse language communities (English and Polish).

The concept is also addressed from the perspective of metaphorical representation and interpretation in language (section 4 *Metaphors of knowledge*). Selected expressions and phrases containing the lexeme *knowledge* are analysed and their meanings in Polish are specified, wherever equivalents are available. Similarly, proverbs in which knowledge is featured are provided and briefly discussed.

It is worthy of mention that cultures of language communities encode and condition the language used by particular groups of users, therefore it is essential to pay attention to cultural scripts, which tend to differ in diverse cultural settings. They are a reflection of how groups of people perceive reality and show diversity wherever various concepts are treated in a dissimilar manner. Scripts, including cultural scripts representative of a particular language and culture community, are treated as inclusive in the representations of cognitive frames.

In order to sketch the outline of frames, the construct is characterised from the cognitive semantic point of view. Owing to the fact that frames are knowledge structures, which

are based on associative frameworks, two groups of respondents were requested to list their associations with the concept under consideration, i.e. 'knowledge'.

The data gathering procedure, the methodology of the research study as well as the groups of native speaker English and Polish respondents are also briefly presented in section 5: *The frame of KNOWLEDGE*. We believe that the responses provided by the participants will enable the author to outline the core of the frames of KNOWLEDGE and WIEDZA respectively. In the discussion that follows the data are analysed and preliminary conclusions drawn (sections 6 and 7: *Discussion* and *Conclusions*) in search of similarities as well as points of divergence.

2. Deciphering knowledge

The nature of knowledge and attempts to specify what knowledge is have been a subject of research undertaken by many scholars. As noted in Strickland (2001: 391), John Locke was among the first to refute "the *a priori*, or nonexperiential, account of knowledge" and developed an empirical theory of knowledge. Its nature is described as follows:

> *Knowing originates in external and internal sources of sensation and reflection. The objects or ideas present to **consciousness** are divided into simple and complex. Simple ideas are primitive sense data, which the mind passively receives and cannot alter, delivered by one sense (seeing blue), by several senses (eating an orange as a synthesis of **taste**, **touch** and **smell**), by reflection (hunger), or by a combination of sensation and reflection (pleasure and **pain**). The objective orientation of simple ideas follows from the fact that we cannot add or subtract from their appearance or conception in the mind. In relation to simple ideas, at least, the mind is passive, a "blank" or "white" tablet upon which sensations are impressed. Complex ideas are formed by actively combining, comparing, or abstracting simple ideas to yield "modes, substances, and relations". Modes are class concepts or ideas that do not exist independently, such as beauty. Substance is a complex idea of the unity of substrate of the simple qualities we perceive. And relations are the powers in objects capable of causing minds to make comparisons, for example, identity and cause and effect. The difficult is that complex ideas do not relate to perceivable existents, but hopefully, complex ideas do express elements or characteristics of the real world.*

What is stated as disputable is the relation of the knowledge of ideas to the knowledge of the physical world. Knowledge is thus considered to be relational; "it consists in the

perception of the agreement or disagreement among ideas" (Strickland 2001: 391). Contemporary researchers address the nature of knowledge and attempt to specify its characteristics. Fromm (1983: 28), quoted by Goatly (2007: 11), claims that

Knowing begins with the awareness of the deceptiveness of our common-sense perceptions ... most people are half-awake, half-dreaming and are unaware that most of what they hold to be true and self-evident is illusion produced by the suggestive influence of the social world in which they live.

As noted by Maasen and Weingart (2000: 2),

Virtually every aspect of life is affected by the increase of knowledge, both in quantity and quality. A huge industry has evolved dealing with the production, acquisition, and diffusion of knowledge. Experts and expertises abound. <...> the growing importance of knowledge for the reproduction of societies certainly spills over to non-Western countries as well. Therefore, this development has become an issue both within and outside the academic circles, and it has been given a label: 'knowledge societies'.

Knowledge is a concept that is wide-ranging. It has also expanded over the years and covers a plethora of issues. A resource so inaccessible to many in the past, knowledge has now become a much more widespread phenomenon. As noted by Merriam and Bierema (2013: 4) "the "knowledge society" has replaced the industrial society and has great implications for learning and educational systems across the globe and throughout the lifespan". They also point out that it is not just a mere combination of various facts, knowledge is much more multidimensional. As the authors further note (ibid., 4):

While we are inundated with bits and pieces of information <...>, for information to become useful and meaningful, it needs to be weighted, organized, and structured into meaningful units of knowledge; information and data are the building blocks of knowledge. It is with knowledge that we build new insights, new understandings, and even new products, all of which can contribute to a more enriching context for learning. There are some caveats about this seemingly utopian concept of the knowledge society. Some places in the world are so torn by strife, poverty, and illiteracy that a knowledge society has not evolved, leaving these countries far behind and utterly unable to compete in the developed world. And some groups of citizens, discriminated against because of gender, race or ethnicity, disability, or age, are marginalized in their own societies and prevented from meaningfully participating in the knowledge society.

It is essential to realise that in a similar way to many objects, goods, and properties, knowledge can be obtained more easily by those society members who are better-off and more privileged in various senses of the notion, including financial, social, geopolitical, gender aspects, to mention but a few. Obvious as it may seem, acquiring knowledge can be a complex, expensive, and time-consuming process. Where it is readily available, some individuals may not appreciate it or the simple fact that is so accessible. In many parts of the world, there is no free, general education; moreover, it is denied to some groups. However, those who are underprivileged are often much more willing to acquire even the most basic knowledge in order to somehow improve their position and status. It is also essential to note that in certain countries only limited information and knowledge are provided to their citizens. Political and/or religious regimes often control mass media to such an extent that the availability of and access to unbiased, not manipulated or unlimited information and sources of knowledge are restricted. People are fed with such information and data that are considered essential and sufficient, thus creating a worldview, which has nothing to do with real life. Worse of all, in a large number of places access to sources of knowledge is not available at all. However, it is important to stress that irrespective of the place of residence, the knowledge that individuals acquire, whether consciously or not, influences and shapes their worldview. As defined by Bartmiński (2009: 213):

> *The linguistic worldview conception is semantic, anthropological and cultural in nature. It is based on the assumption that language codes a certain socially established knowledge of the world and that this knowledge can be reconstructed and verbalized as a set of judgements about people, objects and events.*

Thus, it is embedded in and expressed by the language used in a given lingual community.

2.1 Defining knowledge

Knowledge, as defined in *The American heritage dictionary of the English language* (2000: 971) is:

1. The state or fact of knowing. 2. Familiarity, awareness, or understanding gained through experience or study. 3. The sum or range of what has been perceived, discovered, or learned. 4. Learning, erudition. 5. Specific information about something. 6. Carnal knowledge.

Similarly, the Merriam-Webster online dictionary (*s.a.*) characterises the notion as:

1. a: (1) the fact or condition of knowing something with familiarity gained experience or association; (2) acquaintance with or understanding of a science, art or technique; b: (1) the fact or condition of being aware of something; (2) the range of one's information or understanding; c: the circumstance or condition of apprehending truth or fact through reasoning: cognition; d: the fact or condition of having information or of being learned; 2. a: the sum of what is known: the body of truth, information, and principles acquired by humankind.

The synonyms provided for the notion under consideration, i.e. *knowledge*, include: *lore*, *science*, *wisdom*, *learning*, *erudition* as well as *scholarship*. The explanation attempting to differentiate between the various options is stated as follows (ibid.):

Knowledge, learning, erudition, scholarship mean what is or can be known by an individual or by humankind. Knowledge applies to facts or ideas acquired by study, investigation, observation, or experience. Learning applies to knowledge acquired especially through formal, often advanced, schooling. Erudition strongly implies the acquiring of profound, recondite, or bookish learning. Scholarship implies the possession of learning characteristic of the advanced scholar in a specialized field of study or investigation.

Similarly, *The American heritage dictionary of the English language* (2000: 971) notes the synonyms for *knowledge* to be *information*, *learning*, *erudition*, *lore*, and *scholarship*, stating that they "refer to what is known, as through study or experience". *Knowledge* is noted as the broadest in meaning, supporting this argument with Herbert Spencer's words: "Science is organised knowledge". The relations between the enumerated synonyms are specified as follows:

Information[1] often implies a collection of facts and data: "A man's judgement cannot be better than the information on which he has based it" (Arthur Hays Sulzberger). Learning usually refers to knowledge gained by schooling and study: "Learning…must be sought for with ardour and attention to with diligence" (Abigail Adams). Erudition implies profound, often specialized knowledge: "Some have criticized his poetry as elitist, unnecessarily impervious to readers who do not share his erudition" (Elizabeth Kastor). Lore is usually applied to knowledge about a particular subject that is gained through tradition or anecdote: Many American folktales concern the lore of frontier life. Scholarship is the mastery of a particular area of learning reflected in a scholar's work: A good journal article shows ample evidence of the author's scholarship.

In second language acquisition and language learning, the distinction is often made between explicit and implicit knowledge. As pointed out by Ellis (2009) this distinction originated in cognitive psychology. He notes (ibid., 3) that implicit and explicit learning is distinguished in two fundamental ways, i.e.:

(1) Implicit learning proceeds without making demands on central attention resources. <...> 'generalizations arise from conspiracies of memorized utterances collaborating in productive schematic linguistic productions'. Thus, the resulting knowledge is subsymbolic, reflecting statistical sensitivity to the structure of the learned material. In contrast, explicit learning typically involves memorizing a series of successive facts and thus makes heavy demands on working memory. As a result, it takes place consciously and results in knowledge that is symbolic in nature (i.e. it is represented in explicit form).

(2) In the case of implicit learning, learners remain unaware of the learning that has taken place, although it is evident in the behavioral responses they make. Thus, leaners cannot verbalize what they have learned. In the case of explicit learning, learners are aware that they have learned something and can verbalize what they have learned.

Many experts question the presence of a dual system and support the belief that a single system can produce various learning outcomes. A decisive opinion relating to this issue will not be sought as this aspect is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

It should be pointed out that there are various types of knowledge that experts distinguish, such as declarative or procedural knowledge, general, specialist, specialised or scientific knowledge, objective knowledge, rational knowledge, word knowledge and world knowledge, cultural knowledge, linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge, encyclopedic knowledge, conceptual knowledge, practical, knowledge, tacit and explicit knowledge, etc. (Collins 2010; Gascoigne & Thornton 2013; Graff 2015; Jarvis 2009; Kertész 2004; Kirkness 2004; Kövecses 2000; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Langacker 1987; Pawlak 2006 and many others). The intricacies of the various aspects of knowledge, between which experts differentiate, will not be further investigated. The preceding discussion has aimed at exposing the plethora of knowledge types. It is evident that those varieties are derived from the perspective of the analysis that a given researcher decides to adopt. The aim of the present study is to

explore ordinary people's conceptualization of knowledge, particularly as reflected in English and Polish.

Having defined what the notion entails, it is essential to note that knowledge is a universal human concept; therefore in the following section we will consider it briefly through the prism of Natural Semantic Metalanguage.

3. Natural Semantic Metalanguage

Wierzbicka studied diverse languages and proposed that certain underlying concepts are shared universally by humans irrespective of the linguistic means at their disposal. The Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) theory that she developed with her colleagues is based on the assumption that in every natural language there exist conceptual primitives that are a "manifestation of a universal set of fundamental human concepts" (1996: 13). Natural Semantic Metalanguage, as pointed out by Goddard (1997: 198), "began as an approach to lexical semantic analysis based on reductive paraphrase, that is, explication of a word's meaning by means of an exact paraphrase composed of simpler words than the original". Thus, the items used in individual explications are semantically basic; hence they cannot be further defined. Goddard and Wierzbicka (2002: 41-42) also note that "an important research tool in NSM approach to syntax is the "canonical context", i.e. a sentence or sentence fragment, which is composed predominantly (or exclusively) of semantic primes and which is hypothesised to be expressible in any language".

A part of the NSM is formed by a group of 'mental predicates'. As Wierzbicka states "cross-linguistic investigations <…> allow us to state that the innate and universal theory of mind includes the following major constituents: THINK, KNOW, WANT, and FEEL" (1996: 48). She notes that the fundamental status of the above quoted concepts is reflected by their role and importance in grammar in the following words (ibid., 49):

KNOW plays an essential role in the systems of mood – with the "declaratives" being used on the semantic component 'I know', and the "interrogative" on the components – 'I don't know – I want to know'. Clearly, KNOW – as well as THINK – is also the basis of "evidentials" ('I know because I see', 'I know because I hear', 'I think, I don't say: I know', and so on.

While considering the above mental predicates Goddard and Wierzbicka (2002: 59-60) note that:

Aside from favouring personal substantives (i.e. I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE/PERSON) as "subjects", the primes KNOW and THINK share some interesting similarities so far as valency options and complementation possibilities are concerned. <…> they are both hypothesised to allow a propositional complement (in English, <u>know that S</u>[2] and <u>think that S</u>) <…>, a substantive topic (in English, <u>know about Y</u> and <u>think about Y</u>). Both can take a substantive complement (<u>know something, think something</u>).

Hence, the explication, i.e. the valency options available to the semantic primitive KNOW are as follows:

     X knows (that) - -

     X knows something

     X knows something about someone/something

However, as noted by Goddard (2018: 56), with more research conducted with reference to semantic primes, "KNOW is one of the verbs whose NSM syntax has been recently adjusted". According to the most recent analyses experts believe that KNOW has the following four basic frames (ibid, 58):

I KNOW
someone KNOWS something
someone KNOWS something about something
   (including: knows a lot about…, know more about…)

The above-presented basic grammatical frames for KNOW are explained as follows (ibid, 56):

The first frame is I KNOW. For example, someone say something to you, and you reply I KNOW. It's a dialogical, first-person use of KNOW, often used in response to somebody else. As far as we can tell, people can say this kind of thing in all languages. It is extremely common in English.

The second frame is a third-person frame: 'someone KNOWS it.' This time we are attributing something like knowledge to someone. We can also say, using the third frame, that 'someone KNOWS something.' And finally, using the fourth frame, we can say that 'someone KNOWS something about[3] something.' For example, if we want to talk about people (experts) who know a lot about something. These are the basic four frames for KNOW.

The research has also led the experts to realise that contrary to earlier claims, in numerous languages, the exponent of KNOW, which can be applied with reference to 'knowing someone' is not included in the above outlined four frames, because 'know someone' is not "a semantically primitive use of KNOW" (Goddard 2018: 58). Hence, the claim expressed by Wierzbicka (2002: 93) with reference to the Polish equivalent of the English *know*, i.e. *wiedzieć* stating that "like many other languages, Polish seems to distinguish lexically between, roughly speaking, "propositional knowledge" and "personal knowledge". The exponent of the former is *wiedzieć*, and of the latter, *znać*" and they should be treated as allolexes of the same prime is no longer valid. A complex lexical meaning of 'know (someone)' can be explicated as follows (Goddard 2018: 59):

I KNOW him/her (= this someone):
I know some things about him/her (= this someone)
 because I was with him/her for some time before
because of this, I can think like this: "he/she is like this"

The status of the concept of knowledge clearly shows its central position in human cognition and the description of the world. Because of its core locus KNOW is further indivisible in terms of semantic primes, as it constitutes one of them. Nevertheless, knowledge as a broad concept evokes certain associations, which provide various metaphorical extensions and which can create a complex cognitive frame. In the following part of the discussion, the focus shall be placed on the design of the outline of the construct in question, i.e. the frame of knowledge. However, before we analyse the way in which Polish and English native speakers conceptualise the notion relative to their background experience and cultural setting, attention will be focused on metaphorical language use and representation.

4. Metaphors of knowledge

It is the intention of the author to find out whether the perception of knowledge is conceptualised differently by Polish and English native speakers, and whether the linguistic representations of the concept specified by the two groups of respondents are distinctive from one another. It would be also interesting to learn whether the lexical expressions used in both languages are based on parallel metaphors. Selected examples of expressions containing the lexemes *knowledge* and *wiedza* shall be presented and interpreted.

In their classical work, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 5) clearly point out that "the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another". Experts in the field unanimously agree that metaphor in the cognitive linguistic view is defined as "understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual domain" (Kövecses 2002: 4). It has been universally understood that metaphor is not regarded as merely a manner of speaking. As noted by Taylor, Cuyckens and Dirven (2003: 7):

Metaphor cannot therefore be regarded simply as a rhetorical embellishment of an otherwise predominantly "literal" mode of expression, and which is restricted in the main to the creations of poets and orators. On the contrary, metaphor is an important means whereby more abstract, intangible domains of experience can be conceptualized in terms of what is more concrete and more immediate.

Kivistö and Pihlström note that "the variety of the metaphors applied in the epistemic and inquiry-related matters" include among others those, which are "drawn from *architecture*, *buildings* and *the accumulation of knowledge*" (2017: 781). They add that metaphors related to visual perception are equally widespread; "this is the so-called *spectator theory of knowledge*". The authors quote Dewey who "rejected the view <…> that the subject pursuing knowledge is merely a passive spectator of an objective world whose structure is independent of the process of inquiry. Instead, the object of knowledge is <…> partly constructed through inquiry" (2017: 781-782).

Another aspect is highlighted by pragmatists and naturalists who consider the character of human knowledge to be *antifoundational* and *fallible*. Science is compared to a "*cable* consisting of threads none of which is very strong by itself – and all of which may in fact be relatively slender – but which together form a strongly interwoven system", while scientific inquiry is likened to "*walking on a bog*: one can never have more than partial confirmations of hypotheses; there is no resource to an absolutely solid "bedrock of fact, "and therefore we can never stand firm but must, in order to avoid sinking into a bog, constantly move on, take new steps forward" (Kivistö & Pihlström 2017: 782). Metaphors based on a similar imagery of lack of stability are those employing *ship* or *boat*: "scientists are like sailors afloat on the sea who have to constantly reconstruct their vessel during the voyage itself, unable to dock in any safe harbour to do the work". The same source also metaphorically refers to the concept as the *web of belief* (ibid.). *Fishing* is a popular metaphor for knowledge seeking and so are a *map* and *navigation*. A different perspective is presented through the metaphor of knowledge as *capital*, which conceptualises it as an entity of instrumental value. Kivistö and Pihlström (ibid., 783-784) point out that:

Knowledge conceived as capital becomes something that can be managed and measured; we can invest financial resources in it and also expect some good return for this investment. <...> the metaphors of capital and resources objectify knowledge as a thing that can be controlled and benefited from, and thus these images subject knowledge to an accounting discourse and turn it into a property that can be owned, stored, and measured. The capital metaphor connects knowledge to instrumental uses and models in management thinking that imply external control of knowledge production; such instrumentalising control may be detrimental to academic freedom.

The metaphor index provided by Kövecses (2000: 216-223; 2002: 281-285) does not list any instances where the lexeme *knowledge* is included, but it does provide examples of metaphors within the frame of KNOWLEDGE, such as:

IDEAS ARE (VALUABLE) COMMODITIES:

e.g., "there is always a *market* for good ideas"; "a *worthless* idea"; "a source of *valuable* ideas"; "the idea has no chance in the *intellectual marketplace*", etc.;

MEANINGS ARE OBJECTS:

e.g., "to *share* experiences";

MENTAL ACTIVITY IS MANIPULATION: "the mind is a workshop where a variety of "activities" take place: we *work* on a problem, *store* ideas in memory, *look* at questions *from all sides*, *hammer out* a solution, *put things on the back burner* for a while, and so forth" (Kövecses 2000: 196);

THE MIND IS A CONTAINER:

e.g., "to *get into* someone's head"; "have a head like a *sieve*".

In another publication, however, Kövecses (2010: 369-375) specifies a single metaphor including the term *knowledge*, i.e. KNOWING IS SEEING:

e.g., "I *see*"; "*transparent* idea", "*murky* argument", etc.

He also lists other instances of knowledge-related metaphors such as:

IDEAS ARE FOOD:

e.g., "*raw* facts"; "*half-baked* ideas"; "*warmed-over* theories"; "to *chew over* the suggestion"; "to *swallow* that claim"; "to *devoured* the book", etc.;

IDEAS ARE OBJECTS:

e.g., "the message *came across*";

IMAGINATION IS FIRE:

e.g., "The painting *set fire to* the composer's imagination"; "imagination *caught fire*"; "imagination is *on fire*"; "The story *kindled* the boy's imagination";

LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS FOR MEANING OBJECTS;

THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT:

e.g., "her ego is *fragile*"; "she is easily *crushed*"; "he *broke* under cross-examination"; "the experience *shuttered* him";

THE MIND IS A MACHINE:

e.g., "How can a man understand the *workings* of woman's mind?"; "the brain is *ticking over* more briskly";

THE MIND IS THE BODY:

e.g., "in one's mind's *eye*";

THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS:

e.g., "the *foundation* of the theory"; "The theory needs more *support*"; "to *construct* a *strong* argument"; "to *put together* the *framework* of the theory", etc.;

THINKING IS COOKING:

e.g., "to *stew over* something";

THINKING IS LOOKING:

e.g., "*look* before you leap";

and UNDERSTANDING IS DIGESTING:

e.g., "to *digest* all these ideas".

Other metaphors that have not been enumerated above are also present in general as well as academic discourse. Many are dependent on the cultural setting in which a given society or community is immersed. The above set is representative of the English language and cultural tradition. In the following part of the discussion only expressions, which contain the lexeme *knowledge* will be considered. Other examples of knowledge-related metaphorical language deserve a detailed study of their own and will be undertaken as separate research.

4.1. Expressions and proverbs containing the lexeme 'knowledge'

From a narrower perspective, the term itself is a component of linguistic expressions. Let us now study briefly those selected expressions in English in which *knowledge* is present. Polish equivalents available for the quoted phrases and expressions will be provided.

General knowledge is defined as "knowledge about a lot of different subjects", while the phrases **first-hand/personal knowledge** describe "knowledge from experiencing something yourself". **Basic knowledge** refers to "knowledge of the basic aspects of something", as opposed to **in-depth knowledge**, which describes "detailed knowledge about all of a particular subject". **Intimate knowledge** is "knowledge about something because you are involved in it", **inside knowledge** stands for "knowledge that you have because you are part of a group", while **background knowledge** refers to "knowledge that you need before you can understand or do something" (LDCE 2012: 969) or

"knowledge of someone's past or environment that might prove relevant" (TTEM 2002: 902). Similar collocations can be found in Polish as well.

To be secure in the belief / knowledge is an idiom describing the feeling of confidence (Knowledge, *s.a.*), while **to be safe/secure in the knowledge** refers to the situation of "feeling safe or secure because one knows something specified". In Polish, the phrase one may provide to refer to the latter expression is **pewny, że**… (WSAP 2002: 1049), but it is security that is foregrounded, not knowledge, of which there is no mention.

To one's knowledge means "according to what one knows" whereas **to the best of one's knowledge** is "used to say that a person thinks something is true but that there may be something he or she does not know which makes it untrue" or "as truthfully as possible" (Knowledge, *s.a.*). In Polish, both of the above are interpreted as **o ile wiem / o ile mi wiadomo** (Jaworska 2002: 331) and the meanings overlap with their English counterparts. **Without someone's knowledge** is used to say when "something was done the person specified did not know about it" and has a Polish direct equivalent **bez czyjejś wiedzy** (ibid., 331).

The phrase **common knowledge** is defined as "something that many or most people know" (Knowledge, *s.a.*), while **public knowledge** designates "something that people know because it has been reported in the news". Both expressions are rendered in Polish as **rzecz powszechnie / ogólnie / publicznie znana; wiadoma** (Jaworska 2002: 330) and they refer to the same concept, even though the exact Polish equivalent for knowledge, i.e. *wiedza* is not named, but it is evoked.

A **thirst for knowledge** describes a "desire to learn more" (LDCE 2012: 969) and in Polish is known as **głód wiedzy** (WSAP 2002: 653).

An individual's extensive knowledge about "the different parts of something" is referred to as **somebody's breadth of knowledge** (LDCE 2012: 969), which could be rendered in Polish as **rozległość wiedzy** (WSAP 2002: 137).

Working knowledge describes practical abilities and its Polish counterpart is **wiedza praktyczna / praktyczna znajomość** (Jaworska 2002: 331).

The tree of knowledge (of good and evil) – known in Polish as **drzewo wiadomości dobrego i złego** (ibid., 330), refers to "the tree which God planted, together with the Tree of Life, in the garden of Eden". It was from this tree that Eve picked the forbidden fruit and gave some to Adam, and this deed was the reason for which "they were later driven from the garden and the woes of mankind began" (BDPF 2002: 1199).

The overall observation that becomes visible from the examples quoted above is that in both languages, the concepts are similarly treated and to a great extent they overlap not only in meaning but also in structure. The expressions in English and Polish largely correspond in denotation as well as construction.

The English collocations listed in the opening paragraph are not set phrases in Polish but equivalents that can be easily produced for the first four expressions as **wiedza ogolna**, **wiedza z pierwszej ręki**, **podstawowa wiedza**, **dogłębna / szczegółowa wiedza**. No exact equivalents exist for the remaining three.

Language is also rich in numerous sayings and proverbs. They are maxims, which are entrenched in human culture. Society's wisdom is said to be imitated in proverbs. They are sayings, which reflect the truths long held by a given society, and are considered as wisdom that has been handed down through generations. As accurately summarised by Kochman-Haładyj (2017: 140), "in Linguistic Culturology proverbs are perceived as signs of specific ethnic and national cultures <…> the proverb system of a language reflects a certain way of life of a given culture and represents a set of values of people

speaking the language." What this seems to entail is the fact that cultural scripts (addressed in section 5 below) also reflect the worldview of the particular culture and language community.

A few examples of proverbs, which are formed with the concept of 'knowledge', are presented below.

Doubt is the key of knowledge; and *Knowledge is a wild thing and must be hunted before it is tamed* both refer to the sources of knowledge. Its importance is foregrounded in the proverb *Knowledge has bitter roots but sweet fruits* (Fergusson 1983: 75).

Proverbs: *Knowledge is the mother of all virtue; all vice proceeds from ignorance*; *Knowledge is power*; *Knowledge is no burthen* all make reference to the value of knowledge (ibid., 136). Similar connotations are evoked by the proverbs *Blind is everyone who lacks knowledge*; *A man of knowledge increases strength*; *Knowledge is better than money in the bank*; *Knowledge is better than riches*; *Knowledge is light, ignorance a cloud*; *Lack of knowledge is darker than night* or *He who has knowledge has power* (RBWP 2006: 245).

Inadequacy of knowledge is stressed by the following examples: *Knowledge makes one laugh, but wealth makes one dance*; *Knowledge without practice makes but half an artist* (Fergusson 1983: 136). The dangers of insufficient knowledge are expressed also in *Knowledge and wisdom are far from being one* – "knowledgeable people may lack the wisdom to make sound judgements" (Manser 2007: 161).

Zeal without knowledge is a runaway horse; *Zeal without knowledge is the sister of folly* both designate the fact that "uninformed enthusiasm will only lead to disaster" (ibid., 319). Wilkinson lists a third variety of the proverb, i.e. *Zeal without knowledge is fire without light* (TTEM 2002: 740).

The dangers of knowledge are highlighted in the proverb *Knowledge is folly, except grace guide it* (Fergusson 1983: 137).

Ignorance is highlighted in the proverb *A little knowledge is a dangerous thing* (RBWP 2006: 245). The proverb means that "incomplete knowledge can embarrass or harm someone or something" (TDAI 1998: 201).

Its durability is expressed by the Arabian saying *Knowledge acquired as a child is more lasting than an engraving on stone* (RBWP 2006: 245). However, to be more long-lasting knowledge has to be revised: *Knowledge comes through practice*; *Knowledge is a treasure, but practice is the key to it* or *Questioning is the door of knowledge* (ibid., 245). *Knowledge and timber shouldn't be much used until they are seasoned* is a saying which means that "knowledge is not useful until it is tempered by experience" (Manser 2007: 160). *Experience is the mother of knowledge* (Apperson & Manser 2006: 184).

As noted by Wilkinson, *Knowledge has no enemy but ignorance* (TTEM 2002:121) and this saying most clearly illustrates the lack of boundaries to learning. However, appearances can be deceptive, as expressed by the proverb *Don't judge a man's knowledge of racehorses by the clothes he wears* (ibid., 943).

In Polish, the concept 'wiedza' is a part of the proverbs *Ciekawość pierwszy stopień do wiedzy* ("curiosity is the first step towards knowledge") and *Prawdziwa wiedza to znajomość przyczyn* ("true knowledge is the awareness of causes"), both of which emphasise the virtue and necessity of knowledge (Polish proverbs, *s.a.*). Similarly to the English proverb *Knowledge is power*, its Polish equivalent *Wiedza jest potęgą* (KP 2008: 197) stresses how substantial it is in life.

Correspondingly to *A little knowledge is a dangerous thing*, ignorance is condemned in the Polish proverb *Niedostatek wiedzy jest rzeczą niebezpieczną* (ibid., 196).

Niedostatek nauczycielem wiedzy (ibid., 195) ("poverty is the teacher of knowledge") can be interpreted to mean that knowledge is acquired irrespective of material wealth. It has to be noted that the lexeme 'wiedza' itself is infrequently featured in Polish proverbs, even though numerous maxims are devoted to the concept in question.

It can be concluded from the brief analysis above that no significant differences between the contrasted languages can be observed. It clearly shows that knowledge is a valuable asset, a sought-after quality as it provides safety and its lack is unwelcome. It evokes positive connotations and its possession enriches an individual. As such a valued feature it is quite amply documented in language. It proves to be a productive concept, which is represented by and reflected in a sizeable chunk of the lexicon. As opposed to the English corpus, Polish proverbs containing the considered lexeme itself are not numerous. Nevertheless, the maxims representing the concept of knowledge are quite voluminous.

In the further analysis an attempt will be made at finding convergent as well as divergent ways in which knowledge is conceptualised by adult native speakers of Polish and English. The data provided by respondents will be helpful in outlining the core elements of the cognitive construct in the form of a frame.

5. Methodology: The frame of KNOWLEDGE

Pertuck (2013: 1) succinctly summarises the origin of frame as a construct in language study and analysis:

> *Fillmore (1975) introduced the notion of a frame into linguistics as an alternative to "checklist" theories of meaning. Instead of representing the meaning of a linguistic form in terms of a checklist of conditions that must be satisfied for the form to be appropriately or truthfully used, word meaning is characterized in terms of experience-based schematizations of the speaker's world – <u>frames</u>[4]. A semantic <u>frame</u> is a representation of an event or state of affairs whose parts are identified as frame elements and whose underlying conceptual structure speakers access for both encoding and decoding purposes. Thus, the semantic frame, parts of which are indexed by words that <u>evoke</u> the frame (Fillmore 1985), is a cognitive structuring device used in the service of understanding*.

As originally proposed by Fillmore in 1981 a frame is a construct that is characterised by internal relationships. Fillmore (1982: 111) suggests:

By the term 'frame' I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available. I intend the word ' frame' as used here to be a general cover term for the set of concepts variously known, in the literature on natural language understanding, as 'schema', 'script', 'scenario', 'ideational scaffolding', 'cognitive mode', or 'folk theory'.

As Goddard (2007: 69) briefly summarises Fillmore's conception, "the meaning of a word can only be understood against a background frame of experience, beliefs, or practices that "motivate the concept that the word encodes".
Fontenelle (2009: 38) states that:

The 'frame' in frame semantics represents a sort of situation, an aspect of reality in which various keywords, e.g., see, behold, spot, in the case of the 'perception frame', are contrasted with one another and can be classified as a function of the relationships which hold between the various actants or frame elements <…>. A frame-based lexicon aims at describing the combinatory potential of a given lexical item, which boils down to explicitly indicating how each frame element can be realized, syntactically as well as lexically, at the surface level.

Once a frame element is triggered, an entire frame becomes available. Experts provide numerous features of this cognitive paradigm. Despite the differences in its interpretation (Burkhanov 1999), some of the shared, commonly recognised properties include the following (Uberman 2006: 40):

Frame is a particular kind of knowledge structure, <…> a complex knowledge structure, frame allows to operate with large knowledge structures, frame is a socially-significant phenomenon, <…> a system of closely interrelated elements, <…> a conceptual structure of a prototypical nature.

Frames as knowledge structures are known to be networks of interrelated concepts; once a trigger is provided, the entire structure is made available[5]. Owing to the presence of the parameter of prototypicality, it is hoped that the presented conceptual structures reflect the linguistic reality of the analysed language communities.

According to Widawski (2003), if the language is treated as a reflection of the society that employs it in (and for) communication, then the lexicon of this language is a way to understand the culture of its users. This clearly entails that particular culture and language communities can design their own worldview and understanding of the surrounding reality. As Wierzbicka (1996; 2006) and Goddard (2004) note, cultural scripts represent shared ways of thinking as reflected in ways of speaking entrenched in the speech and culture community. Wierzbicka (2006: 23) states that: "widely shared and widely known ways of thinking can be identified in terms of the same empirically established universal human concepts" and she adds that cultural scripts reflect the way people in a particular culture and society think, speak, and act.

Cultural scripts refer to "representations of cultural norms which are widely held in a given society and are reflected in the language" (Wierzbicka 2007: 56). As Goddard (2012: 1039) points out: "In this sense, cultural scripts can be compared with what are known in the ethnography of communication research tradition as 'norms of interaction' and 'norms of interpretation', i.e. widely shared assumptions about how – and why – it is good or bad to speak in certain culturally construed situations". However, Goddard (ibid., 1039) stresses the fact that:

In a more technical sense, the term 'cultural script' refers to a particular technique for articulating cultural norms in a fashion that is clear, precise, translatable, and accessible to cultural insiders and cultural outsiders alike. <...> this outcome is possible because cultural scripts in this sense are formulated in a highly constrained metalanguage of semantically simple words (semantic primes) and grammatical patterns which appear to have equivalents in all languages.

Duranti (1997: 27) views culture as knowledge of the world, i.e. not only of facts, objects, places, and people, but also as culture community members sharing "certain patters of thought, ways of understanding the world, making inferences and predictions". Whatever people communicate is to a certain extent culturally-conditioned.

The interrelation is clearly supported by Levisen and Waters (2017: 240) who state that "on a larger scale of things, words are ordering our shared discursive universes through relative fixities and a complex set of hierarchised keywords with interrelated cultural scripts. Theses fixities form the basis for narratives, stereotypes, mythologies, and local truths". The cultural scripts representative of a given speech community are believed to be a constitutive part of a frame[6].

The main aim of the present study is to learn whether the outlines of the frames of respectively KNOWLEDGE in English and WIEDZA in Polish are similar or if significant differences can be identified. The outlines of the frames have been produced on the basis of the analysis of data provided by mostly adult volunteers – native speakers of Polish and English. A group of 50 Polish and 50 English respondents (two of whom are still in their teens) were requested to provide a list of ten first associations with the concept of KNOWLEDGE and WIEDZA respectively. This data-gathering procedure resulted in obtaining approximately 500 responses in each language (some respondents provided fewer than ten associations). Obviously, the number of lexemes and associations is not sufficiently substantial to be able to generalise about what the entire English and Polish language corpora hold and how complex the frames may actually be, nevertheless the present attempt is aimed at shedding some light on the issue under consideration. The data provided by respondents in Polish have been presented in this discussion together with the English equivalents available for the listed Polish lexemes or phrases.

Thus the obtained and analysed results cannot be considered representative of the entire language community or speech population, nevertheless, they might provide some insight into how the phenomenon of knowledge is conceptualised by working adults, as only three respondents (two English and one Polish) are students or undergraduates (two English-speaking teenagers and one Polish student). Moreover, three Polish respondents are already retired but were in the workforce their entire adult lives.

Frames represent knowledge structures, which are characterised by associative networks. For this reason, the data-gathering procedure was limited to requesting respondents to provide associations they have with the concept under scrutiny. No larger corpora (dictionaries, language corpus, etc.) were consulted in the study, as such detailed treatment and analyses require large-scale research, which shall be undertaken in the future.

6. Discussion

In the following sections, the outlines of the frames of WIEDZA in Polish and KNOWLEDGE in English will be briefly presented.

6.1 Polish frame of WIEDZA – an outline

The gathered data permit an attempt to outline the cognitive construct represented in the Polish language.

The respondents were asked to provide the first 10 associations that come to their minds and that are evoked when they hear the concept WIEDZA. The respondents are adults (30 females and 20 males) representing different professions, such as: doctors, art historians, journalists, secretaries, insurance agents, bank managers, sales representatives, etc. It was the author's intention to avoid responses from teachers. The reason not to include teachers in the poll was the fact that by definition this professional group deals with passing on knowledge to learners. As a consequence, their understanding and conceptualisation of the considered notion tends to be more specific or professionally-biased rather than general. One group member is a student and three are retired. The request was addressed in Polish: *Proszę podać pierwsze dziesięć skojrzeń z pojęciem WIEDZA* and the responses were also provided accordingly. For text clarity, the most representative synonyms in English are listed together with the original Polish answers.

The most recurrent individual notion, listed by 35 respondents, was **nauka** (the term in Polish covers the concepts of **learning and/or teaching,** as it refers both to self-study as well as to being taught), followed by **uczenie się przez całe życie / ciągłe dokształcanie** (**continuous (lifelong) learning**) (2) and **gromadzenie wiedzy (gathering knowledge)** (2). Considered in conglomerate, this group of provided responses amounts to 39. This means that nearly 80% of respondents believe that knowledge (i.e. **WIEDZA**) is part of learning or results from learning.

Książka/książki (book/books) (32) seem to be the primary source of knowledge. However, if we decide to incorporate in this group other mentioned collections of, printed resources, such as **encyklopedia (encyclopaedia)** (7), **biblioteka (library)** (5), **literature (literature)** (4), **podręcznik/podręczniki (schoolbooks)** (2), **słownik(i) (dictionaries)** (2), and **czasopismo (magazine/journal)** (2), the overall inventory proves the most numerous (54), as outlined by the addressed group of respondents.

Szkoła (school) was quoted by 22 respondents. However, by merging **uniwersytet / uczelnia (university/higher education institution)** (7), **studia / student (studies/students)** (12), and **egzamin / wynik egzaminu (exam (results))** (2) into a superordinate category, i.e. **educational institutions and people in education** group (43), makes this collection the second most numerously represented option related to knowledge. The group of educational institutions and people involved could also be expanded by adding **profesor/profesura (professor/professorship)** (4) and a **doktorat (PhD)** (1).

Other individually noted institution-related concepts include: **wykład (lecture)**, **listy (letters)**, **project (project)**, **myśli (thoughts)**, **filozofia (philosophy)**, **trening (training)**, **lekcja (lesson)**, **zeszyt (notebook)**, **znaczenie (meaning)**, **pisanie (writing)**, **poszukiwanie (search)**, **mapa myśli (mind map),** and **stypendium (scholarship)**.

Mądrość (wisdom) (27) was another regularly noted individual notion, with related **inteligencja (intelligence)** (16), **umysł (mind)** (9), **mózg (brain)** (5), **artykuły / publikacje** (articles/publications) (4), **otwarty umysł (open mind)** (2), and **myślenie (thinking)** (2).

Doświadczenie (experience) was mentioned by 18 respondents, and **nauczyciel (teacher)** was associated with knowledge by 14 people. Surprisingly, only 9 respondents listed the **internet (**also spelt **Internet)** as a knowledge-related notion.

Knowledge is also associated with **rozwój (development)** (14), **umiejetności (skills and abilities)** (10), **czytanie (reading)** (9), **ciężka praca (hard work)** (8), **zdobyte wykształcenie (acquired education)** (8), **świadomość (awareness)** (7), **fakty / widomości (facts/news)** (7), **podróż/podróżowanie (travels/travelling)** (7), **poznanie (cognition)** (6), **wykształcenie (education)** (6), and **łatwość rozwiązywania porblemów / radzenia sobie w trudnych sytuacjach (the ease of solving problems/dealing with difficult situations** (5).

A few respondents consider knowledge to be tied to **starszy wiek (older age)** (4), **pieniądze (money)** (5), **status / prestiż (status / prestige)** (5), **szacunek (respect)** (3), **ciekawość (curiosity)** (3), and **czas (time)** (3) – most probably spent on learning and accumulating knowledge. The time spent on education results in **erudycja (erudition)** (3), **zrozumienie (understanding)** (4), **kompetencja (competence)** (3), **oczytanie (being refined)** (3), and **kulturalny** (most likely familiar with **culture)** (4). Three respondents listed **władza (power)** (3) as a knowledge-related concept.

There were very many instances of aspects of knowledge that were mentioned by two individuals each. These include: **kwalifikacje (qualifications)**, **mądrość życiowa (life wisdom)**, **otwartość na świat (openness)**, **sukces (success)**, **poświęcenie (dedication)**, **szerokie horyzonty (wide horizons)**, **globus (globe)**, **niepodległość / niezależność (independence)**, **nowe / nowoczesna technologie (new technologies)**,

komputery (computers), pamięć / zapamiętywanie (memory / memorising), praktyka (practice), poświęcienie (sacrifice / devotion), możliwości (opportunities), ciekawe fakty (interesting facts), dobra praca (good job), rozmowa (conversation), słuchanie (listening), przyszłość (future), badania naukowe (research), odkrycie (discovery), satysfakcja (satisfaction), dzielenie się wiedzą (sharing knowledge), nauka na błędach (learning from own mistakes).

The remaining types of knowledge listed by Polish native speakers include: **wiedza wirtualna** (**virtual** knowledge) (1), **wiedza powszechna** (**common** knowledge) (1), **wiedza praktyczna** (**practical** knowledge) (1), **wykorzystywanie wiedzy w praktyce** (using knowledge **in practice**) (1) as well as **wiedza bezużyteczna** (**useless** knowledge) (1).

The most numerous group, however, is formed of individual concepts enumerated only once in the corpus of the gathered data. Among them the following features can be found: **wytrwałość (resilience)**, **chęci (willingness)**, **bycie systematycznym (being systematic)**, **tolerancja (tolerance)**, **odpowiedzialność (reliability)**, **uniwersalność (universality)**, **pewność siebie (self-confidence)**, **determinacja (determination)**, **bycie rozsądnym (being reasonable)**, **organizacja wiedzy (organising knowledge)**. Knowledge is also considered as related to: **korzyść (advantage)**, **zainteresowania (interests)**, **realizacja (realisation)**, **pasja (passion)**, **poczucie humour / dowcip (wit)**, **mędrzec (sage)**, **mentor (mentor)**, **zmiana (change)**, **intelekt (intellect)**, **talent (gift)**, **atrybut (attribute)**, **docenienie (appreciation)**, **profesjonalizm (professionalism)**, **awans (promotion)**, as well as such universal concepts as: **społeczeństwo (society)**, **media (media)**, **cywilizacja (civilisation)**, **dobre samopoczucie (well-being)**, **harmonia (harmony)**, **prawda (truth)**, **szczęście (happiness)**, **pokój (peace)**.

The negatively-loaded associations include: **ignorancja (ignorance)**, **manipulacja (manipulation)**, **brak wiedzy (lack of knowledge)**, and **głupota (stupidity)**.

6.2 English frame of KNOWLEDGE – an outline

Input provided by native speakers of English (coming from Great Britain, USA, and Australia) has allowed the present author to outline a rudimentary frame of KNOWLEDGE. The obtained responses create a construct that is basic in nature. This is caused by the fact that the data-gathering procedure relied only on respondents' associations and this corpus was not expanded by input derived from printed language sources. They were requested to list their first ten associations with the concept KNOWLEDGE. Some respondents noted that the first few ideas were easy to provide, but to list 10 was quite a demanding task. Similarly to the Polish study participants, the English-speaking respondents (23 females and 27 males) are also members of the workforce and include: bankers, lawyers, caretakers, journalists, artists, to mention but a few. Two participants are still learning/studying.

Unlike the Polish frame, the English-speaking respondents most frequently (28 instances) mentioned **facts/storehouse of facts/news/information** group, including **retained information**. **Understanding/comprehension** was enumerated 22 times.

Learning and **teaching** are well-represented in connection with knowledge (24), as **learning** is noted by 17 individuals, **lifelong learning** by 3, and **teaching** by 4 respondents. It seems important to note that the individual involvement necessary for absorbing knowledge is emphasised in the choice of 'learning' over knowledge being imparted through 'teaching'.

However, if treated jointly, the **education process and institutions** group would reach a score of 66 and would be considered the most recurrent, as **learning** was mentioned by 17 respondents, **education** by 15 (including **extended education**), **schools/universities** (including **college** and **academia**) by 11, **studying** by 8, **teachers/students** by 6, **teaching** by 4, **lifelong learning** by 3, **exam** by 1, and **basic level learning** by 1 respondent.

Experience seems quite essential with reference to knowledge as it was listed by 16 individuals and **life lessons** was the notion additionally mentioned by 3 respondents. **Intelligence** was associated with knowledge by 16 respondents (including **IQ**), **wisdom** by 10, skills (including **transfer of skills** as well as **applicable skills**) was listed by 7, **cognition** by 4, **brain** by 2, **ability** by 2. Interestingly, three respondents associated knowledge with **knowing what you know**, three with **recognising what you do not know**, and two more with **know-how**. Being **smart/clever** was noted as knowledge-related by 10 respondents, two of whom additionally mentioned **book smart** and **street smart** as essential. Being **learned** is an important feature for 4 respondents.

Research (5) and **discovery** (5) together with **development/growth** (5) were stressed by nearly a third of all respondents.

Knowledge is associated with **power** (13) by a quarter of the poll. **Books** (12), **encyclopaedia** (1), **library** (2) and **reading** (3) make a relatively small group (18 responses only).

Surprisingly, **expertise** was mentioned only 5 times and **qualifications** only twice in the researched group.

However, English native speakers value **critical thinking** (5), **enlightment** (4), **seeking the truth** (4), and **curiosity/being inquisitive** (4) with reference to knowledge. Food-related metaphors, such as: **hunger for knowledge** and **thirst for knowledge** were mentioned once each.

In order to retain gathered knowledge **awareness** (4), **memory** (4), and **creativity** (2) are essential.

Various **types of knowledge** are copiously enumerated including: **evidence-based** knowledge (3), **acquired** knowledge (3), **applied** knowledge (3), **practical** knowledge (3), **working** knowledge (2), **common** knowledge (2), **first-hand** knowledge (1), **public** knowledge (1), **carnal** knowledge (1), **specialist** knowledge (1), **useful** knowledge (1), **prior** knowledge (1).

One respondent is **safe in the knowledge** that **a little knowledge is a dangerous thing**. This can be clearly explained by the fact that some of the features of the analysed concept include: **complexity** (2), being **dynamic** (2), **interesting** (2), **intellectual** (2), **considered** (1), **stimulating** (1), **factual** (1), **objective** (1), **impartial** (1), **infinite** (1), **limitless** (1), **positive** (1), but also **limiting** (2), **debatable** (1), **never fully achievable** (1), related to **uncertainty** (1), **propaganda** (1), **brainwashing** (1), **conjectures to be tested** (1) or **ignorance** (3). One respondent considers it as **bubble gum for the brain**. Knowledge is associated with **sharing** (3), **opportunities** (2), **analysis** (2), **open mind** (2), **common sense** (2), **effectiveness** (1), **fulfilment** (1), **enjoyment** (1), **confidence** (1), **security** (1), **responsibility** (1), **progression** (1), and **balance** (1). It is considered **crucial to survival** (1).

Knowledge is also connected with **perception** (2), **freedom** (1), **trust** (1), **modesty** (1), **realisation** (1), **intuition** (1), **reflection** (1), **self-direction** (1) and **making informed decisions** (1). **Turning knowledge into practice** (2), and **the ability to distinguish between views** (1) as well as referring to knowledge as **privilege** (1) seem to be underappreciated.

7. Conclusions

Considering knowledge frames as constructed on the basis of a limited poll is a difficult, if not an unachievable, task. Undoubtedly, a large-scale study would yield more conclusive results. Nevertheless, the data gathered from native speakers of both the analysed and contrasted languages make it possible to outline a sketch of these cognitive constructs.

It is noteworthy that Polish native speakers seem to proclaim 'knowledge' as more institutionalised. Learning, teaching, schools, and books are far more frequently recalled by Polish respondents. However, the English-speaking respondents provided a great number of individual features associated with knowledge, both positive as well as some that are negatively-loaded. Only a few such instances were evoked by Polish native speakers. Also, what is surprising in the contemporary technologically-advanced world, technology was barely mentioned by English native speakers (1) and the Internet was not listed at all. In the Polish frame this association is much more visible (Internet – 9; technology-related items – 4).

Old age and experience seem to be more readily associated with knowledge by Polish respondents; elders were mentioned only 3 times by English native speakers.

Another difference that is observable is the reference to power, which is clearly much more noticeable in English.

As noted in expert literature various metaphors of knowledge are available, in this study the most pronounced was METAPHOR IS POWER, literally specified as such by most English native speakers who readily associate those two concepts.

Interestingly, in Polish one example of an animal is used to designate knowledge, i.e. **an owl**, which is apparently noted for wisdom and symbolises this notion in Polish tradition. In the gathered corpus of English, one respondent referred to **a salmon**, explaining the association with reference to an "Irish legend that there is a salmon that is the fountain of all knowledge". Nature-related associations are also provided by three native speakers of English in the instances **the fountain of knowledge** (2) and **a tree of knowledge** (1). No similar references are made by Polish respondents.

The differences between the two designed outlines of frames are quite easily noticeable and reflect the target language cultural scripts. The Polish frame seems more institution-, experience- and teaching-oriented, while the English provides more wide-ranging features of the concept and tends to promote the individual. This can result from the historical past of both language communities. However, based on the obtained data, it has to be noted that the frames are similar in that they refer to **wisdom, intelligence, education**, and **learning**, all of which can be considered the common core of the analysed concept. The number of respondents in the poll is not significant enough to draw definite conclusions. Nevertheless, the results obtained from the analysed data allow us to tentatively state that certain notions are fundamental for the concept in the considered linguistic communities. The research participants specified related notions included within the overarching concept, as well as, on rare occasions, also listing proverbs, which are the expression of the linguistic worldview of a given speech community.

The lexical expressions and proverbs analysed prior to the discussion of frames also contribute to the understanding of KNOWLEDGE and WIEDZA in the respective language communities. Knowledge is valuable; it gives an individual safety and allows the leading of a prosperous life. It is the driving force of development. It truly represents power, and despite the differences visible in the compared languages, it is essential to universal human well-being as well as interpreting and understanding the world we live in.

Notes

1. The underlines have been introduced to reflect italics employed in the dictionary entry to highlight forms of nouns as well as to make examples stand out.

2. The underlines have been introduced here to reflect the italicised examples and explanations provided by Goddard and Wierzbicka (2002).

3. The underline has been introduced here to reflect the italicised form introduced by Goddard (2018).

4. The underlines have been introduced here to reflect the italicised forms used by Petruck (2013).

5. Compare: Uberman (2016; 2018).

6. Compare cognitive scripts of conflict, confrontation and war (Panasenko et al, 2018).

List of abbreviations

BDPF – Brewer's dictionary of phrase and fable

KP – Księga przysłów

LDCE – Longman dictionary of contemporary English

RBWP – The Routledge book of world proverbs

TDAI – NTC's thematic dictionary of American idioms

TTEM – Thesaurus of traditional English metaphors

WSAP – Wielki słownik angielsko-polski / English-Polish dictionary

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Résumé

'Knowledge' is a complex concept and it can be analysed from a variety of viewpoints. The article discusses the cognitive frames of KNOWLEDGE in English and WIEDZA in Polish. The discussion starts with the outline of the core of the concept and provides its various definitions as well as some of its multiple types that have been identified by scholars. As a universal human concept 'knowledge' is often taken for granted and is omnipresent in human culture and language. It has been identified by Natural Semantic Metalanguage as a mental predicate (KNOW), which is a semantic prime present in most human languages. This presence is reflected in numerous linguistic expressions,

proverbs, and metaphors. The nature of metaphorical language pertaining to 'knowledge' is presented in sections 4 and 4.1, which characterise not only the knowledge-related metaphors embedded in language but also expressions, phrases, and proverbs in which the lexeme *knowledge* is a constitutive part. In order to learn whether Polish and English native speakers conceptualise 'knowledge' differently, the frames of the concept were designed on the basis of associations provided by native-speaker respondents. Because language is embedded in culture, attention is also drawn to the presence of cultural scripts, which are an integral part of cognitive frames. Having received and analysed responses from a total of 100 native speakers of English and Polish (50 respondents in each group) the outlines of the frames were designed. Knowledge proved to be an essential concept inextricably related to learning and development. The differences that can be observed between English and Polish frames focus on individuality, institution, and power, however for both language groups the connotations are fundamentally positive.