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Good life and good death in the Socratic literature of the fourth century BCE

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Abstract

The paper outlines several forms of ethical attitude to good life and good death in the Socratic literature of the fourth century BCE. A model for the Socratic discussions could be found in Herodotus' story about the meeting between Croesus and Solon. Within their conversation, Solon shows the king of Lydia that death is a place from which the life of each man can be seen as the completed whole. In his *Phaedo*, Plato depicts Socrates' last day before his death in a similar spirit, as the completion of his beautiful life. However, there is no consensus regarding opinions on death among the Socratics. The final part of the paper outlines various meanings of death in the writings of the first generation of the Socratic authors, which arise from different attitudes that the individual philosophers hold regarding the soul as well as other topics. This part puts the principal emphasis on Aristippus, who is considered as the most controversial figure of the Socratic movement. Aristippus makes an interesting opposite to Plato concerning death, since he associates the philosopher's endeavour for a good life solely with that which is here and now.

Keywords: death, soul, Solon, Socrates, Plato, Aristippus

A Prologue to Plato: Solon

One of the most famous passages of Herodotus' *Histories* tells the story of the meeting between Croesus and Solon (I.29-33).[2] Croesus was the well-known king of Lydia, who conquered almost all Greek cities in the west of Anatolia. Tribute from the subdued cities and the proceeds of gold mines made Croesus the richest sovereign of Anatolia. At the time, the flourishing Sardis was visited by many foreigners, including Solon, who established the laws of Athens (I.29). Croesus welcomed Solon as his guest in the palace and hosted him for three days; on the fourth day, Croesus commanded his servants to display the king's wealth. At a convenient moment, he asked the Athenian, who was renowned for his "love of wisdom", whether he has ever met the happiest man (ὀλβιώτατος).[3] Herodotus immediately explains to his readers that Croesus asked the question intentionally, since he considered himself as the happiest man. But contrary to the king's expectations, Solon did not begin to flatter Croesus and spoke the truth: "Yes, my lord: Tellus of Athens". Croesus was surprised at his answer and wanted to know why Tellus is the happiest man. Solon explained that Tellus lived in a time of prosperity, that he had beautiful and good sons, lived to see his grandsons and at the end passed away by a glorious death during the defence of Athens (I.30).[4]

Solon's narration about Tellus' happiness aroused Croesus' curiosity. He hoped that he could be at least the second happiest man, but Solon continued by naming other happy men, Cleobis and Biton of Argos.[5] After they performed a heroic deed, they got into Hera's good graces, and she enabled them to die in their sleep on the floor of her temple (I.31). Then Croesus got angry

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[2] See also Diod. Sic. 9.26. Both of these figures, Croesus and Solon, are historical. They were well-known personalities among the ancient Greeks – Croesus as the last king of Lydia, and Solon as a lawmaker and one of the seven sages of archaic Greece. Before Herodotus, Croesus was mentioned by the lyrical poets Pindar and Bacchylides.

[3] By the way, this is historically the oldest text where the word "philosophize" appears, I.30,11: ...ὡς φιλοσοφέων γῆν πολλὴν θεωρίης εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας. Herodotus puts Solon's love of wisdom into direct relation with his travelling, learning about other cultures and looking at the world (θεωρία).

[4] It seems that the name Tellus (Τέλλος) is not used by accident in this story. It is almost identical with the word τέλος ("end", "purpose", in later philosophy "the very completion of life"), which refers to the verb τελευταῖν ("come to an end", "complete"; cf. Her. I.30.21; I.31.15).

[5] No more details are known about these two (Lloyd, 1987).

and asked Solon whether he thinks that happiness is worthless. Solon attempted to explain his judgements: He considers the age of seventy years old to be the final boundary of human life and adds that of all those 26,250 days, no two days are the same; all human things are just a conglomeration of chance.[6] – "Now, I can see that you are extremely rich and that you rule over large numbers of people, but I won't be in a position to say what you're asking me to say about you until I find out that you died well. You see, someone with vast wealth is no better off than someone who lives from day to day, unless good fortune attends him and sees to it that, when he dies, he dies well and with all his advantages intact. After all, plenty of extremely wealthy people are unfortunate, while plenty of people with moderate means are lucky".[7] If one lives honourably and does not experience any misery, if he is healthy and has good sons, if he is personable, and in addition to this, he ends his life well, then he deserves to be called happy. – "But until he is dead, you had better refrain from calling him happy and just call him fortunate". A human being is never completely self-sufficient; although one has something, he lacks something else. One who ends his life having almost everything, and then even he undergoes a pleasant death, is worthy of that designation. Solon completed his speech by words: "It is necessary to consider the end of anything, however, and to see how it will turn out, because the god often offers prosperity to men but then destroys them utterly and completely" (I.32).

Up to now, we have followed Herodotus' narration almost literally. Onwards we will continue in abbreviated form. Croesus said goodbye to Solon – he thought that Solon is an immense ignoramus (ἀμαθέα; I.33,3) if he does not care about the present good.[8] However, the following events proved that he was wrong. Divine anger (θεοῦ νέμεσις; I.34,1) descended on the king – Herodotus adds his own judgement and step by step uncovers Croesus' pride and arrogance (ὕβρις).[9] Herodotus continues the story and describes how Croesus lost his most beloved son by the hand of a Phrygian he had received into his house. He then follows with a story about Croesus' campaign against the Persians, which he set out on based on the prophecy he was given by the Delphic oracle. Croesus misinterpreted the prophecy, and as a result, his entire empire fell into the hands of the Persian king Cyrus. When Croesus, defeated, was standing on the pyre, Solon's statement that no one who is still alive is happy came to his mind (as it was uttered by some god behind him; σὺν θεῷ; I.86,15) cf. (Pelling, 2006, pp. 157–158). Only at the moment of his death did Croesus understand that Solon's words do not relate just to him, but to all the people, and particularly to those who consider themselves to be happy (I.86). Croesus admitted his arrogance, and by doing so, he unknowingly displayed wisdom.[10] Like a distant echo of Solon's words about the happiest man Tellus, who lived in the time of peace and was thus able to raise his sons well, Croesus says to Cyrus: "After all, no one is stupid enough to prefer war to peace; in peace sons bury their fathers and in war fathers bury their sons". Even the Persian king Cyrus then understood that no human things are steadfast.

The historical dating of Solon's journey to Sardis is disputable, because if it had to have happened, as Herodotus states (I.29), during the ten years of travels that Solon took right after he released the Athenian laws (594 BCE), then Croesus was only a little boy at the time. As we know, Croesus assumed his reign around 560 BCE, when Solon was either dead or at least too

[6] I.32,20-21: πᾶν ἐστι ἄνθρωπος συμφορή.
[7] For Herodotus' *Histories* I use the translation by R. Waterfield.
[8] The term ἀμαθέα (I.33,3) is the direct opposite of the previous designation of Solon's "love of wisdom" (I.30,11). By using this term Herodotus indicates in advance Croesus' arrogant behaviour in the subsequent narration.
[9] S. Saïd thinks that Herodotus' narration was influenced by Greek drama, e.g. with regard to a dramatic composition of the whole scene, or the role of prophecy in Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* etc. (Saïd, 2002, pp. 134–135).
[10] Note that Solon and Croesus became a common literary theme in the 4th century BCE; cf. e.g. Pseudo-Plato, *Epist*. 2.311a, where Solon and Croesus are described as sages, and Cyrus as an emperor endowed with power. Later ancient authors also connected Croesus with the seven sages (cf. e.g. Diod. Sic. 9.26).

old to travel.[11] Thus, there is no suggestion that the conversation between Croesus and Solon actually happened as recorded by our historian.[12]

Herodotus' story sounds almost like a fairy tale. It is a story about the king who did not know happiness, despite being surrounded by enormous wealth. However, the whole story is also interesting due to something else: the significance which Solon attributes to death. Regardless of whether the description of Solon is based on some historical source, its value lies in showing that archaic wisdom considered death to be the criterion of judging a happy life.[13] In this context, death is neither the "end" nor "evil" (these would be in accord with popular notions of death), but the "completion" – the place, time and point that give sense to a life.

Herodotus makes of Solon Croesus' teacher, but Croesus understood that too late, only when he experienced the changeability of fate in his own skin: First, he loses his son, and then his whole empire. It seems that Herodotus is not only telling a story about Solon, who wants to teach a lesson to Croesus, but that he equally wants to give a lesson to his readers.[14] Solon is depicted as an archaic sage, one of the wise men (οἱ σοφοὶ) who have been canonized as the symbolical seven by later tradition.[15] The meeting between Croesus and Solon is a story about the clash between power and wisdom. Solon does not pose as a teacher; he only answers questions, but his answers nevertheless reveal Croesus' ignorance.

Taking a closer look at Solon's approach to happiness (εὐδαιμονίη), we could say that it is made up of a tranquilly and well-lived life as a whole (Tellus lived to a great age, lived in prosperity, raised good sons etc.). But Cleobis and Biton died young, so a heroic and famous death is a more important criterion of happiness than length of life.[16] Furthermore, we have to take into consideration the way of life, since Tellus, Cleobis and also Biton were either excellent athletes or brave soldiers. In his speech, Solon presents several models of a good life which put into contrast the luxurious life of the eastern kings with the simple life of the Greeks:[17] Happiness can be based on self-sufficiency and respectability; life may be happy without suffering, when one is healthy and has virtuously raised sons. But the most important criterion of judging the measure of happiness is death as the culmination of life.[18] However, this does not mean that death is better than life.[19] Death is a place from which we can see the life of each person as the completed whole. What matters the most is how one completes his life. For Solon, to die well means to die after living a full-valued life in the presence of family or the closest friends, to die in a way that will be respectfully remembered by the following generations.

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[11] This issue was pointed out already in antiquity. Plutarch (*Solon* 27.1) writes that many authors argued for the time implausibility of Solon's journey to Sardis, but in his opinion, it is not right to reject a story which is "so famous and so well attested". Contemporary historiography calls Herodotus' story into question (cf. e.g. Wallace, 1983, pp. 86–95; Busine, 2002, pp. 18–20, etc.).

[12] One of the possibilities of how to explain the time discrepancy is based on the assumption that Solon met Croesus' father, King Alyattes.

[13] The opinions on happiness, death and length of life that Herodotus attributes to Solon correspond with the information found in Solon's lyric poetry; cf. (Noussia-Fantuzzi, 2010, pp. 14–17).

[14] In the foreword to his *Histories*, Herodotus writes that the purpose of this work is "to preserve the fame of the important and remarkable achievements". Note that Herodotus has similar thoughts as Solon, e.g. on Fortune, that it is unstable and changeable (I.5,3-4), or that divinity is envious; therefore, it is good for a one to be lucky in one thing and unsuccessful in another (III.40) etc. The reason why Herodotus put the story about Solon and Croesus at the beginning of the Book I of the *Histories* may also be that he intended to introduce his own opinions on life and happiness, which he develops in the following books; cf. (Shapiro, 1996, p. 348), with references to further authors.

[15] Cf. Diog. Laert. I 40. Although Herodotus is one the oldest sources of the archaic wisdom tradition, it seems that he does not know the phrase "seven sages" yet; cf. (Busine, 2002, p. 17).

[16] Solon names Cleobis and Biton in the second place probably because they, in contrast to Tellus, died young.

[17] R. V. Munson suggests that Solon's account, as well as the terminology used, is unclear (Munson, 2001, p. 184).

[18] Cf. Herodotus' phrases: "glorious end of life" (τελευτὴ τοῦ βίου λαμπροτάτη; I.30,21-22), "the best end of life" (τελευτὴ τοῦ βίου ἀρίστη; I.31,15).

[19] M. Lloyd argues for such an interpretation (Lloyd, 1987).

The last day of Plato's Socrates

Recalling the dramatic circumstances of Socrates' death, we can ask questions that are similar to those of Solon: Was Socrates' life happy? Did Socrates die in a way that was a confirmation of his life? We could search for the answers to these questions in several of Plato's dialogues; however, one of them posits almost the same questions as we do – as if Plato had Herodotus' story about Solon and Croesus in his mind when he was writing the dialogue.

The dialogue *Phaedo* is set on the last day of Socrates' life. Socrates is in prison and awaiting execution – according to the law, when a jailor brings a cup of hemlock, Socrates has to take it and drink it on his own. One would expect the philosopher to be full of anxiety due to what he is awaiting. But to the surprise of all the disciples present, Socrates spent his last day the same way as all other days – he led conversations with his companions. Despite the fact that he was awaiting death, he did not change his way of life. Right at the beginning of the discussion, Phaedo says to Echecrates that Socrates appeared to him as a happy man (εὐδαίμων; 58e3) – so fearlessly and nobly was he dying – and he recollects the strange feeling of a mixture of sorrow and pleasure (59b4) that overwhelmed him and the others. Plato's portrayal of Socrates as a new type of hero emerges here again: similarly as at the beginning of *Charmides*, in the concluding passages of *Symposium*, or in *Apology*, Socrates is not very eager to talk about his war heroism (*Charm.* 153a1-153a3); however, he zealously examines himself as well as his intimates through conversations (*Apol.* 38a5), which he leads regardless of fatigue or danger (*Symp.* 223d).[20]

The framework of the dialogue is outlined by the opening of Socrates' speech on death and immortality (63e-69e) in the Orphic-Pythagorean fashion (62b).[21] The topic of the speech is a philosopher's care of death (μελέτη θανάτου; 81a1-2): Socrates is not afraid of death, even though most people consider it as a great evil. A true philosopher (ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος; 64e2-3), a lover of knowledge (φιλομαθές; 82c1), does not take care of the body (περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; 64d8), does not care for desires, fears, loves, illusions, trivialities, wars and dissensions – on the contrary, he focuses on the soul, because only the soul itself can achieve the truth and true realities through reason (λογίζεσθαι; 65c2), which must be liberated from sensuality, from that evil (κᾰκός; 66b6) causing delusion. Therefore, the soul must not let itself be led by the sense of hearing or sight, or by pain or pleasure. True realities (such as justice, beauty, the good) are not physical. If we want to acquire knowledge, we have to look at the things themselves with the soul itself, and that can be done only after death – during our life, we can do this only partially, provided that we don't let ourselves become infected with the nature of the body (67a5).

Socrates' philosophical programme is clear: he has to purify his soul from the body as much as possible (67a-b), since only those who are pure (καθαροὶ) will acquire knowledge of all the genuine (τὸ εἰλικρινές) and true (τὸ ἀληθές; 67b1) things through themselves. In this sense, Socrates' care for death is a kind of completion of the philosophical care to which he exhorts the Athenians in Plato's *Apology* 29d: during life, they should not take care of money, reputation and honour, but rather reason, truth and the soul to be as best as possible.[22] In *Phaedo*,

[20] In the final chapter of his *Memorabilia* (*Mem.* IV 8.2-3), Xenophon describes Socrates' death in a similar way as Plato's *Phaedo* does: Even in prison, Socrates did not change his way of living – he maintained his cheerfulness (εὐθυμία) and contentedness (εὐκολία). Xenophon asks: How could someone die more nobly than Socrates? What sort of death would be happier (εὐδαιμονέστερος)?

[21] Socrates speech has a similar function as the myth of the True Earth at the end of the dialogue (107c-115a), i.e. that it is not associated with argumentation but refers to belief and conviction; cf. the phrase μῦθον λέγειν καλόν (110b1).

[22] Socrates' speech on death and immortality (*Phd.* 63e-69e) is, in a certain way, the completion of his defence at the Athenian court (63b2, 69d7).

Socrates mentions the hope that after death he will acquire what he has strived for all of his life (67b10).

Socrates' subsequent conversation with Cebes and Simmias is similar to the educational lessons known from Plato's other dialogues. The course of the dialogue is a depiction of an education pursued in two phases:[23] In the first phase (69e-88c), Socrates and his companions are engaged in a discussion consisting of three attempts to justify the immortality of the soul. From the viewpoint of *misologia* (89d),[24] it is shown that no *logoi*, i.e. neither Socrates' nor the others', are sufficiently justified.[25] The second phase (91c-115a) consists of several (distinctively Platonic) reflections which have a (distinctively Socratic) therapeutic character in relation to *logoi*:[26] At first, we are witnesses to Socrates refutation of Simmias' suggestion that we define the soul as a harmony (91d-95e). Afterwards, Socrates contemplates for a while, and he continues with recalling why he had diverged from the examination of nature and substituted it with the "second sailing" towards the Forms (95e-102a): the true cause of things is not visible; therefore, we have to get into the field of *logos* and come to know that beautiful things are beautiful by their beauty, just things are just by justice, etc.[27] Subsequently, a fourth attempt to argue for the immortality of the soul, based on the causes of arising (102b-107b), is made.[28] Finally, those present listen to the eschatological myth about the True Earth, which ought to support the philosophical belief that the care of the soul in this (physical) life will be rewarded with a better (spiritual) life after death (107c-115a). The myth about the Earth could be approached as the completion of Plato's therapy, which is related to Socrates' introductory speech on the attitude of a philosopher to death, and to the following discussion about the immortality of the soul as well. The collective character of the reflections constituting the second phase is emphasized in the passage 90e4-91a1, where Socrates exhorts the others to strive for the healthy condition of their *logoi* – "you and the others for the sake of your whole life still to come, and I for the sake of death itself".[29]

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[23] Ronna Burger shows that Plato has intentionally divided the dialogue *Phaedo* into two parts, which are separated by the passage about *misologia* precisely in the middle of the dialogue: in her view, these two parts point to the tension between concern about oneself (the fear of death, the hope for immortality) and concern about *logoi* (the fear of *misologia*, the art of reasonable argumentation) (Burger, 1984, pp. 1–13).

[24] Μισόλογοι (89d1-d3) are "enemies of reasonable discourse". *Misologos* is similar to *misanthropos*, "an enemy of men", a person who has come to the conviction that there is nothing sound in anyone at all. One can fall into *misanthropy* the same way that one can fall into *misology. Misology* itself is probably an allusion to *antilogies* (cf. *Phd.* 90c1, *Phd.* 91a). or contradictory arguments. Following on from Protagoras, *antilogies* were developed by the Sophists of the time and also by some of Plato's rivals among the Socratics, e.g. Antisthenes (see fragments *SSR* V A 152 and *SSR* V A 153).

[25] Let me mention that if we link *misology* with a "desire for victory" (φιλονικία), which is the opposite of a "desire for knowledge" (φιλοσοφία; *Phd.* 91a2-3), Socrates may also appear as a "lover of victory" (φιλόνικος) in certain situations, which he self-ironically admits in the passage 89c3-4, where he says that he will cut his hair and will not grow it back until he gains victory over Simmias' and Cebes' opinions. Socrates aims to emphasize that the meaning of a dialectical conversation is not to win, but to save or cure *logoi* (cf. 90e4-91a1). More important than Socrates' opinion is the truth, the care of the truth (91b-c).

[26] J. Crooks points out the therapeutic character of the second half of the dialogue (Crooks, 1998, pp. 117–125). Support for such an interpretation can be found in the passage 89a, where Phaedo admits to Echecrates how delighted he was during the whole conversation: Socrates was not only nimble but also kind to his young interlocutors. And he immediately noted (89a5): "… how sharply he was aware of the effect, the discussion had on us, and then how well he healed our distress…" (translated by G. M. A. Grube). In this passage we could also look for an answer to the question, what does the sacrifice for Asclepius, which Socrates exhorts all those present to with his last words (*Phd*. 118a7-8), relate to?

[27] Socrates emphasizes that he, in fact, talks about this "second sailing" from the very beginning of the discussion (cf. *Phd.* 65d).

[28] The interlocutors do not have any other objections to Socrates' fourth argument for the immortality of the soul – Cebes is fully convinced, and Simmias still has some small doubts, but he is unable to express them.

[29] Grube's translation. As J. A. Arieti notes, the central topic of *Phaedo* is not the immortality of the soul, but the courage with which Socrates approaches his death (Arieti, 1991, p. 220).

From the viewpoint of the overall composition of the dialogue, we could say that the most important task to which Plato's Socrates exhorts his disciples, and, in fact, us, the readers of the dialogue, too, is the care of the self and of others. Such care is pursued in dialectical conversation, which helps us to purify the soul from unhealthy, false opinions.[30] Care of the self is at the same time the care of others, since in the course of the dialogue Socrates purifies himself equally as his intimates, whose souls he helps to purify, as well. In Plato's *Phaedo*, the care of the self (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ) is defined as the care of the soul (ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς), which is ultimately the care of the truth (ἀλήθεια; 91b-c). If the soul is actually immortal, we must not neglect it – it requires our constant attention, not only for the time of our life but for all time (107c). If the soul wants to be saved from evil, it has to become as best and reasonable as possible – this is the fundamental task of education.

If we place Herodotus' and Plato's text next to each other, we see that Socrates' and Solon's attitudes to death are similar in many respects. It seems that Plato depicts Socrates with regard to a paradigmatic example of the archaic approach to death, i.e. as a contemporary hero who lived out a beautiful life, and the confirmation of that is his beautiful death. All of that may be learnt by reading the final scene of *Phaedo*, which describes Socrates' dignified dying. A reader would expect that the physical symptoms after consuming hemlock (κώνειον) would be much more drastic: disjointed breathing, loss of balance, stomach cramps, vomiting, numbness of the limbs, loss of consciousness, etc. However, in Plato's interpretation, Socrates dies smoothly and tranquilly,[31] since he would like to show that Socrates' dying is a fulfilment of the central thought of the dialogue, which is the demand for gradual purification of the soul from the body (*Phd.* 67b-c). The course of the dialogue clearly indicates that Socrates pursues this demand practically, the only one among the others to do so. Plato's depiction of Socrates' dying may be perceived as an amplification of Alcibiades' praise of Socrates' ability to control his body with his mind, even in the tensest life situations (*Symp.* 220a-220d).[32]

Socrates not only lives but also dies as a happy man who has acted in accordance with virtue for all his life, and therefore he is not afraid of dying (58e3; 63e-64a etc.). Care of others is emphasized by Socrates' interest in his intimates, whom he exhorts to the fulfilment of the philosophical way of life they together decided for and to remain faithful to it, despite the opinion of the majority of Athenians, who sentenced Socrates to death (115b5-c1). For his companions, Socrates becomes an example – only the way a philosopher dies may confirm his way of life.

[30] Cf. 115e5-6: "to express oneself badly is not only faulty as far as the language goes, but does some harm to the soul" (Grube's translation).

[31] R. Gautier proposed the radical thesis that Socrates did not know what he was talking about because he was delirious after the consumption of hemlock (Gautier, 1955, pp. 274-275). However, his opinion is groundless from the pharmacological viewpoint – Plato's depiction of Socrates' final moments could be regarded as relatively realistic; cf. (Bloch, 2001, pp. 255–278); (Arihan & Karaoz Arihan & Touwaide, 2014, p. 79).

[32] Such a possibility is pointed out by C. Gill, who compares two ancient descriptions of physical symptoms after the consumption of hemlock, Plato's and Nicander's (2nd century BCE), and finds considerable differences between them (Gill, 2001, pp. 25–28); cf. also (Ober, 1977). E. Bloch objects to Gill's opinion, when, following from modern and also ancient reports (Theophrastus, Pliny, Pedanius Dioscorides), he distinguishes between various species of hemlock with diverse effects and shows that Plato's description corresponds with *Conium maculatum* L., which starts to work slowly (Bloch, 2001). However, even if we accept Bloch's explanation, we have to admit that literary adaptation gives each "historical" event a specific meaning – even more so in the case of such a master, as Plato definitely is.

The soul and death in the discussions of the Socratics

In the course of centuries, the scene of the dying Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo* has acquired a dominant status among other portrayals of the Athenian sage.[33] Subsequent generations of philosophers saw Socrates as a prototype of a man whose attitude to death confirms that the soul must not let itself be led by the senses, pain, or pleasure, since we cannot judge justice, beauty and the good on the grounds of physical experience – the fundamental task of a philosopher is to purify his soul from the body (*Phd*. 67a-b).

When we think about Socrates' historical legacy from the contemporary perspective, we let ourselves be led specifically by that Platonic portrayal. We tend to forget that the Socratics of the first generation created various alternative portrayals of the Master and that they were giving reasons for several attitudes which they considered to be Socratic. Such a circumstance may be caused by the fact that the Socratic writers competed against each other over which portrayal would assert itself, which, in turn, would draw attention to its creator, and he could then claim himself as the true successor of the Master. Therefore, we should not be surprised when we discover among the attitudes with the label "Socratic" even those that do not correspond with *Phaedo*.

From this perspective, there is an interesting passage in Plato's *Apology* (40c-41c) that outlines two ways we could approach to death. Socrates does not work with the Orphic or Pythagorean notions here, like he does in *Phaedo*, but he refers to stories that are comprehensible for most Athenians: Death is either a non-being and thus a dead one does not have any feelings, or it is some kind of a transition (relocation) from this place to another one. Socrates explains that if death was similar to a night of sleep with no dreams, he would benefit from that (the whole of time would become a single night). The second option is an allusion to the Homeric religion.[34] However, at the same time we can see that Socrates does not describe Hades as a dark opposite of the divine Olympus, but he likens it to joyous life in Elysium. Socrates uses the story to call the present judges into question (from the beginning of the dialogue, he calls them "citizens of Athens") – only when we get to Hades' realm will we meet with the true judges, who have already proved their justness.[35] If death meant a possibility to have a conversation with Orpheus or Homer, Socrates would not hesitate to die even several times (his words indicate a strong irony but also a lightness of thought on death). All those famous men in Hades are immortal and happier than men here on Earth.

One of the most discussed topics among the first generation Socratics was undoubtedly self-control (ἐγκράτεια). All of them – Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon, Phaedo, and even Aristippus – in some measure exhorted to the strengthening of self-control. Two questions were discussed in particular: 1) What is that which is able to control? 2) What is that which should be controlled? (cf. Boys-Stone & Rowe, 2013, p. 124). Both questions arise from the experience (already present in Greek drama) of such a man who cannot control his anger, jealousy or erotic passion, but, on the other hand, he also has the will to stand against the things which enslave him. The metaphor of slave and sovereign is not accidental, since it epitomizes an individual's feelings on the threshold of the classical period: one who wants to be truly free has to become a ruler over himself (ἐγκρατής).[36]

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[33] This is found not only in literature but also in the fine arts. On behalf of all the works, let me at least mention the Neoclassical painting *La Mort de Socrate* (1787) by Jacques-Louis David, which today belongs to the collections of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York.

[34] Cf. *Apol.* 41c: "if indeed what we are told is true" (translated by G. M. A. Grube).

[35] Socrates immediately amplifies this motive when he talks about the meeting with Palamedes and Ajax, whose death was the result of an unjust conviction.

[36] Cf. Aristippus fragment quoted below: Plutarch., *De liber. educ*. 7 p. 4 F [= *SSR* IV A 5]. Antisthenes thematizes freedom using the life story of the Persian king Cyrus (cf. *SSR* V A 85), who was initially a slave (δοῦλος), but he was not afraid to carry out laborious deeds (πόνοι), and he was able to use them to the benefit of good goals. Thanks to this, he earned his freedom (ἐλευθερία) and became an ideal ruler (βασιλεύς). Slavery means not only

It is worth noticing that Plato's *Phaedo* substitutes the "political model" used by Antisthenes, Aeschines or Xenophon, for the "medical model": The soul must not become infected with the nature of the body; the soul has to purify itself, i.e. to get rid of the body to avoid infection with evil. Socrates' answer to both questions in Plato's *Phaedo* could be as follows: Only the soul is able to rule the body, since, in relation to the body, the soul is like a "head" that uses the body as its "tool"[37] – and everything that has a physical nature must be controlled, because pain and pleasure lead us to false notions about the good, beauty and justice. From such answers, it follows that loving somebody means loving his soul.[38] Somewhere around this time the idea came into existence of a radical ontological opposite between the soul (ψυχή) and the body (σῶμα), which endured in Western thought in various forms up to the twentieth century.[39]

Almost all Socratics answer the first question in the same spirit as Plato: The soul, or more precisely its rational ability, represents an active principle that leads one from a life dependent on pleasant feelings to a life based on the right decision-making. Reasonableness enables one to live in such a way that he benefits from his life not only momentarily (while a pleasant feeling lasts) but permanently. And we should not forget that the Socratics saw life as a whole; therefore, they argued that life may be described as "good" or "bad" only at the moment of death.

The answers to the second question are not as clear as those to the first one. Since if we think that one should subdue pleasures in the first place, then we have to admit that not all pleasures have a physical character. Some of them may concern the soul – for example, when we are pleased from the conversation with a friend, or when we experience an uplifting feeling while thinking about a beloved person. Mature Plato solves this issue by teaching about the parts of the soul, which include the irrational parts, as well – the highest purpose of education is to achieve the ability to control the irrational parts of the soul by one's reason (τὸ λογισμός).[40]

Some Socratics concede that not only the soul may influence the body (thus it may transform the body), but that this is also applicable in reverse. The notion of mutual influencing between the soul and the body is connected with physiognomonics.[41] It seems that it was no accident that this term occurred for the first time in the Socratic movement, since several Socratics put the famous ugliness of their Master into contrast with his beautiful soul.[42] The comparisons of Socrates to a statue of Silenus or the satyr Marsyas in Plato's *Symposium* (215b) may be classified among those which problematize the notions of a direct relationship between the state of one's soul and his physical appearance.

Besides the indirect criticism of the physiognomonic art (Plato, Xenophon), the opposite tendencies can be found among the Socratics, as well. Aristippus, for example, says that the soul may display its ugliness outwardly; after all, even a "woman applies cosmetics to her face, but shows an unshapely soul".[43] On the ground of this fragment, it seems that Aristippus –

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social status but also dependence on physical passions, which every free man has to get under his control (cf. the example of Alcibiades in *SSR* V A 141). The numbering of the fragments of the Socratics relies on Giannantoni's edition of ancient testimonies: *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*; (Giannantoni, 1990) abbreviation *SSR*.

[37] Cf. Pseudo-Plat. *Alcib. I*. 129c-130c.

[38] Cf. Plat., *Symp*. 210a-e.

[39] Note that for Homer ψυχή still means "life" that is leaving a man in the moment of death (cf. *Il*. 23.100). The turn regarding the understanding of ψυχή (= "one's character", "cognitive ability", "soul" as an active principle) arrived with the Orphic-Pythagorean background, and the first indications of such an approach can be found in Heraclitus.

[40] Cf. Plat., *Resp*. 435c-441d; *Phdr*. 246a-256b.

[41] The art of physiognomony in antiquity is discussed in detail in (Zelinová & Kalaš, 2021; in Slovak).

[42] For Socrates' appearance, see Xenoph., *Symp*. II.18-19; V.5-7; IV.19); Plat., *Symp*. 215b, 216d; Plat., *Theaet*. 143e.

[43] Anton. II, XXXIV 43 [= *SSR* IV A 139]: γυνὴ τῷ προσώπῳ κοσμουμένη, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμορφίαν ἐμφαίνει (translated by G. R. Boys-Stone & C. J. Rowe).

similarly to Antisthenes – admits a close relationship between one's character and his physical appearance. Antisthenes comments on this in a similar way, when he, in an allusion to Homer, says that "souls have the appearance of the bodies that surround them".[44] Antisthenes wrote a separate work about physiognomonic art titled *On the Sophists*, where he apparently ironized the activities of the Sophists: they inculcate young men with their wisdom in the same way that shop retailers feed their piglets by force.[45]

Within a discussion concerning the physiognomonic art, an important role is played by Zopyrus, who appears in Phaedo's dialogue of the same name: The Persian magician Zopyrus reveals Socrates' character behind his appearance (a bull-neck, robust nape, bulging eyes), which indicates a stupid and desirous man who is controlled by his physical passions. Socrates' companions are horrified by the magician's judgement and stand up for Socrates, but he surprisingly admits that he, in fact, has natural tendencies towards physical passionateness. He is able to strengthen his self-control only thanks to philosophy.[46]

The Socratic authors attribute various meanings to death not only in relation to their understanding of the soul but also regarding the issues they consider to be key. For some of them (Antisthenes, Plato),[47] the soul has an immortal nature – if we identify it with reason, then we can arrive at the knowledge that it is taking part in the reasonable governance of the whole *kosmos* (Xenophon, Plato).[48] Others consider death as something that endangers both the soul and the body. One anecdote shows how Aristippus got scared when he found himself in danger of his life: Once he was sailing to Corinth when he got caught by a strong storm and became frightened. Someone told him: "We laymen are not afraid, but you philosophers act like cowards". Aristippus replied: "That is because of the different types of soul we are fighting for!"[49] On the grounds of this story, we could assume that death poses a threat to the body as well as to the soul. Unlike Socrates as depicted in Plato's dialogues (*Apology*, *Phaedo*, *Crito*), who is not afraid of death, Aristippus does not hide his fear, perhaps because he does not believe in the immortality of the soul. At the same time, we can see that distinguishing between uneducated and educated souls is important for Aristippus. The key to his Socratism could lie just in this distinction: only a philosophical education can cultivate a man – only thanks to education of the soul can one achieve happiness.[50] If we go even further in our reading of this anecdote, we could say that each soul is different depending on education: Aristippus knows (in contrast to the laymen) the value of his soul, i.e. the value of his education. As one report states, self-knowledge of the soul is based on exercise (ἄσκησις), care (μελέτη) and endurance (καρτερία): "As our bodies grow by being fed, but get solid by being exercised, so the soul grows by practicing, but gets better by enduring (ἡ ψυχὴ μελετῶσα μὲν αὔξεται, καρτεροῦσα δὲ βελτίων γίνεται).[51] Such a formulation indicates that Aristippus, contrary to Plato, does not consider theoretical knowledge to be superior to everything else. The key terms here are the verbs μελέτην and καρτερεῖν; the former expresses the requirement of taking care of our souls, the latter even more vehemently says that we must endure in this care for our whole life. There is an obvious similarity between Aristippus and Antisthenes, two Socratics whom doxographers put into sharp contrast. Even Antisthenes considers endurance (καρτερία) as one of the most

[44] Anonym., *Schol. venet. ad Il*. Ψ 65 [= *SSR* V A 193]: τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς περιέχουσι σώμασι εἶναι (translated by G. R. Boys-Stone & C. J. Rowe).
[45] Cf. Athen. XIV 656 F [= *SSR* V A 62].
[46] Cf. *SSR* III A 1 – III A 18.
[47] Cf. Antisthenes in Diog. Laert. VI 5 [= *SSR* V A 176]: "Those who wished to be immortal must, he maintained, live piously and justly" (translated by Pamela Mensch). Cf. also *Gnom. Vat*. 743 n. 5 [= *SSR* V A 32].
[48] Socrates lectures Aristodemus in this spirit in Xenoph., *Mem*. 1.4.17-18; cf. Plat., *Phil*. 30d-e.
[49] Diog. Laert. II 71 [= *SSR* IV A 49] (translated by G. R. Boys-Stone & C. J. Rowe).
[50] Cf. Diog. Laert. II 70 [= *SSR* IV A 125]: "He said it was better to be a beggar than to be uneducated (ἀπαίδευτον); for the former is in need of money, the latter of humanity (ἀνθρωπισμοῦ δέονται)" (translated by Pamela Mensch).
[51] *Gnom. Vat*. 743 n. 34 [= *SSR* IV A 124] (translated by G. R. Boys-Stone & C. J. Rowe).

important excellences or virtues.[52] This could mean that the Socratic authors have much in common even despite the various differences between them. A practical understanding of self-control, self-sufficiency and endurance, which means virtues based on exercise or training (ἄσκησις), puts Antisthenes along with Aristippus into a certain contrast with Plato, who puts theoretical knowledge (σοφία) in the first place.[53]

Some critics suggest that the hedonism attributed to Aristippus represents an attitude that excludes him from the Socratic circle. But how would they explain that several ancient authors consider Aristippus to be Socrates' follower and the founder of one of the most influential Socratic schools?[54] The hesitation in evaluating Aristippus follows from the fact that we cannot give a definite answer to the question of whether he holds an attitude of ethical hedonism, according to which pleasure is the only good.[55] Since the ancient testimonies are not unanimous regarding this question, we have to consider carefully how we will read them.[56]

Above all, we should critically approach those reports which depict Aristippus as a copybook example of a hedonist, because they take the form of polemic or have even a hostile tone.[57] An alternative view on Aristippus could show that he was an integral part of the Socratic movement, even though he was thinking in a more extravagant and provocative way than his comrades.[58] Despite undeniable hedonistic tendencies, it is obvious that Aristippus shares basic convictions with the other Socratics, for example, a belief in the irreplaceable role of philosophical education for the achievement of happiness.[59] There is one anecdote that historians link with Aristippus' attitude to excellence (ἀρετή), which could serve as an appropriate example of the importance that he attributes to philosophical education: "It is said that, when, on some occasion, during drinking, Dionysius commanded each of his guests to dance dressed in purple, Plato refused saying 'I could not wear a woman's clothes', whereas Aristippus accepted and, as he was about to dance, made the comment that 'even in a Bacchic dance the temperate woman (ἥ σώφρων) will not lose her virtue'".[60] Here, both Plato and Aristippus paraphrase a verse from Euripides' *Bacchae* (836 and 317), which we could attribute to their good education. However, that should not be seen as the only message of the anecdote. If we approach it from a certain distance, we will see that it is connected with self-control (one of the meanings of the term σῶφρον) in a much larger extent than, as Sextus thinks, with

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[52] Cf. Xenoph., *Mem*. I 2,19 [= *SSR* V A 103]. Xenophon's understanding of the excellences (virtues), among which self-control (ἐγκράτεια), endurance (καρτερία) and self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) take first place, is presumably influenced by Antisthenes; cf. Xenoph., *Mem*. I 2,1-2; I 2,19-24.

[53] Cf. Aristotle's report in his *Rhetoric* 1398b29-32 [= *SSR* IV A 16].

[54] Cf. Apul., *Flor*. 2 [= *SSR* IV A 104]: Diog. Laert. II 68 [= *SSR* IV A 104]: When asked what he had gained from philosophy, he said, "To be able to consort confidently with everyone" (translated by Pamela Mensch).

[55] Several reports testify against ethical hedonism; cf. e.g. Stob. III 17, 7 [= *SSR* IV A 98]: "The person who masters pleasure is not the one who abstains from it, but the one who uses it without being manipulated by it; similarly, the person who masters a ship or a horse is not the one who does not use it, but the one who steers it wherever he wants". (Ἀριστίππου· κρατεῖ ἡδονῆς οὐχ ὁ ἀπεχόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ χρώμενος μέν, μὴ παρεκφερόμενος δέ· ὥσπερ καὶ νεὼς καὶ ἵππου οὐχ ὁ μὴ χρώμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ μετάγων ὅποι βούλεται.) (translated by V. Tsouna).

[56] A fundamental issue arises from the fact that the later ancient authors do not distinguish the attitudes of Aristippus the Socratic from the teachings of his grandson Aristippus the Younger, who in all probability laid foundations of the later Hellenistic school; cf. Diog. Laert. II 86-87 (problematization of pleasures on the grounds of the teaching about passions of the soul).

[57] Several testimonies speak against the black-and-white attitude to Aristippus' hedonism; cf. e.g. Cic., *De orat*. III 16, 61: the most pleasant thing for Aristippus was to lead conversations about pleasure with Socrates.

[58] Hedonistic attitudes are also attributed to Socrates by Plato (*Prot*. 351a-356c), Xenophon (Mem. II 1, 27-34; IV 5, 9; IV 8, 6) or Phaedo in his dialogue *Zopyrus*. For the Socratic background of Aristippus' hedonism, see (Lampe, 2015, pp. 31–35); (Tsouna, 2021, pp. 389–403).

[59] The same conviction is defended by Socrates in Plato's *Apology*. Aristippus' courage to tell the truth under all circumstances could be seen as the typical Socratic attribute; cf. *Gnom. Vat*. 743 n. 43 [= *SSR* IV A 108]; cf. also testimonies in *SSR* IV A 104.

[60] Diog. Laert. II 78 [= *SSR* IV A 31] (translated by V. Tsouna).

Aristippus' indifference to the way of dressing or with the Socratic-Platonic conviction that excellence once achieved cannot be lost.[61] Perfect self-control (σωφροσύνη) in the ethical as well as political sense is the ripest fruit of philosophical education.[62]

Moreover, even the story about how Aristippus became Socrates' follower is similar to many other Socratic chreiai: Aristippus got enthused about the examination of Socrates, his words and his philosophy, the aim of which was to bring each one to the awareness of the faults in his action and to get rid of them. Aristippus came to Athens right after Ischomachus gave him a few examples of Socrates' dialectic investigation (διαλεγόμενος), and he was so intensely moved that he suffered a physical collapse.[63] In this context, to recognize one's faults means to try to know oneself (ἐπιγνῶναι) – but self-knowledge should be understood as an activity, not as a state.[64] It is just this activity that makes Aristippus the Socratic – together with the effort to give his self-knowledge – a distinctive character with respect to the problematization of the pleasure.[65]

Aristippus (contrary to Plato or Euclides) belongs to the radical Socratics who reject the examination of nature or theoretical-logical reflections and focus their attention exclusively on ethical questions.[66] Several testimonies indicate that Aristippus attributes to the good an ethical as well as an aesthetical value (the terms ἀγαθόν and καλόν are synonymous in Greek).[67] The anecdotes about Aristippus' affection towards the beautiful hetaira Lais could serve as indirect evidence for that – these anecdotes can be even labelled as typically Socratic *topoi*, since they thematise the nature of the soul through the physical display of beauty.[68] Several stories say that Aristippus loved Lais of Corinth, but he was not jealous when other men fell in love with her.[69] This could mean, on the one hand, that Aristippus did not hold a possessive relationship toward her, and, on the other hand, that he managed to control his delight from the pleasures that intercourse with the famous courtesan had brought to him.[70] Aristippus' well-known words that he may have had her, but he is not had by her, should not be considered to be a display of his superiority to the beautiful hetaira but as the manifestation of his self-control, since he explains that Lais possesses the other men but she does not possess him.[71]

On the grounds of ancient reports, we can conclude that Aristippus puts the benefit from achieved knowledge above knowledge about many things (πολυμάθεια) – this usefulness alone makes of us virtuously acting men (σπουδαῖοι).[72] Also, the distinction between a conventional

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[61] Sext. Emp., *Pyrr. hypot*. I 14, 155 [= *SSR* IV A 32].

[62] The opposite of σωφροσύνη is μανία, "madness", which is often caused by passions or uncontrollable desires. Xenophon terms those who have perfect self-control by the aristocratic phrase καλοὶ κἀγαθοί.

[63] Plut., *De curios*. 2 [= *SSR* IV A 2]. Plutarch's choice of words depicting Aristippus' state after he heard about Socrates would be appropriate rather to someone who fell in love and suffers from unrequited love: γενέσθαι παντάπασιν ὠχρὸς καὶ ἰσχνός, ("he became pale and thin").

[64] It seems that Aristippus has adopted from Socrates several features of his dialectic examination; cf. Xenoph., *Mem*. III 8, 1-7 [= *SSR* IV A 165]; Plutarch,. *De prof. in virt*. 9 p. 80 B-C [= *SSR* IV A 111]; Xenoph., *Mem*. II 1, 1-17 [= *SSR* IV A 163]; Phlod., *De rhet*. fr. 12 col. XLI 7 sqq [= *SSR* IV A 11]; Diog. Laert. II 71.

[65] For details, see (Tsouna, 2015, pp. 1–25).

[66] Cf. Aristot., *Metaph*. 996a32-996b1 [= *SSR* IV A 170]. According to Aristotle, Aristippus dismisses mathematics because it is not concerned with the good and evil.

[67] Cf. Aristot., *Metaph*. 1078a31-34 [= *SSR* IV A 171]. Here Aristotle probably argues against Aristippus.

[68] Cf. e.g. Plato's dialogues *Charmides* (on Socrates' affection toward Charmides), or *Symposion* (on Alcibiades' love for Socrates), or Aeschines' dialogue *Alcibiades* (on Socrates' education of Alcibiades).

[69] Lais of Corinth or of Hyccara (Gr. Λαίς) was a prisoner of war, later known as the famous Athenian hetaira, who was said to be the most beautiful woman on earth. Her name is linked with the fortunes of several distinguished personalities (Demosthenes, Diogenes). Aristippus dedicated one of his dialogues to her. For the interpretation of Aristippus' anecdotes concerning his relationship to Lais, see (Tsouna, 2020, pp. 400–401).

[70] Cf. Athen. XIII 588 E-F [= *SSR* IV A 92]; Plutarch., *Amat*. 4 p. 750 D-E [= *SSR* IV A 93].

[71] Cicer., *Ad famil*. IX 26, 2 [= *SSR* IV A 95]: *Habeo, non habeor a Laide*; Lactant., *Divin. instit*. III 15, 15 [= *SSR* IV A 95].

[72] Diog. Laert. II 71 [= *SSR* IV A 122].

and philosophical education is influenced by the Socratic spirit: "He [Aristippus] used to say that those who obtained a general education but were deprived of philosophy were like the suitors of Penelope; for they had their way with Melantho, Polydora and the other serving women and were able to do everything but marry the mistress herself".[73] What people without a philosophical education lack is the ability of care of the self, care of the soul, the awareness of one's own nature and the work on its improvement.[74] Care of the soul enables us to make the right decisions in every matter of life, and primarily in our choice of pleasures. We cannot achieve happiness without care of the soul, without the ability of right decision-making. Aristippus is Socratic just because of this conviction and not due to an affirmative or negative answer to the question of whether the soul is immortal. If Aristippus showed a fear of death when his life was in danger, as the anecdote from Diogenes Laertius reports, maybe it was because he considers death as the end of the philosophical endeavour for a good life.[75] After death, – if there is any "after death" – a philosophical education loses its own value. This value is primarily tied to life. Aristippus does not want to attach to death such meanings that would heroize the completed life of a philosopher. Philosophical life has to be focused on the present world, not on wandering in lost eras or on waiting for a vague future.[76] For Aristippus, the philosophical life is, first of all, the way of right decision-making here and now, and so the way to freedom.[77]

The fact that Aristippus attributes different meanings than Plato to death does not mean that he is a minor Socratic. According to Aristippus, the endeavour for a good life ends with death; however, that does not make our efforts useless. In this sense, Aristippus belongs to those Socratics who are focused on the present life, the present world, and not on a promise of a just life after death.

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[73] Diog. Laert. II 79-80 [= SSR IV A 107] (translated by Pamela Mensch). Several anecdotes depict how Aristippus was making fun of uneducated people; cf. Diog. Laert. II 73 [= *SSR* IV A 120]: When asked one day how the wise man differs from the unwise, he said, "Send both of them naked among strangers, and you will learn" (translated by Pamela Mensch); Plutarch., *De liber. educ*. 7 p. 4 F [= *SSR* IV A 5]: When asked by someone how much the education of his son will cost, he answered, a thousand drachmas. When that man lamented that it is too much and that he would buy a slave for that money, Aristippus replied: "Well then, you will have two slaves, both your son and the one you buy".
[74] Philosophers know their needs thanks to self-knowledge; cf. Diog. Laert. II 69 [= *SSR* IV A 106].
[75] When asked what his benefit from philosophy is, Aristippus answered that he achieved the ability to talk with anyone without a fear (τὸ ἀδεῶς); cf. *Gnom. Vat*. 743 n. 36 [= *SSR* IV A 104].
[76] Cf. Athen. XII 544 A-B [= *SSR* IV A 174].
[77] Aristippus wished for freedom, i.e. life without commitments to the city; happiness for him means to live anywhere as a stranger; cf. Xenoph., *Mem*. 2.1.1–4 a 7–17 [= *SSR* IV A 163].

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Philosophical, anthropological and axiological aspects of Constantine's definition of philosophy

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the philosophical-ethical foundations of Constantine's definition of philosophy, as well as its anthropological and axiological aspects. The focus is placed on the relationship between definitions of philosophy postulated by Constantine the Philosopher and John of Damascus, the latter of which traces the six classical definitions systematized by Platonic commentators. Byzantine thinkers proposed a method of unifying both the theoretical and practical aspects of ancient philosophy with a Christian way of life by interpreting the classical definitions of philosophy and dividing it into theoretical and practical parts, the latter including ethics. Constantine understood philosophy in the sense of the second (knowledge of things Divine and human) and the fourth (becoming like God) meanings of earlier definitions, with the addition of the Christian sense of acting in accordance with the image of God. In addition to these gnosiological and anthropological aspects, the paper also observes the axiological aspect of Constantine's definition of philosophy, which appears to be a foundation for exploring human behaviour as in compliance with Christian laws encouraging changes in ethical principles so as to follow a new code of ethics, through which new values were presented to the Slavs.

Keywords: Constantine (Cyril), definition of philosophy, image, likeness, Byzantine anthropology

Introduction

This paper analyses the philosophical, anthropological and axiological aspects of Constantine's definition of philosophy and focuses on the selected ethical cornerstones of the Cyrillo-Methodian mission to the Slavic cultural space, to which Byzantine values cultivating human personality were being transferred through the works of the eponymous Constantine the Philosopher (Cyril) and Methodius. Brothers Constantine and Methodius became the link between Byzantine and Slavic cultures; a part of the immensely rich Byzantine culture, education, and thinking was brought to Great Moravia through their work, contributing to the intellectual elevation of the Slavs.

Through Christianity, the Cyrillo-Methodian mission (Ivanič, 2020, pp. 655–667) promoted, among the Slavs, new values and a new code of ethics, which was closely related to the new understanding of the world and of the position of man in it. The Byzantine Emperor Michael III encouraged Prince Rastislav to promote these new – Christian – values, which were to become the pillars of all the Slavic nations. He encouraged Rastislav to "search for God with all his heart" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 33). He continues:

> Nor spurn the salvation of people, but foster all, so that they set off on a path of truth without hesitation; so that you, too, would be repaid today and in future for your effort, for showing them the knowledge of God, for all those souls who will turn to Christ our Lord, from now on and forever, leaving your legacy to later generations like the great emperor Constantine! (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 33).

The import of the Byzantine mission lies especially in the fact that it elevated Great Moravian Slavs and significantly contributed to the cultural upswing of other Slavic nations of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, which developed their cultures on a basis of common mentality and values for many centuries. Simultaneously, the mission of St. Constantine-Cyril and Methodius to Great Moravia in 863 casts light on the methods of contemporary Byzantine

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diplomacy, as pointed out by Nikos Matsoukas: "The respect for the languages and cultures of other nations corresponds with Byzantine philosophy, which [...] contributed to the flourishing of culture without racial, ethnic and language prejudice" (Matsoukas, 2010, p. 432). This innovative policy is an example of the sophistication of Byzantine culture, which – by virtue of the Cyrillo-Methodian mission – allowed Slavs to become a developed nation and further advance their own culture, language and thought.

Philosophical aspect of Constantine's definition of philosophy

Let us first briefly explain the background information on Constantine's philosophical education, starting with his mentor, Photios the Great – an exquisite philosopher, theologian and historian, who contributed to the flourishing of Greek writing and became a leading representative of Byzantine humanism. In this period,[2] Byzantine humanists laid the foundations for the revival of the study of ancient philosophical texts and art (Stavrianos, 2014, pp. 33–34). An increase in attention paid to classical studies also took the form of transcribing and circulating selected texts. In this regard, Photios the Great issued and commented on works by ancient philosophers with the help of his colleagues, among them Constantine the Philosopher, who acquired a remarkable education before coming to Great Moravia, "[he] studied Homer and geometry, was lectured in dialectics and all philosophy by Leo and Photios, and studied rhetoric and arithmetic, astronomy and music and all other Greek arts" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 15)

The Moravian-Pannonian text *Život Konštantína-Cyrila* [*The Life of Constantine-Cyril*] states that Constantine answered the question of what philosophy is as follows: "The knowledge of matters Divine and human, to what extent man can approach God. It teaches man to be in the image and likeness of the One who created him" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila 2013, p. 16).

If we accept the premise that the first contact of the Slavic cultural space within the area of Great Moravia with Byzantine philosophy took place via this text, it is evident that this "definition" of philosophy, likely the first to be presented in a Slavic language (Dupkala, 2006, pp. 95–102), hides not only the direct impact of ancient thought, but – most importantly – the key to understanding basic values, then being transferred to Slavic countries from the Byzantine cultural space, which was, on the one hand, a continuation of ancient Greek culture and on the other enriched with a Christian dimension (Tatakis, 1967, p. 174).

According to František Dvorník, Constantine bases his definition of philosophy "on Stoic teaching that wisdom lies in the knowledge of matters Divine and human. The second part of Constantine's definition reminds [sic] of Plato's conclusion that man should, according to his capacity, grow to be in the image and likeness of God" (Dvorník, 1970, p. 78). Alexander Avenarius points out that recognition of the Stoic dimension (knowledge of things Divine and human) of this definition, present in its first part, and of the Platonic dimension (man becoming like God) in its second part carries with itself certain issues. He therefore explains:

> It seems that [an] analytical approach and division of the definition into two parts has caused a marked overestimation of [the] ancient influences in the work of Constantine. This approach makes us lose sight of the total structure of the definition and of its fundamental meaning. It is undeniable that the definition, as such, respects in full extent the medieval opinion: the ancient influences which it is made up of provide a certain formal frame and they are subordinate to the idea that cognition is justified when it works towards knowledge of matters Divine. Cognition of matters human is tolerated here, or, its task is given by its function in the process of knowing of matters Divine, i.e. what is said here is a certain variation on a frequent topos of other contemporary

[2] This period is often called the Macedonian Renaissance, but this label has caused a heated discussion, as there is a considerable difference between the Renaissance in the East in the ninth century and the Renaissance in the West in the fifteenth century.

> Byzantine hagiographic works and on what proceeds also from the understanding of patristic literature. In Constantine's definitions nothing suggests that there would appear a truly humanist idea that would attribute autonomy to observing of the world and man, much less an equal gnosiological value (Avenarius, 1992, p. 71).

Definitions of philosophy similar to the one construed by Constantine can be found in many handbooks used at the University of Constantinople at the time (Ševčenko, 1956, p. 449). It needs to be mentioned, at least in passing that, in this era, a higher educational institute existed in Constantinople, which many scholars consider a university by contemporary standards. In Byzantine sources, it is called *Auditorium Capitolii* and Οἰκουμενικόν Διδασκαλεῖον.

In an objective evaluation of Constantine's definition of philosophy, however, one cannot advance without a more complex knowledge of contemporary theology (Zozuľaková, 2016, p. 151), as, in addition to handbooks of this kind, Byzantine philosophical thought was significantly influenced by Greek scholasticism in the sixth century, and in the eighth century by the *Dialectic* of John of Damascus (c. 650–749), who collected Greek philosophical thought of the four pre-Christian centuries and Christian thought of the first eight centuries in the three volumes of *The Fount of Knowledge*, providing an answer to what philosophy is (John of Damascus, 1860a, p. 533).

John of Damascus uses six definitions of philosophy:

1) the knowledge of things which are insofar as they are (*γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων, ᾗ ὄντα*);
2) knowledge of things Divine and human (*γνῶσις θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων*);
3) contemplation of death (*μελέτη θανάτου*);
4) becoming like God (*ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ*);
5) art of arts and science of sciences (*τέχνη τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστημῶν*);
6) love of wisdom (*φιλία σοφίας*).

A later commentator, Nikephoros Blemmydes (1197–1272), writes that the first, second and sixth definitions of John of Damascus were originally postulated by Pythagoras, the third and fourth by Plato and the fifth by Aristotle (Nikephoros Blemmydes, 1865, p. 724). Various definitions of philosophy resonate in Byzantine works throughout the era, reiterating – with certain variations – these six classical definitions, systematized by Platonic commentators: Ammonius, David and Elias, among others (Ierodiakonou, 2010, p. 846; Milko, 2016, p. 122).

These definitions were typically coupled with a division of philosophy into theoretical and practical parts. Theoretical philosophy concerns itself with knowledge and comprises physics (dealing with material things), mathematics (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and harmonics), and theology (immaterial beings: God, angels, souls). Practical philosophy concerns itself with virtues and comprises ethics, economics and politics. In interpreting these definitions, Byzantine thinkers proposed a method of incorporating both theoretical and practical aspects of ancient philosophy into the Christian way of life. From the fourth century onwards, the term philosopher (φιλόσοφος) referred to monks and the term philosophical life (βίος φιλοσοφικός) referred to monastic life. It is therefore understandable that, afterwards, for Byzantine thinkers, true philosophy is inseparably connected with asceticism and monasticism. "This may seem rather extreme and provocative, given the hostility of illiterate ascetics towards ancient Greek philosophy, but it should not escape us that in late antiquity one could be called a philosopher just by virtue of his way of everyday life, without necessarily adhering to, or for that matter introducing, a certain philosophical system" (Ierodiakonou, 2010, p. 847). Eunapius expressed the tenets of this understanding in his Lives of the Sophists; turning to Porphyry as an example, he stressed the equality of words and deeds, but also the necessity to apply philosophical knowledge in practical life, together with asceticism in a life devoted to philosophy (Dostálová, 2004, p. 11).

Among the most noteworthy sources form this era is the work of Athanasius the Great, *Life of Anthony* (Athanasius the Great, 1857, pp. 837–976), which is, as is typical of biographies of

Christian ascetics, reminiscent of such philosophical biographies as The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, The Life of Plotinus and The Life of Pythagoras. Frequently, ascetic literature expanded the notions of "specific topics of ancient philosophy – spiritual exercise, philosophical psychology and fight against passions" (Milko, 2009, p. 178), but detailed analysis reveals that the authors of ascetic texts presented a new philosophical understanding of the world, history and the position of man in society. Their spiritual and physical effort therefore brings forth a new philosophy, one accentuating perpetual self-improvement and a struggle against passions. In this view, asceticism is "*the highest philosophical understanding of life, in which greed and egocentrism hurt relations between people*" (Matsoukas, 2010, p. 406). Perfection (τελείωσις) of man, which is described by the term holiness (ἁγιότης), is not perceived as moral growth, but as a successful change and therapy of one's psychosomatic being. This is expressed e.g. in the work of Palladius of Galatia, *Λαυσαϊκόν* (Palladios, 1992), written in 420 AD, which contains tales about prominent monks and is considered a jewel of ascetic philology.

Connecting the definitions of philosophy by Constantine and John of Damascus

Constantine understood philosophy in the second (*knowledge of things Divine and human*) and fourth (*becoming like God*) interpretation provided by John of Damascus, "with an addition of a Christian sense for acting in God's image and likeness", as M. A. Wesoły observes (Wesoły, 2020, p. 26). Thus, we may assume that Constantine's definition of philosophy hints at a direct connection to the definition by John of Damascus; the claim of "roots in Byzantine theology and theological thought" (Avenarius, 1992, p. 70) indicates that he was a theologian and, therefore, his understanding of the words "likeness to God" (ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ), similarly to that of John of Damascus, differs from Plato's.

In Byzantine ascetic literature, a great emphasis is placed on virtues (ἀρετή) that lead man to perfection and unification with God. Man purifies oneself and becomes in God's likeness through ascetic preparation, reaching illumination that leads to perfection. Byzantine authors transformed these three stages – known from Neoplatonism as purification (κάθαρσις), illumination (φωτισμός) and perfection (τελείωσις) – with regard to differences between the uncreated and created; and, on the basis of this, proposed the process of healing of the human mind through three stages of spiritual life: purification of heart, illumination of mind and deification (θέωσις). A deeper analysis of the phrase "*likeness to God*" (ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ) reveals that, for Constantine, being in the likeness to God means deification (θέωσις).

In this regard, it is necessary to reiterate that "Byzantine thought expands the ancient understanding of philosophy as ascent towards God. A fundamental and substantial difference of Byzantine thought is the description of meaning of this ascent as salvation, which represents deification" (Milko, 2009, p. 201). In Byzantine tradition, deification (θέωσις) is the final goal of man, which is the reason why orthodoxy (ὀρθοδοξία) is closely linked to orthopraxy (ὀρθοπραξία). It is exactly this aspect that Constantine emphasizes when he prays: "So that I would learn what pleases You (God) and was saved" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 15). Therefore, it is evident that Constantine strives "to be in the image and likeness of the One who created him by one's own actions" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 16) so that he would reach the final goal of Christianity, salvation.

In his philosophical works, Constantine the Philosopher probably leaned towards Christian interpretations and therefore founded his ideas primarily on Christian sources. It is possible that he built upon works of both Christian and non-Christian authors, after the example of his tutor Photios and his definition of philosophy was built on theological foundations. In this regard, it is important to remember that, in Byzantine thought, philosophy intertwined with theology and an exact definition of the substance of Byzantine philosophy depends largely on clearly determining the nature of philosophy and theology in the Byzantine Empire – one of the key issues yet to be tackled. Historians of philosophy have not been able to sufficiently delimit the

contents of Byzantine philosophy, which leads to frequent misunderstandings in discussions of this topic. Furthermore, shortcomings of delimiting the contents of Byzantine philosophy and theology impede the proper understanding of the threshold of philosophy and theology, as well as their relations.

Anthropological aspect of Constantine's definition of philosophy

In addition to a gnosiological aspect, Constantine's definition of philosophy also incorporates an anthropological aspect, which is founded in the Byzantine notion of man's creation in God's image and likeness. The question of image has a long history and is among the core terms of Greek philosophy. It is used by Plato, the Stoics, as well as Neoplatonists later on. Philo of Alexandria also uses the term *image* and attributes to it an unusual meaning (Karavidopoulos, 1966, pp. 72–86).

Byzantine anthropology is founded on the Book of Genesis, describing the Divine origin of humanity: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him"[3] (Gen 1, 27). This verse provides the first and most information on the presence of God's image in man and many Byzantine thinkers later continue along this line, among them Irenaeus of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Athanasius the Great, Gregory of Nyssa.

Despite the fact that the works of Byzantine authors do not contain a final statement or clear definition of the term *image*, the expression "in the image" (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ) is the focal point of their approaches to anthropological issues (Nellas, 1995, p. 20). In their texts, the question of image[4] serves as a middle ground on which cosmology and anthropology meet each other. It is evident that the question of image, despite it being the cornerstone of Byzantine anthropology, cannot in itself exhaust all its facets.

John of Damascus ponders the question: "what is meant by 'according to his image and likeness'"? (John of Damascus, 1860b, p. 168), answering it in much the same way as earlier Byzantine thinkers: "[it] means the intellect and free will" (John of Damascus, 1860b, p. 168). In the works of other Byzantine authors, God's image is attributed to the soul and body of man, in others to the division of nature and person, still in others to "the entirety of man" (Epiphanius of Cyprus, 1858, p. 344). That means that not only the soul, but also the body participates in God's image, as the first man was created according to his original (Kavasilas, 1865, p. 680). That original is the Logos that took on body. One does not comprise only the soul, nor only the body, but rather both the soul and body, which make up the being created in God's image. The expression "in the image" pertains to the entirety of man, that is, it relates to the entire human nature, i.e. both body and soul.

Byzantine thinkers sometimes even state that the Divine image in man only pertains to one part, such as soul, spirit, or freedom. However, even in these cases, they assume that man is not only the nature of such but, most importantly, a person that has a nature. Man is a unified personal whole, a unique being, to which John of Damascus testifies elsewhere:

"Thus, man is made up of soul and body, while neither the soul alone nor the body alone is called a hypostasis, but both are called enhypostata. That which consists of both is the hypostasis of both, for in the proper sense hypostasis is that which subsists of itself by its own subsistence, and such this is called" (John of Damascus, 1860a, p. 616).[5] Similarly, Irenaeus of Lyons claims that the Divine image in man includes both soul and body, which was also made in God's image (Irenaeus, 1857, p. 1137). On the basis of the cited, it is evident that term *image* pertains to the entirety of man as a unique person that incorporates the entirety of nature, as it

[3] "Καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν."

[4] The term "image" is meaningfully expanded in each new era in accordance with the issues faced by its thinkers; this influences the approach to clarifying various issues.

[5] "Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς ἐστι καὶ σώματος συντεθειμένος· οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ μόνη λέγεται ὑπόστασις οὔτε τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ' ἐνυπόστατα, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποτελούμενον ὑπόστασις ἀμφοτέρων."

was man in his entirety that was called to life. It is this dynamic fulfilling of a human goal in which dwells the fullness of realization of human life in God's image and likeness.

What does Constantine the Philosopher mean by saying that man becomes "the image and likeness of the One who created him by his very actions" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 16)? The answer to this question now seems evident. He considers God to be his creator, who, to him, "appears to be the highest value" (Vaňko, 2013, p. 405). By performing one's deeds, man fulfils the potential possibility to achieve the Divine form, likeness of God (καθ' ὁμοίωσιν). From the point of view of ethics, this stance has certain consequences, which will be discussed in the following section of the paper.

Axiological aspect of Constantine's definition of philosophy

Research of the axiological aspect of Constantine's definition of philosophy, on the basis of the contents of *The Life of Constantine-Cyril*, is impossible without comparisons with the Byzantine cultural environment and value standards of the period to which the Cyrillo-Methodian mission belongs. Considering the fact that the most prominent feature of this text content– and theme–wise is the description of individual stages of Constantine's life and deeds, axiological aspects represent only one among a multitude of components of the text's content–thematic structure (Vaňko, 2013, p. 404).

This description of ethical values is not intended to represent a philological analysis of *The Life of Constantine-Cyril*, but to point out the new code of ethics, through which the Slavs were offered new values leading to a change in the way of thinking and life. These new values were of Christian origin and introduced to the Slavic environment an ascetic way of life (Zozuľaková, 2016, pp. 149–157) and Byzantine understanding of virtues, as well as the Hesychast tradition that was transferred to Bulgarian, Serbian and Russian environments following the expulsion of Methodius' students from Great Moravia.

In this regard, it is vital to emphasize the fact that the Cyrillo-Methodian mission took place shortly after the resolution of the iconoclast controversy (Avenarius, 1998, pp. 85–90), which created space for the development of education, as indicated in the Introduction. In that period, there was a significant development of monastery life at the Holy Mount Athos near Thessaloniki, to where people travelled in search of the ideal ascetic way of life. The tradition of monasticism at Athos[6] continued in the same nature as at Olympus, where Methodius lived as a monk after substituting earthly values for the heavenly and renouncing the world. Constantine, too, strove to please God, i.e. to observe God's commandments, and thus refused high rank and a life of luxury and "cared only for how to forsake the earthly matters for the heavenly" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 16). Thus, towards the end of his life, he became a monk in Rome and took on the name Cyril. This confirms that both brothers viewed the cultivation of human nature through the prism of ascetic struggle, that is, struggle against passions (non-ideal characteristics) and attainment of virtues. Therein lies the essence of Constantine's definition of philosophy, which can be extended also to the definition of ethical standards for behaviour in a Christian spirit – that is, the goal of human endeavours here is "to become in the image and likeness of the One who created him by own actions" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 16).

Within the *Life of Constantine-Cyril*, it is possible to identify several values that were essential for its author. These include knowledge of truth, repentance and life, self-restraint, prudence; wisdom; diligence; scholarship; as well as calmness in action (Život Konštantína-

[6]Monasticism first appeared in the area of Athos in the ninth century, thanks to the first organizer, Ioannis Kolovos; in the tenth century, Athanasius the Athonite – who previously lived as a monk at Olympus in Bithynia – founded the first great and well-organized monastery Great Lavra. Slavic societies were influenced especially by the Slavic monasteries at Athos: Zograf Monastery (Bulgarian) founded in 973, St. Panteleimon Monastery (Russian) founded in tenth century, and Hilandar Monastery (Serbian) founded in 1198.

Cyrila, 2013, pp. 13–15). Education and knowledge (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 16) were perhaps of the greatest value for Constantine, because he considered education to be the path to wisdom. This means that Constantine's definition of philosophy must be viewed within a wider context, and both his remarkable education and preference for Christian values need to be taken into account. In such manner, the anthropological and axiological aspects of Constantine's definition of philosophy seem to form a foundation for exploration of human behaviour in compliance with the Christian laws which encourage changes in ethical principles.

Via envoys, the Great Moravian prince, Rastislav, asked the Byzantine Emperor Michael III to send a teacher who would explain the essence of Christianity to Slavs in their language. The Emperor responded to Rastislav's request, writing in a letter: "Thus, accept a gift that is far more precious than all the gold, silver, gems and fleeting wealth" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 33). With these very words, he appraised the diachronic value of Slavic script that was to develop in the following period. The Emperor further states: "God who wishes all people to be saved and to see the truth..." (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 32). The meaning of the Old Church Slavonic word for *truth* also indicates justice, legal order, law, good law, which emerges from the Byzantine Empire "in every direction" (Život Konštantína-Cyrila, 2013, p. 32).

What does this, ultimately, mean? It means that a legal, ethical and hierarchical model of society was being brought to Great Moravia from the Byzantine Empire, through which the Slavs were provided with a new code of ethics, values and life. In this regard, Juraj Vaňko aptly states that the work of Constantine the Philosopher and Methodius in itself appears to be "a great, if not the greatest, value for the spiritual formation" of the Slavic nations (Vaňko, 2013, p. 405).

Conclusion

Constantine (Cyril) the Philosopher and his brother Methodius brought to the territory of Great Moravia not only the Slavic script and translations of various texts, but also many cultural elements, which then formed the value system of Slavs in Central Europe (Gluchman, 2017, pp. 62–74; Gluchman, 2019, pp. 106–118). These elements were transferred to everyday life, significantly influenced the direction of other Slavic nations and their position in the European cultural space (Ivanič, 2016, pp. 123–130; Hetényi, 2016, pp. 233–243). By defining philosophy along the lines of the definition proposed by John of Damascus, Constantine delimited the aim of human life and directed man to become – through one's own deeds – an image and likeness of God that made him. This topic is closely linked to the issue of the value platform of Byzantine philosophy, which reflects Byzantine heritage (Pružinec, 2019, p. 136) and expands the deeper understanding of the meaning of human life. The issue of values currently appears to be very topical, since it is related to a wide range of axiological questions and its research involves utilization of a number of scientific disciplines – philosophy, ethics, psychology, sociology, and linguistics (Vaňko, 2013, p. 404).

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Interpretation of affects: Spinozist approach to the issue of human emotionality

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Abstract

This paper deals with the possibilities of using the ethical considerations of Baruch Spinoza in a psychotherapeutic context. I begin the interpretation by defining the basic features of Spinoza's ethics and their connection with the whole of his philosophical system. The core of the study is the interpretation of Spinoza's theory of affectivity and especially his concept of the transformation of passive affects into active, and what role philosophical knowledge plays in this transformation. The third part of the study then tries to show how selected points of Spinoza's introduced ideas can be useful for psychotherapeutic work. As much as the connection between philosophical ethics and psychotherapy seems obvious to many non-experts, most professionals on both sides are vehemently opposed to it. I believe that Spinoza's thinking is an example of how the boundaries of these disciplines can be meaningfully bridged.

Keywords: Spinoza, affects, freedom, Andreas-Salomé, ethics of psychotherapy

Introduction

In the last few decades, we have seen a clear renewal of interest in the teachings of the seemingly forgotten philosopher of the seventeenth century, Baruch Spinoza. As a result of his excommunication from the Jewish community and the placement of most of his writings on the Vatican's list of banned books, his work remained relatively unknown until the late eighteenth century, when it was rediscovered by philosophers in the context of the German-language discussion of the issue of pantheism (the so-called *Pantheismusstreit*) (Sobotka, 1999). It is typical of the nature of Spinoza's work that the controversy was caused mainly by fears about the possible ethical consequences of his ontology. During the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century in the context of the critique of metaphysics, or what the Czech philosopher Jiřina Popelová aptly describes as the "disintegration of classical philosophy" (Popelová, 1968), interest in Spinoza's ideas largely declined, but since the second half of the twentieth century they have attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention. Surprisingly, the renewed interest can be observed in a wide range of differently oriented philosophical authors, both in terms of their starting points and the disciplines in which they seek to use the Spinozist inspiration.[2] It seems as if time, in a way, has matured in appreciating the true significance of Spinoza's work. This text focuses on the possibilities of applying Spinozism in psychotherapeutic theory and practice.

The synthesis of philosophical and psychological approaches has its pitfalls. Philosophers often try to avoid "psychologism", which they see as a misrepresentation of their views and a misunderstanding of the philosophical way of thematization as such. On the other hand, there is a frequent fear of inappropriate "rationalization" among psychotherapists, which, from their point of view, is a defense mechanism blocking the therapeutic process. In contrast, this study is intended to show that Spinoza's ethics is an example of the common field of these disciplines, and that their cooperation can be fruitful. The use of philosophy in the field of psychotherapy is an obvious choice especially in the domain of so-called deep-psychological approaches, i.e., where the existence of unconsciousness is taken into account; where working with the client's rational insight into their problems and their causes is a part of the psychotherapeutic method; and where the emphasis is on the verbal aspect of the therapeutic process. The most typical

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[2] Cf. research in the field of the history of philosophy (Wim Klever), ontology (Louis Althusser, Gilles Deleuze), political philosophy (Antonio Negri), environmental ethics (Genevieve Lloyd), etc.

examples that meet these criteria are psychoanalytic psychotherapy, relatively popular today in Central Europe, and the traditional form of psychoanalysis, which is considerably less widespread. Philosophy can be used in the context of psychotherapy in at least three ways: as theoretical and methodological support for therapists; as a starting point for formulating the ethical focus of therapeutic work; and as a technical tool for achieving psychological change and consolidating it through rational insights.

The discussed topic presents us with the question of boundaries and the relation of various disciplines in the humanities, their hierarchy, and the possibilities of their mutual use or application. In our case, the specifics of Spinoza's thought further complicate the already mentioned problematic aspects of the relationship between philosophy and psychology (and psychotherapy) in terms of the possibility of its disciplinary classification. Although the title of his most famous work, *Ethics* (which will be the main subject of the following analysis), suggests that while the main perspective used is ethical, many authors question the clarity of this derivation. For example, Petrufová Joppová says that Spinoza's "thinking could be characterized as more meta-ethical than ethical" (Petrufová Joppová, 2018, p. 41); Garrett terms it "metaphysics of blessedness" (Garrett, 2018, p. 11); and Pereboom construes it as psychotherapy (Pereboom, 1994). In my opinion, the fundamental theses of Spinoza's philosophy (which will be discussed in the following chapter) imply that disciplinary distinctions are not appropriate for understanding his thought. In accordance with his monistic (or holistic) assumptions, anything can be properly understood only from its relationship to the whole; in other words, it is not possible to meaningfully focus only on a particular section of reality. However, certain questions, approaches, and concepts are traditionally assigned to certain disciplines; thus, we can understand Spinoza's *Ethics* as an interpretation of a philosophical system that begins with ontology, continues with gnoseology, anthropology, and psychology, and culminates in ethics in the sense of teaching about virtue, freedom, and goodness. Proceeding in a similar direction, the present text begins with an interpretation of Spinoza's ethically relevant ontological theses, continues with his psychology, and culminates in his ethics. However, it is always necessary to keep in mind the fundamental complexity and versatility of his thinking, which entails that it largely depends on the reader whether, for example, they will understand the proposition from the fifth part of *Ethics* as psychological, ethical, or psychotherapeutic statements.

According to Spinoza, we are subject to innumerable illusions, and one of those that baffle us the most is that we think we have free will. We are aware of our decisions, but "not even in our dreams" do we notice that (and to what extent) these are determined by the unconscious dynamics of our psychic life (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 239). Spinoza builds the interpretation of the logic of these mental movements on the concept of affects and the ideas by which affects are shaped. As much as free will is a dream for Spinoza, he understands that an essential prerequisite of a joyful and meaningful life is the liberation we attain with reason. If we want to free ourselves, our goal cannot be to escape our own nature that sets clear limits to our possibilities. However, we can use our mental abilities to purposefully transform our conception of the world, life, and the mind, and in consequence of these changes, the corresponding movements in our affectivity will necessarily take place. According to Spinoza, the strengthening and stability of the mind leads to the highest satisfaction associated with maximizing the performance of intellectual and other abilities.[3] The foundations of Spinoza's ethics are outlined below in the chapter "Ontological character of Spinoza's ethics".

The chapter "Spinoza's Treatment of Affects" introduces Spinoza's concept of a complex process of mental maturation, which he calls *emendation of the Intellect*. It will be shown how, according to Spinoza, rational means of analysis and interpretation can be used for the overall

[3] Cf. Spinoza, 2002a, Part V, pp. 363–382.

transformation of personality. Spinoza's ethics has the same goal as psychoanalysis, i.e. liberation, not just external but permanent. External liberation, liberation by external means, does not abolish addiction, but on the contrary deepens it. However, the intimate character of liberation does not mean that it has no external manifestations. When we recognize the independence of our affective states from external affairs and become aware of the role of our own conception of the world and mind as they shape our approach to the outside, we are driven to some degree of objective detachment from illusory – and by various fantasies – manipulated space, resulting from the ability to control our projections and their urgency through awareness of the mechanisms of which they are part. This perspective is a product of Spinozistic reasoning, and an insight immediately accompanied by emotions in a psychoanalytic situation.

The aim of the chapter "Spinoza as a philosopher of psychoanalysis" is to show in what respects Spinoza's ethical thinking may be relevant for psychoanalysis. It will be demonstrated that in addition to the assumptions of the existence of the unconscious and the possibility of targeted work with its contents, there are many other links between the thinking of Spinoza and Freud. Deleuze and Guattari refer to the kind of innocence contained in a Spinozistic perspective when they suggest that Spinozism is simply a matter of becoming a child (Deleuze & Guattari, 2013). The same motif of being deprived of social convention can be found, at least as an ideal, in the character of the psychoanalytic situation, which is naturally reflected in the final mood in which the client leaves therapy. The advantages of Spinoza's philosophy for the *philosophical* needs of psychoanalysis are related to the holistic nature of his reasoning and philosophical system, which was also reflected in the fact that his philosophy is a kind of meta-philosophy and he is a philosopher of philosophers. One of the defining features of Spinoza's ethics is the rejection of Cartesian dualism, of which contemporary Western civilization, in its predominant conception of the relationship between the mind and the body, is still a direct heir. A characteristic feature of Spinoza's conception of affectivity is that he does not understand it in isolation from the issue of knowledge. The decisive ontologically substantiated principle of Spinoza's anthropology of affects as directly shaped by knowledge explains the close connection within the whole of Spinoza's themes, which entitled him to call his completely elaborated system *Ethics* (Spinoza, 2002a). Naturally, even his ethics, in the narrower sense of how we can change our affectivity in the direction of joy, satisfaction, and peace of mind, is closely related to his ontological views, e.g. when he shows how mastering a deterministic interpretation leads to a certain degree of steadfastness. Spinoza's ethics can be understood as psychotherapy by philosophical means and, especially some passages of the last part of his central work, almost as a catalog of possible psychotherapeutic systems.

An endless line of prophets and visionaries have long encouraged us to realize the power of the way we look at the world and some of the opportunities we can unlock by changing our perspective. Spinoza complements his appeal with a detailed system of alternative world perception, thorough arguments for the claim that such changes are anthropologically possible and socially, psychologically, and metaphysically desirable, and detailed guidance on how to think if we want to achieve the highest possible satisfaction in affect, which he calls *intellectual love of God* and which can be described as "the definitive aha moment".

Ontological character of Spinoza's ethics

Spinoza's thinking is distinguished by its admirable integrity. His most famous work, *Ethics Interpreted in a Geometric Way* (referred to as *Ethics*) is fascinating, among other things, in that it presents not only ethical considerations but an entire philosophical system, of which ethics is the most important outgrowth. His interpretation always refers to the essential ontological premises; according to his system, all "special" philosophical disciplines are derived from ontology. Spinoza's interpretation begins with a set of metaphysical claims, their central concept being substance – a term that covers the basic characteristics of God, which is

not materially different from Nature. Spinoza's ontology is traditionally referred to as monism, its theological analogy being pantheism. In *Ethics*, this concept, including its gnoseological aspect, is formulated by the key statement: "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 224). If substance is a subject of ontology, everything derives from it, and therefore no philosophical question can be addressed outside the context of fundamental ontological truths.

For the application of Spinoza's thinking in ethics and psychology, his conception of so-called psycho-physical parallelism, which follows from his monism and characterizes the relationship between body and mind, is crucial. In *Ethics*, it is formulated succinctly: "… mind and body are one and the same thing…" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 280). In speaking of these two "spheres of being" as the same thing, Spinoza does not just mean unity in the sense of an inseparable union of two distinct parts: for him, mind is not a superficial epiphenomenon of matter, nor is it its opposite. The mind is also not united with the body in the sense of closeness, because it is not connected with it at all. The mind and the body are one and the same thing, not just two parts of the same thing. This important contribution of Spinozism was observed and convincingly described by Freud's student and colleague Lou Andreas-Salomé:

> To grasp Spinoza it is only necessary to think through to its conclusion the concept that the physical and mental manifestations are representations of one another. That is quite a different thing from systematic parallelism, which the deepest wisdom now styles as 'cerebral localization' and the like. It is rather the conscious inward contemplation of the integrity and presentness of two worlds – as we reckon – which nowhere exclude or determine each other, because they are but one. It is the philosophical step that goes far beyond Freud (Andreas-Salomé, 1964, p. 75).

Spinoza defines his conception of the relationship between the mind and the body with the help of the concept of attribute, i.e. the way in which a substance can be manifested and understood: "…mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension…" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 280). Thus, the mind is not causally connected to the body, because the mind, as well as the body, is no-thing. They are both aspects of the same thing as detected from different perspectives. There neither is nor can be a causal relationship between the mind and the body, more precisely between the mode (arrangement) of the corporeality (attribute of vastness) and the idea of this mode, because the mind and the body are not two things but one. For us as heirs of the Cartesian, i.e. dualistic, worldview, this concept can be quite counter-intuitive. Spinoza's conception can be interpreted by the fact that his theory of attributes speaks of their infinite number: "… nothing can be clearer than this, too, that an absolutely infinite entity must necessarily be defined… as an entity consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a definite essence, eternal and infinite" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 221).

The difficult notion of psycho-physical parallelism is to capture the fact that physical and psychological determination takes place in a sense independently of each other, and yet simultaneously, in parallel – the determination is neither psycho-physical nor physical-psychic. In *Ethics*, Spinoza expresses it unequivocally: "The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else)" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 279). With this ontology, Spinoza deliberately transcends the "stumbling block" of Cartesianism, that is, the impression of an impenetrable barrier between two fundamentally irreconcilable worlds – the body and the mind. The mental contents that constitute a particular mind are independent of the states of the respective body only in the sense of being another expression of the same and only because the contents and the states cannot be mutual causes. Spinoza further specifies; "So that which determines the mind to think

is a mode of Thinking, and not of Extension; that is…, it is not the body" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 279).

In this sense, the mind has its own network of causes and effects, and the body has its own. The changes that take place in the mind are then understandable from the mind itself, as is the case with movements and changes of the body. The order of causes and effects is one, because the thing is also one the two aspects of which are the body and the mind. Spinoza presents this concept in *Ethics* by stating:

> The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 247). In an explanatory note, he clarifies: "… whatever can be perceived by infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance pertains entirely to the one sole substance. Consequently, thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, comprehended now under this attribute, now under that. So, too, a mode of Extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, expressed in two ways (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 247).

Psychophysical parallelism (which results from monism) has an ethically and psychologically important consequence, which lies in the necessity of the existence of the unconscious. If the human psyche fully corresponds to the human body – i.e. if the mind is an idea of the body, then in the mind there is an infinite number of ideas corresponding to an infinite number of body parts, components, their relationships and changes. However, no one knows their body perfectly and is not aware of it in its complexity in a single moment, so if the mind is the same thing as the body, all that remains is to acknowledge the existence of unconscious ideas. It is essential in the context of ethical issues in that it excludes freedom of will: "… all men are born ignorant of the causes of things… men believe that they are free, precisely because they are conscious of their volitions and desires; yet concerning the causes that have determined them to desire and will they do not think, not even dream about, because they are ignorant of them" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 239).

In Spinoza's teaching on the unconscious determination of our will, his conception of the essence of a thing, the so-called *conatus* (from the Latin original of Spinoza's formulation *conatus in suo esse perseverandi*), has a central position: "Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 283). It might seem that everyone is aware of a certain drive for self-preservation, so that there is no need to invoke some "unconscious mind" right away. What exactly does the term *essence* mean? Spinoza's definition reads: "I say that there pertains to the essence of a thing that which, when granted, the thing is necessarily posited, and by the annulling of which the thing is necessarily annulled; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and, vice versa, that which cannot be or be conceived without the thing" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 244). It is therefore not a simple instinct of self-preservation, but an ontological principle from which the instinct of self-preservation is derived. In accordance with this principle, everything constantly strives to increase its energy, to assert more of its interests, to resist debilitating external influences. All the activities of the mind and the body are always a function of the *conatus*, even when it might seem that the thing is doing something that is destructive to it.

From the above definition of essence, it follows that we will understand our mental states and changes only when we consider their connection – of which we are normally unaware – with our effort to remain in existence, by which they are determined. This point of the present interpretation is not generally accepted, e.g., Michael Della Rocca rejects this possibility, arguing that the *conatus* is always conscious (Della Rocca, 2003). Among Czech authors, for example, Martin Vrabec believes that "for Spinoza, indeed, all thinking is conscious: it is conscious knowledge, whether adequate or inadequate" (Vrabec, 2005, p. 52). In contrast, Jerome Neu asserts that "Spinoza leaves room for unconscious desires, and the operation of

confused and inadequate ideas, in his terms, is very like the operation of unconscious ones, but he does not have a theory of repression and the unconscious. Passive emotions may be due to (unconscious) processes of association, and ideas may be determined by other ideas of which the mind is not aware" (Neu, 1977, p. 148). It can be argued that the views of the "deniers of the unconscious" have not been influenced by what psychoanalysis calls resistance, i.e. the reaction of the ego to displaced contents, of which to become conscious may cause a certain degree of anxiety.

In denying the existence of free will, is Spinoza not a simple immoralist or fatalist, a philosopher of ethical nihilism? If we look at his central work, *Ethics*, we find the term *freedom* in the title of the fifth, final part: "Of the power of the intellect, or of human freedom" ["De potentia intellectus seu de libertate humana"]. Spinoza certainly believes that freedom in a sense is possible. He clarifies his understanding of free will in the introduction of the whole book: "That thing is said to be free [liber] which exists solely from the necessity of its own nature, and is determined to action by itself" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 217). How is the absence of free will and freedom as self-determination compatible? The title of the fifth part of *Ethics* suggests that the role of reason is crucial here. Liberation is not a change in will, but a change in understanding. To understand the power of this change, we must now become acquainted with what Spinoza says we can control with reason, that is, affect.

Spinoza's remedies for the affects

The mind can be viewed statically, that is, as a set of thoughts or psychic data that Spinoza refers to as ideas. His basic concept for describing the dynamic and changeable side of the mind is an affect. The long dualistic tradition tends to understand these concepts in a competitive way. The heirs to this tradition can easily imagine that the "power of reason", which Spinoza discusses in the last part of *Ethics*, consists in trying to overcome and suppress affects with the help of some abstract and inanimate ideas, which may be so vivid as to make us tremble. This is seemingly indicated by the introductory sentences of this section, where Spinoza promises that he "shall be dealing with the power of reason, pointing out the degree of control reason has over the emotions" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 363). However, it was precisely this misunderstanding that Spinoza thought it necessary to address in the following paragraphs of the introduction to the final part of *Ethics*. In his conception, the notions of reason and emotion do not occupy the role of opposites, so there is no struggle between them in his teaching. Rather, the relationship between ideas and affects is construed in terms of implication: affects are shaped by ideas. It is through this constitutive relationship that Spinoza develops the possibility of "the power of reason over affect". Thus, when in one of his books he speaks of the "emendation of the Intellect" (Spinoza, 2002b), it is a matter of transforming the "ideological basis" of what we perceive as feelings, emotions, and passions. Such an "ideological transformation", which can become the basis of an emotional transformation, is a matter of extensive thought work on a complete / holistic revision of our view of the world and human being in it. Let us now turn to the central relevant definitions: "By emotion [affectus] I understand the affections of the body by which the body's power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 278).

To understand the meaning of Spinoza's concept of liberation through the power of reason over affect, we need to understand the key distinction between the two kinds of affect –passive and active. The second definition, which precedes the previous one in this text, introduces a distinction between activity and passivity:

> I say that we are active when something takes place, in us or externally to us, of which we are the adequate cause; that is, (by preceding Def.), when from our nature there follows in us or externally to us something which can be clearly and distinctly understood through our nature alone. On the other hand, I say that we are passive when

> something takes place in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 278).

In this definition, Spinoza refers to the following: "I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through the said cause. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect cannot be understood through the said cause alone" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 278). A distinction remains between active and passive effects: "… if we can be the adequate cause of one of these affections, then by emotion I understand activity, otherwise passivity" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 278).

According to Spinoza, the possibility of liberation lies precisely in the possibility of transforming our passive affect into active affect. I would call this point the very core of Spinoza's ethics in terms of possible ways in which we can shape the quality of our lives. In addition to it, Spinoza contemplates other ways. To understand them we need to clarify the second fundamental difference between two opposite types of affect – joy (or pleasure) and sorrow (or pain):

> We see then that the mind can undergo considerable changes, and can pass now to a state of greater perfection, now to one of less perfection, and it is these passive transitions [passiones] that explicate for us the emotions of Pleasure [laetitia] and Pain [tristitia]. So in what follows I shall understand by pleasure "the passive transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection", and by pain "the passive transition of the mind to state of less perfection" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 285).

This could baffle the reader, as the subject here is only passive affects. However, several pages further on, Spinoza adds: "Besides the pleasure and desire that are passive emotions, there are other emotions of pleasure and desire that are related to us insofar as we are active" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 309).

The distinction is therefore between passive desire, joy, and sadness on the one hand, and active desire and joy on the other. Spinoza does not propose an active counterpart to grief. The defining difference between active and passive affects is based on the difference between adequate and inadequate ideas: "... an emotion, or passivity of the mind, is a 'confused idea'. For we have demonstrated … that the mind is passive only to the extent that it has inadequate or confused ideas" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 319). The power of reason over affects lies in replacing inadequate ideas with adequate ones. Thus, intellectual knowledge acquires an ethical dimension, as it increases the level of joy and activity at the expense of sadness and passivity, which for Spinoza is the intention of all ethical efforts. At the same time, knowledge is the best way to achieve these goals, because if we used other ways, we would be more or less dependent on external causes: "… there is available to us no more excellent remedy for the emotions than that which consists in a true knowledge of them, since there is no other power of the mind than the power of thought and of forming adequate ideas…" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 367).

Since the idea of a certain state lies in the identification of its causes, the power of reason over affect, Spinoza's "therapeutic tool", rests in the power of reason to re-understand the causes of things differently. For example, the affect of love, according to Spinoza, is the affect of joy accompanied by the cause of joy. If the cause of joy is understood as external, the affect is passive (and thus can easily turn into sorrow), while if it is understood as internal, the affect is active (so there is no danger of it fluctuating).

The range of techniques by which – in Spinoza's view – affectivity can be tempered, and passive effects reduced or turned into active ones, is very clearly classified by Jon Wetlesen. The title of this chapter refers to Spinoza's literal designation of these techniques, i.e. "remedies for the affects" [remedia affectuum]. From Wetlesen's detailed analysis, I would mention here his distinction between two types of so-called liberation strategies, several *gradual* and one *instantaneous*: "The gradual strategies are based on the values and norms of reason, and on the

basic law of motivation which states that an affect 'cannot be checked or destroyed except by a contrary emotion which is stronger than the emotion which is to be checked'" (Wetlesen, 1979, p. 5).

While gradual strategies of liberation are aimed at changing the degree of the joyfulness of an affect, the sudden strategy completely changes our state from passive to active. Gradual strategies focus on norms and refinements, while the sudden strategy transcends all norms and does not allow for further refinements. Gradual strategies are based on recognizing the relationships between feelings and ideas and on realizing the context within the mind instead of relating internal states to external objects:

> If we remove an agitation of the mind, or emotion, from the thought of its external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then love or hatred toward the external cause, and also vacillations, that arise from these emotions will be destroyed (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 365).
>
> An emotion toward a thing which we imagine merely in itself, and not as necessary, possible, or contingent, is the greatest of all emotions, other things being equal (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 367).
>
> Insofar as the mind understands all things as governed by necessity, to that extent it has greater power over emotions, i.e. it is less passive in respect of them" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 367).

As we correct our opinions about the world and the workings of the mind, we gradually liberate ourselves, thus alleviating the confusion of our affects and their dependence on notions of external events.

Wetlesen's instantaneous strategy then consists in the possibility of completely changing our state by a radical change of our worldview. This strategy consists in realizing that each of our states is related to the overall state of the universe and to each thing separately, and that in this sense it expresses God's action. It is actually adopting or recalling the fundamental Spinozistic teaching that everything is contained in God. This knowledge forms in the mind a state of the happiest and most active affect, *amor Dei intellectualis*, the intellectual love of God. Of the propositions that belong to Spinoza's "remedies", Wetlesen attributes a sudden strategy to this one: "A passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 366).

If we realize what an affect is, in what sense it depends on God, and what God is, we will see that the affect is not passive, but God of necessity creates it. This awareness opens the way to conscious identification with God. God as the cause of God is free, and so in finding our oneness with God we also find our freedom.

Instantaneous strategy does not actually function as an aid to change our state – from passive to active, from non-free to free, etc. – but paradoxically shows that no change is needed. From the point of view of eternity, our states are not passive, but active, and their subject is not ourselves as modes, but the substance itself. The sudden strategy reveals that freedom is something we always have without knowing it. The "royal technique of liberation" leads to the view that all states are active because they are states of a single substance that is determined only by itself. The mind that knows these truths is experiencing a state of rational love for God. This love is the joy that reality forms a whole of interconnected things. It is complete satisfaction, because the mind is aware in this state that it is eternal, and it is also the highest activity, because its source is the very essence of the mind – its oneness with God.

It might seem that the presented "treatment of affects" has nothing to do with ethics in the sense of caring for moral values, that it completely misses morality, humanity, and even the simplest effort to "be good". I will leave the verification of this suspicion to the reader. I would

just like to point out that in the opinion of Albert Einstein, Spinoza's "point of view has not gained general acceptance by all those striving for clarity and logical rigor only because it requires not only consistency of thought but also unusual integrity, magnanimity and – modesty" (Jammer, 2002, p. 45).

Spinoza as a philosopher of psychoanalysis

The first thing that attracts the psychoanalytically trained reader of Spinoza's *Ethics* is perhaps the largely identical ethos that connects the two areas. The uncompromisingly deterministic conception of the psyche leads to a certain "collision" of the usual "too human" ambitions and comforting notions of exclusivity. While Spinoza removes the belief in the noble election of man and his exclusive position in the whole of creation altogether, psychoanalysis "undermines" it in the particulars of ordinary experience. While Spinoza was frequently seen as a destroyer of all morality, psychoanalysis is haunted by the reputation of a "dangerous method" (Kerr, 1994), and the psychoanalyst often becomes a target of hatred for interpretations that destroy the client's narcissistic illusions and defensive rationalizations. However, there is no real immoralism here: it is another kind of morality distinct from the usual norm. Although its realization is not anti-social at all, its values are not derived from any regard for society or the other. Selfishness is the last thing that would be the subject of shyness here; on the contrary, the hypocrisy of altruism is understood as what is pernicious. Being oneself and being self-aware is what matters because it is a path to contentment, morality, and happiness, all of which will of course be reflected in social benefits, relationship stability, and sensitivity to the needs of others.

The reserve to the majority morality and the suspicious attitude towards its ulterior motives may give the impression of moral primitivism: "There is nothing good or bad in things as they are in themselves. Nothing is wrong with our passions except the suffering they cause us" (Gilead, 1999, p. 175). Gilead further updates Spinoza's teachings with the help of the metaphysical concept of panenmentalism (Gilead, 2003). However, both the Spinozist and the psychoanalyst proudly declare such moral "simplicity": "What primitive man knew all along, that life is all we have to obey, that 'joy is perfection' (Spinoza), we rediscover only in states of untrammeled ecstasy antithetical to morality – inspired states of the noblest egoism" (Andreas-Salomé, 1964, p. 36). The Freudians could be quite foreign to Spinoza's claim to the knowledge of the highest good, which, according to him, lies in the knowledge of God. Andreas-Salomé points to this religious aspect at the heart of the seemingly boundless immoralism of natural morality when she mentions the grandeur of egoism, which, in its quest for joy, meets the commitment to serve life. Spinozism can thus point psychoanalysis to a dimension for which Freud's conception of morality had no understanding. While morality is always a sensitive area for Freud, because it is a set of prohibitions expressing efforts to suppress desires and directives to regulate them, for Spinoza and Andreas-Salomé it is a guide to a happy and contented life.

Spinoza and Freud both saw rational reasoning as the best way to deal with the conflicts that our mental lives entail. According to them, general insight of the laws of the functioning of the psyche, and the understanding of specific determinations, have the potential to liberate us from annoying feelings, undesirable habits, and destructive tendencies. Neither of them made the naive assumption that it was possible to change oneself or another simply by telling the truth. Real awareness and recognition of thought processes, especially conflicting ones, is a long-term mission. Although Spinoza apparently believed in the power of reason more than Freud did, he did not think that our passions could be silenced by the "voice of reason". The psychoanalysts Ostrow and Scharfstein believe to have found in Spinoza's approach an exaggerated emphasis on order in a way of overcompensation balanced by an excessive willingness to resist order (Ostrow & Scharfstein, 1952, p. 232). The emphasis on following the rules is certainly in line

with Spinoza's entire philosophy, but to a large extent it is also typical of psychoanalytic techniques. According to them, *Ethics* is a book that blends the sheer number of contradictions and surprisingly obvious mistakes with the illusion of precise argumentation. The contradiction between necessary immutability and sudden freedom can, in their view, be seen in Spinoza's theory of passive and active affects and in his determinism, an uneasy fit with his doctrine of freedom as being in the power of reason (Ostrow & Scharfstein, 1952, p. 235). However, it is not appropriate to describe Spinoza's "freedom" as sudden, because the only freedom that comes to mind is God's eternal freedom of being God's own cause. It is also misleading to understand Spinoza's concepts of passive and active affects in terms of opposing positions, between which the mind somehow mysteriously shifts. Spinoza's concept, on the other hand, makes it possible to understand the graded nature of affectivity, which shows liberating change as a gradual process of overcoming passivity and expanding and deepening activity.

One of those who appreciated the potential of the Spinozist approach to emotionality was the renowned Californian philosopher and psychoanalyst Jerome Neu: "If thoughts and beliefs are essential constituents of emotions, we can go some way towards understanding how psychoanalytic therapies (as opposed to 'non-rational' behaviorist manipulations) can alter emotional life by changing beliefs" (Neu, 1977, p. 2). Spinoza's belief that the greatest power of the mind lies in knowing the essence of things corresponds to the psychoanalytic emphasis on the rational elaboration of insights into the nature of individual psychic phenomena, which leads to their integration into a coherent system of representations and motives. One advantage of the psychoanalytic approach in psychotherapy is that in addition to changes in behavior and experience, it also leads to an understanding of the therapeutic process itself. Since key psychoanalytic concepts can be interpreted within Spinoza's theory of mind, Spinoza's philosophy can be expected to explain what can only be considered as an axiom or empirically observed in psychoanalysis. Therefore, Neu concludes that in Spinoza we can find a way to understand how psychoanalysis works (Neu, 1977, p. 2).

Spinozistic substantive monism, as well as its derived psychophysical parallelism, lead us to the concept of the mind, which forms a single whole in which no bifurcation of causes is possible, but in which all contents are connected by a single network of mutual determination. According to this concept, the mental state is never affected by the physical state, although it corresponds to it structurally, because the former is an idea of the latter. Such a concept justifies a psychoanalytic approach, which does not exclude "empty words" from the field of possible interpretation, and according to which even silence is always filled with the densest content. It might seem that the deterministic conception of the mind shared by Spinoza and Freud fundamentally precludes the meaningfulness of any effective effort for psychological change. However, such a resignation does not in any way result from such a concept, where the ego, self, or anything else, which we understand as the center of our activity, is not excluded from general determinism, while Spinozist ontology does not allow any such exceptions. Precisely because there is only one order of the whole, we have access to it. Conversely, the popular biological concept in which psychic processes are derived from physical ones, or a religious-dualistic concept that would separate us from what concerns us in the manner of an immortal soul independent of the transient body, could be the basis for a misunderstanding called fatalism.

Precisely because it is part of the same causal network as emotionality, mental activity can lead to liberation from unwanted affects and thus to happiness. At the same time, reason is not in the position of a competitor of affects, a force that should suppress them. Spinoza's "remedies for the emotion" [remedia affectuum] are not intended to displace unwanted effects, but to consciously mitigate or reduce them, complemented by one "royal technique" of forming the affect he justified as the most desirable and which he called *intellectual love of God*. In an atheistic interpretation, which is more acceptable to most practicing psychoanalysts, we can

understand the concept of intellectual love for God as the joy that comes from the view that everything is related to everything. The joy of such a view is understandable because it is the fact of the impenetrable connection of everything with everything that is the guarantee of our power. The patient's experience in viewing the newly discovered connections of previously "incompatible" (conflicting) psychic facts (memories and demands of the superego, etc.) has the character of relief and liberation, as it includes acknowledging our own contribution to mental formation and disintegrating the illusion of being a victim of the past, circumstances, or other external pressures.

The concept of change in affectivity as resulting from change in the understanding of causes corresponds to Freud's principle: "Where id was, there ego shall be" (Freud, 1973, p. 112). Freud speaks about changing the center of mental activity. While we are usually determined by our unconscious instinctual component or, on the other hand, by the equally unconscious component of morality, duties, and obligations, which are closely related to instincts in their genesis through Oedipus complex, the goal of the psychoanalytic process should be to become relatively conscious subjects of our mental activities. In the spirit of nuanced understanding of affectivity, where the black-and-white contrast does not pitch the extremes against one another, Freud points out that the boundaries between individual mental instances – id, ego, superego – are not as clearly defined as the artificial boundaries of political geography. Instead, he compares them to modern paintings, in which colored surfaces overlap and merge in different ways. He concedes that what was initially sharply separated must also be left to the possibility of merging; that the boundaries between individual instances may change significantly during individual development; and that these changes may take a different form in different personalities. In his view, this applies especially phylogenetically to the youngest of these divisions, namely the boundaries between the ego and the superego (Freud, 1973).

"Insofar as the mind understands all things as governed by necessity, to that extent it has greater power over emotions, i.e. it is less passive in respect of them" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 367). As soon as we understand clearly that the feelings we suffer were not caused by chance, but that they are the result of necessary causes, we will cease to suffer from them. For example, if we believe that the thief who robbed us was determined by his hunger or the need to feed his child, we certainly feel less angry than if we imagine that he impoverished us out of envy, some other resentment, or "pleasure". However, this example illustrates only relatively little progress in "mitigating affects" because, when imagining what was on the thief's mind, we assume that the cause of our feelings lies somewhere outside of us. Only if we focus on the dynamics that take place within ourselves can we free ourselves from the feelings that engulf us: why actually do we mind that someone robbed us? The less we are aware of the causes of our emotional reactions, the more upset we will become by the event of robbery, and we will be powerless against our anger. We will perceive similar situations as narcissistic injuries (threats to our value and self-love), and in our understanding of what is going on, we will stop at the fact that something like this "just shouldn't have happened". On the other hand, if we become aware of the inner causes of feeling threatened, and if we look at our interests and understand the situation in which such a thief put us, we will be able to control our affect and calm our minds.

Certainly, such an introspective effort can be risky. We may find that the thief reminded us of ourselves in moments we would rather forget. Even with such a view, however, the path to reconciliation can begin, for it assures us that, in the end, it can be none other than us who is to blame for what is happening to us. It shows us that we only thought we were passive. In fact, we ourselves were the only cause, so we were active without realizing it. We could say that the process of understanding ourselves is not about turning passive effects into active ones, but about realizing that we have always been active. A reinterpretation of the affects which reveals their inner source does not lead to any fatalism, but awakens us to activity, because if it were us who shaped our affects, it could be us again who will change it. The objection that this is

just a kind of a relatively hidden activity because it is oriented only to our heart can be easily refuted. Our mind is not separated from our body; both are the same thing. Therefore, if there are changes in the psyche, there are necessarily physical changes. It is not possible to change the experience without changing the behavior. Active feelings are necessarily reflected in active behavior.

Conclusion

The idea of combining Spinozism and psychoanalysis is not new. First introduced by Lou Andreas-Salomé, it was echoed by several authors, most notably Jerome Neu. While Andreas-Salomé's contributions are mostly in the form of sketchy ideas of a genius privy to the psychoanalytic practice who does not need to elaborate on her unique intuition, Neu intended to defend his theses, but at some points he misconstrued Spinoza – for example, in terms of the question of the existence of unconsciousness. The aim of the present study is to summarize in a nutshell the available considerations presented in this regard that could be useful in terms of inspiration and guidance in two ways: to explain to philosophers how Spinoza's ethics can be implemented in the field of psychotherapy; to introduce psychoanalytic psychotherapists into the possibility of philosophical grounding and conceptual refinement of the procedures they use, which may suffer from a certain uncertainty or hesitation without similar support. Regarding the possibility of psychoanalytic work with unconscious content, two points that Spinoza's philosophy justifies play a key role: first, the holistic nature of the psyche, and second, the connection between idea and affect. The former implies the usefulness of the free association technique, through which material relevant to the understanding of symptoms can be obtained; the latter, the possibility of transforming affectivity into rational knowledge (psychoanalysis uses the terms *interpretation* and *construction*).

In addition to contributing to the systematic question of which type of psychotherapy represents an adequate application of Spinoza's ethics, and in addition to partial inspirations for psychoanalysts groping about the philosophical foundations of their therapeutic approach, the ethical benefit of this study lies in clarifying that interpretations focused on the unconscious inner causes of emotional states do not necessarily lead to fatalistic resignation, but on the contrary shed light on the meaning and reality of the activity, thus arousing courage. From the point of view of everyday experience, it may seem that fear protects us. But fear is a passive affect and as such can and should be overcome. When we are part of a single whole, a single thing, we are always determined and at the same time always active; we are constantly changing, but we are eternal. However, is it "realistically" possible to get around without fear and other negative – or, to use Spinoza's term: sad – emotions? Spinoza responds with an assertion that "in the case of all actions to which we are determined by a passive emotion, we can be determined thereto by reason without that emotion" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 351). How can we imagine this? The following example from Spinoza may lead us to answer: "This corollary can be illustrated by the example of the sick man and the healthy man. The sick man eats what he dislikes through fear of death. The healthy man takes pleasure in his food and thus enjoys a better life than if he were to fear death and directly seek to avoid it. Likewise, the judge who condemns a man to death not through hatred or anger but solely through love of public welfare is guided only by reason" (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 353). It turns out that the ultimate answer that Spinoza's ethics can give to all such questions is nothing but love of life, which is not surprising given that he also claims that the primary motive for everything is the effort to remain in existence.

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Leibniz's and Herder's philosophy of optimism

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Abstract

The author studies Leibniz's views of vindicating God for the existence of evil in the world, as well as the idea of the best of all possible worlds, including the past and present criticism. Following Leibniz, he opted for the presentation of Herder's philosophy of history as one of the most significant forms of philosophical optimism that influenced the first half of the 19th century, including contemporary debates on and critiques of the topic. He defines Herder's concept as the *philosophy of historical progress,* which also significantly influenced Slovak philosophy of the given period. The main goal of the article is to present Leibniz's and Herder's views as a starting point for the Slovak philosophy of optimism and historical progress of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century.

Keywords: theodicy, Leibniz, the best of all possible worlds, Herder, philosophy of history, philosophical optimism, philosophy of historical progress

Introduction

In early Christianity, the question of the existence of evil in the world was dealt with, for example, by St Augustine in his work *The City of God* (*Civitas Dei*), the most famous work of modern times addressing these questions is the work of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) *Theodicy* (1710). The basis of Leibniz's conception of theodicy is the belief that God wants the best. "Now this supreme wisdom, united to goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better. As in mathematics, when there is no maximum nor minimum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is done equally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it may be said likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly than mathematics, that if there were not the best (*optimum*) among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any" (Leibniz, 2007, p. 131).

The doctrine of theodicy has two integral parts: the first is the justification of God for the existence of evil in the world, the second is the doctrine that the created or existing world is the best possible, which, following Leibniz, is also called the philosophy of optimism. The main goal of the article is to present Leibniz's and Herder's views as a starting point for the Slovak philosophy of optimism and historical progress of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century.

Leibniz's teachings on theodicy and his past criticism

According to Leibniz, it is doubtful that a world without evil and sin would be the best, rather he was inclined to believe that it was only a utopia, because if there was no evil in the world, we would lose many good ones as a result of overcoming evil. On the other hand, he admitted that there is quite a mess in the world. It gives the traditional answer that God does good, but because of the fault of men, they turn to evil, which thus becomes a just punishment for abusing

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God's grace (Leibniz, 2007, p. 193). It follows that God created the best possible world, the highest quality of which, however, does not lie in his perfection, but in giving space for man's development, precisely because he left to man the possibility of free will, including the commission of sin.

> If we knew the city of God just as it is, we should see that it is the most perfect state which can be devised; that virtue and happiness reign there, as far as is possible, in accordance with the laws of the best; that sin and unhappiness (whose entire exclusion from the nature of things reasons of the supreme order did not permit), are well-nigh nothing there in comparison with the good, and even are of service for greater good (Leibniz, 2007, p. 200).

Precisely for God to emphasize the value and significance of good, according to Leibniz, he also allows evil. However, he considers the fact that there is undoubtedly more good than evil in the world and in the whole universe to be the most important. If we sometimes perceive it differently, it is due to the lack of our knowledge, because according to him, God always leads to the true, greatest and absolute good (Leibniz, 2007, p. 322). Thus, Leibniz thought that God created the most perfect possible whole, in which even imperfections serve the greater perfection of the whole (Leibniz, 2007, p. 414). It is a world in which there is the greatest possible order, the greatest possible regularity, as much virtue and happiness as possible. God's infinite goodness has meant that everything he has created is in perfect harmony and wonderful harmony. Leibniz brings to the forefront precisely this universal optics, through which it is easier to explain human evil.

Probably the best-known critique of Leibniz's conception of theodicy and within it the idea of the best possible world in the history of philosophy and literature is Voltaire's satirical novel *Candide*. Servant Pangloss reminded Candide in Leibniz's spirit that

> [A]ll events form a chain in the best of all possible worlds. For in the end, if you had not been given a good kick up the backside and chased out of a beautiful castle for loving Miss Cunégonde, and if you hadn't been subjected to the Inquisition, and if you hadn't wandered about America on foot, and if you hadn't dealt the Baron a good blow with your sword, and if you hadn't lost all your sheep from that fine country of Eldorado, you wouldn't be here now eating candied citron and pistachio nuts (Voltaire, 1759/2006, p. 88).

In the story of Candide and his misfortunes, Voltaire believed that Leibniz was wrong because the existing world was not the best possible because it was full of misery, suffering, injustice, deception, and evil people (Voltaire, 2006, pp. 3–88). Arthur Schopenhauer, who, unlike Leibniz, concluded that the existing world is the worst of all possible worlds, can certainly be included among the strong critical statements on this topic in the 19th century. He pointed to the earthquakes in Lisbon, Haiti, to the buried Pompeii, to the diseases that afflict humanity, to the fact that nine-tenths of humanity is living in poverty, on the brink of perdition fighting for a bare existence. "Actually optimism cuts so strange a figure on this scene of sin, suffering, and death, that we should be forced to regard it as irony […]" (Schopenhauer, 1819/1966, pp. 583–584). Schopenhauer, like Voltaire, pointed out that, according to Christianity, the world is a tearful valley in which man is cleansed by his suffering and Leibniz's optimism is incompatible with Christianity (Schopenhauer, 1819/1966, p. 585).

On the other hand, Immanuel Kant was probably the most important advocate of Leibniz's idea of the best possible world in the 18th century, despite objections to the idea of theodicy as a justification for the existence of evil in the world (Kant 1791/1973, pp. 283–297). In his work *An attempt at some reflections on optimism* (1759) he defended Leibniz's thesis of the best possible world as an attempt at a certain optimism. According to Kant, pure reason says that

there is the best possible world, and God chooses it based on His wisdom and nobility (Kant, 1759/1992, pp. 71–73). Even more than thirty years later, Kant confirmed his previous conclusions:

> That the world created by God is the best of all possible worlds, is clear for the following reason. If a better world than the one willed by God were possible, then a will better than the divine will would also have to be possible. For indisputably, that will is better, which chooses what is better. But if a better will is possible, then so a being who could express this better will. And therefore, this being would be more perfect and better than God. But this is a contradiction; for God is *omnitudo realitatis* (Kant, 1792/1978, p. 137).

Leibniz's philosophical optimism in present debates

Despite the more than three hundred years that have passed since Leibniz's *Theodicy* was published, debates on the existence of evil in the world and the best of all possible worlds have not been silenced. On the contrary, there is a great number of present-day literature on this topic, including analyses, commentaries and assessments of Leibniz's arguments on why there is evil in the world and supporting God's choice of the best world of all (Broad, 1975; Franklin, 2002; Grover, 2003; Hadsell, 2019; Hernandez, 2010; Lougheed, 2014; MacDonald, 2018; Nadler, 2008; Silver, 2018; Steinberg, 2007; Strickland, 2005; Strickland, 2017; Rukgaber, 2019 and many others). In a similar spirit to Voltaire's, many contemporary authors, experts on Leibniz's work, voice their opinions. Ira O. Wade believes that *Candide*, in Pangloss' character, is such a crude satire of Leibniz and his views that there was no one brave enough to defend this German philosopher (Wade, 1969, 655). Concerning Leibniz's idea of the best world of all, Wade points out that, according to Voltaire, Leibniz, in this case, tried to join two contradictory ideas–the idea of ancestral sin and its entering the Divine plan of choosing the best world of all. Voltaire refused such a view as, according to him, human suffering brings no good and cannot be advantageous for God either (Wade, 1969, 689).

"Voltaire made the character of Pangloss in *Candide* look foolish by having him continually aver, in the teeth of all sorts of moral evil, that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds" (MacDonald, 2018, p. 264). Following Voltaire, Lloyd Strickland also stated that Leibniz's theodicy cannot serve as an acceptable explanation of the earthquake in Lisbon. In Strickland's view, the event not only discredited the plausibility of Leibniz's theodicy but also the idea of theodicy as such (Strickland, 2017, p. 259).

Charlie Dunbar Broad expressed a similar idea. In his view, Leibniz based his teachings about the choice of creating the best world of all possible worlds on an error when he believed that the necessary monads with determined characteristics are already in existence (Broad, 1975, p. 152). In his opinion, Leibniz believed every world must contain some metaphysical evil; therefore, every possible world must contain some form of sin and pain. However, in Broad's view, this does not result from the fact that sin and pain are part of metaphysical evil. Unlike Leibniz, he claims that metaphysical evil can exist without any moral or physical evil. He, however, believed Leibniz did not consider such complications (Broad, 1975, p. 160). He claims that Leibniz was more interested in saving God's character than in developing an optimistic view on the existing world (Broad, 1975, pp. 162–163).

On the other hand, Bruce Silver holds the opinion that Voltaire's criticism of Leibniz's optimism in the context of the existing world as the best of all possible worlds was excessive and unjust. In his view, Leibniz's best of all possible worlds is the richest in its opportunities which become reality while simplest in the laws that govern its essence and further development. Such a world is, according to him, much richer, although not perfect. He points out that Leibniz never claimed the best world of all is faultless since the only thing perfect is God and nothing else can come near Divine excellence (Silver, 2018, pp. 45–47). Jesse R.

Steinberg joins the advocates of Leibniz's argumentation in asking the question of whether God could abstain from creation if there was no such thing as the best world of all. He concluded that either the existing world is the best of all or God is not its creator (Steinberg, 2007, pp. 123–133).

One of the best present-day analyses of Leibniz's concept of the best possible world is the work *The best of all possible worlds: A story of philosophers, God, and evil* (2008) by Steven Nadler. This author states that, for Leibniz as a Lutheran, the idea of all human beings being sinful and doing evil, while only Divine mercy allows them to do good deeds, is in full accordance with the teachings of ancestral sin. Taking Divine rationality, wisdom and kindness into consideration, according to Leibniz, God opted to create the existing world rather than an infinite number of possible worlds simply because this world is the best of all. One of the reasons that make it the best possible world is the fact that it has a certain amount and type of evil present. God, in His infinite wisdom, undoubtedly knows which the best world is and, since he also possesses infinite kindness, he creates the one and the best possible world (Nadler, 2008, pp. 93–94). In Nadler's view, Leibniz, unlike Candide, does not believe that, should this be the best possible world, it is what is best for him or another being. According to Leibniz, any other world would be worse than this one regardless of the interests of any individual. Equally, he does not think that, in the best possible world, every being will experience endless happiness and bliss. In his opinion, even in the best world possible, all some know is suffering. Not every evil or a group of them leads to a good result. Sometimes a miserable life ends miserably (Nadler, 2008, pp. 98–99).

Referring to Leibniz, Nadler then points out that the concept of the best possible world includes the existence of a great number of good and beautiful things, but this conception of the world also contains a set amount of evil including the sin of certain beings commit. In the best possible world, created by the wisest, most perfect and best God, there is also sin and suffering, as God can fulfil his will to create the best world possible by allowing the existence of sin and suffering in that world. The best possible world is not the best from the aesthetic viewpoint, nor is it expressed in terms of ethics. Its status lies in its metaphysical merit compared to all other worlds. The existing world is a manifestation of the highest degree of perfection, which is expressed by the maximum level of the created being or reality (Nadler, 2008, pp. 101–102).

Based on an analysis of Leibniz's concept, Nadler came to the cognition that, according to Leibniz, the best possible world does not mean it is the place to maximise man's happiness. He even claimed there might be other possible worlds in which a human being can achieve happiness or even such worlds where no unhappiness exists. God, in Leibniz's view, wants a world with no evil; He wants all people to be happy and protected, but not all things are the same. God wants the world to follow simple universal laws which do not allow for exceptions, even though that could lead to the suffering of virtuous people. God also wants the world to be inhabited by free agents, morally responsible for their actions, i.e. actions that can cause sin, for which they then deserve to be punished (Nadler, 2008, pp. 105–106).

Nadler points out that Malebranche holds a contradictory opinion to that of Leibniz, as he claims that God did not create the best possible world and many other possible worlds are better than the existing one. Nevertheless, Leibniz, contrary to Malebranche, holds the opinion the world created by God is the best possible, despite the amount of sin and suffering, as it contains the maximum amount of perfection and happiness a world can contain (Nadler, 2008, pp. 129–130). According to the same author, if one is to use the terminology of moral philosophy, the difference between Malebranche's and Leibniz's understanding of God can be compared to those agents following deontological ethics, whose values and actions must be realised regardless of the consequences (Malebranche) and such agents that obey the rules of consequentialism and opt for such actions that bring about, if possible, the greatest amount of general good (Leibniz) (Nadler 2008, p. 133). The author also views Leibniz as a soft

determinist or compatibilist, as God is determined to choose the best option, which, however, takes away his freedom. In Nadler's view, Leibniz defined this determination as moral, rather than metaphysical or logical, as necessary reasons to choose the best possible world (Nadler 2008, p. 136).

Herder's philosophy of history as philosophical optimism

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) played a significant role in philosophical optimism formulated as the philosophy of history at the end of the 18th and throughout the first half of the 19th century. The aim of the philosophy of history was humanity, to which all human efforts were subjected, as this historical aim followed the natural laws given by God.

> We have seen, that the end of our present existence is the formation of humanity, to which all the meaner wants of this Earth are subservient, and which they are all contrived to promote. Our reasoning capacity is to be formed to reason, our finer senses to art, our propensities to genuine freedom and beauty, our moving powers to the love of mankind. Either we know nothing of our destination, and the deity deceives us in every internal and external symptom of it, to fay which would be senseless calumny; or we may deem ourselves as certain of this end, as of the being of a god, or our own existence. Yet how seldom is this eternal, this infinite end, attained here! (Herder, 1800, p. 123).

The point of our efforts should be to succeed, in our behaviour and actions, as well as our thought and decision making, in the pursuit of humanity in our own life and the lives of our closest relatives and friends, as well as our community, nation, country, and mankind.

The essence of Herder's concept of humanity is a reason as the result of our intellectual and cognitive potential, which should, however, also be completed through emotions, including aesthetic taste, the desire for freedom and empathy. Despite the fact he expected such potential to be present in every person and mankind as a whole, he still bitterly stated that only rarely is it accomplished. Such a pessimistic remark might have been directed at the rarity of its incidence in the ideal form as part of all the aspects he mentioned in his definition of the term 'humanity'. Based on Herder's definition above, at least two aspects of humanity could be involved: rational and emotional. While the first relates to reason and, following it, also science and art, the other one is connected to our actions and feelings towards other people, our closest relatives. Part of this definition is the desire for freedom and beauty.

Herder considered humanity as the purpose of human nature and believed it was with this end that God placed man's fate in his own hands. Considering mankind as we know it and looking at it through the prism of laws contained in it, one will find out nothing is above the humanity in man. In no situation or society could man have anything else in his mind or develop anything else but humanity, be it understood in any possible way (Herder, 1800, pp. 438–439). Despite Herder's philosophy of history being, primarily, a celebration of man, his abilities, reason, science, and art, true humanity, in his view, can only be achieved when one dies and meets the real divine face of mankind. It is in the search of the truth, good, and beauty and their pursuit that true humanity lies that leads man to God (Herder, 1800, pp. 126–127). Herder made humanity into a means as well as the end of man's efforts directed from God to man and back to God again.

I appreciate Herder's emphasis on the need of man to grow through overcoming external as well as internal obstacles, the struggle with his environment as well as himself, his own mistakes and flaws that prevent him from achieving the truth, good, and beauty, in using reason and justice in his life, and in relationships between people as well as nations. Victories that are a result of conquering oneself might even be rarer and more valuable, since man overpowers his 'enemy' in himself and, thus, the obstacles that obstructed his way to religious and moral

perfection. Disregarding the metaphysical scope of Herder's contemplations, I can fully agree with his views on the expectations and requirements for man's growth, improvement, and cultivation, i.e. his development as viewed by present-day philosophy.

Herder, realistically, realised this was not a linear process of constant moral progress on the way to validate humanity in an individual, nation, or mankind, which is evidenced in the general history of the human race. In spite of the regress mankind regularly comes across throughout its history, he was convinced that the human race is heading towards moral progress, manifested in the pursuit of humanity in one's behaviour and actions (Herder, 1800, pp. 227–228).[2] The laws that, in Herder's opinion, God gave mankind are inalienable and indestructible. From this viewpoint, the entire history of mankind is a race to achieve humanity and human dignity. He asked the following question: Should other nations have achieved such victories, why could we not do the same thing? For them to achieve a better form of mankind is just as possible as it is for us, considering the period circumstances, conscience, and duties. Whatever they achieved, anyone else can. Deity helps us through our industriousness, reason, and powers (Herder, 1800, pp. 441–442).

Herder's philosophy of history in present-day debates and critiques

A great number of authors devoted their works to J. G. Herder's person and work in more than two centuries. At present, Herder's work is still topical in various contexts of study, not only in philosophy, history, political science, but also, for instance, in folklore studies (Anderson-Gold 2009; Barnard 2003; Berlin 1976/2013; Dallmayr 1997; David 2007; Dietze 2008; Eggel, Leibich & Mancini-Griffoli 2007; McCarthy 2002; Palti 1999; Palti 2001; Patten 2010; Sikka 2011; Spencer 2007; Taylor 1995; Wilson 1995; Wilson 2010; Wilson 1963/2006 and many others). Nevertheless, it is not my aim to study the similarities and differences in views and interpretations, as Herder is not the main object of my paper. I only wish to briefly present some of Herder's evaluations of the issue that is in the centre of my attention regarding the study of Slovak philosophy in the first half of the 19th century from the viewpoint of *philosophical optimism*.

William A. Wilson stated that, even though Herder is only known to experts, his philosophy of history is still alive and there would be a long list of nations that have been inspired by his philosophy of history (Wilson, 1963/2006, pp. 122–123). Similarly, Charles Taylor points out that Isaiah Berlin saved Herder from philosophical oblivion. The reason why Herder was ignored was, according to Taylor, the fact he was not a rigorous philosopher; an innovative philosopher, however, does not need to be too rigorous to be able to express important ideas (Taylor, 1995, p. 79).

In the introduction to his voluminous paper, Isaiah Berlin presented a rather negative assessment of Herder regarding his populism. He claimed that even though Herder was, at the beginning, a major advocate of great 18th century Enlightenment ideas, he later slipped to a much more reactionary position, while he subordinated to reason and intellect to nationalism; he was also typical for his Gallophobia, indiscriminate faith in tradition, etc. However, Berlin further states it was also characteristic of many other German intellectuals of the given era, such as Fichte, Novalis, Schleiermacher, the Schlegels and, to some extent, also Schiller (Berlin, 1976/2013, p. 222). Many criticised Herder and his 'Blut-und-Boden nationalism', by which he significantly influenced 19th century racial and racist theories (Donskis, 2002, pp. 184–185); he was even accused of having "prefigured the Hitlerian theory of 'Blut und Boden'" (Palti, 1999, p. 322).

[2] Sonia Sikka claims that Herder anticipated Hegel's later opinions regarding human development and progressive logic of history (Sikka, 2011, pp. 91–93).

In the context of my paper, I consider Berlin's following statement important that Herder believed the

> [G]eneral purpose to be achieved by human life on earth, which he calls *Humanität*. This is a notoriously vague term, in Herder and the *Aufklärung* generally, connoting harmonious development of all immortal souls towards universally valid goals: reason, freedom, toleration, mutual love and respect between individuals and societies, as well as physical and spiritual health, finer perceptions, dominion over the earth, the harmonious realisation of all that God has implanted in his noblest work and made in his own image. This is a characteristically all inclusive, general and optimistic formula of Weimar humanism, which Herder does, indeed, adopt, particularly in his later works, but which he does not seem to have used (for it has no precise connotation) as a universal criterion either of explanation or of value (Berlin, 1976/2013, p. 270).

Thus, according to Berlin, Herder felt a deep affinity towards the Enlightenment and wrote with optimism about human beings directed towards humanity (Berlin, 1976/2013, p. 291).

Lina Steiner points out that Herder's idea of progressive realisation of the reason is not focused on individual results but rather places to the forefront collective achievements of mankind as a whole. His idea of humanity is a vision of global cultural advancement achieved through cooperation between various individuals and cultures, while an individual is subordinated to the collective (Steiner, 2011, p. 784). Fred Dallmayr claims that Herder did not replace the term 'progress' with the idea of static repetition or chaotic discontinuity; instead, he provided the possibility of human development, including the advancement of the individual as well as collective abilities in their diversity to the highest possible level (Dallmayr, 1997, p. 107). Robert Anchor holds the view that Herder considered the advancement of humanity as guaranteed, unlike Kant who only thought of it as possible (Anchor, 2000, p. 493). The above opinion is also supported by Alan Patten, according to whom Herder thought of the advancement in history as a result of man's ability to learn from his own mistakes (Patten, 2010, p. 678). Similarly, Dominic Eggel, Andre Liebich, and Deborah Mancini-Griffoli emphasise the progressive character of Herder's perception of history as history directed towards humanity (Eggel, Leibich & Mancini-Griffoli, 2007, pp. 56, 76).

According to John A. McCarthy, Herder understood history as a dialectical process between being and becoming, as a progressive pursuit of the divine in the human race through individual cultural epochs and states of national development. The final objective of this effort was the cognition of truth, self-awareness, tolerance and achieving human bliss. For Herder, humanity was the cultivation of the intellectual and moral mission. In his opinion, all individuals possess this potential and are obliged to use it. Herder, in McCarthy's view, included in the term 'humanity' not only tolerance, altruism, affinity but also all specifically human characteristics and potential (McCarthy, 2002, pp. 47–49).

Sonia Sikka also points to Herder's belief in certain advancement in the pursuit of humanity in history and the decrease of violence (Sikka, 2011, p. 21). According to Herder, history contains certain forms of fight for humanity, which is a type of progress (Sikka, 2011, p. 49).

> More broadly, one might challenge the idea that perpetual progress, in the sense of increase, is what truly has value, and seek instead to envision a possible state of affairs that would be good in itself, sustainable, and worth repeating. Herder does believe in the possibility of a certain kind of progress, but at the same time he finds intrinsic value in the unfolding of happy human lives, of many sorts. This position avoids instrumentalizing either nature or human life. It avoids, especially, the sort of extreme teleology that can tempt people to the view that the end is what really matters, and is worth the sacrifice of individual life and happiness along the way. Contempt for

> happiness can be ethically dangerous, even when (perhaps especially when) it is motivated by high moral principles (Sikka, 2011, pp. 80–81).

On the other hand, Sikka agrees with Herder refusing simple linear progress, typical for many of his contemporaries, as well as opinions expressing total scepticism of any possible historical advancement (Sikka, 2011, p. 89). In Herder's view, the degree of historical progress was freedom, together with an individual's virtue and happiness as developmental functions of various societies (Sikka, 2011, p. 97). In this author's view, Herder, in his later works, emphasised more and more the progressive aspect of his philosophy of history with humanity as a goal that is to be achieved (Sikka, 2011, p. 116). Catherine Wilson points out that Herder was fascinated by Leibniz's analogy between the divine creation of the world and the artistic creation of an object; a metaphysician is also an artist and he believed Monadology to be a poem (Wilson, 1995, pp. 467–468). She goes on to claim that Herder, in his *Letters on the improvement of humanity*, followed Leibniz in his idea of progress and development of mankind (Wilson, 2010, p. 305).

This brief overview of the opinions of Herder and his philosophy of history can be concluded by stating that the authors appreciate, in his concept of history, the optimistic element of progress aimed at the pursuit of humanity in the history of mankind. On the other hand, they positively view his realisation that historical advancement is not linear but, rather, accompanied by inhumanity and the need to cope with its various forms in individual periods of the historical progress of mankind, which can be used to evidence the claim that Herder's philosophy of history is a *philosophy of historical progress* which followed Leibniz's *philosophical optimism*.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be recalled that Slovak ethical thinking of the 18th and 19th centuries also reflected Leibniz's and Herder's conceptions of the philosophy of optimism and the philosophy of historical progress, which significantly influenced some of its representatives. Among the representatives of Slovak ethical thinking of the 18th century, Augustín Doležal (1737–1802) should be mentioned and his work *Pamětná celém světu Tragoedia, anebožto Veršovné vypsánj žalostného Prvnjch Rodičů Pádu* (Doležal, 1791), here in the first place. In addition to his views on the creation of the world, Doležal largely copied Leibniz's views on man. I consider it very important Doležal's confirmation of Leibniz's idea that this world is based on the fact that his good arises from overcoming evil and makes the existing world the best of all possible worlds (Fordinálová, 1993, p. 157; Gluchman, 2011, pp. 209–215; Münz, 1961, pp. 227–228).

In the first half of the 19th century, the development of the ideas of Herder's philosophy of history as a continuation of Leibniz's philosophy of optimism can be found especially in Ján Kollár (1793–1852) and Ján Chalupka (1791–1871). Kollár and Chalupka, in the spirit of Leibniz's philosophy of optimism and Herder's philosophy of history of progress, valued human history mainly as a history of progress in all areas of life and refused to overestimate the past (Kollár, 1823/1831, pp. 57–69; Chalupka, 1847). On the other hand, by recalling their own mistakes and shortcomings, they sought the moral improvement of man, emphasizing the belief in a better future for man and humanity, even based on faith in the power of reason.

Through the work of Augustín Doležal, Ján Kollár, and Ján Chalupka, it is possible to document the connection of Slovak ethical thinking of the 18th and 19th centuries to the European philosophical discourse of the time. This confirms the significant contribution to the development of philosophical and ethical thinking in the Slovak intellectual environment of the end of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century coming from the external environment, mainly through the study of young Slovak intelligence at German universities.

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The Kantian ethical perspective seen from the existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard's Victor Eremita

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Abstract

This article compares two groundings of ethics: the ethical postulates of Immanuel Kant with the existential thinking of S. Kierkegaard. To achieve this goal, first, it proposes highlighting the fundamental ideas of Kantian ethics; then, secondly, highlighting Kierkegaard's ethical stance; and finally, contrasting both approaches to identify differences and similarities. Conclusively, we can say that the pure Kantian ethical formality of duty for duty's sake necessarily dispenses with existential and concrete content; it is an ethics that is grounded in itself, that refers to itself, to the rational nature of the human being and its universality. In contrast, Kierkegaardian ethics is a Christian ethics, it is the ethics of love for one's neighbour and, above all, for God; it is a relational and existential ethics of the single individual.

Keywords: Kant, duty, categorical imperative, Kierkegaard, individual, love

Introduction

During the 18th and 19th centuries there emerged, without any doubt, brilliant thinkers who embellished and consolidated philosophical activity between modernity and the contemporary period. The appearance of diverse and particular artistic, scientific, cultural and, naturally, philosophical trends, as well as major historical events, such as the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution, were outstanding facts in the development of humanity during those centuries.

Philosophical reflection was revitalised and adorned with the investigations, rigorous and always relevant, of great thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard, who, with their contributions and profound approaches, stirred up and stimulated new questions, achieved answers and, above all, promoted an analytical view of the existence and acts of the human being in the current society (Králik, Valco & García Martín, 2014, pp. 47–48). In this regard, this study sets out to pin down the core notions of Kantian ethics and contrast them with the thinking, principally, of Kierkegaard who wrote under the pseudonym of Victor Eremita.

In short, the aim is to reflect on the Kantian categorical imperative, formulated two-fold in *Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals* (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* [GMS], 1785), and in *Critique of practical reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [KrV], 1788),[4] seeking to identify the convergent aspects with Kierkegaardian pseudonymous thought. To do so, the approaches of Kierkegaard's *Either-Other* (*Enten-Eller* [E-E], 1843) will be crucial when considering the two thinkers' points of view, since this work paradigmatically represents Kierkegaard's ethical point of view, in addition to the aesthetic one.

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[4] Used Kant's works in the article and their abbreviations: An answer to the question: What is enlightment? / *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* (1784) [BFA]; *Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals* / *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785) [GMS]; *Critique of practical reason* / *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1788) [KrV]; *Religion within the bounds of bare reason* / *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (1793) [RGV].

The breadth and coverage of Kant's work allow one to tackle many issues. As a result, Kant's thinking, arguably the summit of modern philosophy, represents "an everlasting treasure"[5] for current times. Moreover, throughout this article Kant´s contribution will serve as a benchmark in evaluating the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, the many-faceted writer from Copenhagen, whose philosophy is rightly considered the main cornerstone of existentialism. That said, we will compare and contrast their thought from a strictly ethical perspective, more exactly, by moving back and forth between the following fields: meta-ethics, normative ethics, and existential ethics. Together with physics and logic, ethical thinking represented the three main divisions of ancient Greek thought (Kant, 2016, p. 558 [GMS]). This means that hence from its very beginning, Western philosophy has concerned itself with issues related to human conduct, and especially, the principles or criteria used in defining good and evil (Guerrero, 2008, pp. 137–147, 189–200).[6] Thus, the Greek term "ethos", for instance, referred to reflections on human conduct or character formation which have become constitutive to the way in which we define the notions of good and evil.

Kant and his ethical system

Kantian ethical thought constitutes one of the great systems of current normative ethics; its vision and position against the criteria that help us to identify when an action is good or bad are commendable. The attempt to identify, through the categories of his philosophy, what the origin of good and evil as a metaphysical foundation is, and to point out, at the same time, who should define the reasons whereby we can justify said determinations, make Kant an inescapable reference point for today's society.

To pin down the beginning of an analysis of his notions, it is worth reassessing the issue Kant develops in the short treatise on the Enlightenment: "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. *Sapere aude*! "Have courage to use your own reason!" – that is the motto of enlightenment." (*An answer to the question: What is enlightment?*) (Kant, 2016, p. 535 [BFA]). In this way, Kant takes as his starting point the claim that becoming an adult consists in using one's own understanding. This singular capacity of human nature not only points to the ability to think and acquire theoretical knowledge, but also connects it with the practical. This aspect allows us to reveal that the *Sapere Aude* is aimed at promoting an action preceded by a rational act, by practical reason.

Having said that, as for practical reason and Kantian ethics, these progressively take on a distinctive character in comparison with Greek and medieval ethical postulates. Schopenhauer states:

> *Kant* has the great merit in ethics of having purified it of all *eudaemonism*. The ethics of the ancients was eudaemonics; a) that of the moderns, mostly the doctrine of salvation; b) the ancients wanted to show virtue and happiness as identical; but these were like two shapes that never superimpose however one may arrange them; c, the moderns wanted to connect the two not according to the *principle of identity*, but according to that *of ground*, and so make happiness the consequence of virtue (Schopenhauer, 2009, p. 123).

[5] Expression taken from Thucydides, the Athenian historian, from the 5th century BCE, when in his work: *The Peloponnesian War*, in Thc. 1.22 he affirms the validity, grandeur, and utility of his work.

[6] In the cited work (2008), we can find two chapters, each of which is devoted to one of the great philosophical figures we are comparing in terms of ethics in this paper.

Consequently, ethics in Kant undergoes a process of purification; that is, it dispenses with interest, whether it be that of virtue (Aristotelian ethics), that of happiness, (the Stoics and the Epicureans) or that of eternal life (Platonism). Kant, however, proposes an ethics that is not instrumentalised, without proposing ways to achieve ends, but rather considering solely the end in itself. In general, according to Kierkegaard, Kant was inclined to find another starting point in modern philosophy to clarify knowing the world (Kierkegaard [SKP], 1968–1978, I A 192 / [SKS], 1997–2012, Papir 258:10 / [JP], 1967–1978, 3: 2515). This also entails looking for it clearly in the field of ethics.

The novelty of its ethical position is the issue of duty for duty's sake, its approach being deontological *par excellence*; that is, subject A when he does action X, said action only has moral value when the reason for acting is duty. Kant says in this respect:

> On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it – not from inclination or fear, but from duty – then his maxim has a moral worth (Kant, 2016, p. 563 [GMS]).

From this, it is inferred that an action contains moral value insofar as the reason for materialising it is solely and exclusively for duty. Faced with the matter of the moral law, Kant establishes the universal legality of human actions. In this way, what is known as the Kantian categorical imperative is shaped:

> But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification? As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maximum should become a universal law (Kant, 2016, p. 565 [GMS]).

Acting, the will and all inclinations, therefore, seek to be a model for all; it is the enthronement of duty. In this way, his ethical system responds to the definition of ethics as having to be, incorporating, and amplifying each (particular) act to a universal (general) law. To state this differently, a morally worthy act is one done out of a sense of duty or universal moral law. That is, in an ethical dilemma, the morally worthy act, in my opinion, to do is that which I am prepared to make into a law for everyone to follow, without exception.

In the formulation of the imperative (the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals) Kant explains: "the categorical imperative can also be expressed thus: Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature" (Kant, 2016, p. 583 [GMS]). From this approach, notions are derived such as those of the *maximum* and *universal law*, whose extremes (the subjective and the objective) are intertwined by the will. When one speaks of "maximum" in Kant, it must be related to the particular criterion of the subject; and, on the other hand, when one uses the expression "universal law", it refers to the objective law, which we must all abide by, as it is directed at all rational beings.

In all approaches related to the Kantian ethical system, one can sense a conception of the individual; that is to say, of the subject, of the particular or specific human being. First of all, in *Sapere aude*, the expression it uses is a form of imperative: "Have courage to use your own reason!" Truly, it is aimed at the subject or self (Torralba, 2011, pp. 17–61); its target is the concrete individual. Consequently, the enlightened spirit is a rational process whose purpose is the subject, to arouse rational ability and assess its criteria and possibilities. Subsequently, in

the diverse formulations of his categorical imperative, Kant starts with the individual: "Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only" (Kant, 2016, p. 579 [GMS]). In this way, the value of the individual is established, not in the margin or correlationally with the other, but insofar as he is a singular person or individual.

However, the touchstone of Kantian ethics is to be found in the issue of moral "evil" (Gómez Caffarena, 2004, pp. 41–54), radically considered (*radikale Böse*, or radical evil) (Kant, *Religion within the bounds of bare reason*, 2016, p. 951 [RGV])[7]. The explanation of its existence would be due to the co-existence in Man of an innate disposition (*Anlage*) to good and an inclination to evil (*Hang zum Bösen*). Now, however, one must distinguish in Man between freedom as will (*Wille*), essentially good, in any case, and freedom as free will (*Willkür*), which is capable of choosing evil. Therefore, moral evil is not a positive principle, unlike good. Neither is it necessary that it should determine human nature (that would clash with the moral dimension of Man and with freedom as a postulate). Evil is necessary as a possibility; the possibility of not accepting, as an end in itself, the person acting in a selfish manner and for its own gain (*Selbstliebe*). In this regard, the human being can and must act subordinating sensitive ends to intelligible ones, more specifically to law-making reason and the moral imperative.

Kierkegaard in his diaries, for his part, not as praise, but rather as criticism, refers to the Kantian theory of "radical evil" and says that: "Kant's theory of radical evil has only one fault: he does not definitely establish that the inexplicable is a category, that the paradox is a category" (Kierkegaard [SKP], 1968–1978, VIII 1 A 11 / [SKS], 1997–2012, 20: 88–89, NB: 125 / [JP], 1967–1978, 3: 3089). In saying this, Kierkegaard expresses his characteristic complaint of attempting to explain or clarify a question or topic rationally that transcends our own rationality; for that reason, in that sense, he takes the view that the "inexplicable" (*Uforklarige*) can only be explained (or be "categorised") as "paradox" (*Paradoxet*). Nonetheless, he thinks that Kant made an honourable approach to the issue of radical evil insofar as he claimed that his theory on the matter was a speculative concept (*speculativ Begriben*) of the Christian issue (Kierkegaard [SKP], 1968–1978, X 2 A 501 / [SKS], 1997–2012, NB16:33 / [JP], 1967–1978, 3: 3408).

Kierkegaard: Ethics and the Individual

To begin with, Kierkegaard considers it absurd for human beings to give themselves their own moral law (moral autonomy). He thinks an external commitment, obligation or coercion is necessary. Without this, the necessary moral "reduplication" would turn into an illusion or experimentation, in an impossibility, and in something of such little seriousness "[…] Then Sancho Panza's self-administered blows to his own bottom were vigorous" (Kierkegaard [SKP], X 2 A 396, 1968–1978 / [SKS], 1997–2012, NB15: 66 / [JP], 1967–1978, 1: 188). Kierkegaard takes the view, therefore, that moral obligation cannot be grounded in oneself, but rather in something external (divine law or God) that coercively commits us to act in existential compliance with it. Thus, in contrast with duty for Kantian duty, Kierkegaard advocates an existential duty; in contrast with formal Kantian ethics, Kierkegaard proposes a Christian existential ethics. Leaving our acts in the hands of our own reason (practice) and moral autonomy could even lead to anarchy itself (cf. Kierkegaard [SKP], X 2 A 396, 1968–1978 /

[7] Gómez Caffarena, in his article "Sobre el mal radical" ["On radical evil"], takes as his starting point the contrast of the said theory with its anthropological optimism presupposed in his "criticism". In this regard, he views Kant as closer to Hobbes (at least in principle) than to Rousseau, who represent that dual conception (benign and malign) of human nature. In any case, for the author of the cited article, the root, origin or foundation of evil in Man is to be found in free will, without which it would not be morally imputable. Having said that, on the other hand, as a propensity or inclination, evil questions the free actions of humans.

[SKS], 1997–2012, NB15: 66 / [JP], 1967–1978, 1: 188). It seems that for Kierkegaard our will is incapable of abiding by a self-imposed moral duty, as happens in Kant, who constrains our will for Kierkegaard only insofar as we understand it in a heteronomous and existential way.

At this point in our study, we will try to address and explore in more depth the notion of "ethics" in Kierkegaardian thought, following in the footsteps of the pseudonym Victor Eremita. Normally, when one mentions Kierkegaard, one thinks of concepts or topics such as existentialism, pseudonyms, journals, or his radical adherence to the Christian faith. However, ethics acquires an interesting perception in his various works. According to R. Fremstedal, "there is some overlap and consistency between the different works in Kierkegaard's authorship, not that the pseudonyms should be taken to represent the same voice or perspective" (Fremstedal, 2012, p. 198). However, we will now refer solely to one work in particular (although it is possible to make the occasional incursion into any of the other Kierkegaardian texts).

When we use the expression "ethics" in Kierkegaard, one must bear in mind his work *Enten-Eller II* (*Either-Other 2*), written in 1843 under the pseudonym Victor Eremita (Hartshorne, 1990). Therefore, the ethical and aesthetic conception (Part 1) as two antagonistic, but existentially necessary, realities in the human condition (Torralba Rosellò, 2008, pp. 9–11). Part 1 of Either-Or, narrates two necessarily existential and antagonistic realities comprising the human condition, namely the aesthetic and the ethical. While the first underscore the dimension of immediacy in the human, the second defines that whereby a human becomes the character that he is or is becoming (Kierkegaard, 1992, pp. 108–117 [SV3, 4: 95–103 / SKS, 3: 100–108]).

In the first instance, Kierkegaard (as Victor Eremita), when he considers ethical expression, the first point one must consider is his interest in the philosophical current in which his thought is circumscribed. In this way, stressing his existentialism and his position in the face of life, commitment, being and God. Kierkegaard contributes certain particularities to universally philosophical terms, giving them his own style and meaning. Indeed, contextualising the *aesthetic* and the *ethical* entails and leads us to have to interpret "what he says" and the "way (or way) in which he says it" (García Martín, 2011, pp. 9–12); in addition to taking into account his work under his own name and his pseudonymous work, which makes up the entirety of the Kierkegaardian oeuvre.

Either way, ethics acquires relevance based on fundamental categories such as *choice* and *decision*. For that reason, Kierkegaard's Victor Eremita says: "I think of my early youth, when without really comprehending what it is to make a choice in life I listened with childish trust to the talk of my elders, and the moment of choice became a very solemn and momentous matter, although in choosing I only followed someone else's directions" (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 143 [SV3, 3, 135 / SKS3, 141]).

On this specific point, the possibility of choosing from infinite possibilities, one catches a glimpse of the ethical component of his thought. Consequently, from the freedom-choice relationship, the choice-decision relationship will be broken down, since Kierkegaard (as Víctor Eremita) goes on to say: "I think of moments later in life when I stood at the crossroads, when my soul was made ripe in the hour of decision" (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 143 [SV3, 3, 135 / SKS3, 141]). In this way, vital maturity, in aesthetic terms, is examined in the decision as a decisive point of ethics that entails beings what one chooses to be as the quintessential *muß sein (must be)*. Ethical behaviour is reduced to fulfilling my more or less capricious and voluptuous desires or aspirations; freedom, meanwhile, based on free will is reduced aesthetically to what I want.

Nevertheless, Kierkegaard, as an intimate and existentialist philosopher, perceives and suggests that, in the possibility of choice-decision, human aspiration confronts truth, justice and holiness, contrasted with the weaknesses and passions that underlie the human condition. From this constant tension, one can infer the Kierkegaardian anthropological conception, insofar as

Man is an auto-relationship (or reflexive relationship), aware of the relations of freedom-necessity, eternity-temporality, infinity-finiteness, as one can find in *The sickness unto death* (Kierkegaard, 1980, p. 13) and some passages of his *Journals*. Following on from this, on the basis of this anthropology, its objective is configured, which is to awaken spirits so that each *individual* is what he or she really and authentically is (García Martín, 2007, pp. 82–92; 2017, pp. 99–108).

A significant element is the descriptive aspect that Kierkegaard, through the pseudonym of Víctor Eremita, uses of human existence, of the moments or spheres of life: its aesthetic, ethical and religious stages[8]. In this regard, in the conception of ethical existence[9] "the Kantian influence of duty can be observed, but also its critique and complement through the more individual and existential character of its approaches" (Guerrero Martínez, 2008, p. 189). Each of these stages contains a series of experiences and significant moments of choice in which we identify ourselves to carry out the dialectical movement that makes it possible to be me, as *Den Enkelte*, a *singular individual*;[10] and not just another one of the crowd, lost or absorbed in the majority by the mass, the multitude, the people or the party.

The personality of the said individual will be shaped and determined by the "instant" (*Øjeblikket*) of the choice: "The choice itself is crucial for the content of the personality: through the choice the personality submerges itself in that which is being chosen, and when it does not choose, it withers away in atrophy" (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 163 [SV3, 3, 16 / SKS 3, 172]); in such a way that the choice entails identification with the personality of the individual[11]. From this perspective, in the ethical stage, Man commits himself, takes responsibility and moves away from the sensuality of the aesthetic stage. Which leads us to understand ethical acts and responsibility to the extent that there is a commitment, as in marriage (although equally, with respect to work and society). It is not, then, that I choose and decide to act out what I want, but what I must; or I want what I must do morally.

Lévinas, with regard to Kierkegaard and his ethics, says:

> That shattering of the system because of the Other [Autrui] is not an apocalyptic image, but the very impossibility, for a thinking that reduces all otherness to the same, of reducing the Other. An impossibility that does not remain in its negative meaning, but immediately puts the I in question. This putting in question signifies the responsibility of the I for the Other. Subjectivity is in that responsibility and only irreducible subjectivity can assume a responsibility. That is what constitutes the ethical (Lévinas, 1996, p. 73).

Consequently, ethical acts consist in treating another individual as an Other and not as the same; that is, only I being who I am can deal and interact with the Other as he or she is.

Finally, in the religious stage, the individual self-reveals his genuineness or singularity before God; as the *I* is the *I before God*. From the Kierkegaardian perspective, it is in this

[8] To explore this comment in more depth, see the Introduction made by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero in Kierkegaard (1996): *Estudios Estéticos I* (Aesthetic Studies), pp. 9–30. As is well-known, Kierkegaard also wrote under the pseudonym Hilarius Bogbinder *Stadier paa Livets Vei (Stages on life's way*).

[9] Apart from in *Enten-Eller* (*Either-Or*), Kierkegaard's pseudonyms speak of ethics, for example, in the opening lines of the chapter on the issue of its teleological suspension; cf. *Frygt og Bæven* (*Fear and trembling*), SV3, 5: 51 / SKS, 4: 148.

[10] Among the many contributions that Kierkegaard has made, the notion of the individual stands out as an important conceptual category, given that it expresses the uniqueness of the human being, who after an existential journey, becomes what one is because one is.

[11] In accordance with a present-day reading, the said choice would have to do with what is termed "gender identity". It is not only that I conform to how I may see myself, but that everyone else must see me and identify with what I choose to identify with. Even if that self-identification changes or is modified, according to my own perceived and/or chosen personal identity.

scenario of considering Man as a singular individual that authentic ethics begins; that is to say, an ethics of life, based on and sustained by Love, as it is only through Love that one can relate to other individuals (Zalec & Pavlikova, 2019).

In the implications of love and in order to extract the ethical notions in Kierkegaard writing under his own name (he himself defines himself as a *religious writer*),[12] we read in *Works of Love* (*Kjerlighedens Gjerninger*):

> Christianity certainly knows far better than any poet what love is and what it means to love. For this very reason, it also knows what perhaps escapes the poets; that the love they celebrate is secretly self-love, and that precisely by this its intoxicated expression ─to love another person more than oneself─ can be explained. Erotic love [Elskov] is still not the eternal; it is the beautiful dizziness of infinity; its highest expression is the foolhardiness of riddles (Kierkegaard, 1995, p. 19 [SV3, 12: 25 / SKS 9, 27]).

In this way, it is in Christianity (*Christendommen*) (not in "bible-bashing" or false Christianity (*Christenheden*), worldly and lacking in existential and spiritual rigour, as Kierkegaard would say) that love is conjoined and revealed in its most sublime and authentic sense (Binetti & Pavlikova, 2019; Pavlikova & Zalec, 2019). However, taking into account that it is not a selfish love nor one that looks to itself, but on the contrary, it is a love of the Other, it is a way of getting away from oneself and loving to the utmost. In short, an oblative love that transcends even human categories to dimension the Other's worth[13].

Conclusions

To underline some considerations about the proposed inquiry, the importance that both philosophers – Kant and Kierkegaard – attribute to the concept of the individual can be highlighted. Namely, for Kant, the subject with his maxims can become one of them, a universal law. It is a subject who must become an adult, use his own capacity of understanding, his rationality. The Kantian enlightened subject is he who acts in accordance with practical reason and is precisely the one to whom Kant wishes to appeal, praise and rescue. Conversely, the path of rescue or awakening of the "singular individual" in Kierkegaard is not by the rational way, but rather by the religious existential way; because, in his thinking, reason is not enough to become what the human being authentically is; a commitment is necessary and, above all, to see oneself reflected in and before the absolute truth, which is God (the concept of God is equivalent in Kierkegaard to "Absolute difference") (Llevadot, 2008, pp. 22–25).

Another outstanding conclusive aspect is that ethics for Kant project a demanding maxim with "duty for duty's sake". The possibility that he affirms of making my acts universal laws and seeing in my person and in others, not just means, but ends at the same time, is enormously valuable. However, in the Kierkegaard of Victor Eremita, ethics are on the verge of the religious phase and come into play when I build inter-individual relationships that allow me to see the Other as he is because he is. Also, if we consult an entry in one of Kierkegaard's journals, one can deduce (in contrast with Kant's law-making reason) that there is no moral law that I have given myself, bur a law that comes to us from above and that educates us (cf. Kierkegaard [SKP], 1968–1978, X 2 A 396 / [SKS], 1997–2012, NB15:66).

On the other hand, the pure Kantian ethical formality of duty for duty's sake (very much in line in a certain way with the Teutonic and Puritan character), necessarily dispenses with existential and concrete content. It is an ethic that is grounded in itself, that refers to itself, to the rational nature of the human being and its universality (Mahrik, 2018). It would be a

[12] One of the key elements to understanding Kierkegaard's work, as he himself suggests, is to be found in the work *The Point of*, whose function is to offer determining hermeneutic principles to comprehend his thought.

[13] For this approach, compare with St Paul's hymn to love, expressed in 1: Co 13, 4-7.

"thought" morality, based on enlightened reason, not on a "lived" morality based on the concrete and indeterminate character of human existence in all its complexity. If it is a matter of duty for duty's sake, ultimately we cannot avoid the question of "what specific duty". In short, Kantian duty for duty's sake is like the abstract "observing for the sake of observing": it requires a "what" and a "what for". Although the categorical imperative in some way specifies that "duty", however, is limited only to the extent that I personally assume it with my practical reason; However, as we saw earlier, for Kierkegaard the main thing is lacking: external coercion based on divine command.

In contrast, Kierkegaardian ethics is a Christian ethics (Rocca, 2020, pp. 121–136); it is the ethics of love (*charitas*) for one's neighbour and, above all, for God. It is not an ethics of love for love's sake, but rather love of God and our neighbour as ourselves that is projected or made explicit of necessity in our acts or behaviour (Kierkegaard, 1995, p. 19 [SV3, 12: 25 / SKS 9, 27]). Absolute duty is, with respect to this, maxim and universal law at the same time (at least in the case of the true Christian believer). Its basis is theological, but with anthropological and sociological implications. It is a relational and existential ethics. On the other hand, one may well think that the Kantian "radical evil" theory is the enlightened and secularised version of the Christian "original sin" [14]; "original sin" which Kierkegaard analyses as Vigilius Haufniensis in *The Concept of Anxiety* dogmatically (doctrinally), psychologically and existentially (García Martín, 2009, pp. 48–59).

Finally, it is appropriate to point out that ethics itself, approached rigorously and as an object of philosophical study, was made much more explicitly and better developed in Kant than in Kierkegaard, due to the interests and aspects of each philosopher. Nevertheless, the ethical requirement to go beyond acts motivated by duty and see other individuals, from a Christian and metaphysical viewpoint, becomes an inescapable challenge for all human beings, especially the faithful.

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[14] Without going into a consideration of the distinction between "guilt" and "sin", which would call for deserved attention, but which goes beyond the limits of this small research paper. In addition, R. Fremstedal achieved some success in the aforementioned article (cf. Fremstedal, 2012, pp. 214–215).

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Disputes over the place of ethics in Polish Marxist philosophy

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Abstract
In the article, the author presents attempts by Polish Marxist philosophers to enrich Marxism with ethical issues. The initial absence of ethics in Marxism is associated with the ignorance of tradition related to their own formation. In the author's opinion, only polemics with the competitive Lviv-Warsaw school forced Polish Marxists to take the issue seriously. That is why Polish Marxist ethics in its mature form was only established in the 1960s, and did not enrich Marxism itself, but rather indirectly contributed to the initiation of socio-political transformations in our country.

Keywords: Marxism, communism, morality, Marxist ethics, Karl Marx, Adam Schaff, Maria Ossowska

Introduction

Eric Hobsbawm, the British historian pertinently noted that Marxism had been the main subject of intellectual discussions around the world over the course of almost a century and a half (Hobsbawm, 2011, p. viii). The complicated history of our country renders this remark only partially relevant to Poland, which can be easily explained by the fact that until 1918 Poland did not yet exist on the map of Europe as an independent state. Much more important, however, is the political message in which Marxism is portrayed as an intellectual product of the hostile nations that initiated the dismantling of Poland, and on this occasion, imposed on it not only their political authority, but also tried to dominate it culturally and scholarly. This left an indelible mark on the reception of Marxism in Poland both in the interwar period (1919–1939) and now.

The history of Polish Marxism is now barely known, mainly for non-scholarly reasons. Consequently, some of its traditions have been silenced or marginalised according to current political needs. Most of the participants in the discussion on the history of Polish Marxism represent one of the two opposing options in which Marxism is either completely alien to the Polish philosophical tradition, or – in the 20th century had only one face, that of Leninist-Stalinist ideology. This is the dominant narrative in most publications attempting to present its complicated history. Even the works of the most important representatives of Polish Marxism followed this rule, like Adam Schaff in the book entitled *Narodziny i rozwój filozofii marksistowskiej (The birth and development of Marxist philosophy*) (1950), and Leszek Kołakowski in his monumental work: *Main currents of Marxism: The founders – the golden age – the breakdown* (1976).

Adam Schaff associated the lack of Marx's successors in Poland with the civilisational backwardness of a country with no working class, which resulted in not needing an ideology that would aim at improving its social position. This was also due to the fact that Polish Marxism was only secondary in relation to Russian and German research, and certain issues were completely neglected therein. This meant focusing on ontological and epistemological issues at the expense of issues relating to human philosophy, especially ethics and aesthetics. Some Polish philosophers spotted such one-sidedness of Polish Marxism and tried to fill the existing gap by formulating cognitively interesting concepts. Others, while not finding answers to their axiological problems, abandoned Marxism or switched to revisionist positions. Studies

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in the ongoing discussions on these issues in Poland bring a number of interesting observations and is an important complement to the history of Polish ethics.

Polish Marxism before World War II

Publications devoted to the history of Marxism in Poland do not tell us anything about the achievements of the philosophers who authentically enriched its theoretical foundations at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A completely forgotten example of a thinker taking interest in Marxism was Władysław Weryho (1868–1916), the founder and long-time editor of the first Polish philosophical magazine '*Przegląd Filozoficzny*'. In 1892, Weryho defended his Ph.D. dissertation entitled *Marx als Philosoph* written under the supervision of Ludwig Stein (1859–1930) at the Swiss University of Bern. What is significant is that this dissertation was published by the local publishing house (Weryho, 1894) and is still cited today by many of Marx's biographers. Weryho's important contribution to the history of philosophy consisted in drawing attention to the fact that Marx was not only a philosopher but also a sociologist. Nevertheless, according to Weryho, Marx committed a mistake in absolutising the economic phenomena, which resulted in the one-sidedness of his philosophy. However, this fact did not diminish the great importance of Marx's thought for world philosophy (Weryho, 1894, p. 52). Weryho devoted several other texts to Marx's philosophy, including analyses of both his scholarly and popular works, highlighting two periods, the first of which lasted until 1848, i.e. the publication of *The poverty of philosophy,* and the second one – until his death (Weryho, 1897/98, pp. 159–160). This division corresponds more or less to the popular division between 'the young Marx' and 'the old Marx', but Weryho interpreted it differently. In the first period, Marx was mainly a philosopher and in the second period a sociologist. In light of Polish scholarly disputes in the mid-20th century, it is surprising that their participants had no idea that the issue they were dealing with had already been analysed within their native philosophy.

Selective interest in Marxism in Poland was also related to the popularity of positivism in our country. However, the physicalism of positivism led to the reduction of philosophical issues and in particular to the removal of those issues that could not be included in the framework of empirically verifiable theories. The first victim of such a reductionist approach was metaphysics, alongside axiological issues. In the view of the positivists, traditional philosophy, due to its saturation with metaphysico-axiological content, lost its right to the status of science. Such an approach, however, met opposition even among declared positivists. They tried to 'scientify' traditional ethics in various ways, which led to building of an independent ethics systems. This meant separating ethical issues from *a priori* accepted assumptions. In Poland, such attempts to build an ethics devoid of metaphysical assumptions were first formulated by Aleksander Świętochowski, who developed a unique treatise entitled: *O powstawaniu praw moralnych* (*On the formation of moral laws*) (1877) (Świętochowski, 1877). The uniqueness of this study consists in Świętochowski's usage of methods appropriate for empirical sciences; he tried to build a scientific system of normative ethics. However, this attempt met with many critical opinions, which made Świętochowski change its contents quite radically. He wrote a book entitled *Źródła moralności* (*The sources of morality*), in which there was not much left of his old revolutionary ideas (Świętochowski, 1912).

Another positivist, Julian Ochorowicz, in an effort to avoid Świętochowski's shortcomings, developed his own version of positivist ethics in *Metoda w etyce* (*A method in ethics*), a competing work, which presents his own version of positivist ethics and and tries to combine all moral issues into one system united by a common scientific method (Ochorowicz, 1906). Although this work revolutionised Polish ethics, it did not avoid numerous simplifications, and never, on its completion, fulfilled the promises made at the book's start. Today we know that it had a great influence on Kazimierz Twardowski, who attempted to implement Ochorowicz's intention by using methods derived from analytical philosophy. Unfortunately, during

Twardowski's lifetime (1866–1938), his works on ethics were completely unknown, as they were only published thanks to the efforts of his students almost half a century after his death.

At the same time, a book was published, which can be considered the first Polish attempt to formulate Marxist ethics. In 1906, Stanisław Garfein-Garski (1867–1928) published an interesting study: *Materialistyczne pojmowanie dziejów a etyka* (*The materialistic interpretation of history and ethics*), in which, under the influence of evolutionism and Nietzschean philosophy, he clearly wrote that ethics is indelible from human history, and it is always present therein, because all progress and persistence of culture depend on it. According to him, Marxist ethics embodies the progress of history, for it "leads mankind to fight for a more dignified, better and nobler life, building in it the revolutionary energy that leads to action" (Garfein-Garski, 1906, pp. 77–78). Although it was, in a sense, secondary to Karl Kautsky's well-known book *Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung* (1906), Garfein-Garski included elements of the Polish philosophy of action into ethical issues, making it an important element of the Polish philosophical tradition. Unfortunately, this publication was ignored by Polish Marxists oriented towards communist ideology, as it represented the revisionist trend which they rejected.

Polish Marxists of that period were active in the scholarly community alongside representatives of other philosophical trends. They participated in scholarly life, conducting intense scholarly polemics. The first Polish Marxist philosophers also tried to spread their views in various ways, including carrying out polemics with representatives of competing philosophical schools. They formed a certain, though today quite forgotten, tradition. For example, in 1906, Adolf Rejbekiel (1865–1935), today a completely forgotten supporter of Marxism, attacked Julian Ochorowicz for his work *Metoda w etyce* (*A method in ethics*) (Rejbekiel, 1906, p. 460). This attack, though it appeared to be scientific in character, was, in fact, a camouflaged attempt to promote Marxism. Rejbekiel also exposed a Marxist motif in his polemic, suggesting that enriching Ochorowicz's work with references to Marx would improve its scholarly value. It was, therefore, a question of demonstrating the need to take Marxism into account in all the scholarly discussions that were taking place at the time. The Polish Marxists of the Partitions period were therefore involved in the academic discourse, and, consequently, they closely followed the achievements of national and world research.

Therefore, at the time of the state's rebirth in 1918, Polish Marxism was not uniform. In the socialist option approved by its supporters, Marxism constituted one of numerous possible ways of interpreting the world, while for the supporters of the communist version, so-called Marxism-Leninism was the only possible option. Rosa Luxemburg was the last major authority among all supporters of Marxism in Poland, but, unfortunately, her untimely death during the Berlin Revolution meant that they had no theorist who could interpret the changes taking place in Europe in a way appropriate to philosophy. This meant that the left-wing radicals did not see the need for studying Marxism in a scholarly way at all. Some of them did not even know that Marxism was a scholarly theory, which, like any other theory, had to improve its assumptions. In Rosa Luxemburg's time, Marxism was still an attractive intellectual proposition because it "presented itself as an effort to abolish the dehumanized conditions of the bourgeois world, which was to be achieved by denouncing social injustice, 'work alienation', work liberation, and building a socialist relationship to work as a category significant indicative of a new reality, which was to be a 'vanguard of the bright tomorrows'" (Gluchman, 2020, p. 44).

Before World War II, Polish Marxist philosophers could easily cooperate with representatives of other orientations, even if their teachers and Marxist polemists never accepted each other. An example of this was the promotion by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, one of the most outstanding representatives of the Lviv-Warsaw school, of the Doctor of Marxist Philosophy Stepan Oleksiuk (1892–1941). Oleksiuk, even before obtaining a Ph.D. degree, presented readings on Marxist philosophy at the meetings of the Lviv Polish Philosophical

Society (Twardowski, 1997, pp. 211–212). Furthermore, Mark (Mełech) Bitter (1902–1965) completed, under Tadeusz Kotarbiński, a doctoral seminar on philosophy. After the war, Bitter chose a political career. This clearly shows that before the war there was no rivalry between the Lviv-Warsaw school and Marxism. It was artificially triggered for the sake of political in-fighting only after the war, more precisely in the late 1940s.

What is important, such politically unengaged Marxists were approved not only by the pre-war administrative authorities, but could also conduct research according to their convictions without any problems. At that time, however, there was no such tolerance towards the agitators of communist ideology. Moreover, there was no work authored by Polish communists that could be considered a lecture on Marxist ethics. Only Jan Hempel (1877–1937) made some efforts directed towards such issues, but his efforts did not receive any synthetic development (Szmyd, 1973, pp. 95–124). In principle, he confined himself only to criticism of Christian ethics, considering it a tool of people's enslavement, and was inclined to return to the original Slavic customs having their roots in nature. This situation meant that post-war Polish communists did not have any ethical traditions that could be employed as an attempt to reorient the morality of Polish society.

Consequences of the lack of continuity of tradition for ethics in Polish Marxism

The problem with the reduction of ethical content in Polish Marxism was noticeable at the very beginning of post-war social transformations. Pre-war Polish Marxism of a communist orientation did not develop any systemic concept of ethics that would constitute an attractive offer for intellectual elites. It was for this reason that it could constitute an offer only for the economically disadvantaged strata, as it did not have anything attractive for other social groups. After all, such attraction is not due to the fact that it satisfied any existential needs of people, but to the fact that it would allow the development and consistent application of a certain formula of justice, which is a measure of self-esteem, as well as the evaluation of the behaviour of others. Marxists had quite a lot of problems with ethics, which is confirmed, for example, by a reading of the first Polish textbook on Marxism authored by Adam Schaff, in which ethics and morality are not even mentioned (Schaff, 1947). The author of this book undoubtedly followed the model of similar studies developed in the USSR at that time, which, however, does not explain the omission of the axiological component in Marxism. Yet, this was a testimony not so much to the absence of ethics in Marxism, but rather to the ignorance of recent traditions of his own formation, of which Schaff was, after all, the main ideologist.

For Polish intellectuals, Adam Schaff's attempts seemed exceptionally awkward, and in 1945, while objecting to the allegations of the lacking ethical component in Marxism, he stated; "Marxism has its own ethics and its own ethical norm. It is a demand to act in accordance with the interests of the proletariat, or indirectly in accordance with the interests of the majority of the nation" (Schaff, 1945, p. 5). Thus, the ideological content was equated here with the scholarly one. Schaff certainly could not refer to Garfein-Garski because he was influenced by Austro-Marxism when writing his book, so for communists he was a revisionist. Nevertheless, Schaff knew nothing about Garfein-Garski's book, although it was published in his native Lviv and received a lot of interest in Polish scholarly circles. This shows that Polish Marxists of the post-war period were poorly educated in philosophy, and it was only in polemics with competitive positions that they supplemented the gaps in their knowledge on cultural history and philosophy.

Schaff especially revealed his inadequate mastery of the theoretical foundations of Marxism in his polemic with Paul Konrad, who, in the '*Odrodzenie'* journal, criticized the ways Marxists practiced philosophy. Konrad called Schaff's principle: "that which serves the interests of the working class is moral", the 'bush' principle in the sense of its primitiveness. Konrad's charge sounded very serious, because accepting the assumption of a connection between morality and

the interests of the working class would not allow for a negative moral assessment, e.g. of Nazi crimes committed during the war (Konrad, 1947, pp. 10–11), with which Schaff did not even try to argue, although it was certainly a fundamental charge.

Adam Schaff did not have an easy task in this dispute, because in the Leninist version of Marxism, the so-called 'classics', that is Marx, Engels and Lenin, had a somewhat decreed infallibility. As one Russian philosopher aptly described this situation: "Not only criticism, but also the development of materialistic dialectics, was, in Soviet philosophy a completely marginalised topic. To be the author of a discovery in Soviet philosophy! God forbid! It would be like signing a death sentence for oneself" (Gricenko & Danilczenko, 2007, p. 28). In order to maintain his superior position in Polish philosophy, Schaff could not afford to lose the trust of political authorities.

This situation led to a kind of regression in Polish Marxism, because Marxist philosophy, in the Polish version before World War II, developed according to the positivist premise of the rivalry of ideas, the best of which wins, but, from this rivalry, the winner emerges enriched with the best content of the defeated idea. It was, therefore, an offensive strategy, attractive to intellectuals looking for new challenges all the time. After the Second World War, a defensive strategy prevailed, consisting in defending the already existing solutions at all costs. It thus lost all its intellectual attractiveness, and hence it was later so easily rejected by the elites.

Paradoxically, it was only the pre-war philosophers, fought by Marxists, who took seriously research on the ethical component in Marxism. Maria in her *Socjologia moralności* (*Sociology of morality*) treated Marxism in the same way as any other philosophical concept, and thus criticized the compatibility of its proclaimed slogans with scholarly justified reasons. Her study of the place of ethics in Marx's work begins with a devastating diagnosis that, in principle, there is no room for such considerations in Marx's philosophy. According to Ossowska, the "quadruple source of ethical abstinence of Marxism" (Ossowska, 1957, p. 1) was derived from the following:

a) The influences of Hegelianism,

b) Attempts to oppose traditional utopian socialism (in the Proudhonian version),

c) Aversion to bombastic declamatory enunciations (full of hypocrisy) 'cultivated by the ruling classes',

d) The ambition of scientificity characteristic of the era in which it originated (Ossowska, 1986, p. 372).

According to the scholar, this was due to the conviction of the creator of this trend that "morality is not transformed by moralization, but by a change in the social relationships that determine morals. In his *German ideology*, Marx claimed that communists did not formulate any morality, they did not say that we should love one another and should not be selfish, because they knew that selfishness was determined by social conditions, and that it was not man's ideal which affected his liberation, but the productive forces" (Ossowska, 1986, p. 372). While developing her article on Marx's ethics, in her notes she added another important remark: "There is no point in preaching morality when you know the conditions that determine it. These conditions must be created" (Ossowska, 1957, p. 1).

Ossowska also noted that ethical thought in Marxism was not formulated within a coherent concept, and therefore this thought had yet to be reconstructed. Moreover, she tried to perform such a reconstruction herself. Adequately, in Marxism, she identified the fundamental problem areas in which such reconstruction was possible. It was about the model of man – what kind of man he should be, not what he is. Furthermore, "the description of the deformity to which man is subjected in the capitalist system" is, of course, an indication of what is considered evil in Marxism. Ossowska pointed out the essential features of this design and the way in which it was presented by Marx. She called this model a 'Renaissance' one, in the sense that man should be characterized by the richness of his entire personality. This does not, of course, exhaust all

the richness of the model, as it should also be characterized by the "cult of work and solidarity between people" (Ossowska, 1986, p. 379). Ossowska perceived a negative example of depriving a person of such opportunities for personality development in her descriptions of female characters subjected to a kind of training and pressed into ready-made patterns to which they had to adapt, thus becoming deprived of the opportunity to fully externalize their personality qualities. Summing up her reflections, she emphasized the social and emotional nature of the popularity of Marxism, although its ethical message was basically hidden.

Ossowska also attempted to capture how Marxism enriched the science of morality. In her opinion, at least four factors can be mentioned here:

1) "The designation of morality by the interests of the ruling class;
2) Moral variability;
3) The misleading hope for changing values through education;
4) The family has no morality" (Ossowska, 1957, p. 4).

Obviously, the last point refers to the assumption that the family is not a subject of morality, because it may consist of people characterized by different levels of morality, or even showing opposing views. Ossowska noticed an example of this in family situations: "Parents exploit children; it is a clear deformation of the relationship that should unite parents and children. Children are traded, children are the tools. Violence is carried out by parents through upbringing" (Ossowska, 1957, p. 8) .

It is striking that the representatives of competing concepts, owing to their analyses, knew more about Marxist ethics than Schaff and his disciples or supporters did. The situation changed dramatically after the announcement at the 20th Congress of Khrushchev's paper on the consequences of the cult of the individual, which, from a philosophical point of view, was mainly an accusation of all those who forgot about ethics in Marxism. Therefore, the breakthrough that took place at the time of the publication of Khrushchev's paper, in Poland primarily caused shock, after which yesterday's declared communists switched to 'revisionist' positions, against which they had only recently fought hard. Thus, Polish communism lost its intellectual elite, which meant that it was no longer able to influence the attitudes of society or gain other followers beside opportunists. The crash of the system based on such fragile foundations was therefore inevitable.

Adam Schaff himself, however, was able to assess the mental and political breakthrough that had taken place at the time. Evaluating the condition of Polish Marxism, he wrote:

> Today, together with false myths, in the eyes of many there disappeared also that which is undoubtedly the truth and strength of Marxism. At the same time, we have helped to restore the authority to bourgeois science – discrediting our own positions and surrounding the opponent's positions with the romanticism of the forbidden fruit. [...] The shock was enormous, especially in the case of people who, acting in the best faith, turned out to be objective co-creators of evil (Schaff, 1957, p. 1).

He wrote openly that the party had used violence, which exposed him to a wave of criticism, especially from the political elites of the time.

Schaff, however, continued his reflections on morality in the subsequent editions of the 'Polityka' journal. In the article *O sprawach moralnych – bez mitologii* (*On moral issues – without mythology*), he expressed an idea that puzzled Ossowska. He, namely, once again stated that Marxism has its theory of morality, and that it is not the theory but the practice of its implementation that is faulty. He pointed out two reasons for making such a charge: "Because, *primo,* it does not have a codified and equally old system like religions, and, *secundo,* because of the atheistic nature of Marxism, people are willing to attribute to it a denial of those moral principles which have been codified by religion" (Schaff, 1958, p. 1).

The direct confrontation of Maria Ossowska's reflections on the ethical content of Marxism with the views of Adam Schaff took place during the 1st National Conference on Ethics organized on May 10–13, 1965 in Nieborów by the Department of Ethics of Warsaw University. Besides the opponents, Tadeusz Kotarbiński was one who participated in the conference. Adam Schaff was the last speaker to deliver his lecture *Jednostka a socialism* (*The individual and socialism*). After the lecture, a discussion took place in which all participants of the conference, except for Kotarbiński, took part. The content of the presented paper does not arouse any emotions today, but in the period when it was delivered, it meant a kind of 'earthquake' for Marxists. How much emotion it aroused was best evidenced by the fact that the editors of the 'Etyka' journal did not decide to publish it, limiting themselves to a short mention that the paper was an abridged version of the fifth chapter of Schaff's newly published book *Marksizm a jednostka ludzka* (*Marxism and the human individual*). Maria Ossowska took part in the discussion on the issue of individual freedom under socialism and its so-called necessary limitations. Schaff's reply could not, first of all, satisfy the Marxists, because in his paper he pointed to the existence of various forms of alienation, also in socialism. The freedom of individuals acquires a political dimension, which means that it must be regulated to some extent. "By introducing certain necessary restrictions on the freedom of an individual […] it is not always possible to guarantee the rightness of these restrictions. But the lack of a guarantee, the possibility of risk is a distinctive feature of politics" (Schaff, 1958, p. 1). At the same time, defending himself against the objections of the debaters, the speaker emphasized the fact that he was a communist and did not undermine Marx's authority in any way. Nevertheless, Schaff's speech had mainly a symbolic meaning, because since then ethical issues have become a permanent part of Polish Marxist philosophy.

The marginal treatment of ethical issues in Marxism occurred mainly in the Stalinist period, as on the wave of the thaw after October 1956, Marxist ethics in Poland began to develop dynamically. Leszek Kołakowski also approached issues of this kind, although they were on the edges of his scholarly interests. His work entitled *Etyka bez kodeksów (Ethics without codes)*, published in 1962, constituted a controversial attempt to defend the absence of ethics in Marxism. Kołakowski wrote there that "conservatism, like nihilism, constitutes a self-defense against the compulsion to make moral decisions" (Kołakowski, 1962, p. 148). Thus, dynamic Marxism would not have to expose its moral message, as it was contained in each of its postulates. It was also a critique of Adam Schaff's attempt to enrich Marxism with the content of existentialism. In other words, at that time Kołakowski was still convinced that the ethical message was inextricably linked with each postulate to improve the existing situation. Therefore, Marxism does not need a code of ethics, as long as the striving for progress is preserved in its postulates. The problem only arises when Marxism itself becomes a conservative doctrine. It is then that the need to codify Marxist ethics will arise, which in fact will mean the end of its development potential.

Conclusions

The shallowness of perceiving Marxism solely as an ideology was, therefore, common in Poland, both throughout society and among the supporters of new orders. A closer understanding of Marx's own thought paradoxically led philosophers to a crisis, which eventually resulted in a shift towards positions that were officially called revisionist, although this did not necessarily mean rejecting Marxism as such. When Adam Schaff moved to the position of Euro-Marxism, he recognized that in Poland there had never been true Marxism, but only a caricatured form of it, which he himself called communo-fascism (Schaff, 1990, p. 45), which according to political decision makers did not need any philosophical justification. However, this does not change the general conclusion that Marxism in Poland, despite having a formal monopoly, was unable to enrich the achievements of national and world science.

Undoubtedly, the achievements of Kołakowski and Schaff arose only when they finally had the opportunity to confront their beliefs with the achievements of world science. In other words, all the achievements of Marxist philosophy in our country arose from challenging its Leninist version. As a result, Polish Marxism has never been as static as that practiced in the former USSR, which is why practically all the activists of the former Polish democratic opposition have Marxist roots. However, this does not change the fact that only the incorporation of ethical issues into Polish Marxism has indirectly become the main cause of democratic changes in our country. This dictates a completely different approach to Marxism, since its importance does not lie in scientific communism, as Lenin's followers believed, but precisely in underappreciated Marxist ethics.

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Freedom in the *Age of surveillance capitalism*: Lessons from Shoshana Zuboff

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Abstract

The Age of surveillance capitalism is a profound economical, sociological, political, philosophical, and ethical work by the American author, Harvard University Professor Shoshana Zuboff. In this work, she analyzes the new economic system, which she calls "surveillance capitalism." This system revolves around the commodification of personal data, which allows human behavior to be predicted and "nudged" towards profitable ends. This system is historically unprecedented and has only become possible in the technological milieu of interconnected devices, which appeared in the 21st century. In this article, I look at the issue of freedom in Zuboff's work. I argue that her understanding of freedom involves three ethical dimensions, namely privacy, autonomy, and authenticity. I take "surveillance capitalism" as a theoretical framework, in which I explore several ethical challenges to freedom in the digital age.

Keywords: surveillance capitalism, freedom, behavioral surplus, instrumentarian power, privacy, autonomy, authenticity.

Introduction

The digital age is allegedly the fourth stage of development of human civilization after the hunter-gatherer society, the agrarian, and industrial eras. Each of these eras were not only different from the standpoint of their economic, political, and social organization, but, most importantly, in terms of the existential condition of man. As the digital age unfolds, it carries both promises and threats to human existence. By comparison, the industrial age made our species, on average, richer, more individualistic, and more connected than in the previous agrarian era. However, as the Communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes testify, the brunt of its technological power was also turned against the human being. Today, we look to the promises of the digital age just as our ancestors looked to the hopes of the industrial. Therefore, it is vital to analyze its potential threats, including the ethical ones, which come along with the opportunities.

Freedom is a core ethical value. For Immanuel Kant, it is the source of morality. To act morally is to exercise freedom, while the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally (Rohlf, 2020). Can the digital age create circumstances that will threaten freedom on a mass scale? If yes, what will these circumstances be? I consider Shoshana Zuboff's concept of "surveillance capitalism" as a framework within which it is possible to explore several ethical challenges to freedom in the digital age.

Shoshana Zuboff is an American author, a Harvard University professor, social psychologist, and philosopher. She is the author of the books: *In the age of the smart machine: the future of work and power* (1988), *The support economy: why corporations are failing individuals and the next episode of capitalism* (2002) (in co-authorship with James Maxmin), and *The age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power* (2019). The last book is Zuboff's most monumental piece, which integrates her lifelong themes: the digital revolution, economy in the 21st century, and human existence in the digital age. In this work, she has presented a thorough analysis of a new economic phenomenon, which she calls "surveillance capitalism." This phenomenon is characterized by surveillance and prediction of human behavior in a technological milieu of interconnected devices. Zuboff's theoretical schema allows not only the workings of the economy to be interpreted, but also the human condition in the digital age, including the ethical value of freedom.

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In this article, I will explore the challenges to freedom that arise from Shoshana Zuboff's concept of surveillance capitalism. I will show that these challenges should be understood not so much as a political or economic, but more as an ethical issue. My goal is not to analyze this system empirically or examine how deeply it penetrates into society, but to take it essentially as a framework, in which I will consider a number of ethical challenges to freedom. The article is divided into three parts. In Part 1, I will look at Shoshana Zuboff's concept of surveillance capitalism and outline its basic features. In Part 2, I will delineate a few lines along which she interprets freedom. In Part 3, I will consider several ethical threats to freedom that proceed from the system of surveillance capitalism. Finally, in Conclusions, I will suggest some ways to consider the issue further.

The logic of surveillance capitalism

It would be no exaggeration to say that freedom is the central theme of *The age of surveillance capitalism*. If one dared to scale down this almost five-hundred-page book to a single sentence, that sentence most likely would be the following: "The essence of surveillance capitalism is the annihilation of freedom and its replacement by a machine-like certainty." This extraordinary annihilation does not have historical antecedents and cannot be tapered down to any of the known threats. It is only possible in the interconnected and highly dense network of apps and devices, which are simultaneously sensors and actuators. These sensors record human activity and piece together fragmented information about a person's behavior. This raw data is processed by machine intelligence and assembled into a model. Once this person's data is fed into this model of behavior, it will predict their future actions. Actuators aim to convert this knowledge into profit by "nudging" human choices toward outcomes that align with the interests of surveillance capitalists. As this system unfolds, it poses a threat to human freedom, replacing a person – a sovereign and autonomous decision-maker – with a kind of Pavlov's dog who is studied and conditioned by others.

Shoshana Zuboff's concept of surveillance capitalism revolves around two central concepts: behavioral surplus and instrumentarian power. The first concept refers to the practice of rendering human behavior as data and profiting from it, whereas the second indicates a specific type of power that operates through behavior modification.

In Karl Marx's economic theory, "surplus value" is the difference between the amount raised through the sale of a product and the amount it costs to the owner to manufacture that product. Zuboff writes about a new kind of surplus value, namely the "behavioral surplus," which she understands as behavioral information that goes beyond product or service use and instead is used to understand and predict human behavior. The manufacturers of digital products, including apps or websites, constantly get feedback data from their users, including clicks, spelling errors, browsing history, geolocation, etc. According to Zuboff, Google was the first to discover (around the early 2000s) that those "digital crumbs" contained valuable insights into human behavior and, thus, allowed it to be understood and predicted. It turned out that such knowledge was a goldmine. Not only was there a great demand for it among advertisers, but it also provided a constant and free of charge stream of behavioral information, which could be turned into a continuous flow of money. Human private experiences have, thus, become a means to others' commercial ends.

The tycoons of surveillance capitalism, including Google and Facebook, do not charge a fee for their services, despite being among the most valuable companies on earth. Instead most of their income flows from behavioral surplus, which they glean from their users, recycle through machine intelligence into prediction models, and sell those models in a new kind of marketplace, which the author calls the "behavioral futures market." At first, behavioral surplus was simply "found" as a by-product of users' online actions. Later, it was hunted aggressively and procured largely through surveillance. Once this economic logic had been discovered,

competitive dynamics pushed others to follow, and the system of surveillance capitalism materialized. According to Zuboff, "even the most innocent-seeming applications such as weather, flashlights, ride sharing, and dating apps are 'infested' with dozens of tracking programs that rely on increasingly bizarre, aggressive, and illegible tactics to collect massive amounts of behavioral surplus ultimately directed at ad targeting" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter. 5).

Yet, she contends that this system is only incidentally about ads just as "Ford's new system of mass production was only incidentally about automobiles" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 3). Instead "any actor with an interest in purchasing probabilistic information about our behavior and / or influencing future behavior […] can play in markets where behavioral fortunes are bought and sold" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 3). In a broad sense, surveillance capitalism is about buying and selling human futures.

Eventually, the goal of this system is not just to know what human beings will do now, soon, and later, but to put this knowledge into use by "nudging" them toward profitable ends. The term "nudging" was introduced by the American economist and 2017 Nobel Prize laureate Richard Thaler. According to Thaler, the knowledge of human psychology allows people to be prodded to make all kinds of decisions if the options are presented to them in the right way. One example is the university cafeteria manager who wants her customers to eat healthier food (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003, p. 175). Knowing that the students do not have much time to deliberate between classes, she displays vegetables right at the entrance and puts cakes some distance away from their line of sight. With this trick, the clients of the cafeteria shifted to a healthier diet. The desired behavior resulted from the knowledge of their psychology combined with manipulation of the context in which the options were presented to them.

Zuboff discusses nudging as the central element of her concept of instrumentarian power. In general terms, power is the capacity to direct or influence the behavior of others. The Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells argues that historically there were two main types of power, namely coercive and persuasive power (Castells, 2017). The first type is body oriented. It is embodied in police and law-enforcement agencies and is exercised through instructions and prohibitions. The second type is mind oriented. It is embodied in propaganda and carried out through mind control. Instrumentarian power is neither body nor mind oriented. It does not prohibit anything, nor does it attempt to change its subjects. Instead, it operates in stealth (its subjects, for the most part, do not suspect that power is being exercised over them) and works via behavior modification. Yet, it is still power if power is understood as imposing one's will on others. The example of the students' diet clearly shows that the desired behavior resulted from the manager's will – not the will of the students.

According to Shoshana Zuboff, the digital realm has become an unprecedented playground of instrumentarian power. We live in a dense and highly saturated environment of digital devices, which continuously monitor human behavior and alter the settings in which it occurs in order to prod it to lucrative ends. The scope of behavior modification ranges from ads popping up on smartphone screens to remotely controlled machinery.

The hunt for behavioral surplus and instrumentarian power does not belong exclusively to the online world, but increasingly comes to define the physical world as well. Zuboff contends that "smart" objects, including cars, appliances, furniture, and even toys, all become means of surveillance and behavioral modification. She discusses the augmented reality game Pokémon Go, launched by Google's internal startup Niantic Labs in 2016, as an attempt to engineer human behavior on a mass scale and drive it to profitable ends. While most of its players thought it was just a "game," Pokémon Go was, in fact, a social experiment intended to lure players into facilities with Pokémons. Based on the theory of operant conditioning, introduced by the 20th century social psychologist B. F. Skinner, the servers of the game predicted what goods its players would most likely buy and made the Pokémons appear precisely at those locations. "The elements and dynamics of the game," writes Zuboff, "combined with its novel augmented-

reality technology, operate to herd populations of game players through the real-world monetization checkpoints constituted by the game's actual customers: the entities who pay to play on the real-world game board, lured by the promise of guaranteed outcomes" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 10).

Pokémon Go is only part of a bigger picture of what she calls "machine society," or "the replacement of society with machine action dictated by economic imperatives" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 7). She writes that surveillance capitalism is "the transformation of the market into a project of total certainty," into which we march "like the smart machines" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 13). Under this economic system, in which "unpredictable behavior is the equivalent of lost revenue," (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 5) choices are considered to be made not by free and rational individuals, as Adam Smith supposed in his classic views of free market economy, but by programmable, predictable, and controllable "machine-men."

Like Taylorism in the early 20th century, surveillance capitalism is consolidating as a system of interrelated economic and technological factors, in which economic interests result from specific technologies, while technologies, on their part, express economic interests. It must be noted that despite the author describing surveillance capitalism primarily as an economic system, her discussion of it extends beyond pure economics and spreads into the fields of politics, ethics, and philosophy. Just as slavery was more than an economic system, but a condition of human existence based on the denial of freedom, so surveillance capitalism is a new existential condition of non-freedom, which, unlike slavery, operates without chains, handcuffs, or even the knowledge of those whose freedom has been abrogated.

I argue that the challenges it poses to freedom are primarily ethical, because they confront the very foundations of freedom, including the concepts of privacy, autonomy, and authenticity, which I will discuss later in this article. Political, economic, and institutional changes usually affect freedom by increasing or reducing the number of ways in which people can (legally or morally) act in society. The present lockdown, for example, has significantly curtailed freedom by imposing restrictions on many actions, especially those involving face-to-face interactions. The challenge from surveillance capitalism is different, because it does not affect the range of eligible actions, but rather the capacity to act within that range. Therefore, the discussion about it revolves around the ethical and philosophical questions: What is freedom? What value does it have in human society? What is required to be free? These questions are different from the issue of how much freedom there should be in society, which is rather a legal and political one.

The age of surveillance capitalism has been warmly received by reviewers. Some critics, e.g. Kirstie Ball and Sam di Bella, argue that the author has not offered sufficient guidelines on how to mitigate the threats she described (Ball, 2019, p. 254; Di Bella, 2019). Others have underlined the lack of attention to the features of surveillance capitalism in the global South (Evangelista, 2019, p. 247), some simplification of this system's legal framework (Cohen, 2019, p. 242), and giving too little weight to the role of the state in its development (Khan, 2019, p. 737). However, all the reviewers, including the above ones, have praised the book for its deep ethical, philosophical, and sociological insights. Rafael Evangelista argues that at the heart of this piece is the defense of the ethical ideal of freedom against the encroachments of an unprecedented type of power, assisted by new technologies: "*The Age of surveillance capitalism*," he writes, "is written with the intensity of someone who wants to save a type of subjectivity of the individual, of society, and the dream of freedom that seems to vanish when facing a new type of power" (Evangelista, 2019, p. 249). Before we can proceed to the analysis of how this vanishing happens, let us establish what freedom means for Zuboff.

Shoshana Zuboff's ethical aspects of freedom

Shoshana Zuboff did not provide a single or straightforward definition of freedom. Instead, she touches on it on many occasions and in relation to the different themes in her book. I suggest

that her interpretation of freedom revolves around three different, yet interrelated, aspects; *privacy*, *autonomy*, and *authenticity*. These aspects are either directly undermined by the system of surveillance capitalism or are important from the standpoint of its development and functioning.

Freedom as privacy. In Zuboff's analysis, privacy is understood as an essential part of freedom. Although she did not provide a formal definition of privacy, I suggest that she regards it primarily as a personal space, in which an individual can be free from intrusion or overseeing by others. Such an interpretation proceeds from the central theme of her book. According to Zuboff, surveillance capitalism leads to the ongoing dwindling of personal space and the converting of human lives into behavioral data for others' profit. In particular, she discusses how different "smart" technologies, including thermostats and even toys, invade people's houses and act as spying devices, recording the lives of those who dwell inside. The understanding of privacy as the absence of intrusion from others is compatible with Isaiah Berlin's definition of negative freedom (Berlin, 1969, pp. 121–122), but Zuboff also treats privacy as a condition of freedom. She links it with the issue of knowledge possessed about a person by others. The more is known about the person, the more capacity others have in controlling, manipulating, or limiting his / her behavior. Therefore, people who have the least freedom (e.g., prisoners) also have the least privacy. This approach features primarily in her discussion of B. F. Skinner and Alex Pentland, whose views she regards as intellectual underpinnings of surveillance capitalism. These scholars deny freedom as an independent value and argue that it is inversely proportional to the growth of scientific knowledge, while advocating for ubiquitous monitoring of human activities via technologies.

Freedom as autonomy. Zuboff's interpretation of freedom is also very close to the moral ideas of Immanuel Kant. The core concept of Kant's philosophy is human autonomy, which literally means "law onto oneself." Kant argued that human understanding is "autonomous," because it is the source of the general laws of nature that construct our experience. But autonomy is also the central element of his moral philosophy, which is based on the principle of freedom. For Kant, freedom is a type of causality that belongs uniquely to rational living beings. In contrast to natural phenomena, which are subject to deterministic causality, Kant argued that human beings possess an "uncaused cause," which is not subordinate to the deterministic laws of nature. This "uncaused cause" proceeds from the "noumenal Self" within a person and underlies his / her transcendental ability to choose any action (or inaction), even though a plethora of empirical factors (desires, needs, fears, preferences, etc.) may play on their mind at any moment. Kant formulated moral law, which guides freedom, in the famous maxims of his categorical imperative. The categorical imperative facilitates freedom by recognizing its universality and respecting all people as fundamentally valuable "ends in themselves." In Section 3 of his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, the philosopher argued that despite human freedom of will not being able to be proven empirically, it nevertheless must be postulated, because without it we would not be able to make sense of moral appraisal and responsibility (Kant, 1997, p. 55).

I suggest that Shoshana Zuboff's interpretation of freedom is Kantian because she claims that surveillance capitalism undermines human autonomy and treats human beings basically as commodities. A key principle of this economic system is that digital footprints, which people leave behind as they interact with digital devices, hold clues to their innermost Selves. It is also postulated that by studying these footprints it is possible to manipulate their behavior and steer them to profitable ends. Therefore, surveillance capitalism rejects the crucial Kantian tenet of transcendental "noumenal Self" and regards human beings rather as Humean "bundles of sensations," whose resultant force determines their actions at any moment and which can be manipulated for others' sake. Zuboff argues that human beings possess not only the capacity of *will*, but also a more abstract faculty of *will to will*, which she defines as "the inner act that

secures us as autonomous beings who project choice into the world and exercise the qualities of self-determining moral judgment" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 9). This definition approximates the Kantian notion of "noumenal Self," which confers upon persons their moral worth. Because we have this capacity, we are also entitled to what she calls "the right to the future tense" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 11). Surveillance capitalism, which attempts to predict human behavior and put these predictions into use, robs people of their future and shifts control over it from "I will" to "You will." From the Kantian perspective, this shift can be interpreted as a substitution of the domain of freedom, based on the moral law, with the domain of nature, which is based on cause-and-effect relationships and, thus, is deterministic, foreseeable, controllable, and subject to ownership and instrumental use. Throughout her book, Zuboff repeatedly claims that Internet users under surveillance capitalism are stripped of their moral worth and treated as a source of raw material for data mining. She also frequently argues that they have become "a means to other's commercial ends," which I see as a reference to Immanuel Kant's second formulation of categorical imperative (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 16). It must be remarked that Zuboff has made no claim whether or not freedom of will exists, but she postulates it as a vantage point, from which to criticize the project of surveillance capitalism. Thus, she espouses the Kantian idea that human autonomy is the source of morality, which surveillance capitalism blatantly rejects.

Freedom as authenticity. Zuboff's interpretation of freedom has one more aspect, which goes back to the legacy of Romanticism. The understanding of freedom as authenticity, pioneered by Jean Jacques Rousseau, Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and other figures of European Romanticism, emphasizes the idea that people have unique identities, which must be respected and cultivated. From this viewpoint, freedom is the ability to live one's authentic life and express oneself in unique and genuine ways. In his work *The ethics of authenticity*, Charles Taylor described this ideal as "a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live in this way, and not of anyone else's. If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me" (Taylor, 1992, pp. 28–29).

According to Zuboff, this dimension of freedom became prominent in the historic period known as the "first modernity." Around two centuries ago, the strict regimentation of human lives by the norms of traditional societies began to unravel, and people gradually obtained freedom to choose their lifestyles and identities for themselves. Despite the "first modernity" formally freeing men and women from once relentless social norms and roles, it simultaneously created new ones. Mass production, sprawling bureaucracies, political ideologies, and all-powerful states suppressed the Self and trapped it in a cold and calculating social system, which Max Weber called the "iron cage." In the 1960s, according to Zuboff, the Western world arrived on the "second modernity," in which "the Self is all we have" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 2). It was no coincidence that the digital revolution concurred with this historical period. People turned to new technologies, because they offered "new ways to amplify their voices and forge their own chosen patterns of connection" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 2). Thanks to them, we can foster our authentic ways of life: connect with like-minded people, cultivate our profiles on Facebook and Instagram, express ourselves via Tweets and weblogs, subscribe to our favorite YouTube channels, and do many other things, which express our unique personalities. Freedom as authenticity seems to thrive in the age of the smartphone. Yet, in a paradoxical manner, this freedom serves as a touchstone for the development of surveillance capitalism, which I will consider later in the text.

These three aspects – privacy, autonomy, and authenticity – constitute the bottom line of Shoshana Zuboff's consideration of freedom. Historically, there were different social and political systems that deprived people of their freedom. Totalitarian regimes, slavery, and fanatical theocracies are the first to come to mind. Yet, surveillance capitalism is different from them because it does not operate through violence. In the systems I have just mentioned,

violence produced resistance, which eventually led to its downfall. However, violence and terror are not the only ways to take away human freedom. In surveillance capitalism, the operational role of violence is replaced by seduction, obsession, delusion, pleasure, and the promise of happiness, making this system closer to Huxley than to Orwell. In the next part of the article, I will consider several ethical challenges to freedom in the framework of surveillance capitalism.

The challenges to freedom under surveillance capitalism

Just as the reader will not find a single definition of the concept of freedom in *The age of surveillance capitalism*, he will also not encounter a straightforward list of threats to it. The author touches on them on many occasions while discussing different aspects of this new power leviathan. Therefore, it is necessary to summarize these challenges in the same way as we did regarding the meaning of freedom. To do it, I will take up Zuboff's schema of surveillance capitalism as a conceptual framework. I will not repeat her arguments, but I will attempt to show what challenges accrue from this conceptual framework in a more abstract way. Above I have listed three crucial aspects of freedom: privacy, autonomy, and authenticity. These aspects will also serve as touchstones by which I will interpret the challenges to it.

Challenge to freedom as privacy. According to David Shoeman, privacy "protects social freedom by limiting scrutiny by others and the control some of them have over our lives" (Shoeman, 1992, p. 7). Behavioral surplus, the crucial element of surveillance capitalism, runs against privacy and, *ipso facto*, freedom. The more information about an individual and his daily routine is incorporated into a prediction model, the more accurately this model will forecast his actions and manipulate his behavior. Manuel Castells argues that privacy has become a new "currency," with which the users pay for their supposedly "free" online services:

> Everybody is transformed into data. We are all data and these data are key commodities. The data are at the basis of all the major Internet companies, including Google and others. You are not paying for the service, but you are paying with your data. You are the currency (Castells, 2017).

The bargain whereby someone is paying with his privacy to get something in return is Faustian in nature. Doctor Faust was the protagonist of the 16th century German legend who sold his soul to the Devil, exchanging it for knowledge and worldly delights. Since then, the term "Faustian pact" has been used to describe a bargain whereby a person trades something of supreme moral or spiritual importance for some of worldly or material benefit. Zuboff quotes a new app-based approach to lending as a particularly vivid example of such a pact. According to this approach, a prospective tenant receives a demand from her potential landlord to grant full access to all her social media websites and smartphone activity. This data is then processed by analytical software, which predicts the likelihood of payment default based on such factors as, for example, when and how often she returns phone calls, charges her battery, or how many miles she travels every day (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 5). Although she must formally consent to such a humiliating inspection, those with less money have nothing to do but to accept the deal.

In this case, the motivation to give up one's privacy proceeds from desperation. However, surveillance capitalism exploits a wide range of human emotions to tap into privacy, including amusement, curiosity, pleasure, and others. You can take an online quiz or download an app from Google's Play Market and use it at no cost, but only if you grant access to your contacts, photos, browsing history, geolocation, and other sources of behavioral information. These so-called "surveillance assets" have become so valuable that it is profitable to distribute digital products, including apps and software, very cheaply or for free just to use them as bait for a person's information.

In the past, everybody had a degree of privacy because there were limits to what technologies could do. Today, due to electronic rendition of virtually all aspects of human experience, decreased privacy and increased control have become two sides of the same coin. Since human lives have largely become computer-mediated, they are being rendered as information. This information, however, does not belong to them. It is being annexed by the companies behind worldwide digitalization, which use it for their corporate goals. Zuboff illustrates how electronic information could be used for social control with the following example.

In the 1980s, scientists who worked at a pharmaceutical company, to which she refers as the "Drug Corp," developed a precursor of today's social media, named DIALOG. It was an early computer conferencing system, which allowed employees to communicate with each other via electronic text. At first, the scientists embraced the new technology and began using it not only for their professional but also for private conversations. Eventually, they discovered that their managers scrutinized every piece of information they shared on DIALOG and had to face some unpleasant consequences. "In a series of conflicts that unfolded over the years," she writes, "I watched as the managers and executives at Drug Corp were simply unable to quell their inclination to use the new social text as a means to evaluate, critique, and punish" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 9).

Today, billions of people in the world render their lives electronically, while just a handful of companies behind this worldwide digitalization possess an unprecedented ability to oversee and control their actions. The example of Drug Corp is especially expressive today when even more human activities have moved into the digital realm because of the global pandemic. Many employees work remotely and are compelled to use those digital tools, which are prescribed by their bosses. In Ukraine, university departments urge lecturers to use platforms that retain their communications with the students, such as Microsoft Teams, as opposed to those giving more privacy, like Zoom. As a result, there is less freedom of speech and more control from university regulatory bodies. I believe that, in many cases, there will be a temptation to retain these systems of control even after the end of the pandemic.

It should be noted, however, that surveillance corporations have different goals in mind than the managers of Drug Corp. While DIALOG has become a kind of Foucault's panopticon, intended to produce a self-policing and self-censoring individual, the corporations do not intend to punish their audiences, but rather to "hijack" and shepherd them to lucrative ends. I see this hijacking as the next ethical challenge to freedom, namely to freedom as autonomy, which I will discuss next.

It is appropriate to mention, though, that not everybody agrees that the contract whereby privacy is exchanged for something else is "Faustian" by nature. James Bridle, for example, criticizes Zuboff's claim that companies "usurp," "hijack," or "appropriate" people's rights to privacy and self-control. He argues that "people are very willing to give up their private information in return for perceived benefits such as ease of use, navigation and access to friends and information" (Bridle, 2019). In his opinion, this form of *quid pro quo* is not essentially different from virtually every transaction on the market, and he personally does not seem to find unmitigated legal or ethical troubles accruing from it. I would side with Zuboff, though. Despite people being willing to give up their privacy in exchange for some benefit *now*, they will not be able to control how their information will be used in the future. Market transactions provide for the possibility of product or payment withdrawal, however, it is impossible to withdraw private information once it has been disclosed to someone.

Challenge to freedom as autonomy. Based on Zuboff, I suggest that this challenge happens in the context of the so-called "machine society." The formation of such a society is a bilateral process whereby human beings become machinelike, while machines, on their part, increasingly come to govern human lives. I believe that Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy provides a valuable framework to assess freedom in the context of the "machine society."

James Bridle, the British journalist whom I have mentioned above, illustrates the experience of living in such a society:

> The alarm beside your bed rings, triggered by an event in your calendar. The smart thermostat in your bedroom, sensing your motion, turns on the hot water and reports your movements to a central database. News updates ping your phone, with your daily decision whether to click on them or not carefully monitored, and parameters adjusted accordingly. How far and where your morning run takes you, the conditions of your commute, the contents of your text messages, the words you speak in your own home and your actions beneath all-seeing cameras, the contents of your shopping basket, your impulse purchases, your speculative searches and choices of dates and mates – all recorded, rendered as data, processed, analyzed, bought, bundled, and resold like sub-prime mortgages (Bridle, 2019).

Perhaps, I would enjoy living in an environment which has been carefully adapted to serve my daily desires and needs. Maybe I would have done all those routine actions myself, so what is ethically wrong in the fact that these corporations had anticipated my choices and deprived me of some little inconveniency? Zuboff's answer is that such a society would take away the key component of human freedom, namely the autonomous capacity to make conscious decisions based on one's internal "will to will." Unlike animals, humans do not only will things (for example, food or mating partners), but also the will itself. The concept of "will to will" closely resembles the Kantian "uncaused cause," which resides within the "noumenal Self" and confers upon human beings their moral worth. Thanks to this capacity, we belong to the moral "realm of freedom" and not to the deterministic "realm of nature." Zuboff argues that the goal of surveillance capitalism is "not to destroy us but simply to author us and to profit from that authorship." "There is no violence here," she contends, "only the steady displacement of the will to will that has been expressed in the first person voice, and nourished in the kind of sanctuary that depends upon the possibility of private life and the promise of public freedom" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 11).

It is necessary to emphasize the different nature of the challenges to human freedom, proceeding from surveillance capitalism and "classic" authoritarian systems of power. The latter systems try to subdue the Self through violence. However, even under the most repressive regimes, the Self is still present, although shackled by fear and crippled by indoctrination. Instead, the actions "co-authored" by surveillance capitalists, are no longer determined by the Self. Imagine an authoritarian regime whose leaders bully its citizens to vote for a pro-government candidate. Now conceive that they simply "nudge" them to support that candidate via ubiquitous behavior modification technology. In the words of Chris Wiley, the whistleblower of Cambridge Analytica, the second scenario is worse: "I think it is worse than bullying, because people don't necessarily know it's being done to them. At least, bullying respects the agency of people" (Cadwalladr, 2018). Alex, the protagonist of Anthony Burgess's dystopian novel (and Stanley Kubrick's iconic movie) *A Clockwork Orange*, is an example of a person whose Self has been "hijacked" through behavioral modification. The title of this piece reveals what type of beings we become in the "machine society" – not autonomous and self-conscious agents, but programmable and predictable "clockwork" entities.

The other part of the bilateral process whereby the "machine society" is constituted is the consolidation of machine agency and its power over human beings. The more we enter into a world where humans are replaced with machine action, the less room there is for freedom. According to Kant, there is no freedom in the realm of nature, or "things" more broadly. You cannot negotiate with gravity or blame the laws of physics for a broken leg. Human laws, on the contrary, can be changed and are subject to moral evaluation. If there is a contradiction between the supreme law of morality – the categorical imperative – and human norms, we, as

free beings, must act based on the former rather than the latter. Helping the Jews was not legal in the Third Reich. Thousands of them were saved by people of good will who disobeyed orders, risked their lives, and acted in accordance with their innermost principle of moral freedom. There would not have been even a single rescue, however, if the Third Reich had been a "machine society." Had robots executed Nazi commands, none of them would disobey orders, sympathize with their victims, or feel remorse.

Surveillance capitalism exists in the context of the "machine society," or the vast architecture of interconnected and remotely operated devices pre-loaded with hardwired instructions and commands that come to replace humans in an increasing number of spheres. As it happens, freedom gradually becomes expelled from society and replaced by the ruthless determinism of machine action. Zuboff provides an example to illustrate this point.

Pat and Stanford Kipping were an elderly couple from Belleville, Illinois, who could not afford to pay $95 leasing fee for their 1998 Buick. Jim Ford, a local repo man, was sent to retrieve their vehicle. Once he arrived, the Kippings invited him in for tea and shared their story. They told Ford that they had missed their payment because they had to buy medicine. Ford was so heartbroken that he waived his repossession fees and volunteered to pay the couple's debt. His response to their misfortune was deeply humane. To act humanly means sometimes to deviate from the determinism of the instruction and heed to one's conscience and moral feelings. Suppose, now, that the car had been pre-installed with a program that would have automatically disabled it in case of delay in payment. Imagine, also, a self-driving vehicle, instructed to drive to a penalty area on its own. Unlike humans, machines would execute any command with which they were programmed. They cannot be invited in for tea and arguing with them is as pointless as arguing with gravity. In a society dominated by machine action there will be less freedom and more of ruthless and implacable necessity.

The view, according to which a person is seen not as a free and moral subject, but as a deterministic automaton whose behavior can be manipulated and changed, has deep roots in Western philosophy, going back to La Mettrie's *L'Homme machine* [Man a machine] (1747). More recently, it was adopted by the American social psychologist B. F. Skinner whom Zuboff describes as an intellectual precursor of surveillance capitalism. In 1971, Skinner published his controversial book *Beyond freedom & dignity,* in which he rejected the notions of "freedom" and "dignity" as antiscientific, obscure, and obsolete terms. According to Vasil Gluchman, "it is important to emphasize that the very title of *Beyond freedom and dignity* is provocative. It shows the author's fundamental rejection of what he characterizes as traditional literature about freedom and dignity, which shaped the idea of an autonomous person" (Gluchman, 2001, p. 260). In Skinner's view, human behavior is only quantitatively different from the behavior of the rats running through mazes, which he studied in his experiments. He argued that human choices are dictated by a variety of empirical causes beyond their control and recognition and believed that crimes, wars, poverty, drugs, etc., happen because people nourish the belief in freedom and resist the attempts to understand what truly motivates their behavior. Instead, they should reject this ancient "illusion" and submit themselves to a caste of dispassionate scientists and administrators:

> Science does not dehumanize man, it de-homunculizes him, and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of the human species. To man qua man we readily say good riddance. Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real causes of human behavior. Only then can we turn from the inferred to the observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessible to the manipulable (Skinner, 1976, p. 196).

Before the digital age, it was unclear how behavior modification could be used beyond small, controlled environments. An attempt to adapt Skinner's views to modern circumstances has been made by Alex Pentland, an American computer scientist and entrepreneur with degrees in

computer science and psychology. In his books *Honest signals* (2010) and *Social physics* (2015), he wrote that for the first time in history "we will have the data required to really know ourselves and understand how society evolves" (Pentland, 2014, p. 19). Thanks to Big Data, everything will become predictable and automated – traffic, energy, crimes, infections, political opinions, etc. Big Data, which he calls "the God's eye view," will put an end to the age of "darkness" of mankind. As he writes in *Social physics*,

> Big data give us a chance to view society in all its complexity, through the millions of networks of person-to-person exchanges. If we had a "god's eye," an all-seeing view, then we could potentially arrive at a true understanding of how society works and take steps to fix our problems (Pentland, 2014, p. 11).

Any revolution – and this is definitely a revolution – requires toppling the idols of the past. Like Skinner, Pentland believes that in order to submit ourselves to "the God's eye view," we must stop worshipping the "fetishes" of freedom, privacy, and individuality. A free and sovereign individual, according to Zuboff, has been "an achievement carved from millennia of human suffering and sacrifice. Instead, Pentland brushes it aside as just another debugging of humanity's computer code, a much needed upgrade to the outdated software that is the long human story" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 15).

It must be emphasized that the parallel with religion in Pentland's quotation does not seem accidental. In Abrahamic religions, God is an omniscient and omnipotent authority. In the Old Testament, he acted in history to achieve his divine plans. In particular, he inflicted ten plagues on Egypt (Exodus 7-11), opened the Red Sea before the Israelites (Exodus 15), and stopped the sun to allow Joshua to win the battle (Joshua 10). These episodes from the Bible can be interpreted as examples of divine "nudging," or the manipulation of contexts to shape the outcomes of behavior, which happens within those contexts. A verse from the Bible also surprisingly illustrates the type of knowledge surveillance capitalism aspires to achieve: "Even before a word is on my tongue, behold, O Lord, you know it altogether" (Psalm 139: 4).

Historically, there have been attempts to secularize the archetype of divine power. For example, Julie Jespersen et al. argue that "with the [Foucault–Bentham] panopticon, God's eye was transformed into a secular context" (Jespersen et al., 2007, p. 112). Richard Hardt and Antonio Negri also contend that just as it is impossible to escape "the eye of God" in religion, the "contemporary control knows no outside. Whereas earlier forms of control had limits, barriers, insides and outsides, postmodern control is an ou-topia, or no-place, formed through circuits of movement" (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 190). Surveillance capitalism seems to continue these endeavors. However, despite the power of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition being absolute and unbounded, it also exalts the human being and endows him / her with freedom, dignity, and moral responsibility. Freedom and morality exist precisely because there *is* the ultimate source power, which is God. No morality, however, arises from surveillance capitalism (even the crooked one of the last century's ideologies), which rejects the idea of autonomous person.

Paradoxically, in order to exist, this sociotechnical system requires freedom, but it creates only an illusion of it, which is subverted at the very moment it comes into being. To illustrate this point, let me move to the last ethical challenge to it, namely to freedom as authenticity.

Challenge to freedom as authenticity. As it has been said, this aspect of freedom highlights the right of human beings to emphasize their personhood, foster their unique ways of living, and express themselves in genuine ways. Surveillance capitalism seemingly welcomes this freedom. Whereas privacy, in the words of Mark Zuckerberg, "is no longer a social norm" (Johnson, 2010), and autonomy, according to Alex Pentland, is an illusion inversely proportional to the growth of knowledge, the titans of surveillance capitalism, including Google and Facebook, pretend to be the advocates of authenticity. The so-called "Californian

Ideology,"espoused, in part, by the Silicon Valley tycoons, is imbued with the counter-cultural attitudes of the 1960s, which advocate diversity and equality. According to Zuboff, surveillance capitalism rose against the backdrop of the shift from the masses to the individual. The explosive commercial success of consumer electronics companies, such as Microsoft and Apple, was largely due to their tapping "into a new society of individuals and their demand for individualized consumption" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 2). The target audience of these companies were "second modernity" individuals who sought the means of self-expression and emphasizing their unique identities.

Surveillance capitalism encourages individual self-expression and widely distributes technological means for this end. Yet, it also hunts for behavioral data and attempts to control individuals who are mostly unaware that their apps and devices are infested with different kinds of tracking accessories. The paradox of authenticity is that the more people use digital tools for communication and self-expression, the more "digital crumbs" they leave behind, which are used to treat them essentially like marionettes subject to different configurations of behavioral nudges and cues. Thus, according to Zuboff, "the precise moment at which our needs are met is also the precise moment at which our lives are plundered for behavioral data, and all for the sake of others' gain. The result is a perverse amalgam of empowerment inextricably layered with diminishment" (Zuboff, 2019, chapter 2).

This obvious paradox, in my opinion, can be interpreted as the illusion of freedom, emphasized by Fyodor Dostoyevsky. In his novel *The Brothers Karamazov*, namely the famous *Grand Inquisitor* part, we encounter a passage that surprisingly resonates with the central theme of Shoshana Zuboff's book:

> People are more persuaded than ever that they have perfect freedom, yet they have brought their freedom to us and laid it humbly at our feet. "I don't understand again." Alyosha broke in. "Is he ironical, is he jesting?" "Not a bit of it! He claims it as a merit for himself and his Church that at last they have vanquished freedom and have done so to make men happy. 'For now' (he is speaking of the Inquisition, of course) 'for the first time it has become possible to think of the happiness of men'" (Dostoyevsky).

All the great abandonment of freedom that Zuboff writes about happens because people get something in return – something that makes their lives more comfortable, convenient, pleasurable, and enjoyable, in short, brings them "happiness." People lay their freedom "humbly" at the "feet" of surveillance capitalists, because they make them "happy" by offering countless opportunities to entertain themselves, appease their desires, and serve their needs, including apps, quizzes, mobile phone games, funny pictures, movies, communication, navigation, and all sorts of useful contraptions.

Today, in the words of Dostoyevsky, people have all the reasons to be "more persuaded than ever that they have perfect freedom." Thanks to digital technologies, they have been liberated from the constraints of time, space, borders, and institutions. I can communicate with persons thousands of miles away on Skype, Facebook, and Gmail. I can visit places on the other side of the planet thanks to Google Street View. If something happens anywhere in the world, I will know about it immediately thanks to Twitter. All the while, YouTube, Netflix, and Pinterest offer myriad ways to entertain myself without even the need to go somewhere. All I need to get these wonderful opportunities is a device at a price most people can afford. Isn't it a "perfect freedom"? It would be if it was rooted in autonomy and protected by privacy. Without them, however, the same things that empower individuals simultaneously subdue them. This can be interpreted as an example of Hegel's dialectics, or a thesis-antithesis union: We have these historically unprecedented means of controlling minds and behavior precisely because there is this equally unprecedented freedom. In the industrial age, the same technological advancements that made people freer, compared with the agrarian age (e.g., trains, automobiles, airplanes,

radio, telegraph), were also used to subdue them, resulting in a system of totalitarian domination, which none of the despots of the ancient world could dream about. Anatoliy Karas argues that the "civic order" of social relationships, which respects the autonomy and dignity of persons, has evolved around the "identification of the meaning of individual freedom and the displacement of the institutions of subordination" (Karas, 2003, p. 11). From this viewpoint, surveillance capitalism is a pushback into the relationships of "subordination,"[2] which treat human beings rather as tools than ends-in-themselves. Zygmunt Bauman wrote that our time is marked by "the yawning gap between the right of self-assertion and the capacity to control the social settings which render such self-assertion feasible." In his opinion, "it is from that abysmal gap that the most poisonous effluvia contaminating the lives of contemporary individuals emanate" (Bauman, 2000, pp. 38–39).

Perhaps, the Grand Inquisitor was right, and a "happy" life is indeed more valuable than a "free" life. I will not try to overturn this claim (and even if I wished, I do not know how). I will just quote Yuval Noah Harari who argues that the "freedom vs happiness" dilemma is perhaps more relevant now than it has ever been before, and we are approaching the moment when we will have to choose one of the "horns" of this dilemma – both individually, and collectively: "You might be perfectly happy ceding all authority to the algorithms and trusting them to decide things for you and for the rest of the world. If so, just relax and enjoy the ride. You don't need to do anything about it. The algorithms will take care of everything. If, however, you want to retain some control of your personal existence and of the future of life, you have to run faster than the algorithms, faster than Amazon and the government, and get to know yourself before they do" (Harari, 2018, chapter 19).

Conclusion

Since the onset of the global pandemic, Shoshana Zuboff's ideas about "surveillance capitalism" have become even more insightful. The amount of physical interactions between people has dropped dramatically, giving way mostly to computer-mediated communications. This potentially can give a big boost to the burgeoning practices of nudging, behavior surplus extraction, and surveillance via digital means. It is possible that many of these systems of control will be retained even after the end of the pandemic. The year 2020 also showed that people can surprisingly easily agree to the reduction of their rights if there is an existential threat, such the virus. Locked in their homes, they can become defenseless before the encroaching leviathan, especially if security, rather than liberty, will be the next political agenda for the coming decade.

However, *can* does not mean *will*. I find Shoshana Zuboff's *The age of surveillance capitalism* a wonderful depiction of the future that *can* come true if no action is be taken to prevent it. From this viewpoint, despite her book being academic in nature, it is also close to the dystopian novels of Aldous Huxley, George Orwell, Anthony Burgess, Philip Dick, Yevgeny Zamyatin, and other authors who amplified and projected into the future the socio-technical trends of their time.

Legal and political action must be taken to avert the further materialization of surveillance capitalism. Perhaps the surveillance capitalists will be mandated by law to grant access to their data assets, and the users will be able to customize their profiles, used for ad targeting, for themselves. Maybe, the "surveillance assets" of Big Tech companies will be transformed into a kind of joint-stock company, in which users will be like shareholders, and the companies will lose their exclusive monopoly over the monetization of their private information. In any case, such an action must be preceded by the awareness that the system of surveillance capitalism is ethically wrong.

[2] Historical examples of such relationships include slavery, feudalism, racial and gender discrimination, etc.

Individual freedom has been the crucial ethical value in the West for centuries and remains so today. It is the cornerstone, against which people set up their policies to adapt to ever-changing political, economic, and technological settings. By putting freedom in the center, we can make sure that the power of man over nature and his fellow beings, which has been greatly extended by modern technologies, will serve the human being rather than someone's egoistic ambitions. Thus, we must be aware of the ethical threats to it in the digital age. The author of this article hopes that it may contribute to this awareness.

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Stoic pragmatist ethics in the time of pandemic

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Abstract

The present paper is a response, of sorts, to the challenges of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID) and lockdown that we all must face. We have an idea of what doctors, nurses, teachers, among many of the other professions, do for the general public, but one may ask whether there is something substantial that philosophers and ethicists can offer in these circumstances. The thesis of this paper is that the stoic attitude towards times of trouble and the pragmatist way of finding out what is possible to elevate the quality of living against all odds, if skilfully interwoven, could be an important tool in keeping mental health in good shape and, additionally, could contribute to the cultural scene at large. If this is the case, stoic pragmatists can indeed offer an interesting example of practical philosophy for many audiences, especially during the pandemic lockdown and, perhaps, for other serious difficulties or problems. To be effective in delivering their message, stoic pragmatists, as most with philosophers today, should enrich their textual and oral modes of traditional transmission of knowledge and become digital-culture public intellectuals that can recognize and reach more general audiences by, among other things, visual modes of digital communication.

Keywords: stoic pragmatism, ethics, pandemic, digital culture

Stoic ethics and pragmatist ethics: Any points in common?

There must be something exceptional in Stoic ethics (in this text, capital "S" refers to the historical Stoicism, small "s" to its contemporary trajectories, and "SP" to stoic pragmatism). It is as if there were an invariable lode of wisdom within the orientation that has stood the test of time. It has had a continuing relevance long after its classic representatives died, and long after their ideas reappeared in medieval Christianity and the Renaissance. In the modern age, it has been inspirational even when deprived of some of its original metaphysical ingredients. Recent decades have not been that much different. There have been numerous scholarly studies (Irvine, 2009; Brouwer, 2014; Holiday, 2016; Pigliucci, 2017) that have assumed the general name of *New Stoicism* or *Modern Stoicism*. One of the principal figures of this movement, Lawrence Becker, interprets Stoic themes from a contemporary perspective as if Stoicism has had a continuous history up to the present, and that some of its themes have developed according to the successive developments of physics, logic, and ethics (Becker, 1998/2017, pp. xii–xiii). At the same time, some elements of Stoic ethics are incorporated into different contemporary contexts that lie outside of academia: business, coaching, leadership, mental hygiene, and many other enterprises and platforms. Numerous blogs and websites dedicated to Stoicism that can be found on the Internet testify to this. The question arises how one can adapt Stoic teaching into contexts of our present situation, scantily metaphysical and with so much of it secularized and commercialized. Becker answers that a part of Stoic ethics, in opposition to Stoic cosmology and theology, can be easily adapted nowadays, if "appropriately restated". He even claims that "Stoic virtue ethics could have remained largely the same" as would the idea of "living in accord with nature" and other central doctrines of historical Stoicism (Becker, 1998/2017, p. xiii).

Interestingly enough, there have also been attempts to merge Stoicism with the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism in recent years. Frank McLynn (2009) in his biography of Marcus Aurelius, writes about Marcus's pragmatic approach to public works and generally takes Stoicism as a primitive version of pragmatism. Ethically speaking, he claims, "Stoicism

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was a primitive form of pragmatism, in that one knew in advance that the value of duty would always overrule that of pleasure, and strenuous virtue that of lazy indolence or apathy" (McLynn, 2009, p. xvi). From the political angle, he describes Marcus as a "political pragmatist" (McLynn, 2009, p. 185) and offers a more general comparison: "Pragmatism in the U.S.A. functions as an ideological 'support' for the social and political system, just as Stoicism did in Roman society (...). Stoicism and pragmatism are both 'imperial' ideologies, both suited to world powers at the moment of their greatest dominance" (McLynn, 2009, pp. xiv–xv).

Stoic pragmatism (SP), which I address below, embodies the ambition to be a more developed version of interpreting these two philosophical traditions from the point of view of their common individual and public aims. That pragmatism emphasizes the social context of the individual life is no surprise given the abundant efforts of some its classical figures (G. H. Mead, John Dewey, Sidney Hook) to examine this relation and stress the social and cultural impact on the individual. The Stoics, however, have a notorious reputation in popular circles of having been egocentric individuals indifferent to what happened around them. Yet, they did refer to social contexts and some of the basic ideas of their doctrine (*oikeiosis*, *kosmopolites*) have a strong social-ethical character. Some Stoics held public responsibilities and referred to the social aspects of their purposive actions, in the strong sense of Marcus Aurelius's claim that "rational beings exist for one another" (Marcus Aurelius, book IV, chapter 3). Hence, the temptation for the stoic pragmatists to wed these two sources together and put forward a concept that would focus on meaningful life individually and, at the same time, strengthening it by giving it a public and cultural significance.

What is Stoic pragmatist ethics?

The term *stoic pragmatism* was coined by the Hungarian-American philosopher John Lachs (2005; 2012; 2014a; Skowroński, 2018), as a theory and practice of the good life both in individual, social, and cultural contexts. The present text, as well as some others (Skowroński, 2020a; 2020b) complement and develop Lachs's initial idea, and the reasons why I want to do it are the following: It seems to me that our (my own and Lachs's) Eastern-European post-Communist sensitivity renders us similar on two points. First of all, to have experienced what it means to have very little is an excellent way to appreciate what the wealthy, liberal West can offer, even during dire crises. Secondly, this appreciation needs to be assisted by learning how to use this wealth and liberty, intelligently and in an enjoyable manner, rather than to complain about not having more.

SP has two principal philosophical sources of inspiration. The first is American pragmatism, especially James, Dewey, Royce, and Santayana, whose links with pragmatism are detectable at some points. The second is the philosophy of Stoicism, especially the ethics of the Roman Stoics: Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, who in some places "is indistinguishable from a pragmatist" (Lachs, 2012, p. 47), and Cicero who, fundamentally, was more a sympathizer of Stoicism and an elaborate articulator of its ideas rather than an authentic Stoic philosopher. In his own works, Lachs reduces the whole tradition of Stoic philosophy to its later, Roman, version in which, as in the pragmatism of James and Dewey, metaphysics was much less pronounced than ethics: "The heart of stoicism is its ethics, not its metaphysics or epistemology" (Lachs, 2014a, p. 203). Despite many unquestionable discrepancies between these two important, yet historically distant, philosophical traditions, an effort to "enrich and complete each other" (Lachs, 2012, p. 5) finds its justification in providing "a better attitude to life than either of the two views alone" (Lachs, 2012, p. 42). As a result, "Stoic pragmatists believe that intelligent effort can make life longer and better. At the same time, they acknowledge human limits and show themselves ready to surrender gracefully when all efforts at amelioration fail" (Lachs, 2014a, p. 206).

Stoic pragmatists hope that if we interpret pragmatically some of the Stoic ideas (which are also Hellenistic on some points) that refer to the good and meaningful life, and practically weave them into contemporary contexts, that they make it possible to help us recognize our own sense of agency in a more effective way, and this in order to increase our sense of the quality of our lives, which is also one of the ways to ameliorate social life. For example, "The most notable feature of pragmatists is their commitment to bring life under intelligent and effective human control" (Lachs, 2012, p. 44). This does not differ much from the Stoics, at least in using a rational selection of things and actions that help them control the self and become self-sufficient. Becker also, as already mentioned, has indicated that, for modern stoicism, rational agency "is a defining feature of mature human consciousness" (Becker, 1998/2017, p. 13).

We could anticipate that if such an attitude towards life were to become a more popular stance, it could lead to an amelioration of social life, and a modification of culture in a variety of ways. The assumption for this claim being that a way to make social and cultural life better is through the moral and cultural betterment of the members of the group; in the same way, the betterment of institutions can be achieved by the betterment of the members of these institutions, and the term "betterment" in SP means, among other things, individually assuming a *better attitude* (more effective) in reference to such aims as the quality of life and its meaningfulness in various contexts. Dealing with the coronavirus pandemic lockdown is one of such contexts, and on this point, I update Lachs's original idea of SP. In the context of a pandemic, the principal idea of SP would be to use these two philosophical sources so as to form a sort of approach toward life by strengthening the individuals and giving them a more efficient orientation toward their current situation, and more optimal ways of self-development against all odds.

SP is an open project in the sense that it pursues factual improvement in the quality of life for living individuals, rather than a new theory about such improvement. It hopes to do it by showing, explaining, and encouraging better *attitudes* towards life among various audiences, despite divergent cultural norms and clashing values. SP abandons "the research/discovery paradigm of philosophy" as "wrongheaded and unproductive" (Lachs, 2012, p. 21) and focuses on the expansion of philosophy beyond the practices of academic circles out into the open public. Stoic pragmatists should be instrumental in giving (and justifying) the patterns and strategies of the good life, be they individual, social, or cultural, yet they do not and cannot *solve* problems in a scientific or political way. Stoic pragmatism does not and cannot solve the problem of the pandemic, yet it can help us think about what to do during a difficult time. More generally, it is hardly possible to overcome problems that are out of our reach, yet we can optimize our efforts within what is possible, according to Santayana's general claim that "survival is something impossible: but it is possible to have lived and died well" (Santayana, 1951/1995, p. 210).

SP should promote philosophy understood as a guide to life for many audiences rather than a methodologically coherent set of theories for a limited circle of experts. There are even places in which Lachs uses, as did the Stoics, the analogy between medicine (treatment of the body) and philosophy (treatment of the soul). On the other hand, the present hyper-professionalization of science-oriented philosophical research that makes philosophy look abstract and superfluous for the general public is Lachs's main criticism of contemporary philosophy and seems to be the main reason why he proposes his idea to wider audiences. SP can be seen as, at least partially, a result of Lachs's critical assessment of American pragmatism. Especially, that it was pragmatism that announced a transformative model of doing philosophy as a practical amelioration of society and its culture. However, it has failed to do so by having become entangled in a web of meticulous analyses of abstract puzzles. Having been unable to offer an adequate attitude towards life, it requires "a stoic correction" (Lachs, 2012, p. 56), that would

make pragmatism more practical and action-oriented and more widely audience-oriented. Despite *praxis* being announced as the central theme in pragmatism it is, in fact, the *idea of praxis* or the *theory of praxis* that is discussed most profoundly in the pragmatist camp. Despite James's moral message to evoke "energies of men" as well as Dewey's appeal to deal with the problems of people rather than those of philosophers, a great part of the work that pragmatists take on deals with exchanging views about theoretical issues among professors and candidates for professorships within academic institutions. This combination of theorizing and elitism has resulted in abstract hairsplitting presented in sophisticated argot barely understood by anyone outside of academia and having little impact on the cultural world. Whereby, if members of the public should need or hope for anything from philosophers at all, it is not new theories rendered in technical language about problems that hardly anyone outside of academia would see as important. As a consequence, we witness a growing abyss between philosophy and wider audiences for whom philosophers and their work seem both abstract and irrelevant. It is not the fault of these audiences, but that of the philosophers themselves because they seem not to care or forget that "philosophy becomes marginalized only when it distances itself from the problems of life" (Lachs, 2003, p. 11). At this very moment, the coronavirus pandemic is the existential problem that philosophers, stoic pragmatists or not, should address and come to grips with.

Stoic pragmatist diagnosis of contemporary Western culture

The term "diagnosis" is not used here to claim that Western culture is ill, but to show SP's therapeutic ambitions in identifying problematic contexts, such as the pandemic for example, and convert them into challenges while suggesting a possible "treatment", or a possible way out in the form of appropriate actions, of which I write below. At the same time, the phrase "Western contemporary culture", indicates the operational framework for SP, but is difficult to define precisely: it includes the Antipodes (Australia and New Zealand) and excludes, say, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela, despite the fact that they are in the Western hemisphere. Additionally, we have millions of migrants (or their parents) who have arrived from Asia or Africa and now live in Western countries and whose characterization as being "Western" tends to be ambiguous. Moreover, we have many non-Western countries that have implemented and even integrated some elements of Western culture into their social fabric, and are "Westernized" to some extent—Taiwan having recently legalized same-sex marriages, for example.

Nevertheless, Western contemporary culture can be characterized collectively, without specifying numerous types of more specific traditions, cultures, and subcultures that constitute it. Viewing it from the stoic pragmatist perspective, we can say that one of its main features is that it provides a relatively high level of comfort for a major segment of its population, along with many types of opportunities that may make our individual lives more meaningful and our collective life more or less functional. Excluding this terrible span of time of the coronavirus pandemic, it has been a considerably peaceful time with no wars amidst the West in recent decades, with the most open accessibility to education ever attained, the highest living standard for a major part of the population, the highest life expectancy, the most developed social security system available to a major part of North Americans and Western Europeans, and with social justice systems that are more developed than in other places in the world right now, and more than in the past.

This does not mean at all that social justice is guaranteed or that there are no conflicts among numerous social groups, but there is a hopeful prospect, in general, for everybody's future. Nor does it mean there are no clashes among social groups with specific interests, or societal problems related to ethnicity, race, religion, politics, sex, gender, and, perhaps most importantly, an economic gap between the *superrich* elite and the poor. Yet, SP claims that some balance and adequate assessment must be exercised in our criticism of situations and it

needs to be taken into consideration that there have never been conflict-free societies. Additionally, if we look at what is happening and has happened elsewhere, contemporary Western culture provides most of its members comparatively advanced forms of individual and communal possibilities for thriving and self-realization in relatively numerous areas of life. One of these ways of thriving and self-realization is the recognition of different modes of cultural life, many of which have been emancipated on an unprecedented scale in history. Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Russia do not provide such a scale of autonomy, social security or freedom for vast segments of their societies. Nor do we know of any societies in history, including the first democracy in ancient Greece, full of slaves, that has developed a comparatively decent and secure system for most of its citizens.

All these achievements—and this is the other part of the characterization of Western culture—do not seem to get easily converted into a commonly enjoyed sense of a meaningful life, as if the already available sources and opportunities were, for whatever reasons, unrecognized and unused by a significant segment of the Western population. This unrecognition of what we have, among other things, produces unnecessary disappointment, frustration, and a sense that life is meaningless and full of conflicts. Some of those negative reactions have burrowed even deeper during the coronavirus pandemic.

An adequate assessment requires comparisons and proportions, without which it is difficult to maintain any orientation points. Making comparisons with other cultures, present and past, to assess our situation is both pragmatic and stoic; pragmatic because it actually shows us the current state of our culture in light of its achievements and failures, and stoic because it distances us from those conventional fashions that assess cultures, ours or others, in simplistic, black-and-white, and absolutistic terms. Such comparisons should accommodate the already incredibly rapid accelerating progress of the medical and hygiene industries, along with access to medical knowledge via the Internet to practically everybody. This also includes the coronavirus pandemic. Obviously, this is a great tragedy and the millions of people affected should spark concern in everybody. At the same time, there are some options for us and recognition of these options and acting on them accordingly is something that we can do.

Appropriate actions in the context of the pandemic (and similar troubles)

"Appropriate actions" (Lachs, 2012, p. 45) try to link the pragmatist idea of intelligent action, especially Dewey's "intelligence as the preferred method of action" (Dewey, 1933, p. 101), with the Stoic *kathekon* or *officium* (Cicero, 1918, p. 409), although without the metaphysical background of the latter. Stated otherwise, *appropriate actions*, in the stoic pragmatist interpretation, refer to what rationally should be done or chosen in any given circumstance and in legitimate respect to the regularity of nature, as it so happens, for example, when one reflects on what should be done to maintain good health, corporal and mental, for the longest time possible, while trying to take into consideration the various natural and cultural factors of diet, hygiene, physical activity, as well as the consequences of one's decisions to forego them. We do not have unlimited choices and cannot have control over the entirety of the external world; sometimes such choices are indeed limited. However, we can focus on what we can do by, initially, becoming aware of the choices that surround us. In our contemporary world, in opposition to the views of so many critics of Western culture, there are opportunities and accessible goods that were unimaginable by the generations who lived before us.

This includes all sorts of medical, hygienic and therapeutic sources of information accessible by the Internet at no cost. Most importantly, however, this includes access on the part of individuals to national health systems. The degree to which accessibility by a significant portion of a country's population to first-rate health-care has never been equal to what it is today. Ignoring these factors would be neither rational nor appropriate. Just having our awareness more heightened may make it possible to become cognizant of the amount of salutary social

wealth surrounding us, and the ways of dodging malevolent influences. SP stresses the autonomous agency of each of us in this respect.

SP claims that "each private, conscious person is a unique center of activity and feeling" (Lachs, 2019, p. 7). The SP attitude includes, among other components, the Socratic "know yourself" idea of self-knowledge, which refers to our own possibilities; however, these possibilities should always be contextualized and inevitably be based on, for example, the knowledge that we can derive by using different sources. The recognition of one's singularity (know yourself) as well as that of others (humanism), does not allow stoic pragmatists to immerse uncritically into a surrounding culture or cultural fashions, nor does it allow them to fall into victimization narratives about their fate or *fatum*. Actually, it is our own choice to collapse or not to collapse into victimhood narratives. Epictetus, a former slave, physically disabled, and even then a renowned teacher of how to attain happiness (*eudaimonia*), stands as an iconic figure in showing us that a meaningful life depends on our attitude and on our character, much more than on surrounding conditions: socio-political, economic, and historical. The proto-pragmatist (Ralph Waldo Emerson) spoke to the idea of a self-made man. The pragmatist reference to meliorism, and, for the first time in history, unlimited access to knowledge (through the Internet), which makes it possible for us to become more aware of the possibilities of thriving, help to update the claim about the vital importance of *attitude* towards the surrounding world.

Multiple forms of appropriate action that use tools and skills that are readily at hand according to the claim that the more self-knowledge one possesses, the better are the actions that one performs. That is, they do not require substantial or additional funding, and they are realizable on our own, at practically any moment of reflection, and they start in our minds which means the realization of them does not depend completely on external circumstances. In this way, we pragmatically realize particular activities in order to achieve given aims and, stoically, we depend primarily on our decisions and our recognition of situations rather than on the external circumstances. To be sure, we must take them into consideration as we must take into consideration the weather conditions when we want to go outdoors. However, this does not entail that we depend on them in the same way as when grabbing an umbrella to not get wet, or an overcoat to not suffer cold, as we protect ourselves against the elements while simultaneously realizing our intended plans, notwithstanding those elements.

Does SP have any message concerning an individual's strategy in relation to the people encompassing one? The Stoic idea of *oikeiosis*, or Hierocles's concentric circles, as transmitted by Stobaeus (Whittingham, 1822), corresponds with the stoic pragmatist *virtue of leaving others alone* (Lachs, 2014b). Concentric circles, as when a stone is thrown into the water, show the center of attachment, affection, and vital interest that every individual should zero in on and take care of; yet, at the same time, his or her social bonds decrease to the extent that circles expand outwards. The closest circles would include one's relatives, then one's community, then one's culture, and finally all of humankind. Nevertheless, with the least possible amount of attachment do we fulfill this. The idea does not evoke egotism in the sense of a detached self-interest and insensitivity or indifference to the fate of others. Rather, it means that there is a natural order of things, that individuals are the basic points of reference in their actions, that there is a degree of responsibility for others, and the degree is more acute when we deal with those closest to us. Those others who are around us should be helped when needed; however, when they do not need our help, we should be wise and tolerant enough to let them do what they think proper for themselves.

Marcus Aurelius's message on the pandemic in 165–180 CE

In the later years of Marcus Aurelius's life, a terrible plague spread within the Roman Empire in the years 165–180 CE. The so-called *Antonine Plague*, probably caused by smallpox or

measles, caused the death of between 5 and10 million people (according to *World History Encyclopedia*). Interestingly, the time of the pandemic (in the years 165–180) coincided with the time of his composing *Meditations* (161–180). In point of fact, his short collection of thoughts addressed to himself do not focus on the pandemic, despite the fact that, relatively speaking, it was far more devastating that our current pandemic, Covid 19. Perhaps the pandemic, the military campaigns and the battles, and the harsh material conditions of social life all together comprised a cultural and intellectual ambience in which only good character (virtue, the Greek *areté*) was capable of being the stable and reliable point of reference. How do we interpret his claim that the plague, or "mental cancer", understood in the moral terms of "dishonesty, or hypocrisy, or self-indulgence, or pride" is "worse than anything caused by tainted air or an unhealthy climate? Diseases like that can only threaten your life; this one attacks your humanity"? (Marcus Aurelius, book IX, chapter 2). Is this an informative message for us today?

We should not forget that the Stoics did not live in a capitalist society and did not develop a consumerist mentality. This may be one of the reasons why their message about temporary goods sounds strange to contemporary ears, especially in the West. Yet, it was not a message about asceticism and the rejection of goods that was pronounced most strongly, but rather a message about controlling our approach towards objects (material goods) and states of affairs (natural and social phenomena) in other words things that cannot be effectively controlled by us. In other words, we should do what is within the powers of our will and our intellect to make our lives better, but it is very risky and unpredictable for ourselves if we make the external world – external in relation to what we can do – the main point of reference.

Yet, we have a problem at this point. The external world, to which the Stoics recommended a sort of emotional disengagement (*apatheia*), embraces the contemporary health service, medical technology, the Internet full of medical expertise, our educational systems and so on—after all, these are the externals against which the Stoics warned us. Here, it seems to me, that the message of historical Stoicism should be updated, for example, by the pragmatist approach according to which the modern achievements of the Western world should be appreciated and taken seriously. I say *appreciated*, not uncritically indulged. This also refers to the ways in which stoic pragmatists should disseminate their philosophical and ethical message which, in our time, needs to be delivered via the Internet and social media so as to more effectively reach as big an audience as possible.

Digital-Culture as public intellectual activity

I would like to get back to responsibility. More specifically, not of everyday inhabitants of the public realm, but that of the philosopher and ethicist, stoic pragmatist or not. One of the ways to cope with the challenges I write about would be becoming a *digital-culture public intellectual*. Such an intellectual would have to, among many other things, modify and broaden the traditional modes of communication. Namely, such an intellectual would have to expand his or her textual or primarily text-related communication mode into an aesthetic and visual communication mode. More precisely, stoic pragmatists would have to learn how to aestheticize and visualize their ethical and cultural narratives by using some digital tools, *YouTube* clips for example. If we want to stress the role of reflection in the quality and meaningfulness of individual lives, or if we want to try to self-develop during lockdown, we cannot just talk about it in a (digital) classroom or merely write scholarly papers about it; we should also be able to display it in an attractive way so as to be more convincing to various audiences. Why is this important?

Whether philosophers and ethicists should stay in university classrooms and congress conference rooms, or move their activity onto the Internet, does not seem a yes/no dilemma any longer. Institutions of higher education in the West have been losing their privileged status, if

not monopoly, as exceptional institutions that are responsible for the cultivation and transmission of knowledge to future generations. The Internet, independently of any university curricula, stores and transmits knowledge and wisdom in whatever area the learner wants to choose and does it on a much larger and much more accessible scale than institutions of higher education. Even well before the present lockdown, very few students had their hands Smartphone-free, and they had already been deeply affected by the technological transformations in what they think and what they do. During the current lockdown period, the processes of the digitalization of education accelerated even further, and as a result, we can surmise, Western academia will never return to its traditional shape. If so, intellectuals, stoic pragmatists or not, should creatively use available digital tools to be actively present in cyberspace so as to shape its content. Or, at least, they should want to try to do it and have some intention to make a slight difference in the character of the thoughts and ideas to be accessed on the Internet. Many of our university colleagues perform this or that form already with a various spectrum of tools.

Would we be able to define or specify this type of activity? Elsewhere (Skowroński, 2020a), I have tried to propose a definition that would embrace stoic pragmatist philosophers' and ethicists' activity in cyberspace as *an array of practices that explore digital tools to make philosophical, ethical and values-oriented messages be recognized by wide audiences.* This definition stresses, first of all, the role of practices that would enable *digital-culture public intellectuals* to produce the material and introduce it into cyberspace. I mean not only to the technical activities but even more importantly to the social practice that is essential to such philosophical traditions as Stoicism and pragmatism (and possibly some others) with their focus on practical action of a given individual for the sake of social amelioration. Secondly, it stresses the role of recognition of the message by the target audience. Just putting the material out into cyberspace can hardly make any difference, as we have an ocean of materials already existent. Publishing a text on a personal website may result in nothing more than a short-time action and even shorter-time reaction of the viewers, with the text and its ideas remaining unseen by the larger public, and having no impact whatsoever on anyone. Instead, the recognition of the public intellectual's message is closely related to the public intellectual's recognition of the audience to which the message is directed, and the manner of communication in which this message is conveyed. This is why, thirdly, *digital-culture public intellectuals*, especially those of a pragmatist sensibility, should be predisposed to recognizing the communication needs and expectations of various audiences, given pragmatists' focus on anti-essentialism pluralism, toleration, and contextualization. The biggest challenge here is that there are many target audiences, and the modes of communication differ from target audience to target audience. Many non-academic audiences are non-textual-culture oriented, and they understand communication best when visual elements of certain sorts play the central role. This happens in the case of a massive audience, and, in my view, public intellectuals, philosophers included, need to take it into consideration.

Possible criticism of SP on the virtue ethics vs utilitarian ethics inconsistency

The question of the integrity of stoic pragmatist ethics can arouse controversy. One can say that SP is internally split because its two components refer to divergent types of ethics. Both historical Stoicism and contemporary stoic moral ideas refer to virtue ethics, whereas pragmatism has its roots in utilitarian ethics. According to the former, it is the character of the person that needs betterment independently of the external circumstances and this very character is the main source of tranquillity (*ataraxia*) and happiness (*eudaimonia*). Virtue (*arete*) should be cultivated for its own sake and possible cultural pressure from surrounding social conventions should not be taken as an indicator of the virtue's worth. Nor were various cultural norms seen, at least openly, as sources for enrichment for a Stoic because virtue (*arete*)

was something internally given, not externally, that is to say from a contingent form of culture. According to the latter, the good is measurable by the fulfilment and satisfaction that most members of the group can derive from any given activity. The cultivation of any personal virtue that is not transmissible to other members of the group does not deserve any special status. Nor it is possible to cultivate one's own private virtue, because moral standards are social and cultural products.

Such a division between these two, however, although interesting theoretically, does not have to look so divisive in the practice of life. Those Stoics who had public roles, like Marcus Aurelius and Seneca, could not limit their ethics merely to perfecting virtue only. They knew very well that they had to act meaningfully in social, political, and cultural contexts, in the name of the common good. It was simply necessary to execute their public functions in a proper, if not a pragmatic way. This type of interpretation, among other possible ways of dealing with the virtue ethics vs. utilitarian ethics discrepancy, can be seen, for example, in Bertrand Russell's *History of Western Philosophy.* According to him, the Stoics worked out double standards, or rather, two standards of *narrating* what is good and bad: one for themselves and another standard for non-Stoics. Russell explains these two standards by establishing a context of economic activities or, as we would say today, business life. The first part of his statement deals with the Stoic attitude:

> When the Stoic philosopher is thinking of himself, he holds that happiness and all other worldly so-called goods are worthless; he even says that to desire happiness is contrary to nature, meaning that it involves lack of resignation to the will of God. But as a practical man administering the Roman Empire, Marcus Aurelius knows perfectly well that this sort of thing won't do. It is his duty to see that the grain-ships from Africa duly reach Rome, that measures are taken to relieve the sufferings caused by pestilence, and that barbarian enemies are not allowed to cross the frontier (Russell, 1946–1947, p. 291).

The second part of Russell's statement speaks about the two different Stoic approaches towards economic reality:

> …in dealing with those of his subjects whom he does not regard as Stoic philosophers, actual or potential, he accepts ordinary mundane standards of what is good or bad. It is by applying these standards that he arrives at his duty as an administrator. What is odd is that this duty, itself, is in the higher sphere of what the Stoic sage should do, although it is deduced from an ethic which the Stoic sage regards as fundamentally mistaken (Russell, 1946–1947, p. 291).

It seems that Russell's interpretation can be helpful in dealing with the virtue ethics vs. utilitarian ethics discrepancy. This interpretation can also be helpful for stoic pragmatists to work on more efficient communication with their audiences.

Conclusion

I do not suggest that philosophers and ethicists should become stoic pragmatist philosophers; nor do I suggest that public intellectuals can significantly shape the content of social media and have an impact upon a mass popular audience. I do not have such hopes because I follow the Stoics' claim that the external results of actions are out of our control and, therefore, should not be the main concern. What is within our, philosophers' control, and pragmatist at the same time, is to propose a vision of the good life for us and those who want to listen, a vision that would refer to the most important issues of the day. Coronavirus and the lockdown belong to such issues. Stoic pragmatists cannot be invisible in the public debate on such problems because they

know very well that "philosophy becomes marginalized only when it distances itself from the problems of life" (Lachs, 2003, p. 11).

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The main principles and values of professional teaching ethics and their application in education

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Abstract
The author discusses professional teaching ethics and its main principles and values. The theoretical basis of the study is ethics of social consequences and, in its context, primarily the principles and values of humanity and human dignity, including their possible application in the teaching profession and, partially, in the process of teaching foreign languages and Slovak as a foreign language to students from abroad.

Keywords: ethics of social consequences, humanity, human dignity, professional teaching ethics, education

Introduction

As reasoning about professional teaching ethics primarily follows philosophical-ethical principles, the need also arises to reflect on ethical theories that could serve as the methodological basis in solving ethical and moral issues in the teaching profession. In ethics, there is no uniform or 'true' view of what is moral, immoral, correct or incorrect. This reflects how views of the world, our value system, and life experience differ, which, as a result, must, in some way, be reflected in our opinions on the criteria of the moral assessment of the behaviour and actions of an individual. This is also reflected in the plurality of ethical theories. It also fully applies to applied ethics, professional ethics, including professional teaching ethics (Kar, 2018, pp. 1729–1733).

Teaching ethics is understood as a branch of professional ethics, focused on the theoretical reflection of ethical and moral issues of the teaching profession (including defining the moral values, principles and norms of the teaching profession in the form of a code of ethics). Moreover, it also searches for answers, or solutions, to practical moral problems within the teaching profession. The base of teaching ethics is an interdisciplinary approach where philosophy, ethics, pedagogy, and psychology interact (Gluchmanová, 2013, p. 143). The whole area of professional teaching ethics is usually reduced to two main approaches, consequentialist and non-consequentialist (deontological), while such domains as ethics of virtue, discourse ethics, Kantian ethics, etc. are not really taken into account.

This is evidenced by, for instance, Kenneth A. Strike and Jonas F. Soltis who disregard the non-utilitarian version of consequentialism (within which Petit's virtual consequentialism, Slote's satisficing consequentialism, Jackson's probabilistic consequentialism, or Sena's evaluator relative theory fall) and reduce the whole of consequentialism to Jeremy Bentham's and John Stuart Mill's classic utilitarian version , i.e. the period from the end of the 18th century until the second half of the 19th century (Strike & Soltis, 2004, pp. 12–14). In professional ethics in general, and especially in codes of ethics, a non-consequential, or downright deontological, approach is preferred (Brooks & Dunn, 2009, p. 185; Crigger & Godfrey, 2011, p. 7; Kuppermann, 2007, p. 135; Lucas, 2005, p. 41; Morrison, 2009, p. 27; Sethy, 2018, p. 297). In professional teaching ethics, consequentialist ethical theories are frequently depreciated as a potential instrument for, or source of, solutions to moral problems in the teaching profession while one-sidedly preferring deontological ethics, which requires the teacher to act on their moral duty while performing their profession (Campbell, 2008, p. 366).

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Ethics of social consequences as the theoretical basis of teaching ethics

The present paper examines the possibility to apply ethics of social consequences as a version of non-utilitarian consequentialism in the form of a methodological basis of teaching ethics. The above ethical conception has been developed by Vasil Gluchman and his followers, while basing it on the principle and values of the consequences resulting from decisions and actions, or opinions and attitudes of a moral agent. The core of the value structure of this conception is formed by values of humanity, human dignity, and man's moral right. Among other values of this conception are justice, moral responsibility, responsibility, and tolerance (Gluchman, 2003, pp. 7–19; 2016, pp. 52–62; 2017, pp. 57–65; Kalajtzidis, 2018, pp. 2–13; Kalajtzidis, 2019, pp. 705–722; Polomská, 2018, pp. 137–183; Gluchmanová, 2013, pp. 141–160; Gluchmanová, 2018, pp. 262–280).

Ethics of social consequences has been the subject of constructive critical analysis and discussion for more than twenty years. There are a great number of positive statements expressing appreciation of its efforts to become a new approach, defining principles and values exceeding the traditional framework of consequentialist ethical theories, as well as producing stimuli that lead to the development of this ethical theory and polemics about some values and its emphasis on consequences. Undoubtedly, one of the most significant contributions to the discussion on ethics of social consequences is an analysis and assessment of this ethical conception by Teodor Münz, a renowned Slovak philosopher (Münz, 2002, pp. 275–284). Unlike other authors, who only focus on one of the aspects of ethics of social consequences, Münz carried out a complex analysis and assessment and defined ideas primarily concerned with the need to embrace biological sources of morality and moral values. Based on his analysis, he stated that "[…] Slovak, and perhaps also foreign, ethics has found in [Gluchman] an exceptional personality. He follows his own path, solves problems from his own viewpoint, he is thoughtful, conceptual, self-confident, brave, and his work is purposeful and systematic. That is, especially in Slovak philosophy, a common phenomenon" (Münz, 2002, p. 284). Similarly, before him, Jiří Kánský (a significant Czech ethicist working in Slovakia on a long-term basis) wrote about ethics of social consequences that it abandons the tradition of morality that is conventional in Slovakia and brings about new ideas and proposes a new ethical conception (Kánský, 1997, p. 487).[2]

The above principles and values of humanity, human dignity, and man's moral right are the main criteria for the assessment of a man's moral development in this conception. In keeping with the ethical theory, just actions respect and confirm the fundamental moral values valid in human society. The primary requirement for justice lies in that it must not deny any of the fundamental moral values. An action that is unjust can also be considered right, provided it brings about a prevalence of positive over negative social consequences. In this context, it should not be considered an unjust action; rather, the term *non-just action* is more appropriate, as it better fits the context and understanding of the criterion of moral assessment in this conception, i.e. consequences. Wrong and, mainly, immoral, actions must be labelled as unjust, especially due to the fact that, regardless their motives, they primarily bring about negative consequences. In such a case, intentional unjust actions must be differentiated from unintentional unjust actions; these are, however, still unjust (Gluchman, 2003, pp. 9–10).

The value of moral responsibility is, in ethics of social consequences, expressed by the principle of responsibility, which, together with other principles, such as the principle of humanity, justice, and tolerance, is an integral part of this conception. Within the ethical theory in question, moral responsibility is primarily concerned with respecting and pursuing man's

[2] The fundamental principles and values of ethics of social consequences are not only addressed by the Slovak, but also the international philosophical and ethical community (Dubiel-Zieliňska, 2018; Grzybek & Domagala, 2018; Jemelka, 2018; Konstanczak, 2018; Kuře, 2018; Losyk, 2018; Misseri, 2018; Mysona Byrska, 2018).

moral rights and dignity, i.e. the principle of humanity, which defines the main dimension of the principle of responsibility. In the author's opinion, responsible actions are just and in line with the principle of humanity. To practise common responsibility related to the pursuit of humanity, respecting human dignity, observing and pursuing human and moral rights, social institutions, which, indirectly, express not only mankind's common interests but also their shared moral responsibility, are necessary. Social institutions do not fully relieve an individual of their share of common responsibility. An individual's share in this responsibility varies and is defined by their social and political status, possibilities and abilities, which are, apart from other things, influenced by their education, upbringing and mental and physiological capabilities. What is, however, decisive is the individual moral responsibility of a moral agent when pursuing the principles of humanity and justice in specific everyday situations.

Here, immediate (direct) and mediated (indirect) responsibility must be considered. Immediate responsibility, for instance, occurs in the context of consequences directly resulting from the actions of a moral agent (set in motion by the agent's actions). The degree of mediated responsibility decreases in proportion with the time interval that has passed since the primary action of the moral agent. In this conception, moral duty is mainly defined at the theoretical level. It is a guide for a moral agent on how to contemplate, make decisions, behave, and act in specific everyday situations and how these principles should be applied in various circumstances. The principle of tolerance in the context of ethics of social consequences is limited by the principle of justice in actions as well as assessment. This means that, alongside the author of this conception, one could claim the following: The action is right if, and only if, it brings about a prevalence of positive over negative consequences and if it is in keeping with the principle of humanity". Moreover, the action is moral if, and only if, it produces almost exclusively positive consequences, if negative consequences are rare, and if the action is in keeping with the principles of humanity and justice (Gluchman, 2003, p. 16).

The principle of humanity[3]

In various contexts that are part of the school environment or the teaching profession as such, the actions of a moral agent usually bring about both positive as well as negative consequences. What is, however, important is that the moral agent who bases their thoughts, decisions and actions on these principles and values, chooses and pursues such actions that result in a prevalence of positive over negative consequences. The consequences that arise relate to the individual and the environment they live and work in and which they influence by their actions. Provided the actions and behaviour of moral agents (in this case, teachers) are aimed at protecting and supporting children and youths, i.e. the development, of human life, it could be claimed that the moral agent acts humanely. Humanity stands for all forms of behaviour and actions directed at the protection and support, i.e. development, of human life. In Gluchman's opinion, following the latest knowledge of natural sciences,[4] the main form of humanity, lies in the protection and support, i.e. the development of one's own life and the lives of their close ones, friends, relatives and acquaintances. He calls in a natural-biological trait we share with many other animal species. This all results in the fundamental rights and obligations regarding

[3] In the context of ethics of social consequences, I work with its author's understanding of morality and moral values, which is, to a significant extent, also marked by the latest discoveries of natural science pointing to the natural-biological basis of human behaviour, including morality (in this context humanity as well as human dignity). The author of this conception has been, among others, also motivated by Münz and his analysis (Bekoff, 2004, pp. 489–520; 2006, pp. 71–104; McKenzie Alexander, 2007; Münz, 2002, p. 281; Prinz, 2007).

[4] Genetics, neurology, biology, zoology, ethology, etc. keep bringing about new knowledge regarding the similarities man shares with the rest of the animal kingdom, such as brain activity, behaviour and actions that are identical or similar to many members of the animal kingdom, such as primates and mammals (but not only these). Münz previously pointed to strong anthropocentrism of ethics of social consequences and the need for taking man's biological dimension into regard, as it significantly influences his morality (Münz, 2002, pp. 281–284).

the protection and support of human life. The protection and support of human life usually brings out positive social consequences (Gluchman, 2013, p. 127) It seems that this opinion of his corresponds with present-day philosophy and ethics where the emphasis is shifted from exclusively anthropocentric understanding of morality to socio-biological or, possibly, bio-centric, which also takes, to various extents, the influence of the biological determination of human behaviour and actions into account. It is something that might be disputed; human biological relatedness to the animal kingdom cannot, however, be denied, as, according to the findings of natural science, is, often, much deeper than one wishes to admit and accept in humanity-related areas of cognition.

When it comes to the application of ethics of social consequences in teaching practice, or the education process as a whole, it must be admitted that a teacher's reasoning, decision making and acting in accordance with its principles and values is more demanding than following other ethical theories. This theory requires more effort when pondering upon and assessing one's actions from several potential perspectives before one acts and considers the possible resulting consequences and decides based on that, while realising the associated responsibility. This ethical conception provides a teacher with more options and greater freedom when making decisions and acting; it, however, places greater responsibility upon them in comparison with such conceptions as, for instance, deontological ethics. According to this conception, a teacher's duty, primarily, lies in acting in line with approved, or generally accepted, rules and values established within the profession in question (most commonly expressed in the form of a code of teaching ethics), regardless their applicability in solving specific moral problems or the consequences that follow. This is not some kind of 'moral arithmetic', as one can never exactly calculate positive and negative social consequences but rather a model of morally rational reasoning based on strictly defined criteria which provide good conditions for a teacher to make free decisions and act when addressing moral issues and problems within their professional and educational work.

At present, when the education system is transforming, humanity is emphasised in the interaction with and among students, as well as among the teaching staff, and in the education process in general, i.e. the focus is placed on the personality of the educated as a human individuality with the right to their own decisions and development (Kafi, Motallebzadeh & Ashraf, 2018, p. 4). Equality and humanity should be the norms for the relationships between educators and the educated. In a humanely-oriented school, the emphasis is placed on the cultivation of man, mutual relationships, as well as the general morale. If all moral agents (including students as potential moral agents) at school as well as out-of-school facilities behave and act according to such criteria, it should lead to the support and protection of the lives of students and youths and, at the same time, produce positive social consequences. Humanity is especially important when, for instance, teaching a foreign language and especially when working with foreign students, as these are often representatives of different cultures, religions, as well as social, political, or ethnic backgrounds who brought with them to the new university (quite often on a different continent) environment their own values, customs, and traditions.

In general, it could be said that school and its environment contributes to humanity and care for the protection of their students, which suggests that school primarily produces positive social consequences. However, at the same time, when new trends arise in the life of society, some individuals understand freedom and democracy in a different way, which also brings about new problems and challenges for the teaching profession and teaching ethics. There is information about increased aggression and violence among children and youths, as well as cases of teachers not behaving in accordance with the requirements of humanity when, for instance, they do not strive to protect human life and instead, oftentimes, expose themselves or others to various types of danger (fights, theft, bullying) in school or out of it. This can be even more precarious if foreign students are involved.

Thanks to the application of ethics of social consequences, its principles and values in teaching ethics and especially in the teaching profession, positive thinking and adequate motivation, skills necessary for social life and progressive interpersonal relationships (also with foreign students) are shaped, while moral way of thinking, right decision making, predicting, and accepting responsibility for one's moral and educational decisions are taught. All this produces positive consequences in the teaching profession towards teachers but, mainly, on the part of teachers towards their students. It could then be stated that ethics of social consequences has a great potential to be applied in teaching ethics and the teaching profession as such.

On the other hand, Vasil Gluchman, in the context of the above-mentioned latest knowledge of natural science, claims that the protection and support of lives of strangers or unknown people is a moral surplus value, by which a new, higher, quality in one's behaviour and actions towards other people is created. It concerns humanity as a moral trait, or surplus value; it is something extra, which is truly specifically human and, in any case, worthy of respect and admiration. By such behaviour, man confirms he can, at least to a certain extent, exceed the natural-biological framework of its determination (Gluchman, 2013, p. 127).[5]

School is concerned with the protection and support, development, upbringing and education, and cultivation of students (unlike other professions where the clientele is more stable), i.e. actually strangers and unknown people (especially in the case of foreign students). In this way, a higher quality in behaviour and actions is shaped. That is why I believe that teachers' work for the benefit of others (students) is worthy of respect and admiration and truly a moral surplus value contained and pursued within the teaching profession. By emphasising humanity as a moral surplus value produced by one's actions for the benefit of strangers and unknown people, ethics of social consequences clearly defines a value framework, which is, to the full extent, acceptable for the teaching profession, as it is space inherent to this profession – help others, educate, cultivate their overall (including moral) development. In this way, ethics of social consequences in professional teaching ethics named the core of its efforts. The teaching profession, thus, becomes the creator of a moral surplus value on an individual, as well as social, level.

The existence of exceptions, i.e. cases that are in contradiction to the tendency of pursuing humanity in the teaching profession, merely confirms how demanding the teaching profession is, as teachers are, for the entire working time, exposed to significant mental and emotional load issuing from a great number of objective and subjective factors. If one of these factors fails to work, or plays a negative role to an extent that is greater than it should be, then the teacher might fail in the effort to solve a specific moral or educational problem. In the context of ethics of social consequences, even these situations should be concerned with assessing the teacher's actions in a broader context rather than based on a single act and the consequences resulting from it. Primarily, an effort should be made for a clear prevalence of positive over negative social consequences in each individual moral agent working as a teacher, and a clear effort to achieve and pursue humanity in the possible problems and drawbacks of one's actions. Nevertheless, in no way should clearly inhumane actions (be it on the part of the teacher or students) be tolerated, or even justified, that would endanger the lives of children and youths, or deny their human dignity.

[5] The term 'moral surplus value' expresses a higher moral value of certain behaviour or action as opposed to common everyday behaviour and actions of an individual. A similar concept can also be found in Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) in the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperative, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) in qualitatively deferring forms of pleasure, or George Edward Moore (1873–1958) in joining several forms of good when, in his view, an additional value, or additional good, is produced.

The principle of human dignity

According to Vasil Gluchman, there are two aspects of human dignity in ethics of social consequences. The first one is related to the value of life that deserves respect and appreciation, which results in positive social consequences that are a function of human dignity. The other aspect concerns human dignity being the function of positive social consequences resulting from one's behaviour and actions that are to be prevalent over negative social consequences. Based on this, a qualitative or surplus value of human dignity can be ascribed to a moral agent (Gluchman, 2019, p. 1130).

When discussing professional teaching ethics, mutual respect and appreciation must be emphasised not only towards the students, as pointed out by some authors, but, at the same time, make sure it is also teachers who are respected and appreciated. Only then can one talk about successful mutual relationships not only between the teacher and the student, but also within the teaching staff, between teachers and their superiors, etc. Human dignity stands for respect of a human being regardless their age, i.e. dignity is also observed with regard to children in preschool facilities and so are students of primary and secondary schools and universities; regardless their sex, religion or religious belief, race and ethnicity, political views, as well as their national and social background. This applies to an even a greater extent at present, when a great number of foreign students study at Slovak universities. This follows from the first way of understanding human dignity within ethics of social consequences, since every human individual, based on their species affiliation, is worthy of respect and appreciation. This, first, aspect of understanding human dignity is especially significant for children and youths. Every individual, thus, has the right to the protection of and respect for their human dignity (and, consequently, freedom and security) at school as well as during out-of-school activities.

School education should be aimed at full-value development of one's personality and enhancing the respect for human rights. It is to aid mutual understanding, tolerance, and friendship. This aspect places emphasis on the realisation of one's duty to accept this value and express respect, mainly on the part of teachers towards their students. On the other hand, it also entails the duty, or obligation, within the teaching profession, for teachers to lead and educate children and youths towards mutual respect and appreciation of human dignity in other children as well as adults. Just as the students' cognitive and intellectual abilities increase, according to ethics of social consequences, so does their way of assessing their human dignity also change. Through gradual cognitive and intellectual development, children and youths change from purely passive bearers of human dignity (merely based on their species affiliation) and work their way through to a position where they, to a significant extent, build their respect and appreciation of themselves, based on their behaviour and actions. It is this process of realising one's human dignity and showing respect and appreciation to others that is a moral and educational task, or duty, of the teaching profession (naturally, it is not only a teacher's task and duty).

I have to state that fulfilling this moral and educational task is not always successful in the teaching profession, since there is a lack of qualified teachers at (especially primary and secondary) schools, while those qualified might also fail to manage specific situations that require an educational and moral intervention. Discipline and manifestations of violence in, as well as outside, school pose a problem. In this case, these are also problems related to human dignity and its degrading or breaking (Klembarová, 2015, pp. 31–38).

There is space to apply the principles and values of ethics of social consequences in solving these moral and educational issues within the teaching profession and teaching ethics in general. The key to approaching contemplations on human dignity in the teaching profession is differentiating between the developmental stages of human dignity, as defined by this conception. It is the difference between the basic level of understanding human dignity and the resulting respect and appreciation of a human being based on their species affiliation, associated

to unconditional respect and appreciation that children of pre-school age, or students at the first level of primary school, are due. From (approximately) this period on, the second stage of shaping one's human dignity starts to shape (as a result of the development of cognitive, mental, emotional, intellectual, and moral qualities of children and youths), which manifests through, apart from their species affiliation, behaviour and actions, which gradually affects the respect and appreciation of these children and youths.

This process culminates in the third stage of the development of human dignity, when it is assumed the individual meets the criteria of a moral agent (secondary school students in the final year of their studies and university students) and human dignity reflects the consequences of their behaviour and actions. It, thus, follows that teachers should show full respect for children's human dignity while in the first stage, in the second, and especially the third, stage the respect and appreciation of human dignity of students is correlative, i.e. results from, among other things, their behaviour and actions towards teachers and other people taking part in the education process, as well as people outside this environment. This does not, however, mean that teachers should have the right to degrade the human dignity of those students who behave inappropriately towards other people in class or school (including teachers). Rather, it should serve to explain or justify that, in such cases, the teacher has the right, and even a moral duty or justification, to choose a different approach and relationship to such individuals, as opposed to those who are worthy of their full respect and appreciation.

What is, however, highly surprising is that a great number of school representatives claim there are no serious educational or moral problems (such as bullying) present at their school, or they downplay the obvious problem. It might be caused by the fact that not even adults are sometimes able to recognise negative action of students. Sometimes, teachers and other pedagogical employees also become participants in bullying. A decisive approach of educators when exposing bullying is of a paramount moral importance, as this reassures students such phenomena are, in the school environment, impermissible. Teachers, however, make several mistakes: they sometimes indirectly express their agreement with the practices of the initiators of bullying; they initiate the whole mechanism (by mocking an individual in front of the whole group); they downplay the extent and gravity of bullying at their school; they tend to ignore bullying, as they are unable, for multiple reasons, to discipline the bullies. Physical consequences might quickly disappear but emotional wounds are deep and their healing often complicated.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it could be stated that ethics of social consequences, by means of its principles and values, has the potential to contribute to the development of the theory of research into teaching ethics, as well as to the solving of moral issues related to the teaching profession. This ethical conception concerns, on the one hand, actions directed at the achievement of positive social consequences while respecting the values of humanity, human dignity, and moral rights; on the other hand, such actions that respect the above values and bring about positive social consequences, which is the core of the ethical theory in question. Ethics of social consequences, as well as in professional teaching ethics, is primarily concerned with positive social consequences which, however, must follow the principles and values of humanity, human dignity, and man's moral right and, possibly, other values, such as justice, responsibility, tolerance, commitment, etc.

Another argument in favour of ethics of social consequences is the fact that, according to this conception, when addressing moral issues, every moral agent should take regard for the justified needs and interests of other people, i.e. students, colleagues, parents, while also expecting these people to also take in consideration his justified needs and interests. In this way, one-sided overrating of students' welfare can be avoided (which, in some approaches, is often

the case), as the teaching profession should not one-sidedly favour of the teachers' duties and the students' rights, but rather a complementarity of rights and duties (including the moral right) of all parties.

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Defining human-animal chimeras and hybrids: A comparison of legal systems and natural sciences

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Abstract
The article aims to present issues arising out of differences in the way that the terms chimera and hybrid are defined in legal systems and by natural sciences in the context of mixing human and animal DNA. The author analyses the different approaches to defining these terms used in various legal systems, dividing them into groups in light of conclusions reached from examining definitions used in natural sciences. The distinction is used to answer the question of which approach to definitions applied by legislators is the best way to handle the subject of human-animal organisms, given the need to balance their impact on medicine and the ethical concerns that arise.

Keywords: chimeras, hybrids, human-animal organism, legal definition, legislation

Introduction

The issue of beings with mixed human and animal elements is becoming one of the primary subjects of analysis in bioethics. We are also expecting legislators to start confronting that challenge, due to the impact of this type of research on science and the moral dilemmas connected with it. The methods of dealing with the issue of chimeras and hybrids (I will explore aspects of this distinction further below) are diverse. I want to present the various approaches to how these are defined (if at all) in several different legal systems. I decided to present examples from these systems, because in my opinion it is the best way to analyse the legislative techniques while commenting on their benefits and shortcomings. I also provide basic information on legal definitions and introduce a more general concept of mixed organisms before going on to present more specialised definitions and the consequences that result from them.

Role and aspects of legal definitions

Legal definitions are always at risk of being flawed or outdated. An endless stream of debates in the history of legal doctrine – such as the textual and intentional approach to the interpretation of disputed rules – clearly demonstrates that, despite a long history of language, law, and the tools related to them, there is no convincing way of creating perfect legal definitions. A legal definition is simply a definition that is worded by a legislator, placed in a legal act and used to give a specific meaning to a word or term used in the legal act (Malinowski, 2005, p. 215).

As Lawrence M. Solan stated: "Most battles over legal interpretation are battles about the meanings of words" (Solan, 2001, p. 244). To prevent situations that are unclear from a linguistic perspective, the legislator often introduces legal definitions. Legal definitions are useful in law for many reasons – their existence helps to correctly interpret the legislator's intention, to remove problems with the correct meaning and to make regulation more accessible (Bielska-Brodziak, 2008, pp. 159–174). They are beneficial both to the legislator and the subjects of law as a method of explaining an ambiguous word (Macagno, 2010, pp. 199–217). The structure of a definition, and simultaneously the reason for creating them rose "from two requirements that law must accommodate: logical consistency in expression and flexibility of application" (Jackson, 1985, pp. 377–386). Difficulties with law often come from the various

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possible understandings of a word, so legal definitions are helpful for lawyers to unify meaning. The legislator often complies with the requirement of legal certainty of a normative text, and legal definitions are a very reliable technique for avoiding confusion and manipulation (Sobolev, 2015, pp. 168–180).

In very specialised areas like biotechnology, legal definitions can also be the optimal and perhaps the only solution to introducing a preferred meaning to lawyers or subjects of law – phrases used in these regulations are not a part of commonly used language, and therefore leaving them without an understandable definition could be harmful and produce endless disputes about the correct meaning. To give a better look at the importance of legal definitions and their relationship with reality, I will introduce some more statements from the doctrine. The cited examples will also point to the fact that legal definitions are not a flawless solution to all interpretational dilemmas.

One author analyses the relation between everyday language and the language of law and lawyers. He concludes that legal definitions are not ideal because legislative technique forbids them from being used too frequently and it is not possible to define every word. In addition, to introduce a legal definition is to introduce a new word, which can itself need an explanation (Opałek et al., 1969, p. 43). The verbal character of legal definitions – they are not statements of fact – is their disadvantage (Huntington, 1936, pp. 1099–1106). On a more positive note, another author considers them to be a valuable method for the legislator to make contact with the reader of a legal act. He presents three main reasons to use legal definitions:

- they give meaning to terms used in law and provide conditions to consider a situation, an entity or an object as the subject that a certain legal provision is dealing with,
- they eliminate the ambiguity of words with more than one meaning,
- in some cases, the legislator needs to establish a very precise meaning of the word (Zieliński, 2012, pp. 198–200).

Legal definitions are also a way not to only clarify a potentially ambiguous meaning of a word, but also to introduce a new meaning or even a completely new term (Bartoszewicz, 2018, p. 356).

As the research of Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak shows, there are some concerns with legal definitions. Her research discusses a different understanding of them by representatives of the doctrine and the courts – for example, in one of the cited judgements, the Polish constitutional court denied that one of the provisions, despite looking like a legal definition ("A business trip is…" – File reference of the judgment: 2002 T 69/01, OTK-B 2002/2/118, ruling of Polish Constitutional Court), is not. in fact. a legal definition. The author groups concerns about legal definitions into three types:

- Problems with formulating legal definitions, placing them in regulations and recognising them as legal definitions (this problem is also underlined by Paweł Saługa (Saługa, 2008, p. 76).
- Problems with the interpretation of legal definitions.
- Problems with the scope of their application (Bielska-Brodziak, 2008, p. 159).

The presented information about legal definitions explains why they are so important and what their disadvantages are. No matter what is being defined, there is a considerable possibility that the legal definition will at some point not be sufficiently precise or will not fully reflect reality. This situation certainly appears in the case of beings with mixed human and animal DNA.

Chimeras and hybrids

Chimeric and hybrid organisms, being one that combines human and non-human DNA, are nowadays one of the most problematic aspects of bioethics. A chimera is an organism that contains cells, tissues, genes or even organs and body parts of another organism (Greely, 2003,

pp. 17–20) – in the analysed case, a chimera mixes cells from a human and non-human being. A hybrid is the result of impregnating the egg cell of one species with semen from another species (Bonnicksen, 2009, p. 59).

Arguments supporting and prohibiting the creation of these are numerous on both sides. Due to the scale and complexity of the argumentation, I will restrict myself to introducing just a few key points. I selected these arguments because they show the most visible advantages and disadvantages of creating such beings. Moreover, the mentioned arguments are frequently cited in literature. They show why mixed beings have already had an impact on our reality and what their prospects are, but also arguments from the other side that underline the dangers that are discussed in bioethical discourse. For example, creating these organisms is useful for the purposes of drug testing, analysing the development of diseases (Huther, 2009, p. 83), or even, in the future, for transplanting organs from non-human donors (De Los Angeles et al., 2018, p. 335). As we can see, the main goal behind creating mixed beings is to achieve medical solutions. The history of successful experiments with implementing human genes into an animal genome starts back in the 1980s (Hanahan et al., 2007, pp. 2258–2270). The creation of animals with some human genes resulted in the possibility to fight against cancer, HIV and Ebola, or to test new methods of diagnostics (Walsh et al., 2017, pp. 187–215). These organisms are helpful in research about cells (Levine et al., 2017, p. 131), or when scientists try to understand certain human evolutionary mechanisms (Shi et al., 2019, pp. 480–481).

On the other hand, there are dilemmas like the enigmatic status of an entity that combines human and non-human DNA, the moral issue of using foetus stem cells, questions about human dignity, and the so-called "yuck factor" (Huther, 2009, p. 60). The welfare of animals with a modified genome is another problematic aspect – a good example is the case of the Beltsville pigs, which started to suffer from unexpected sicknesses after being implanted with human genes (Mann et al., 2019, p. 6).

Moreover, there are also many fields that we can consider as grey areas. These organisms can be created in different ways – less or more "moral" – and developed to different stages of life. Moreover, many ethical dilemmas are now rather theoretical, but they are starting to be revealed in our world in very real shape – like creating animals with cognitive skills closer to humans than in natural order. Considering that future human-animal organisms might possibly have better intellectual abilities (Shi et al., 2019, pp. 489–490), or even a visual resemblance to people (Bourret et al., 2016, p. 5), there are certainly a lot of doubts. As research on the arguments used in the debate about mixing human and animal DNA shows, there are multiple reasons to create mixed beings or to question the ethicality of their creation. These arguments are very varied – from moral or theological to pure consideration of negative consequences from biological view (Kwisda et al., 2020, p. 1).

The name *chimera* – which is more popular, because human–animal hybrids are currently much less real, and experiments involving their creation have no scientific justification – has come a long way.[2] Now we consider chimeras to be a part of the natural sciences. However, the first descriptions of chimera are based on mythology, where the original Chimera was a monster combining the body parts of a lion, a goat, and a snake. A chimera in Greek mythology was a symbol of disaster (Kuře, 2009, p. 8), but was also associated with the seasons of the year

[2] "At present there appears to be no rationale for creating animal-human hybrids in research. Members of the group that produced the U.K. report on humans and chimeras "were of the opinion that there is no scientific case for true interspecies hybrids" (U.K. Department of Health 2007b, Appendix H 5.7–5.9). The Wellcome Trust conveyed the same message: "full sexual hybrids between human and animal gametes would not develop beyond early preimplantation stages. It is hard to see what scientific information would be gained from such an experiment" (United Kingdom. Parliament 2007a). If there were some reason to combine human and nonhuman biological properties, this would be done by other methods such as transgenics, not by hybridization. Nevertheless, perhaps in order to protect flexibility in research, the U.K. House of Commons defeated a proposed ban on the creation of human-nonhuman hybrids in 2008 (Henderson and Elliott, 2008)" (Bonnicksen, 2009, p. 62).

as something that combines different states (Graves, 2017, p. 130). The meaning of chimera evolved and by the Middle Ages had become not only an obvious representation of unholy forces, but also the name in medieval logic for an object that does not exist (Roberts, 1960, p. 274). Further sections will examine possible definitions of chimeras in interesting contexts, but now we can simplify it to an organism with cells from at least two different species.

Hybrids are not as problematic to define, though there are voices pointing to the fact that there is more than one possible understanding of hybrids in terms of mixing human and animal material (Kuře, 2009, p. 5). In fact, hybrids are not a very big part of modern research, so before examining legal definitions and definitions from natural sciences, we can consider them simply as a result of combining gametes from two different species.

In recent decades, research on chimeric entities has significantly accelerated – in 1961, Andrzej Tarkowski developed the first chimeric mice. By 2019, we had animals with superior cognitive skills due to the human gene implemented in them. The law eventually started to confront the issue of chimeras, which became an important part of medical research and ethical analysis – but it is also hard to expect that legislators will be able to answer every question associated with such a complicated matter. The law almost always tries to match progression in the real world, and we can see this also in the case of beings with mixed DNA. To name a few current examples where the legislator was forced to prepare new rules after a new situation occurred, we can mention cryptocurrency or drones. In my opinion, the consequences of developing chimeras in future can be much more complicated than in the cited examples.

The issue of mixing the DNA of different species goes much further than only aspects related to human DNA. Multiple other types of mixed organisms – like animal-animal chimeras, plant chimeras, or the effects of microbiological manipulation also have a huge impact on the shape of the world. They provide numerous advantages and disadvantages, which should be noted. However, due to the especially problematic ethical character of human-animal beings, I decided only to analyse these entities and the rules concerning them in legal acts. It is no coincidence that legislators often directly refer to chimeras and hybrids with human elements, but this will be properly presented in the later part of the article.

In later parts of the article, I will compare the regulations about chimeras and hybrids – mainly definitions – in various legal systems and in natural sciences. Based on the results of this comparison, I will try to answer the question about the best possible definition of a chimera, or even the need to define a chimera in law.

What do the natural sciences say?

Natural sciences is a broad term and, due to main subject of the article, I will focus only on the selected definition of chimera and hybrid from them – I do not think that it is even possible to list every proposed definition of these organisms. We can agree that there exists a simplified and working definition – "an organism with cells from two genetically different sets of parents in its body" referring to a chimera. Despite the cited definition, concerns are also expressed about different understandings of chimeras in different sciences – "molecular biologists, geneticists, cell biologists, embryologists and other academic specialists attaching somewhat different definitions" (Bonnicksen, 2009, p. 27). The cited sentence is not the only situation when the definition of chimera, even in the context of only pure biology, is considered to be complex and multiple (Huther, 2009, p. 1).

As an example of the presented thesis that the terms chimera and hybrid have different or specialised meanings in different natural sciences, I will provide some selected definitions divided into scientific categories, with a focus on chimera, as it is more frequently discussed in terms of its precise meaning.

Genetics: “Chimeras are hybrid products between multiple parent sequences that can be falsely interpreted as novel organisms, thus inflating apparent diversity” (Haas et al., 2011, p. 494).

Embryology: “Churchill’s Medical Dictionary (1989) defines a chimera as: ‘an organism composed of two or more genetically distinct cell types.’ In her review of the biology of human chimeras known in 1983, Tippett (1983) says: ‘a chimera has cells from two or more zygotes.’ The definition in Churchill’s Medical Dictionary (1989) mentions somatic mutation as a possible source of chimerism, but goes on to say: ‘it occurs in humans most commonly when the blood of dizygous twins mixes in utero.’ The definition in the Online Medical Dictionary (2004) does not mention mixing bloods, but offers a fusion of embryos first among the possible origins suggested” (Boklage, 2006, p. 580).

Transplantology: “The world ‘chimerism’ is used in this review to describe the existence in a recipient of haemopoietic elements from a donor that is allogeneic or xenogeneic to the recipient. In our terminology ‘microchimerism’ refers to chimerism that is not measurable by flow cytometry (FCM) (which usually has a detection limit in the range of 0.1–1%), and requires sensitive techniques, such as a polymerase chain reaction (PCR), for its detection. ‘Mixed chimerism’, the topic of this review, refers to a state in which donor and host haemopoietic elements of multiple lineages coexist at levels detectable by FCM. ‘Full chimerism’, on the other hand, is a state in which essentially all haemopoietic elements are derived from donor stem cell inoculum” (Sykes, 2001, p. 417).

Medicine: “In medicine, an individual whose body contains different cell populations derived from different zygotes of the same or different species is defined as chimera, whereas a mosaic is an individual with two genetically distant types of cell that originates from a single zygote. In contrast to this, a hybrid is an individual composed of a single cell population derived from one zygote created by parents from two different breeding lines, races or species” (Weschka, 2009, p. 35).

As the cited examples say, there is no one correct understanding of the term “chimera” in natural sciences – a term that law must adapt in one covering meaning. In addition, there is an aspect of detailed definitions like the mentioned microchimerism. We can, however, notice the shared core in a requirement of mixing cells from different organisms. However, if we try to go further from this point, then we must admit that there is not one accepted definition of “chimera” or “hybrid” in the world of natural sciences (Kuře, 2009, p. 5). Nevertheless, when we refer to chimeras or hybrids, we have intuition about what we are debating, or we can even use some simplified, widely accepted definitions.

The legislator is forced to refer to one meaning or to enumerate situations. The wording of a legal act shapes the scope of permissible and impermissible actions. As a result, a definition forms specific orders and prohibitions, permissions and obligations. This is the main difference between legal discourse and other discourses, and that includes discourse in natural sciences. In the case of chimeras and hybrids, the simplified meaning can be used, or variants of mixed beings can be enumerated without going into dialogue with the various natural sciences.[3]

It hard to negate the fact that the law must confront the problem of chimeric or hybrid entities. The law is an institution that must keep up with the shape of the modern world in order to be relevant and to work. One of the methods of slowing down progression is to completely shut down some type of research, though in the aftermath, it may result in being a dead end, especially considering how much potential is in research on chimeras and hybrids. On the other hand, the moral implications of these experiments are complicated and without consensus, as was stated in the earlier part of research in this area.

[3] Constanze Huther dedicated a chapter to provide and discuss several arguments against chimeras and counterarguments (Huther, 2009, pp. 49–114).

I do not think that the law must perfectly reflect the world of natural sciences in regulations. I do not even think it can perfectly reflect the world of natural sciences. This is not possible due to a plethora of biological meanings of chimeras or hybrids, and the fact that the law operates on a more abstract level as a set of rules – a regulation that divides mixed beings in an embryological meaning and in a genetic meaning will be illegible and would not work better than regulation with a definition that simplifies these beings. The correct definition of a chimera or hybrid is built on negating dangers and creating space for ethical and useful research on them. Of course, there is still the question as to what constitutes ethical and useful research, but that is a topic for much more extensive research. The fact is that research on chimeras and hybrids is common and it is still developing (Bonnicksen, 2009, p. 2). Now, when the issue of different definitions of human–animal beings across the sciences is underlined, we should see how the legislator is trying to define these organisms.

Chimera and hybrid in legal systems – defined, not defined, over-defined?

The issue of human-animal entities is barely touched on by the rules of the European Union, meaning that there is no definition in any directives or other acts of European law. Given that there are no explicit regulations for chimeras and hybrids in EU Law, at most we have to analyse more general regulations, such as those concerning clinical tests, public health, animal welfare or the status of human DNA. There are no binding documents even in international law (Taupnitz, 2009, pp. 450–451).

As I will show, this leads to a situation where the legislation on this topic is not uniform among European Union Member States (and, for the record, not only in Europe). The question of whether it is possible to establish a fully uniform definition of chimeras is one that only the natural sciences can answer; certainly from a legal point of view there are very different ways in which chimeras and hybrids can be presented in law. After analysing various legal systems, I isolated three options of treating these organisms in legal acts.

To begin with, there is an interesting but worrying attempt to not even to try to define a chimera or hybrid. That means the legislator is using the term "chimera" and "hybrid", introducing them to the world of law, but without defining what is meant by the term or clarifying how it is understood in the given legislative context[4]. Spain, where the relevant regulations – Law 14/2006 of 26 May 2006, on techniques of assisted human reproduction[5] and Law 14/2007, of 3 July 2007, on Biomedical Research[6] – use the term hybrid and clarify hybrid by using the word "interspecies" in order to prohibit their creation, with the exception of cases mentioned elsewhere in the legal act. This situation causes many problems even before we analyse other regulations, doctrine and jurisprudence. Without a definition of hybrid, we do not know whether the term covers also a chimera (because chimeras, as beings originating by mixing cells, are different from hybrids as products of insemination – we do not know whether the legislator was simply trying to cover a wide range of human-animal organisms in one word), which is precisely what a hybrid is, and in what context we should try to find the meaning of the term hybrid. For example – if there is no distinction between chimera and hybrid, then a person implanted with a heart valve of animal origin could be examined in light of this definition of a hybrid being. Despite a distinction in natural sciences between chimera and hybrid (Pietrzykowski, 2017, p. 48), we cannot be sure that the legislator also applies this distinction. Of course, the law cannot define every word used in acts, propose a meaning in a

[4] In these cases, a useful tool for interpretation can be legislative materials. Problems of their usage were comprehensively discussed by Agnieszka Bielska-Brodziak (Bielska-Brodziak, 2017).

[5] (Article 26 c) 7 – "*The production of interspecific hybrids using human genetic material, except in the cases of currently permitted trials*".

[6] "*The production of interspecific hybrids that use human genetic material, except for the provisions of the Law on Assisted Human Reproduction Techniques*".

statutory glossary or be overly enumerative. The model used in Spain causes disorientation because of the lack of a definition or other rules that give a better perspective on the nature of a mixed being. After reading the mentioned legal acts, it is only clear that hybrids are banned. On the other hand, not having a legal definition of a hybrid (or a chimera), considering developments in biotechnological research, can lead to many unclear situations. I would call this type of dealing with the issue of mixed beings the "silent approach". While the lack of a regulation or definition from legislator may be intentional, it certainly generates problems for subsequent interpreters (Bielska-Brodziak, 2017, pp. 430–431).

Another, similar, situation occurs in Germany, where the Embryo Protection Act (Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – ESchG) applies. This act is carefully presented in the opinion of the German Ethics Council, which states: "The Embryo Protection Act contains specific provisions on the formation of chimeras and hybrids only in Section 7:

Section 7

(1) prohibits the creation of a number of entities, while Section 7

(2) provides for a ban on certain transfers.

Under Section 7(1) the following, and hence also attempts at the following, are punishable offences:

1. Uniting embryos with differing genetic information to form a group of cells using at least one human embryo;
2. Combining a human embryo with a cell that contains different genetic information from that of the embryo's cells and is capable of further differentiation with that embryo; or
3. Creating an embryo capable of differentiation by fertilization of a human egg with the sperm of an animal or by the fertilization of an animal egg with human sperm" (Translation cited from the opinion of the German Ethics Council, 2011, p. 37).

The German act uses the title in section 7 – "*Chimären und Hybridbildung*" which means "The creation of chimeras and hybrids". While there is no clear assignment to each type of organism, there is at least clarity about what the German legislator considers a chimera and hybrid to be. It is rather obvious to rate this solution as better than in Spain, but if we analyse the cited opinion of the German Ethics Council, there are some other interesting aspects. Page 50 of the work states that the transfer of an animal organ into a human body is not a punishable offence, and this is clear, given that there is no human embryo involved. However, from a biological standpoint, after transplanting an animal organ into a human, that human technically becomes a chimera (Huther, 2009, p. 2). That is just one situation where the law clearly simplifies or even reduces the meaning of a word, though this is not necessarily a bad thing. In addition, as the German legal act proves, the legislator can even make his intent at least readable to some point without definition. While chimeras and hybrids are not defined, the reader of the law can understand exactly what types of research are banned. I consider this definition as technically a silent approach, although the rules dedicated to mixed beings makes regulation much more accessible. It is also worth noting that, in the practice of interpretation, it is assumed that a group of rules can be used to decode the legislator's intent with good results and to construct a legal definition.[7]

A completely opposite method to the silent approach is a wide legal definition. From the point of view of legal philosophy, this way of defining words should be termed an axiological definition, as Andrzej Malinowski states.[8] Those definitions have an extensive range because

[7] For an example of this concept in practice, see file reference of the judgment: 2004 1CK 178/03 of Polish Supreme Court.

[8] "Axiological definitions (or in the other words: by postulates) comes down to indicating postulates that should pass every designation of defined name. If said object passes every postulate, then this is a designation of defined name, and if it does not pass even one, then this not a designation of defined name. There can be one postulate or

the legislator specifies certain postulates that elements of reality should pass in order to fall under the legal definition.

The first example of an axiological definition is in the Polish Act on Infertility Treatment (Ustawa z dnia 25 czerwca 2015 r. o leczeniu niepłodności (Dz.U. 2015 poz. 1087). Definitions of chimera and hybrid are set out in Article 2, which contains a statutory glossary:
"Chimera" – a group of cells built from cells [of] differing genotypes originating in more than two specimens of the same species or different species, where one of the species is human.
"Hybrid" – a cell or group of cells formed from [human – author's addition] reproductive cells and animal reproductive cells.

As we can see, these definitions are rather wide and do not cover only an aspect of creating mixes of human and animal cells, but also experiments with more than two human "parents" for cells. A later part of the regulation, Article 25, bans the creation of chimeras and hybrids. The proposed definitions have one obvious advantage – they cover every, or almost every, possible case of hybrids and chimeras. There is not much room to discuss qualifying a new human-animal group of cells (in other words, every organism), and, in this way, we achieve clarity. On the other hand, such a rigorous and very general definition can slow down the development of biotechnologies based on interspecies creations. There are, at least, some aspects of creating chimeras or hybrids that are generally not considered to be highly unethical, such as combining a very low dosage of human cells with animal cells to analyse the development of diseases.

Another country that has taken the route of using a similarly wide definition is Switzerland, where the Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction (Federal Act of 18 December 1998 on Medically Assisted Reproduction <Reproductive Medicine Act, RMA>) claims in its Article 2 that; "chimera formation means the fusion of totipotent cells from two or more genetically different embryos. Embryonic cells are totipotent if they are capable of developing into any type of specialised cell" and "hybrid formation means causing a non-human sperm cell to penetrate into a human ovum, or a human sperm cell into a non-human ovum". In addition, Article 1 of the Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction states that the regulation concerns humans, so "chimera" or "hybrid" in this case merges with cases of using human DNA. Another resemblance is the fact that Article 36 bans the creation of chimeras and hybrids. While the wording in the Federal Act on Medically Assisted Reproduction is a bit more precise in the case of chimeras, it stills bears a strong similarity to the Polish act, with the same advantages and disadvantages. Significantly, Article 2 also gives a definition of totipotent cells, thereby smartly evading the problem of using a specialist word "totipotent" and, despite using an axiological definition, manages to create a more limited framework than the Polish act.

Axiological definitions cover most of the possible aspects of creating mixed beings, which is useful in order to avoid doubts. In this case, there is no possible misunderstanding about what a chimera or hybrid is. It is beneficial from the perspective of potential legal liability (both civil and criminal), but I do not consider this option to be the best possible one. Axiological definitions about human-animal organisms solve a problem in too general a manner that blocks research. The legislator should think about creating space for scientific development rather than preventively banning all types of research in a situation when there is a general consensus that at least some experiments involving mixing human and animal DNA can be considered as ethical.

The legislator can, however, take an alternative approach and use enumeration to express exactly his attitude to the numerous types of experiments involving mixing human and animal material. These definitions are referred to by Andrzej Malinowski as definitions by enumeration.

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many. The system of postulates should be consistent, and postulates should be unambiguous – passing these conditions allows postulates to be treated as an axiological definitions" (Malinowski, 2005, p. 229).

The American "Human-Animal Chimera Prohibition Act" (H.R.6131 – Human-Animal Chimera Prohibition Act of 2016, s. 52), as the title suggests, bans the creation of human-animal chimeras. Due to the strict regulations this act sets out, there should also be a precise definition of chimeric entities. As the act states in §1131 ("Definitions"), a human-animal chimera means:
"(A) a human embryo into which a nonhuman cell or cells (or the component parts thereof) have been introduced to render the embryo's membership in the species Homo sapiens uncertain,
(B) a chimera human/animal embryo produced by fertilizing a human egg with nonhuman sperm;
(C) a chimera human/animal embryo produced by fertilizing a nonhuman egg with human sperm;
(D) an embryo produced by introducing a human nucleus into a nonhuman egg;
(E) an embryo containing at least haploid sets of chromosomes from both a human and a nonhuman life form;
(G) a nonhuman life form engineered such that human gametes develop within the body of a nonhuman life form;
(H) a nonhuman life form engineered such that it contains a human brain or a brain derived wholly or predominantly from human neural tissues".

Such a method of defining terms excels in covering many possible aspects, while also leaving possible space for other organisms that we can consider to be chimeras or hybrids from a natural sciences standpoint. We can look at this from two perspectives. In the first, we assume that the legislator is able to use the enumeration method to reasonably allow certain types of chimeric entities to be produced, i.e. those not classified as unethical or dangerous. On the other hand, we can argue whether, if a new "unethical" type of chimera emerges, then the regulation is incomplete and needs to be updated to once again cover the legislator's initial intention.

Another regulation that is built on enumeration is the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 <c 22>, s. 4.), which lists types of "admixed embryo" in its Article 4A, in addition to a prohibition on mixing human and animal gametes. This is an interesting name for entities mixing different DNA, because in this way the legislator covers both chimeras and hybrids, without confronting the potentially problematic distinction. In addition, the act sets out a list of human-animal beings, from which I cite a few examples:
"an embryo created by replacing the nucleus of an animal egg or of an animal cell, or two animal pronuclei, with:
(i) two human pronuclei,
(…)
(ii) one human pronucleus and one animal pronucleus,
any embryo not falling within paragraphs (a) to (d) that contain both nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of a human and nuclear or mitochondrial DNA of an animal ("animal DNA") but in which the animal DNA is not predominant".

Despite the rather harsh wording of this act, the British system does not ban all research on chimeras – "(…) a licence would be granted dependent on the nature of the species involved and/or the extent to which such modifications are apparent: for example, a pig hybrid with <some 'human genes> would be acceptable" (Beyleveld et al., 2009, p. 658). What's more, despite the enumeration, the legislator used one wider regulation in the end to have assurance that he did not leave out a situation whereby some *unethical* combination is not listed. However, the last case, where the embryo does not fall into the categories mentioned earlier, is still not an axiological definition, because of the specified precise criteria (combination of human and animal nuclear and mitochondrial DNA, where animal DNA is not predominant) as an addition to other mentioned possibilities of combining human and animal cells.

The last definition representing enumerative method comes from Article 2 of the Japanese Act on Regulation of Human Cloning Techniques (Act No. 146 of 2000).[9] There are three groups defined:
1. Human-Animal Hybrid Embryo,
2. Human-Animal Clone Embryo and
3. Human-Animal Chimeric Embryo.

To illustrate this method of legislation, I will cite only from the part dedicated to human-animal chimeras:
"Human-Animal Chimeric Embryo: Any of the following Embryos which is — not a Human-Human Chimeric Embryo, Animal Embryo or Animal-Human Chimeric Embryo (including each Embryo produced successively by single or multiple splitting of such an Embryo):
(a) An Embryo produced as a result of aggregation of two or more Embryos (including an Embryo produced as a result of aggregation of such an Embryo -4- and a Somatic or Embryonic Cell) (b) An Embryo produced as a result of aggregation of an Embryo and a Somatic or Embryonic Cell (c) An Embryo produced by Fusion between an Embryonic Cell with a cell nucleus of an Embryo listed in (a) or (b) and a human or Animal Enucleated Egg".

As we can see, in additional to defining the meaning of "Human-Human Chimeric Embryo", the act insists on very detailed definitions divided into specific groups. I consider the Act on the Regulation of Human Cloning Techniques to be the most precise of the presented regulations, with a huge emphasis on not leaving any possible flaw in the regulation. The legislator knowingly enumerates which practices he regards as creating a chimera and hybrid, and even adds the category of a human-animal clone.

I think this type of definition is the most useful because it is a comprehensive representation of the legislator's intent and sets out a clear distinction of what is allowed and what is banned. In the presented situation, scientists have a plain overview of what research is permitted and, even more importantly, the type of research that is not completely prohibited.

It is, of course, possible to combine the methods of making the legal definitions set out above. One example of this is from Canadian law, because the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act (Assisted Human Reproduction Act <S.C. 2004, c. 2>) uses both axiological definition and definition by enumeration. In its Article 3, which introduces definitions, a chimera is defined as:
"– an embryo into which a cell of any non-human life form has been introduced,
– an embryo that consists of cells of more than one embryo, foetus or human being".

This definition is rather general, and, indeed, a bit lacking from some possible perspectives (like introducing human cells into animal embryos). Under the act, a hybrid is defined as:
"– a human ovum that has been fertilized by a sperm of a non-human life form,
– an ovum of a non-human life form that has been fertilized by a human sperm,
– a human ovum into which the nucleus of a cell of a non-human life form has been introduced,
– an ovum of a non-human life form into which the nucleus of a human cell has been introduced,
– a human ovum or an ovum of a non-human life form that otherwise contains haploid sets of chromosomes from both a human being and a non-human life form".

This throws up an interesting situation, because two close aspects of combining human and animal elements are resolved in two different ways – the concept of chimeras by an axiological definition while the concept of a hybrid through a definition by enumeration. In the case of chimera, the legislator decides to use a broad definition, but for hybrid he carefully sets out possible combinations leading to the creation of such a being. Both activities are banned in Article 5.

[9] I used translation provided by the Cabinet Secretariat. [Retrieved December 17, 2020] Available at: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/htc.pdf

It is worth noting that issue of adequate definitions in legislation is discussed in the available literature. As Julian J. Koplin and Julian Savulescu observed, the creation of part-human chimeras by introducing human cells to animal embryos is not properly addressed in many legal systems. Even with definitions in legal acts, this method of producing chimeras falls between the gaps of existing legislation (Koplin et al., 2019, p. 40). Considering this observation, a question of the right way to define chimeras and hybrids is even more important.

From this point, we can summarise the gathered types of definitions (or the lack thereof) and examples from various legal systems. As a reminder, I have determined three approaches to definitions: the silent approach (used in Germany and Spain); axiological definition (used in Poland and Switzerland) and enumerative definitions (USA, UK and Japan). In all the mentioned acts, except for Canada, the legislator decided to use only one of these approaches.

The first way of handling the issue of chimeras or hybrids is simply not to define them and to use the silent approach. It is hard to rate this approach as positive, due to the very complicated status of these organisms. The terms chimera and hybrid, in the context of natural sciences or scientific experiments, are not common terms with an obvious meaning, so it is understandable that we should expect the legislator to offer at least an indication of how to interpret these words in a legal context. What is more, the average person probably does not know what a chimera is, because it is specialist knowledge. However, the German act on creating these entities can be considered as serviceable, because of listing punishable activities involving organisms, which helps to reconstruct the legislator's intent.

Another method is an axiological definition, containing such a wide range of possible chimeras and hybrids that we can even consider them to cover almost *every* possible way of creating these entities in ways known to modern science. This approach is much clearer that the previous one and resolves the problem of understanding when dealing with human-animal organisms. A few general postulates about what is mixed show, in broad strokes, what will fall under the scope of the definition, without the need to clarify and discuss the several specific methods of mixing animal and human cells. However, as I noted, it can be a roadblock for developing biotechnology if there is no other regulation that perhaps loosens the strictness of the mentioned definitions (such as, for example, a provision that states when a certain type of research is not considered to involve chimeras). Another possible take is the use of a *lex specialis* that allows human-animal organisms to be created under very special conditions without generally undermining the rules on prohibiting them without extraordinary situations (like testing a new therapy). However, in this way, the legislator risks the dispersion of the legal system if it is later decided to introduce such a *lex specialis*. *Lex specialis* are more commonly used in international law. Regardless of deciding to use a different regulation to loosen a strict ban or a *lex specialis*, without them axiological definitions seem to have the potential to cause a negative impact on biotechnology.

The last option for dealing with classifying chimeras and hybrids is definition by enumeration, which possibly works the best, as it clearly displays what should be considered as a chimeric or hybrid entity, and due, to this fact, we can ban it or allow certain methods of experimentation. As I mentioned, this is maybe not a perfect solution, but I consider it as the most adjusted to modern science and the reality of law. I highly favour definition by enumeration over the other two possible approaches due to its openness to scientific developments and as the amendment process is simpler, making it more responsive and better able to react to new ways of creating human-animal organisms (through the addition of a permissible or prohibited method versus the lack of a definition or a definition covering all experiments).

Then there is the solution taken by Canada, with the possibility to adapt two approaches to definitions and even mix them in one act. I do not think there is any reason to introduce another category. More pertinent would be to ask how the legal definitions (or lack of them) resonate

with the world of science – as Aristotle stated in "Topics", these definitions are really "a phrase signifying a thing's essence" – and to ask the extent to which they must resonate with science.

Conclusions

As I presented above, legal definitions, while useful, are not always a remedy to issues of meaning. They simply cannot cover all aspects of reality, and they themselves have limitations and flaws. These limitations and flaws are especially evident in situations of a very specific nature like when dealing with purely scientific terms. We can construct them differently, as a binding description (which in some cases, despite their role as guides, we must correctly interpret) or as an enumeration. When we discuss this in the context of biotechnology, there emerges another problematic aspect – terms like "chimera" or "hybrid" are highly specialised and not in use in common language, they come from scientific journals and ethical disputes. Placing them in legal acts always requires a simplification due to the nature of law. Legal definitions can be made by enumeration or postulates, but, in many cases, these would not be as detailed as their reflection in other sciences or reality.

Law not only shapes reality, but often has to respond to it. In this respect, the law is generally playing catch-up and responds to changes in reality with an inevitable delay when attempting to cover aspects of the world that are already affecting our lives and are not sanctioned. However, the law makes boundaries for morally challenging issues. This is especially visible in the case of mixing human and animal DNA, when it can wholly ban this type of research or divide accepted and prohibited methods of creating new organisms. Definition is one of ways in which to achieve the goals of the legislator and clarify his intentions. When the legislator confronts the issue of chimeras and hybrids, he must reach for knowledge gathered in natural sciences, but cannot cite dozens of definitions from various branches. The legal definition must either be general (building upon passing postulates, like in the cited work of Malinowski) or must enumerate specific cases of mixing DNA.

Whichever of these approaches to legal definitions is used in the case of chimeric or hybrid entities, it is still better than not attempting a legal definition at all. Where the legislator adopts the silent approach and resigns from using a definition at all (which forces meaning to be teased from other sources like legislative materials), this merely confuses the interpreter and results in attempts to decode meaning from jurisprudence or the doctrine. This method cannot be recommended. I consider general definitions, as used in the Polish or Swiss acts, as an attempt to prevent the controversial results of experiments before they are conducted. In some ways this works, but in other ways it is not fully understandable from either an ethical or a scientific point of view, especially taking into consideration the circumstances for creating chimeras or hybrids, i.e. to develop medicine, not to satisfy curiosity. No matter whether we analyse human-animal organisms or other rapidly developing areas such as the use of artificial intelligence, the law can struggle with matching current trends and challenges before they have an impact. The best-known method for both controversial and specialist terms like chimeras and hybrids is definition by enumeration. Enumeration gives scientists confidence that they can use one method of creating chimeras and hybrids and cannot use another. It makes the intent of the legislator a much clearer and compromises between the development of new, probably helpful medical technology and pausing research that can be considered as dangerous or immoral.

One thing is certain, chimeras and hybrids cannot be overlooked by legislation. The importance of research on them will only continue to grow. Other things are not so certain, namely the point to which we can develop this type of research, and where the boundaries that cannot be crossed lie. Without well-designed regulations, we will only be guessing or suffering from the blindness of the legislator.

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