Moral Virtues in J. A. Comenius' Mundus Moralis

Kateřina Šolcová

Abstract
The aim of the article is to reconstruct Jan Amos Comenius' (1592–1670) conception of moral virtues as it is presented in his major work *General Consultation on an Improvement of All Things Human (De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica)*, mainly in its part *Pansophia – Mundus Moralis* with respect to the role which prudence plays *(prudentia)* in relation to the other cardinal virtues – fortitude *(fortitude)*, justice *(justitia),* and temperance *(temperantia).* Comenius' conception of virtues is further compared with the traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine formulated prevailingly by Aquinas. In conclusion, it is shown that it is the position of prudence *(prudentia),* as an intellectual virtue that connects significantly Comenius with the Aristotle-Thomistic tradition in this perspective.

Keywords: Comenius, moral virtues, cardinal virtues, prudence, Aristotle, Aquinas

Introduction

The quality of the human personality was an important topic that has attracted attention since the ancient history of mankind. One can think of the mythological figures of gods and heroes, whose properties have been praised or vilified. Moral qualities occupy a special position here, as the qualities that give direction to human behaviour. These properties, when they are morally positive, are called virtues,[1] morally negative ones are vices. Virtues that were of fundamental importance to human behaviour, over time, came to be called cardinal virtues,[2] those around which human life spins like a door in their door jambs *(cardo)* (Aquinas, 2013, p. 34).

The cardinal virtues are four: justice *(justitia)* – traditionally perceived as a virtue to give everyone his or her rights (Comenius, 1966b, p. 566),[3] fortitude *(fortitudo)* – the strength to face difficulties, in particular the danger of death (Comenius, 1966b, p. 536),[4] temperance *(temperantia)* – the right level in the pursuit of sensual pleasure (Comenius, 1966b, p. 662).[5] A special role in this foursome is taken by prudence *(prudentia)* – the correct judgment regarding human behaviour (Comenius, 1966a, p. 624)[6] according to which a prudent person decides on the appropriate course of his or her actions. As prudence directly controls judgment and conscience underlying every other virtue, it becomes a kind of conductor who manages the other virtues. Additionally, prudence can be understood as a light, which makes practical reason discern the true good in every situation and choose the appropriate means to achieve it. Consequently, other virtues are derived from cardinal virtues, as parts of them *(partes subjectivae, integrantes, potentiales),* aside from the obviously divine virtues (Hope, Love, and Faith) that have an entirely different position.

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[1] It should be noted that the ancients understood the meaning of the word virtue *areté* more widely, as a prowess that originally was not confined to the field of the moral. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics systematically distinguished intellectual and moral virtues.

[2] The term cardinal virtues *(virtutes cardinales)* was first used by Saint Ambrose in his *Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam* [Commentary on the Gospel according to Luke].

[3] *Justitia est virtus suum cuique tribuens. Vel, est ad juris leges vivendi studium.*

[4] *Fortitudo est ad ea, quae difficultatibus terrent, sive in agendo, sive in patiendo robur.*

[5] *Temperantia est cupiditatum et actionum moderatio,ut ne quid nimis.*

[6] *Prudentia est ars tranquilitati suae et aliorum providendi, per media certa, mediisque utendi modos debitos.*

The theme of virtues has become an important part of Christian ethics and it would be certainly interesting to watch its development through centuries and cultures. In our context, however, it is important that among the many thinkers who paid attention to virtues was Jan Amos Comenius (1592–1670). In this text I intend to focus on the concept of virtues, particularly prudence, as contained in the 6th grade of Pansophy entitled *Mundus moralis –* Moral World which is part of Comenius's work *De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica* – General Consultation on the Reform of All Things Human. His views are consequently compared with the traditional Aristotelian conception which was further processed primarily by Thomas Aquinas, but also by other Christian theologians. Finally, I will argue that it is the position of prudence (*prudentia)*, as the intellectual virtue that significantly connects both systems.

Comenius's *Mundus Moralis*

It should be noted that although Comenius in *Mundus moralis* deals with the moral dimensions of man, it is discussed together with other political, politico-philosophical, or educational issues (Schifferová, 1993, pp. 50–64). Compared with other Comenian writings, as well as with other parts of the Consultation, *Mundus moralis* shows that it is in many ways an unfinished work, the final edition of which was never made. The work also lacks a uniform concept, much of it remains faintly, and the thought continuity is often unclear. Here we find a large variety of references and citations, often inaccurate, suggesting that Comenius gathered them to later clarify the relevant issues, and probably with the intention of making substantial reductions of or refinements to the text in the final processing (Schifferová, 1992, pp. 249–250). Nevertheless; despite its incompleteness, Comenius' Moral World provides good idea of Comenius' ethical thinking, especially of his conception of moral virtues that is our focus here.

The basic principles of the Moral World are contained in the first introductory chapter, *Mundus Moralis quid, et quae illius Principia*, where the author emphasizes that the moral foundation of the World lies in human nature. That remains the same in all people, and its basic requirement is that the person lives like a human, not as a dull beast (Comenius, 1966a, p. 549).[7] Here it should be noted that this is a clear reference to natural law theory, which recognizes the standards of human nature as the supreme criterion for norm correctness. This would be nothing too special, since the tradition of natural law theory comes from ancient philosophers and was also recognized in various forms in the Middle Ages. However significant differences existed between the different variants of natural law theories, for the conviction of the close relation between nature and reason is typical of all of them. Generally, it can be said that natural law theory in all its forms presupposes a reasonable nature and its corresponding human mind, which is able to recognize this nature and to subtract from it the laws and rules of human conduct.

Nevertheless; the fact that Comenius based his Moral World on human nature is gaining importance, especially if we keep in mind that Comenius was a theologian of the Unity of Brethren. As such he was confronted with Protestant beliefs about the irreversible corruptness of human nature, which was the basic theological proposition of the reformist movement of the 16th century.[8] The problem of the concept of human nature in Comenius' views on ethics deserves more thorough attention. It would be also interesting to indicate Comenius *Mundus*

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[7] *Mundi Moralis basis sit Naturae Humanae identitas seu aequalitas, hoc requirens, ut Omnes Homines vivant humaniter, non brute aut bestialiter.*

[8] While the foundation of moral principles on human nature is not unusual, it was highly original that Comenius derived his teaching art from human nature, as pointed out by Stanislav Sousedík (Sousedík, 1983, pp. 34–47).

moralis for understanding the context of the Protestant ethic, but that would far exceed the scope of this paper.[9]

The first chapter of the Moral World is concluded with a reflection on the moral principles as derived from metaphysical principles. This derivation is not satisfactorily drafted, it is incomplete, but from the text it follows that Comenius (like many of his contemporaries) did not realize the philosophical difficulty of this process.[10] The second chapter is devoted to human prudence (*prudentia*), which is presented as the builder of the Moral World. Its structure is further divided into six parts, each of which refers to prudence, namely: I. Ethica – prudence to regulate oneself, II. Symbiotica – prudence to control oneself and another, III. Economica – prudence to manage others associated in a society, especially in the family, IV. Scholastica – prudence to manage schools, V. Politica – prudence to manage the community, VI. Basilica or monarchica – prudence to govern the kingdom. At first glance, it is evident, that prudence occupies a fundamental position in the entire system (no matter how flawed and incomplete). In the second chapter, which is wholly devoted to prudence, it is defined as the art of taking care of tranquillity using certain resources and using them appropriately (Comenius, 1966a, p. 550). Comenius further explains that the essence of moral prudence is in the use, imitation, and control of oneself and others. The origin of prudence is necessary, according to the author, to be found in our tendencies, patterns of nature, and in the Scripture. Comenius points out that natural innate concepts are often a highly reliable guide of practical wisdom – and then for ethics. Comenius further gives universal moral laws of prudence, which take the form of guidelines and recommendations relating to prudence.

The following chapters explain how to behave prudently to oneself, among people and against them, and in the family, towards youth and in the government of the community. The penultimate chapter discusses the moral perfection of the world in opposition to so called monsters and their shortcomings, which hinder the government over human nature and finally the tenth chapter is a celebration of God's governance of the moral world. These chapters mainly contain particular regulations, guidance or quotations relating to prudent conduct in certain situations, their logical connections, however, are unclear in many places due to the aforementioned incompleteness of the work.

While the status of prudence in Comenius' Moral World is crucial, we find it difficult to discover the references to the other cardinal virtues. For example, justice is mentioned in chapter IV on the prudence in managing oneself, along with others or in chapter II – The art of dealing with people – Symbiotic. Comenius at this point indicates that the connecting links in human relations are primarily concord (*concordia*), justice (*justitia*), and faith (*fides*). Concord is included here, as not offending or provoking anybody, justice, not deceiving each other, and finally faith because we should take care of what concerns us as well as others appropriately (Comenius, 1966a, p. 570).[11] At the beginning of the following chapter, which deals with prudence in controlling others merged into the community, Comenius reiterates

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[9] Attention should especially be paid in this context to the practical philosophy of Comenius' teacher Herborn Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638), as presented in the IVth part of his *Encyclopedia*. At first glance, it is obvious that some parts of Alsted's ethics coincide with Comenius's Moral World chapters. In the introduction Alsted explains that human nature leads to love of virtue. (*Homo natura duce amat honestum*) Human nature has been corrupted by original sin, but may be, in Alsted's opinion, rectified by philosophy to some extent. Theoretical philosophy eliminates the disease of the mind, practical philosophy eliminates the disease of the will – vices (Alsted, 1630, p. 1236).

[10] The problem was formulated by David Hume, who pointed out that many authors conclude prescriptive sentences (ought to statements) based on descriptive sentences (is-statements). Called *Hume's law* or *Hume's guillotine*. (Hume, 1739, III, I, 1).

[11] *Vinculum conversationis potissimum sunt Concordia, Justitia et Fides… Justita, ut alter alterum ne defraudemus…*

that relationships with other people requires humanity, justice and goodness, and other virtues which characterize friendly ties (Comenius, 1966a, p. 577).[12] Brief mentions of justice are found even in the seventh chapter – Politics, where Comenius emphasizes the need for a just ordering of society and laws that are the standard for justice (Comenius, 1966a, p. 586).[13] Temperance – *temperantia* is mentioned in the chapter on Ethics where Comenius also engaged it in self-control issues, in which he sees the essence of being temperate (Comenius, 1966a, p. 562).[14] The same chapter also explains that temperance is needed for a person not to fall into unrestrained desires, such as unrestrained desire for wealth, pleasure, fame, or knowledge. Fortitude is cited as one of the desirable virtues in the event when it is necessary to face adversity, through equanimity, magnanimity and patience (Comenius, 1966a, p. 567).[15]

It can be briefly summarized that Comenius's *Mundus moralis* is built on the fundamental role of prudence, while the other cardinal virtues are subordinated only to one of its species. Comenius did not adhere to the schema of four cardinal virtues; on the one hand, the above intentioned role of prudence suggests (as will be shown) a certain conformity with the traditional concept.

The ancient concept of moral virtues – Aristotle

Aristotle, on whose intellectual legacy this concept is largely based, developed his ethics clearly in terms of virtues. These are understood as a kind of soul quality, a habitus – a stable disposition that enables certain actions to be carried out easily. You could also say that through frequent repetition, one becomes more at ease with a certain activity and thereby acquires habit (Aristotle, 1103a 15–20). In the case of virtues in respect of morally good acting, it stands in the middle between two undesirable positions. Aristotle divided virtues into those improving reason and those perfecting the will and sensual assiduity. Various virtues are manifested in various areas of human life, among which Aristotle ranks fortitude and temperance (Aristotle, 1107a 28–1108b 10). Justice is discussed in considerable depth later in Book V of Nicomachean Ethics which begins with the claim that justice is the condition that renders us just agents inclined to desire and practise justice. Further, Aristotle specifies it in terms of what is lawful and fair. Two sorts of justice are further distinguished: distributive justice that involves dividing benefits and burdens fairly among members of a community, while corrective justice requires us, in some circumstances, to try to restore a fair balance in interpersonal relations where it has been lost. Like all moral virtues, for Aristotle, justice is a rational means between bad extremes. Proportional equality involves the "intermediate" position between someone unfairly getting "less" than is deserved and unfairly getting "more" at another's expense (Aristotle, 1129a–1132b, 1134a).

The last cardinal virtue is prudence; Aristotle ranked it among the intellectual virtues, along with knowledge, art, understanding and wisdom.[16] The only one of them, which applies to human behaviour, is prudence. While Plato considered wisdom (*sofia, sapientia*) one of the foremost virtues, which is a virtue of the rulers in his *Republic* (Plato, 427 e),[17] Aristotle replaced this virtue with prudence (*phronésis, prudentia*).[18] In his conception it is a rational

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[12] *Vidimus praecendenti capite, quomodo nemo nostrum nascatur sibi uni, ac necessitate conversandi ad Humanitatis, Justitiae, Benignitatis, aliarumque virtutum amicabilium exercitium devinciantur omnes.*

[13] *Leges sint norma justitiae, ideae rerum agendarum.*

[14] *Regimen suiipsius in cupiditatibus per Temperantiam.*

[15] *Fortitudine animi hic opus est, quae vincat omnia per aequanimitatem, magnanimitatem, patientiamque.*

[16] The concept of Aristotle's phronésis is treated thoroughly by Aubenque (Aubenque, 1963).

[17] The concept is derived from the virtues of an ideal city-state, which are to be wise, courageous, sober and fair.

[18] Wisdom remains one of the intellectual virtues, in some respects superior to prudence, but prudence is directly related to human behaviour, while wisdom refers to divine things.

sound judgment relating to human behaviour in terms of its accuracy. So it is a virtue that in this sense stands above the other virtues, because it governs them in accordance with intellectual knowledge so that they follow a good purpose. Although Aristotle was concerned with all the cardinal virtues, it should be noted that this quartet is not thematised in his work, cardinal virtues are treated separately and to gather them together into one unit is a mere interpretation.

The foursome of cardinal virtues; nevertheless; can be found in Cicero, particularly in the work *De Officiis*, where the four components of virtue are described, in which all honest behaviour is based (Cicero, 1994, I,5,15). It turns out, however, that in this text Cicero rather held Plato's teachings that systematically assigned the main place to the virtue of wisdom – knowledge of things divine and human, rather than to prudence, which, as stated, is the knowledge of things desirable and contemptible. However, he also dealt with prudence and defined it as the knowledge of good, bad, and neutral things including memory *(memoria)*, intelligence *(intelligentia)*, and providence *(providentia)*.

Thomas Aquinas on cardinal virtues

The four cardinal virtues, mainly based on Platonic Stoic tradition, enriched by some Biblical elements, were later adapted to a Christian context, primarily due to St. Ambrose, who was the first to use the term cardinal virtues.[19] Since the Patristic writers it made a major impact on the Middle Ages especially in Jerome's concept of virtue and above all Augustine's ethics. His work includes two approaches to cardinal virtues. The first is relatively optimistic about the ability to achieve spiritual perfection. In the latter, Augustine was under the influence of the polemics with Pelagianism, and he held rather pessimistic views. In the *City of God*, he even rejected the possibility of the virtues of non-Christians, arguing that mastery over the body remains poor, if it is not formed by the spirit of true religion. This position is close to that of the Lutherans, for which human nature is so corrupt that it is naturally incapable of good deeds.

A lively medieval ethical debate followed especially on the part of these Church Fathers and ancient sources, and from the 13th century, Aristotle's doctrine became an important source. The rediscovered Aristotelian ethics gave rise to new ethical considerations of many philosophers and theologians, from which the most important was Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas took the theme as a key issue in two of his works, in *Questiones disputatae de virtutibus* q. 5 and in the *Summa of theology* II, 1–2. To some extent, there he follows the doctrine of Augustine, which is nevertheless developed along the lines of Aristotelianism.

In his *Questiones disputatae* Aquinas (referring to Aristotle's doctrine) explains firstly that man is of sensuous nature, which also animals have. But what makes us human different from animals is reason and therefore it is necessary to seek a control element not in the plane of the senses (pleasure-centred), which is insufficient for human behaviour, but in the rational plane, which is thus decisive for humans. Reason, however, is twofold, partly speculative, and partly practical. Practical reason is the most appropriate for man because it is the principle of active life. Practical science is very important for life – everyone needs it, because everyone in this life acts, while speculation is not a standard, but rather a transcendent aspect of man.

The activity of a virtuous life is significantly influenced by the deliberation of what needs to be done, and prudence is a virtue that cultivates this rational thinking. For Aquinas it is the main virtue, because it should be said that the rational is the principal part of man. However, something is rational in two ways, essentially or by way of participation and, just as reason itself is more principal than the powers participating in reason, so prudence is more principal

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[19] The outline of development of the conception of cardinal virtues in ancient times and the Middle Ages is provided by Tomáš Machula (Machula, 2013, pp. 4–23).

than the other virtues (Aquinas, 2013, q. 5, 1,11).[20] Aquinas confirms the four cardinal virtues, "it should be said that the cardinal virtues are called more principal, not because they are more perfect than all the other virtues, but because human life more principally turns on them and the other virtues are based on them" (Aquinas, 2013, q. 5, 1, 12).[21]

Other virtues are derived from the cardinal as their integrating parts (*partes integrantes*), i.e. those that help to ensure that the virtue was complete, or perfect, or as their potential parts (*partes potentiales*), i.e. those which, although they agree in some way with the cardinal virtues, are somehow not implemented in the concept perfectly, and finally subjective parts (*subjectivae partes*) which are subject to cardinal virtues as a species to genus.

If we focus our attention on prudence that has, as already stated, the key role, we find that its integrating virtues are acts of reason, which is prepared for correct judgment. These include memory (*memoria*), providence (*providentia*) or vigilance (*circumspectio*) and caution (*cautio*). Its potential parts are *eubulia* – resourcefulness in providing advice, *synesis* – appropriate judgement according to the rules of the corresponding situation and *gnomé* –a higher judgment on things, in which it is sometimes necessary to derogate from the general law. Finally, the subjective parts of prudence are personal prudence, prudence in the management of others (family prudence – in the management of the family, political prudence – in the management of the state). In the same way it would be possible to determine the portion of the remaining three cardinal virtues.

Conclusion

Returning now to Comenius Moral World, it is clear that the concept of prudence largely corresponds to the Aristotelian notion of prudence (*phronésis*) as a virtue that belongs to human reason. Reason is typical of human nature; it is precisely the rational side which differentiates human nature from animal. In the traditional Aristotelian-Thomist schema prudence exists as a necessary condition of the other virtues, which controls action through the last practical judgment. On the other hand, as prudence has no sense without the other virtues, neither the other virtues are thinkable without prudence. If behaviour is not properly attached to virtues, reason is not inclined to judge correctly. This scheme, however, we do not find in Comenius' Moral World. However it emphasizes the priority of prudence and the resulting dependence of the other virtues, the fact that the other virtues are also necessary for prudence itself, Comenius' text does not show explicitly.

Comenius' own interpretation is directed along the lines of subjective subordinate parts (*partes subjectivae*) of prudence. According to them his *Mundus moralis* is divided into other chapters –prudence to themselves, to others in the family, in the kingdom, etc. In these chapters we find references to other cardinal virtues, which, nevertheless, are not given special attention. They stand beside other virtues without special emphasis on their status.

As is known, Comenius drew on many sources, both traditional and contemporary, reflected the philosophical and theological considerations and on this basis, he then built his original projects. It was pointed out that in the Moral World an ancient Socratic line is represented, resulting in stoicism, especially Seneca, Biblical tradition, namely the immediate effect of the Gospels and Paul of Tarsus and through a reformed Christianity (Schifferová, 1993, pp. 50–64). But I believe and I even tried to show, to give priority to, prudence

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[20] *Ad undecimum dicendum est , quod principalis pars hominis est pars racionalis. Sed rationale est duplex: scilicet per essentiam et per participationem; et sicut ipsa ratio est principalior quam vires participantes ratione, ita etiam prudentia est principalior quam aliae virtutes.*
[21]*Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod virtutes cardinales dicuntur principaliores omnibus aliis, non quia sunt omnibus aliis perfectiores, sed quia in eis principalius versatur humana vita, et super eas aliae virtutes fundantur.*

(*prudentia*), as the intellectual virtue which makes us human, it is one of the essential features of the Moral World, which refers to the Aristotelian or Thomist tradition.

Prudentia in Comenius plays a role in the final adjudicator of the moral conduct of man, thus becoming the rule of the other virtues. The emphasis on the rational judgment connects the Aristotelian tradition with early modern thinkers. Its validity, however, I believe, is timeless. Without adequate intellectual assessment, the content of individual virtues can easily be emptied. In some cases, the unilateral application of a virtue without intellectual insight, which will consider its appropriateness in the situation, leads to dangerous or pernicious consequences, which in recent times, unfortunately, we have often become witnesses to.

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Egalitarian sexism: Kant's defense of monogamy and its implications for the future evolution of marriage II

Stephen R. Palmquist

Abstract
This second part of a two-part series exploring implications of the natural differences between the sexes for the cultural evolution of marriage considers how the institution of marriage might evolve, if Kant's reasons for defending monogamy are extended and applied to a future culture. After summarizing the philosophical framework for making cross-cultural ethical assessments that was introduced in Part I and then explaining Kant's portrayal of marriage as an antidote to the objectifying tendencies of sex, I summarize Kant's reasons for rejecting polygamy and for viewing monogamy as the only ethically acceptable form of marriage. Finally, I argue that if we apply Kantian principles to the real situation of marriage in many modern cultures, and if we wish to maintain a legitimate place for marriage in the future evolution of human culture, then the future evolution of marriage laws must recognize polyfidelity (i.e., plural marriages for both men and women) as being just as legitimate as monogamy.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant; sexism, marriage law, egalitarian ethics, cross-cultural assessments, monogamy, polygamy, polyfidelity

Kant on marriage as an antidote to the objectifying tendencies of sex

Part I of this two-part series (Palmquist, 2017) examined two key issues relating to Kant's various claims about women, many of which are likely to offend twenty-first century readers. First, I examined whether, as some critics have claimed, these claims necessarily contradict the egalitarian ethics that Kant so famously defends in works such as *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Critique of Practical Reason*. Second, I assessed whether recent interpreters are justified in condemning Kant himself as a sexist on the basis of his controversial claims about women.

I addressed these two topics against a background of the philosophical framework for making cross-cultural ethical assessments, proposed in the second section of Part I. This new framework revolves around the following key definitions and distinctions, which are presupposed here in Part II: (1) a *sexist* is a person who believes there are significant natural differences between males and females, whereas a *non-sexist* rejects this claim; (2) claims about *natural* differences (or differences in *nature*) may be limited to biologically based characteristics about the sexes or they may extend to include *culturally* conditioned (especially *social–psychological*) differences as well;[1] (3) sexism can be either *domineering*

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[1] Feminist scholars have differing views on whether nature predisposes men and women to be essentially different. Whereas many (especially early) feminists sought to downplay or even reject the idea that our biological nature gives rise to any essential social–psychological differences, so that any *de facto* differences in the latter realm ought to be opposed and eventually eliminated in the search for absolute equality (see e.g., Denis, 2001, pp. 20–21), some have actually emphasized and sought to increase awareness of such differences. Among those feminists who, like Kant, see real *equality* between the sexes as integrally bound up with an accurate awareness of how women are naturally *different* from men, Luce Irigaray is among the most influential. She challenges Kant's notion that everyone unavoidably experiences self-love, claiming that men and women experience self-love in very different ways. But in discussing this point, La Caze notes that for Irigaray, "sexual difference is more fundamental than all other differences" (La Caze, 2005, p. 105) – a point Kant would affirm, though of course the two had very different theories of *how* ethics and law must take this difference into consideration in order to create a society of justice and equality. Irigaray "argues that women and men cannot truly love where women are oppressed" (La Caze, 2005, pp. 106–107); that is, they must be "in a relationship that is not submissive to one gender" but wherein the rights of both sexes are protected by being "written into the

or *egalitarian*, where the former refers to the blameworthy belief that the allegedly natural differences between the sexes justify a person in *controlling* persons of the opposite sex, while the latter refers to the innocent belief that these differences are relevant *only* insofar as one's society must consider them in order to introduce cultural norms in an effort to create equality between the sexes; and (4) when making ethical assessments of persons from other cultures, we must judge such persons according *their* cultural context, not according to our own.

On the basis of this framework, Part I concluded that Kant *was* a sexist, but an *egalitarian*, not a domineering one, and that persons from other cultures (including, for example, everyone reading this series of articles) are therefore *not* justified in accusing Kant of being objectionably sexist merely because many of his comments and views would be inappropriate and/or offensive if they were expressed by someone in *our* cultural context. Part II now applies this framework to broader ethical issues by exploring the *evolution* of marriage through a series of four Kant–inspired examples of cross-cultural ethical assessment. Part I dubbed these paradigmatic examples "culture-k" (for the society of *Kant's* day, in which Christian ethics typically set the norms), "culture-p" (for a *pre*-Kantian society such as those depicted in the Old Testament, in which polygamy is allowed), "culture-m" (for modern day cultures in which marriage is legally defined as monogamous), and "culture-f" (for a proposed future society, where cultural norms will have evolved still further).

In the remainder of this section I explain how Kant's theory of marriage serves as an antidote to the objectifying tendencies of sex. As I briefly noted in the prequel, when discussing Kant's overall view of the nature of women, his theory is often derided as an outmoded expression of his personal sexism. Taking this theory of marriage as a basis for culture-k, the next section examines Kant's assessment of the pre-Kantian tradition of polygamous marriage (i.e., culture-p), which he regarded as an expression of an objectionable (domineering) form of sexism on the part of males toward females, then employs Kant's way of reasoning as the basis for questioning the continued value of anti-polygamy laws in the advanced stages of culture-m. The third and fourth sections then come full circle by arguing that the preference for monogamy in culture-m can itself promote domineering sexism, especially when viewed from the standpoint of a presumed future culture wherein plural marriage *by either sex* is both legal and culturally acceptable.

In his *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* Kant interprets the biblical story of Adam and Eve as an illustration of the conflict all human beings experience between nature and freedom. Nature, in the form of biological instinct, gives us certain desires that are essentially good. However, human imagination creates "artificial desires" that present us with options that give birth to our rational capacity for free choice. The story of the Fall uses hunger for the "forbidden fruit" as a symbol of these desires, but the lesson applies to all appetites, including the human sex drive. Once Adam's capacity for free choice is activated, according to Kant's reading of the story (Kant, 1963, pp. 111–112), he "discovered in himself a power of choosing for himself a way of life, of not being bound without alternative to a single way, like the animals." In terms of the aforementioned framework for making cross-cultural assessments of ethical situations, Kant is here describing the origin of what I previously referred to as the distinction between "biological nature" and "social–psychological nature".[2] That is, our free

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legal code" (La Caze, 2005, p. 107, quoting Irigaray's *Sexes and Genealogies*, p. 4). Interestingly, Irigaray (like Kant) does not want these rights to be *identical*, but rather claims they should be "*sexuate*" rights, "rights particular to each sex" (La Caze, 2005, p. 107, quoting Irigaray, p. 133), for only by taking our sexual nature into account can laws be constructed that will encourage genuine equality. This (Kantian!) claim will play a key role in the argument I advance in the second half of this article.

[2] In Part I of this series, I define "biological nature" as any characteristic of one sex that applies to its members from birth as a result of the physical make up that they did not choose; by contrast, "social–psychological nature" refers to the deeply ingrained habits that are part of a person's character because they were instilled into

choices as to how we will live determine how we will cope with our natural desires, including the desire for sex. In *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (6:26–27), he makes essentially the same point, portraying the impulse to sex as a key aspect of our predisposition to *good*, because it promotes life, but then warning that it is easily corrupted, when reason comes into play, through our power to *compare*.

In nonhuman animals, the natural desire for sex poses no inherent problem; but once human reason has been awakened, so that the ethical responsibilities accompanying freedom must be taken into consideration (namely, our duty to respect humanity both in ourselves and in other persons), our sex drive gives rise to a major ethical dilemma. According to Kant, engaging in sexually pleasurable behavior necessarily entails being treated as an *object* of pleasure by another person. He argues: "The desire which a man has for a woman is not directed towards her because she is a human being, but because she is a woman; that she is a human being is of no concern to the man; only her sex is the object of his desires. Human nature is thus subordinated" (Kant, 1930, p. 164).[3] Kant's categorical imperative commands us not to treat persons (including ourselves) *merely* as a means of self-gratification, so in order to remain morally good, our sex drive must be moderated by some rational safeguard that insures the persons enjoying such animal behavior will continue to uphold the rational requirement to respect each other as persons. Kant thinks that safeguard is the socially sanctioned, legal institution of marriage: "Sexual union in accordance with principle is *marriage* … that is, the union of two persons of different sexes for lifelong possession of each other's sexual attributes" (Kant, 1991, p. 277).

The key to Kant's definition of marriage is that it forces sexual union to *conform to a rational principle*. Lara Denis (2001, p. 10) isolates five basic aspects of Kant's principle of marriage: "(a) [the] partners have reciprocal use of each other as sexual objects, that (b) these rights extend beyond control over the others [*sic*] sexual organs to the 'whole person,' and that this relationship is (c) monogamous,[4] (d) permanent, and (e) legally enforceable." Kant's point in defining marriage as a sexual contract is not that procreation alone is the *purpose* of marriage. Quite the contrary: procreation is nature's purpose in giving us a *sex drive* (Kant, 1991, pp. 277, 424–426; Kant, 1997, p. 391; Kant, 1974, pp. 303, 310); see also Kant's Critique of Judgment (p. 425).; the purpose of marriage is to enable us to satisfy that natural drive in a morally justifiable way, just as the purpose of any contract is to ensure that the potentially conflicting desires of the contracting parties can be satisfied without one party unduly dominating the other. Once a marriage begins, Kant sees no problem with the partners having sex even in situations where procreation is unlikely or even impossible, because the nature of their union is such that it *could* be used for procreation. Soble ignores this point when he claims Kant "has killed his reliance on nature's end" by allowing non-procreative sex (Soble, 2003, p. 68). For Kant, non-procreative sex still satisfies a secondary end of nature (i.e., happiness), as long as the partners mutually *enjoy* the experience (e.g., Kant, 1991, p. 62). Soble acknowledges Kant's appeal to this second end of nature, but claims he is inconsistent in his appeal to it. Soble points out, quite rightly, that if pleasure is accepted as an independent end of nature, this could be used to justify homosexual marriage as well (Soble, 2003, p. 69). But because Kant tends to downplay (or even reject) uses of sex that *could only* be for pleasure (i.e., uses that could *never possibly* end in procreation), Soble ridicules a mere caricature of Kant's position: "The only permissible marital sex is boring marital sex" (Soble,

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him or her at an early age through explicit and/or implicit education concerning what is "proper" for his or her sex (Palmquist, 2017).

[3] Page references to translations of Kant's writings normally refer to the pagination in the relevant volume of the *Akademie Ausgabe*; only in cases where the translation does not specify the German pagination do I provide the English page numbers, as here; I indicate the latter by putting the page number(s) in parentheses.

[4] In the concluding section of this paper I explore the possibility that a marriage principle that does not require monogamy might be rationally justifiable for some culture-f.

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2003, p. 77).

As we saw in the prequel and will examine further in the following section, Kant advances a similar argument to defend monogamous marriage as superior to polygamy. He thought monogamous marriage is the only morally justifiable way to overcome what he took to be the key problem relating to sex, that in agreeing to have sex with another person, we allow ourselves to be used as a "thing", an object of the other person's sexual pleasure. Whereas marriage is traditionally conceived as an expression of one's dutiful commitment to another person (e.g., to love, protect, obey, etc.), Kant depicts it as providing an external (legally binding) means of fulfilling a person's duty to *oneself*, not to disrespect the humanity in one's own person while satisfying one's sexual desires. It avoids this disrespect in two ways: first, by requiring the partners to share equal ownership of all their *personal property*, it creates a new "moral person", so that in sex the marriage partners do not *merely* treat each other as objects of pleasure but also express respect for the personhood of their shared identity; and second, it encourages equality between the sexes by ensuring that each partner contributes to the household in a manner that befits his or her nature. Contrary to the claims of critics who deride Kant for being sexist (as discussed in Palmquist, 2017), Kant insists over and over that the marital relation must be characterized by radical equality of rights.

Pateman interprets Kant's pleas for equality in marriage as an "adept sleight of hand" whereby he only *pretends* to be giving women such a role, inasmuch as he in fact excludes women from the public sphere (Pateman, 1988, pp. 171–172). Against Pateman's claim that Kant is "inconsistent" in portraying women as freely agreeing to a marriage contract when they lack "civil personality", Wilson points out that Kant also viewed many males as passive citizens and that this classification did not prevent a person from entering into contracts or even owning property (Wilson, 2004, p. 119). Wilson follows Barbara Herman in taking Kant's idea of merged personality in marriage so seriously that the spouses appear to compromise their individual autonomy (Wilson, 2004, p. 112). In this context Wilson clarifies that Kant neglects love in his theory of the marriage contract simply because the purpose of the latter is to provide "an *external* mechanism" that will guarantee equality *whether or not* the couple's emotional attachment to each other persists (Wilson, 2004, p. 113). The state's role in all of this is "to secure the personal space within which individuals can develop their own moral personality" (Wilson, 2004, p. 121).

A thorough examination of Kant's theory of sex and sexuality is beyond the scope of this paper, though it would have to be carried out in order to present a complete assessment of the acceptable and unacceptable aspects of Kant's sexism. Commentators disagree, for example, on the issue of whether Kant's view of sex is consistent with feminist accounts – partly because feminist writers themselves hold differing positions on the nature and purpose of sex (see note 1, above). Mendus views Kant's position as opposed to the common feminist allegation that heterosexual sex specifically objectifies *women*. As she rightly explains: "In Kant's eyes, sex represents just as much an exploitation of the man by the woman as of the woman by the man" (Mendus, 1992, p. 31). Thus de Laurentius observes that "Kant's conception of sex in marriage has more in common with the generic feminist claim … than expected, though he extends this conception to both parties involved" (de Laurentius, 2000, 299n). Kant's view of sex, in this sense, may be more egalitarian than that of the many recent writers who, in their efforts to combat sexism, tend to view sexual objectification as an *exclusively* male vice. In any case, for our purposes we may give Kant the benefit of the doubt and assume he is right that sex objectifies *both* parties. As such, a key aim of this article is to answer the question: *if* Kant is right about the objectifying nature of sex, then can we glean anything from his theory of marriage as the solution to this problem that will be instructive for culture-m?

Although many today would disagree with Kant's claim that to engage in sex is to allow

oneself to be treated as a "thing", or that in marriage the partners exchange *ownership* of their sexual organs, we must accept this assumption as his basic starting–point, if we are to assess whether his view of women constitutes a domineering and thus objectionable form of sexism. A rare exception to the tendency merely to ridicule Kant's theory of sex instead of rationally assessing it is Denis, who acknowledges its continuing relevance even today: "although Kant's picture of sex is far from complete, I think that he has identified deep and morally troubling elements present in much of human sexuality. Sexual desire often does feel like an appetite for another person *qua* sexual partner; it often is difficult to continue fully to recognize the object of one's sexual passion as an autonomous, separate person; and when one has sex with another person outside of marriage, it can feel as though one gives her one's whole self, uncertain as to whether one is more than an object of enjoyment for her" (Denis, 2001, p. 9n).

Significantly, Kant does not actually say the marriage contract gives spouses ownership of each other's *persons*. This would contradict what he says in *The Metaphysics of Morals*: "So a man can be his own master (*sui iuris*) but cannot be the owner *of himself* (*sui dominus*)…, let alone be the owner of other human beings, because he is accountable to humanity in his own person" (Kant, 1991, p. 270). De Laurentius (2000, p. 308) thinks Kant simply forgot about this principle when he described the nature of the marriage contract as one whereby the spouses "possess each other in respect of their whole moral disposition [*Gesinnung*]" (Kant, 1997, p. 27:677). However, neither Kant's claim that spouses exchange ownership of certain *body parts*, nor his view that they somehow possess each other's *moral Gesinnung*, needs to be read as contradicting his claim that we cannot totally surrender our moral accountability as *persons*; for in both cases the *spouse* – unlike the unmarried sexual partner – has publically promised to *return* what he or she has given away.

To appreciate the plausibility such a position had for Kant, we must keep in mind that the chief alternative to culture-k was not culture-m but culture-p. That is, for all its disadvantages when viewed from the perspective of our modern ethical presuppositions, Kant's understanding of sex had the advantage of providing a solid foundation for upholding the superiority of monogamy over *polygamy*, its chief competitor in human history. With that in mind, let us therefore turn to examine Kant's reasons for regarding only monogamy and not polygamy as an ethically acceptable form of marriage.

Kant's rejection of polygamy and its implications for culture-m

Anyone nowadays who portrays the practice of polygamy in culture-p as a direct result of a genuine natural difference, one that culture-m tends to neglect at its peril, runs the risk of being labeled a domineering sexist by those who treat monogamy as the highest possible stage in the evolution of marriage. Nevertheless, there may be a biological (evolutionary) explanation for why most ancient cultures allowed men to have multiple wives but not vice versa. It was not merely a matter of men selfishly desiring political and social–psychological domination over women – though a tendency to condone domineering sexism was undeniably a by-product of the patriarchy that shaped many concrete historical expressions of culture-p. Such practices arose in nearly every ancient and primitive culture because nature predisposes men to be more likely than women to seek out multiple sexual partners. One of several possible ways of justifying this controversial claim[5] relates to the example of biological nature cited in the first article in this series: the fact that a fertile man produces millions of sperm each day, whereas a fertile woman produces only one ovum per month means that one man could potentially father hundreds of children in a year, whereas one woman can have no more than one full term pregnancy in one year. The tendency of males to be polygamous and

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[5] For a more detailed discussion of this point (Palmquist, 2003, especially Lecture 11|.

females to be monogamous appears to be rooted in this "brute fact" about how members of each sex must behave in order to realize the full potential of their sexual nature. Evolutionary biology accepts as commonplace that the natural tendency of males to focus on "the hunt" (e.g., for more and more women) and of females to focus on "the nest" (i.e., nurturing the offspring) is grounded in countless millennia of behavior governed by natural selection: polygamous behavior maximizes the survival value of the male's biological contribution to society, while monogamous behavior maximizes the survival value of the female's biological contribution.

Culture-p (e.g., the type of culture reflected throughout most of the Old Testament) typically regards the social–psychological nature of women as inferior to that of men; as such, women are given and taken in marriage without considering their own free choice; once married, they are regarded as their husband's exclusive property; husbands therefore make most if not all key decisions for the household, often without consulting their wives, whose proper role is to obey and follow, not to question. Polygamy is normal in culture-p, because people believe nature (or God) predisposes men to desire multiple sexual relationships and women to desire only one. For a man to have multiple wives is no more considered to be ethically wrong than it would be for him to own several houses, or more than one cow.

Kant's view of marriage is a clear advance on that of culture-p because he explains why polygamy is morally wrong: whereas culture-p allows and even encourages men to treat women as collectible objects, Kantian monogamy *forces* men to treat women as equals, as far as their personhood is concerned. For, as Kant points out, "in polygamy the person who surrenders herself gains only a part of the man who gets her completely, and therefore makes herself into a mere thing" (Kant, 1991, p. 278).[6] He makes the same point in his *Lectures on Ethics*: "If only one partner yields to the other his person, his good or ill fortune, and all his circumstances, to have right over them, and does not receive in turn a corresponding identical right over the person of the other, then there is an inequality here" (Kant, 1997, p. 388). Polygamy is wrong, according to Kant, because it confers fundamentally unequal rights onto the spouses. It positively *encourages* domineering sexism, whereas monogamy as Kant portrays it encourages an egalitarian relationship that is achieved by assigning roles for the partners that aim to compensate for the differences in their sexual nature.

By the standards of both culture-k and culture-m, culture-p is blatantly guilty of domineering sexism; yet a fair assessment of the moral status of an individual polygamous man living within culture-p would require a prior understanding of how *his culture* would distinguish between domineering sexism and egalitarian sexism. (Of course, the term "sexism" is a recent invention, first coming into common usage in the late 1960s [Shapiro, 1985]. When I refer to domineering sexism and/or egalitarian sexism as existing in cultures prior to culture-m, I am therefore referring to the view people in such a culture *would* have held, had they formed a clear concept of sexism.) Gaining such an understanding in the case of a biblical character such as, say, King David, would require an examination of the various Mosaic laws whose purpose was to remind men that, in spite of (or perhaps even *because of*) the lower place women had, presumably by virtue of their nature, males must take care to respect females and not treat them improperly. The *Torah* contains an elaborate set of laws requiring, for example, that: a man is not to engage in sexual intercourse with another man's wife; a man who rapes an unmarried woman must subsequently marry her; a brother, even if

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[6] In what follows, Kant criticizes not only polygamy, but several other marriage traditions that wrongly build inequality into the very nature of the contract (Kant, 1991, pp. 278–279). For substantial textual evidence that Kant saw the objectifying tendency of sex as a problem for *both* sexes, not only for the woman, so that marriage must solve the problem for both sexes equally (Wilson, 2004, pp. 106–118). Wilson points out that Kant's rejection of polygamy, by contrast, focuses *only* on "a concern with the status of women in relationships of these sorts" (Wilson, 2004, p. 120).

already married, must marry the wife of his deceased brother if she has not yet given birth to children; when taking a new wife a man is not to divorce an existing wife merely out of disinterest but is to continue loving and supporting her along with the other(s); if divorce is deemed necessary for legitimate reasons, a husband must provide his ex-wife with a certificate of divorce; etc.[7]

These and other rules were designed to *protect* women against misuse by men. The charge that the rules themselves are an institutionalized form of domineering sexism, as someone from culture-m is likely to view them, would be incomprehensible to a person living within culture-p. While it would be quite proper to assess culture-p as a culture that *tends to tolerate* domineering sexism, it would not be right to regard every man (and certainly not every compliant woman) living in that culture as condoning domineering sexism. We should rather say that, within the context of culture-p, a person is guilty of domineering sexism if he or she does not abide by the rules that define how members of one sex are to *show respect* to members of the other sex, given that culture's understanding of nature.[8] These rules determine within that culture what constitutes inappropriate domination of women by men. The mere fact of being a polygamist, for example, would not suffice to make a man living in culture-p a domineering sexist – even though the whole of culture-p, by virtue of its acceptance of polygamy, may be judged to be immoral from the standpoint of culture-m. To be guilty of domineering sexism, a man living in culture-p would have to disrespect his spouse(s) and feel *justified* in doing so because a wife is *merely* a woman. By contrast, a man could live as an egalitarian sexist in a culture that encourages domineering sexism, provided he employs the rules of his culture as a means of showing respect to women, despite their presumed inferior nature. Though his actions would not be considered "equal treatment" for someone in culture-m, assessing his character in terms of the latter culture's rules of equality would be unfair to him.

Analogously, we may recognize someone as a "virtuous soldier" even if we regard the institution of war as *always* wrong. A pacifist may legitimately blame the soldier's culture for perpetrating the false notion that war is acceptable, while still honoring the soldier for being courageous, self-sacrificing, etc. However, a person who *recognizes* the wrongness of all war would probably make a bad soldier and can maintain virtue only by refusing to fight. Likewise, those who live in culture-m may be guilty of domineering sexism if they engage in the same activities that were acceptable for those who live in culture-p, because we can expect their awareness of what constitutes proper respect and equal treatment between the sexes to be greater. The range of attitudes and actions that can make a person in culture-m guilty of domineering sexism is far broader than the range for a person living in culture-p.

Were Kant to evaluate the moral status of someone such as King David, a polygamist living in culture-p, he would not cite culture-k's ban on polygamy as a rationale for accusing him of unfair treatment of women. A Kantian evaluation of such a person must be based on more fundamental principles, most notably, the categorical imperative. Thus, we must attempt to assess whether the man gave due respect to women as human beings, or treated them merely as a means to his own ends. What constitutes "due respect," however, will differ markedly between different cultures. Kant demonstrates his sensitivity to cultural evolution when he describes an Indian wife who, living in a rather peculiar version of culture-p, *expected* her husband to beat her and therefore took offense at a foreigner who attempted to intervene (Kant, 1974, p. 304n). Kant's use of this story as an example of culturally

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[7] For examples, respectively, of biblical texts where these ethical rules are found, see: Deut. 22:22–25; Deut. 22:28–29; Deut. 25:5; Ex. 21:10; and Deut. 24:1–3.

[8] For a culture that takes its cues from the Old Testament, the natural differences between the sexes might be defined in terms of God's plan in creating Adam and Eve. But we need not explore here the details of how such a culture might describe those differences.

inappropriate ethical assessment suggests he would *not* argue as follows: polygamy is always wrong because it necessarily entails domineering sexism; King David was a polygamist; therefore he was guilty of domineering sexism. Rather, Kant's illustration indicates he requires cross-cultural assessments to respect the cultural norms of the person being assessed. A modern Kantian wishing to condemn David as a sexist would therefore need to look for signs of disrespect (unfair dominance) that were recognizable even within his culture-p.

In King David's case, as the well-known story relates, he did procure one of his wives through illicit means. Seeing the beautiful (but married) Bathsheba bathing on her rooftop, he lusted after her, sent her husband to the front lines of battle, then married her once he was killed. To the unknowing observer, everything seemed proper. But the Bible relates how the judge and prophet, Samuel, subsequently brought David to an inward awareness of his own guilt: even though he had obeyed the letter of the law, by not having sex with Bathsheba until she was no longer married, he had broken the *spirit* of the law (in this case, both the norms of his culture and the categorical imperative) by treating another person (Bathsheba's husband) merely as a means to his selfish end.[9] Although Samuel's accusation focuses primarily on David's disrespect towards the deceased husband, the fact that David was willing to use such a means to procure another wife is evidence that he was guilty of domineering sexism, even within the expectations of culture-p: his desire to possess Bathsheba's body did not show due respect to her prior commitment to another man. Of course, more evidence would be needed in order to make a fully informed character assessment of King David; but this is only a passing illustration.

Our main purpose in this section is not to evaluate whether the Bible portrays this story as illustrating domineering sexism, but to evaluate the charge that Kant's way of defending monogamy over polygamy makes him guilty of such a charge. Keeping in mind the foregoing, Kant–inspired account of how we can condemn a cultural norm without necessarily condemning those who follow it with good intentions, let us therefore return now to the question of whether Kant can be exonerated from the feminist-led charge of domineering sexism. An aspect of Kant's alleged sexism that we have not yet considered is at one and the same time regarded by many commentators as his worst offense (supposedly showing that his other sexist claims *did* encourage men to dominate women after all) and yet ironically may also provide the basis for a rather surprising (Kantian) assessment of culture-m as it relates to the future cultural evolution of marriage.

Kant distinguishes at several points between active citizens (who have the right to vote) and passive citizens (who depend on others for their livelihood and therefore should not be allowed an independent voice in matters of public concern). In several offhand remarks, Kant seems to imply that being male is an absolute requirement for being a full or "active" citizen. For example, in 1793 Kant writes: "The quality requisite to this [i.e., to being a citizen], apart from the *natural one* (of not being a child or a woman), is only that of *being one's own master (sui iuris)*" (Kant, 1996, p. 295).[10] Gangavane claims that with such comments Kant absolutely "excludes women from the category of active citizens" (Gangavane, 2004, p. 367). Likewise, Cash says: "[W]omen are *automatically* excluded from active citizenship…. [T]he first qualification Kant makes is that an active citizen must be an adult *male*" (Cash, 2002, p. 128).[11] But such uncharitable interpretations are far from being necessary; it is just as plausible to read Kant as merely saying that this was the *de facto* situation in culture-k – a claim whose accuracy nobody disputes: women did not normally participate in politics in Kant's day. Unfortunately, like most interpreters, Mendus reads into Kant's passing

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[9] The fullest account of this episode in King David's life can be found in 2 Sam. 11–12. Psalm 51 is traditionally read as David's reflections on his guilt following this incident.

[10] See also Kant (1991, p. 126)

[11] For a thorough discussion of Kant's position on the citizenship of women (Mendus, 1992, pp. 23–30).

comments a view he never actually defends, that women are "by definition, incapable of independence" (Mendus, 1992, p. 30). She claims "it is undeniable" that in Kant's view of women "the contingent facts of eighteenth-century German society are elevated to the status of eternal truths" (Mendus, 1992, p. 30). Kant is supposedly insisting on "the elevation of contingent practices to the status of requirements of reason" and is denying the possibility of "anything other than the status quo" (Mendus, 1992, p. 39). One of the main purposes of this two-part series is to provide a viable alternative to such uncharitable readings of Kant's remarks about women.

Such offhand remarks need not be interpreted as prescriptive, especially since many of Kant's other claims about civil society imply that women must be given the opportunity to raise themselves up to a position where they are qualified to take on the responsibilities of full citizenship. He insists, for example, that in a culture that distinguishes between active and passive citizens, "everyone be able to work up from this passive status to an active status" (Kant, 1991, p. 315). His offhand comments about women do not imply that women *will never* be able to do this, just as the same comments do not imply that *male children* will never be able to do so. As Mosser puts it: "Kant's remarks about the dependence and passivity of women are in some sense politically accurate, given his era's *de jure* and *de facto* denial to women of their own, independent identities" (Mosser, 1999, p. 345). Kant's position reflects primarily that, up to that point, the vast majority of women had not in fact done so, and perhaps also that most people in culture-k would not understand why a woman would even *want* to do so, for it would seem to many as if she were choosing to lower her status by becoming like a man.

Within the context of a culture that does not allow women to vote, Kant's insistence on monogamy makes perfect sense, as a necessary *equalizing* force for women. Kant himself emphasizes this when he encourages women not to shy away from marriage, reminding them that without a marital commitment, sex will inevitably end up putting women in a "degraded" position, as "a mere means for satisfying man's desires", and adding: "[I]t is by marriage that woman becomes free: man loses his freedom by it" (Kant, 1974, p. 309). [12] This might seem like a bad joke to readers in culture-m, or a sinister way of keeping women in domestic chains so they would not attempt to procure *genuine* external freedom by fully participating in public life; but Kant appears to have taken it seriously. A monogamous marital commitment eclipses a man's freedom to fulfill his natural biological predisposition to seek out multiple sexual relationships, as Kant assumes a typical man will have done (or at least would *want* to do) prior to marriage, whereas it enhances a woman's natural biological predisposition to nurture and care for a family by providing her with financial protection (Kant, 1974, p. 309). Moreover, marriage limits a man's freedom to express his own social–psychological nature as an independent participant in public life by requiring him to consider the interests of his wife, whereas it provides a woman (through her proper role as ruler over her husband's inclinations) with access to a realm of public freedom that would otherwise be closed to her in

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[12] Mendus and Gangavane argue that Kant's emphasis on reciprocity between husband and wife is not enough to guarantee true equality (Mendus, 1992, p. 32; Gangavane, 2004, p. 366). As long as Kant denies women a fully equal status in public life (Gangavane, 2004, p. 366), this inevitably "leads to inequality within the family, as the wife never receives a right over the person of the husband in the identical manner in which the husband has right over the wife." While Kant would fully agree that the reciprocal rights are not "identical", he justifies his position by appealing to the natural differences between the sexes, claiming that *true* equality can come only when the social–psychological roles assigned to each are appropriate reflections of their respective biological natures. Thus he argues that juridical law must not contradict "the equality of the partners", so any provisions it makes for the husband's "dominance" must be "based only on the natural superiority of the husband to the wife in his capacity to promote the common interest of the household" (Kant, 1991, p. 279). What happens to the institution of marriage when a culture *denies* any such natural difference between the sexes, or decides that the woman is actually more capable in some respects than the man, will be discussed below.

culture-k, for the Kantian husband must regard himself as casting his vote on behalf of his wife, as her public proxy.

From the standpoint of culture-m, all of this seems disingenuous. Why not just give women direct access to citizenship and public life *on their own*? This, of course, is exactly what has happened in the transition from culture-k to culture-m. Indeed, emboldened by the newfound status of women as fully equal to men in their right to vote and to participate in public life, some feminists have sought to go *beyond* equality by promoting a kind of reverse sexism – as is aptly evidenced by the many writers nowadays who regularly employ a new set of sexist pronouns, "she/her/hers" as *substitutes* for the old sexist language whereby "he/him/his" referred to both sexes. Thus, for example, Robin May Schott describes the project of "philosophical feminism" as that of taking "women's experience *rather than men's* to select the objects and methods of investigation" (Schott, 1998, p. 40).[13] If this emphasis is regarded merely as an attempt to balance an equal and opposite "masculinist" agenda, then it may be an acceptable strategy, at least until women have fully attained the goal of equal power and influence in a given culture. However, it must be viewed not as an ethical norm that is somehow "absolutely" true, but as a necessary step in the long-term process of cultural evolution – *just as Kant regarded his own theory*. In both cases, to justify the theory by demonstrating its *a priori* relation to the categorical imperative shows only that it *can* be regarded as an ethical norm, not that it must *forever* be regarded as such. What the more radical feminist approaches tend to neglect (and the reason we must look forward to a future culture that corrects this neglect) is that the version of the marriage principle Kant took as self-evident, as a result of the assumptions generally accepted by culture-k, may no longer be *appropriate* on Kantian terms, once culture-m develops to the point where women have obtained full political equality to men.

Contrary to the way many feminists read Kant, we need not read his view of women as "a categorical denial … that anything other than the status-quo [i.e., the norms of culture-k] might be either feasible or permissible" (Gangavane, 2004, p. 371); rather, Kant's open acknowledgment that ethical norms evolve looks forward to future changes in the way nature's end might manifest itself in human culture. The question that ought therefore to be obvious (yet is almost never raised) is: if monogamy, as the principle of marriage necessary to render sexual relations moral in Kant's day, worked by promoting a view of wives as subordinate to (i.e., fully free only through their private influence over) their husbands, then when culture evolves to the point where it abandons this view of the indirect role of women in public life, how does that affect the rational principle that ought to define the nature of marriage? If the unquestionable faith many in culture-m put in the absolute normative superiority of monogamy turns out to carry with it a new form of (typically hidden) domineering sexism, then culture-m may be making the same error many accuse Kant of making, namely that of "justifying the present injustice in the name of a just society which is supposed to emerge in some remote future" (Gangavane, 2004, p. 371).[14] To conclude this

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[13] She goes on to cite numerous examples of western dualisms that favor males (Schott, 1998, p. 42) and points out "that the prevailing psychological theories of moral development display a distinctly masculine bias" by focusing "on justice and rights" while devaluing the more feminine values of "care and responsibility" (Schott, 1998, p.43). The allegation that Kant's philosophy supports such a devaluing has been challenged by Sedgwick and others (Palmquist 2017, note 35). For those who make such allegations are *confirming* Kant's basic claim that the natural differences between men and women must be taken into consideration in any concrete application of ethical principles such as marriage. The claim that feminine psychology focuses not on "justice and rights" but on "care and responsibility" is ironically reminiscent of Kant's supposedly offensive generalization that "women's philosophy is 'not to reason, but to sense'" (45, quoting Kant, 1960, p. 230[79]).

[14] Gangavane adds: "If both men and women are being used by nature to serve its own purpose, there is no reason for [society] to put unjust restrictions on women and to deny her [*sic*] the opportunity for moral development" (Gangavane, 2004, p. 373). Precisely this rationale, but applied to men, lies at the root of my prediction, in the remainder of this article, as to how marriage norms will evolve in the future.

study we shall therefore turn our attention to this possibility – i.e., to an assessment of the view upheld by culture-m, that an ethically justifiable marriage must be monogamous.

Polyfidelity as an antidote to the domineering sexism in anti-polygamy laws

If asked why polygamy is (and ought to continue to be) illegal, a common response of many people in culture-m would be that such a law protects women from the dangers of domineering sexism.[15] This was quite true and proper in the context of culture-k, where women were still typically regarded as subordinate to men, due to the influence nature was believed to have on the proper social–psychological roles played by the sexes. Any culture that portrays nature as having given women more of an ornamental value than an independent power of choice needs to have laws preventing men from taking advantage of this situation by merely *collecting* women for their own enjoyment, lest it institutionalize domineering sexism. The imposition of such increasingly effective laws is a major factor that justifies the claim that culture-k is morally superior to culture-p and so also, that culture-m is morally superior to culture-k.

Kant pushed culture-k beyond its previous comfort zone, providing the philosophical foundations for the transition from culture-k to culture-m. He did this, as I argued in Part I, by developing a moral philosophy that completely ignored the natural differences between the sexes and a cultural anthropology that viewed these differences as complementary functions that can work together for the good of the whole, rather than as functions that justify members of one sex in disrespecting members of the other sex. Once Kant's philosophy has had its full effect, once culture-m reaches the level of maturity whereby all or the vast majority of its members agree that men and women (whether or not they have different natures) must be accorded *equal levels* of respect and freedom, the types of laws that will be appropriate to guarantee the further growth and development of the human race in that future culture will need to be revised accordingly.

The foregoing speculation raises a fascinating question: is it possible that, even though most people today may be unaware of condoning a form of oppression, culture-m has institutionalized a new and very different kind of sexism?[16] Kant, of course, would not see culture-m in this way, for he defended monogamous marriage as fulfilling "the end of humanity in respect of sexuality" (i.e., "to preserve the species" through procreation) "without debasing the person" (Kant, 1930, p. 170). Legalized polygamy debased the humanity in women because it sanctioned an imbalanced relationship: the husband receives the whole woman but only gives her part of himself. Monogamy corrected this imbalance by regarding the wife as an equal even though strictly speaking (i.e., in terms of her *legal status* as a citizen) she was not. But once women obtain the same legal status as men, as they now have in most parts of the world, does the principle of monogamy still fulfill the sexuality of both persons in a manner that preserves equality and thus avoids debasing either partner? If Kant was right in claiming that the biological nature of men and women is fundamentally different,

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[15] In the USA anti-polygamy laws were introduced as a direct response to Mormonism, first by President Lincoln in 1862 and then more forcefully by President Arthur in 1882. While these laws were probably also motivated by economic and political concerns, the *explicit* rationale given was that Mormon plural marriage was oppressive to the women involved.

[16] Along these lines, Mendus concludes her harsh critique of Kant's sexism by warning that "to abandon eighteenth-century German values for twentieth-century British values is not necessarily an improvement, particularly if the philosophical model underpinning both is faulty" (Mendus, 1992, p. 41). Similarly, Elam argues that an open-minded interpretation of Kant's notion of a "beautiful woman" in the third *Critique* "can give feminism, for all its sophisticated assessment of the status of women in modernity, additional insight into how its own practices can avoid repeating the very injustices it has tried to redress" (Elam, 2010, p. 119) The beautiful woman's body, Kant says in §17, presents in visible form "the moral ideas that rule men inwardly". Elam does not relate this passage to Kant's theory of the evolution of marriage, but it seems obviously consistent with his view that women's rule over men has a moralizing effect on them (Palmquist, 2017, p. 52).

and if the nature of women no longer calls for special consideration because they have obtained equality under the law, then a principle of union that continues to give their nature special consideration risks debasing the male sexually (though not politically and financially, as polygamy did to women in culture-p). If nature inclines the typical woman to be devoted to one partner, while the typical man is naturally inclined to seek out multiple partners, then in cultures where women enjoy absolute legal equality with men, what is the rationale for giving preference to feminine nature in the legal definition of marriage? As one moderate feminist says, "all rights should be 'sexuate' in the sense that they should serve, directly or indirectly, to secure for women *and men* the all-important ability to *enhance their sexuation* through culture" (La Caze, 2005, p. 112).[17] Does legally enforced monogamy still accomplish this goal at the most mature stage in the development of culture-m?

Commentators on Kant's theory of marriage have noted, often disapprovingly, that he treats friendship, not marriage, as the highest expression of love.[18] He does so because true friendship as he conceives it is a relation between *equals*, partners who learn to balance the opposing forces of love and respect. Given the lower status of women in culture-k, Kant (like Aristotle) assumed true friendship, if it occurs at all, would be between persons of the same sex. Now that women have gained legal equality with men, this restriction is no longer applicable. We may therefore be able to enrich Kant's conception of marriage by incorporating into it aspects of his theory of friendship. One such aspect is that friendships are not exclusive:[19] a person can have committed friendships with more than one person without offending any moral principle. This could not apply to marriage in culture-k because the law *forced* marriage partners who viewed each other as naturally unequal to *act as if* they were equal. But once the law *does* give women and men equal rights, monogamy serves no such purpose; instead, it unduly favors the feminine side of a sexual relationship, thus in effect debasing male sexuality by eclipsing the man's natural tendency to prefer multiple concurrent sexual commitments.

The transformation of culture-m into culture-f will occur as people change their view of what laws can best protect both men and women from social–psychological abuse in their sexual interactions with each other. This change is already in the process of happening in many places, with an emphasis on the possibility of same-sex marriages for a minority of the population, but needs to be taken considerably further before its full implications for society in general become evident. Just as men in a fully matured culture-k agreed to sacrifice an aspect of their nature in order to promote greater equality between the sexes, women in a fully matured culture-m will need to agree to sacrifice their preference for viewing marriage as

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[17] La Caze quoting Alison Stone, "The sex of nature: A reinterpretation of Irigaray's metaphysics and political thought", *Hypatia* 18.3 (2003): 76, second emphasis added; cf. note 1, above.

[18] See, for example, Denis (2001). In Part Four of Palmquist (2003) I make the same claim about friendship.

[19] Denis shows how a richer, "ideal" view of marriage, one that is far more palatable to the modern reader, can be gleaned from Kant's writings by incorporating key elements of his view of friendship into his theory of marriage (Denis, 2001, p. 26). However, Denis never mentions the possibility of extending this incorporation to the criterion of inclusivity. Instead, she *emphasizes* monogamy as a crucial aspect of Kant's theory of marriage (Denis, 2001, pp. 10–13, 27) without acknowledging how friendship differs. Similarly, Cash argues that the duties Kant associates with marriage point not to his theory of spousal dominance and submission, but rather to a "unity of will … something like the way Kant sees it achieved in friendship" (Cash, 2002, p. 125), where love and respect are ideally balanced in perfect unity, much as attraction and repulsion function as balancing forces in the physical world (cf. Kant, 1991, pp.469–70[261]). The reason this suggestion appeals so much to us today but did not even occur to Kant is that Kant assumed ideal friendship can be approximated only by persons of the same sex, whereas today (now that women have achieved political equality with men) the idea of male–female friendship causes no problem to anyone who has fully taken on the (allegedly non-sexist) values of culture-m. Once the significance of this enormous step in the post-Kantian evolution of human culture is taken into consideration, we can no longer blame Kant for not attempting to incorporate friendship into marriage. For a good account of Kant's theory of the need for a balance between love and respect (La Caze, 2005, pp. 92–114).

exclusive in order to reflect the reality of their equal status with men in the public realm. The new principle of marriage as *polyfidelitous*[20] will still require some sacrifice from men, inasmuch as it requires them to be *faithful* to any partner with whom they have a sexual relationship – a trait Kant associates with feminine nature. But in culture-f, marriage law will accurately reflect the fully equal legal status of men and women by *not* assuming the old-fashioned view that having multiple concurrent sexual commitments necessarily debases women. Guarding against the tendency of sex to objectify and thus debase *both* partners equally, the new law will accord rights of shared personhood to any sexual partners who choose to be ethically responsible by committing themselves fully to the person(s) with whom they have sex. As such, the law will avoid one of the chief disadvantages that polygamy has for men (namely, that of making fewer women available for less advantaged men to choose from), inasmuch as it will allow females as well as males to have multiple legally binding commitments; neither sex will be protected *more* than the other. In other words, the law will be fully egalitarian, giving both women and men an identical right to make such multiple concurrent marital commitments for partners who mutually agree to such an arrangement. Of course, the law will not *require* plural marriage; many in culture-f will continue to find fulfillment in monogamy, while others may choose to continue what has already become the new standard in culture-m, which is simply to ignore the idea that sex partners ought to be married before they cohabitate, rear children, etc. The main point of my argument is that the growing tendency to marginalize the significance of marriage – a direct result of the failure of marriage to fulfill its proper functions in culture-m – can be reversed *only* by changing, in the not-so-distant future, the definition of what counts as a legal marriage.

How would polyfidelity (i.e., egalitarian plural marriage) be possible if, as Kant claims, a marriage contract requires me to "hand over my whole person to the other"? Kant himself provides the basis for an answer when he notes that, by "obtain[ing] the person of the other…, I get myself back again, and have thereby regained possession of myself" (Kant, 1997, p. 388). Having obtained myself in return, and within the context of a fully matured culture-m wherein women have equal political and financial power, why should the law prevent me and my spouse from agreeing together that one (or both) of us may also make a similar legally binding exchange with someone else? The only additional requirement in order to conform plural marriage to Kantian ethics, in a culture that treats men and women as fully equal under the law, is that both (or all) current spouses must freely agree to the addition of a new spousal

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[20] For a discussion of this concept within the context of a more general philosophy of love, see Palmquist (2003), especially Chapter IX. A polyfidelitous marriage is a lifelong (marital) commitment to sexual fidelity between two persons that does not prevent either person from making a similar lifelong commitment with another person. It is fundamentally different from polygamy, because the option of making a second, concurrent commitment is equally open to both sexes. Another important distinction is between polyfidelity and promiscuity, the two being virtual opposites: the former is *rule-governed*, based on commitment and mutual respect for persons (and therefore consistent with Kantian principles of right), while the latter is governed only by personal pleasure and whim. At present, most versions of culture-m manifested throughout the world still treat polyfidelity, like polygamy, as both morally unacceptable and illegal; yet in many cases they ironically go easy on mutually agreed promiscuity.

The well-publicized conviction in Utah of the Mormon, Tom Green, on four counts of polygamy in 2001 is a case in point. More recently, the trial of Warren Jeffs, leader of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, has attracted similar attention to the continued harsh treatment culture-m has on anyone who continues to promote polygamy. Feminists with views of nature like those described in my text (Palmquist, 2017, note 12), tend to approve of such prosecutions, as ridding culture-m of the last vestiges of culture-p. My argument here should *not* be construed as an approval of such remaining vestiges of polygamy, for they are indeed often motivated by attitudes and beliefs characteristic of domineering sexism. Rather, my argument is that when a culture emerges wherein both sexes have reached full maturity, anti-polygamy laws will become both unnecessary, because women will be able to look after themselves without depending on a special law that favors their nature, and undesirable, because such laws will be seen to promote a very different (but no less real) kind of sexism.

commitment. This effectively resolves Kant's ethical concerns over the one-sidedness of polygamy and its tendency to encourage over-indulgence by males in oppressing females.

The evolutionary theory of marriage I have sketched up to now can be summarized in terms of the way each cultural stage in the evolutionary process would answer two questions: (1) does the law promote egalitarian rather than domineering marriages? and (2) is marriage law non-sexist, ignoring any natural differences? Culture-p and culture-m both answer the first question negatively, while culture-k and culture-f answer affirmatively. The second question is negated by culture-p and culture-k but affirmed by culture-m and culture-f. This enables us to distinguish clearly between the main features of these four evolutionary stages: culture-p makes no effort to be egalitarian, nor does it shy away from sexism, being openly grounded in natural differences that make polygamy seem normal; culture-k affirms Kant's thoroughly egalitarian principles, thus rejecting polygamy, but justifies monogamy on the basis of a need to build sexual difference into the law in order to compensate for the lower status of women; culture-m insists that marriage law be non-sexist, yet preserves monogamy as the only legal option, thereby inadvertently exhibiting a domineering tendency in favor of feminine nature in sexual relationships; and culture-f, recognizing the inconsistency and potential injustice of culture-m, restores a fully egalitarian legal system by allowing multiple concurrent marital commitments as a legal option, thus refusing to favor the feminine preference for exclusivity.

The role of women in the transformation to culture-f

The change from culture-p to culture-k and from there to culture-m has been exceedingly valuable for the moral development of the human race. Whether willingly or by the collective force of their culture's influence on their nature, men (males) now regularly sacrifice (or at least, believe they *ought* to sacrifice) their inbuilt desire to realize their full natural potential by submitting to a culture that has instituted monogamy into its laws; those who would dare to challenge this relatively recent status quo run the risk of being labeled as domineering sexists. Why have men in culture-k and culture-m freely assented to the eclipsing of their nature in this way? They have done so because they quite properly realized the importance of allowing women equal access to freedom of choice and an equal right to have *their* side of nature properly respected. If Kant is correct in his aforementioned claim (Kant, 1974, pp. 303–311) that (at least in culture-k) women are primarily responsible for the enculturation of men (and so also of the whole human race, through their greater role in nurturing children of both sexes during their formative years), then ironically, women may have been more fundamentally responsible for effecting these developmental stages in the evolution of cultures than men. That is, even though men generally believe (and the history of human sexuality officially tells us) that the increased freedom of women has, by and large, come about because men have eventually agreed to women's demand that men "share" what used to be regarded as primarily theirs by nature, a more accurate explanation may be that mothers have "re-encultured" their children (especially the boys) at an early age to view females in new ways.

Whether or not we accept Kant's claims about the role of women in moral education does not affect my main argument in this concluding section, which is about the future of anti-polygamy laws. Significantly, one of the outcomes of culture-m has been that it tends to give men an increasingly active role in the moral up-bringing of children than they had in culture-k or culture-p. As this trend increases, children are being brought up to be more and more sensitive to a hidden tendency of culture-m to condone what might be called "domineering *non*-sexism"; as more and more of these children become adults, they will increasingly challenge this implication of culture-m and will eventually revise the law. The hidden tendency of culture-m to be domineering lies in the simple fact that the legal system favors the biological nature of one sex: institutionalized monogamy imposes norms that may result in

real biological and social–psychological abuse being done to anyone whose sexual nature points them in another direction.

Aside from the new child-rearing practices that tend to arise in culture-m, two crucial factors are likely to influence the transition to culture-f. First, natural *biological* differences will become increasingly less important, due to improvements in technological methods of overcoming our biological limitations. Indeed, this factor is already giving men and women a real choice as to whether they will produce babies according to the means nature has provided or through various artificial means – or not at all. A parallel factor, relating to natural social–psychological differences, is the acceptance by common citizens in culture-m of those twentieth century psychological systems that portray all humans as having aspects of *both* masculinity and femininity within them.[21] This insight reveals domineering sexism to be a ludicrous approach to relationships with the opposite sex, for it implies that one who adopts this disposition is, at least symbolically, oppressing *oneself*, treating *oneself* unfairly, preventing a part of *oneself* from maximizing freedom. When the implications of such insights are fully digested, how will the resulting culture-f assesses our culture-m assumptions about marriage?

Anti-polygamy laws were not needed in culture-k (see note 16, above), because marital arrangements such as the one Kant describes give men a sense that they have a *duty* to sacrifice their natural desire for multiple committed sexual relationships in exchange for the sacrifice of political and economic freedom being made by their spouse. Such laws became necessary only when culture-k began its transformation into culture-m, where they have served a good and proper purpose by preventing men from re-subjugating women as they gradually sought and obtained political and economic equality. But as women have gradually gained such equality in culture-m, with the right to vote and the expectation that they will contribute to the workforce and play key roles in government, these laws have been a major factor contributing to the huge increase in the divorce rate, which now threatens a virtual collapse of marriage as a reliable context for raising healthy children for the next generation. Obviously, the laws have not changed the biological nature of the sexes. Instead, they have merely ignored this important difference, imposing naturally feminine norms onto males, just as culture-p imposed naturally masculine norms onto females. As women living in culture-m become more and more accustomed to the increasingly equal access culture-m gives them to freedom and mutual respect, and as men begin to take up more and more responsibilities for childcare, two changes will gradually take place. First, *women* – especially those who have been raised and undergone moral education principally from their fathers – will (indeed, are already beginning to) insist that they are not "the same" as men after all, on the basis of an informed consideration of the natural differences that do exist between the sexes. That is, an acknowledgement of sexual difference will come to be seen not as a dangerous, "slippery slope" leading to domineering sexism, but as the only reliable *safeguard* against it. The tendency of well-meaning anti-sexists to label all forms of sexism as domineering on the grounds that no real natural differences exist (so that *anyone* who affirms such differences must thereby be objectionably sexist) will then be seen for the fiction it is.

The second change should now be self-evident. As a given society in the transition from culture-m to culture-f accepts the reality of natural sexual differences more and more widely, and refines its understanding of these differences through more and more sophisticated scientific research, the inequitable, domineering nature of laws defining marriage as necessarily monogamous will become more and more obvious. *Women* will then begin to recognize that such laws are no longer in their best interest. For some women, this may come

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[21] Among the most profound of these psychological theories is Carl Jung's theory of the "anima" and "animus" as unconscious representations of a person's opposite sex characteristics. For a detailed discussion of this and other features of Jung's psychology (Palmquist, 2008).

in the form of a desire for polyfidelity, recognizing it is possible for them simultaneously to live a life of legally binding, committed sexual love with two or more husbands. But for most, it will come as a result of recognizing that such laws, in most if not all examples of culture-m around the world, are now contributing to the heartache of divorce and broken homes that hampers the moral and psychological development of children. In other words, the very laws that were originally established to *protect* women from being oppressed by men in culture-m have, for some time now, been *causing* a considerable degree of heartache and oppression to both sexes. For a man in culture-m who, sincerely wishing to develop the capacities of his nature to their fullest by committing himself in genuine sexual love to more than one person, is told he must *choose*, even if his masculine way of understanding such natural differences does not require such a choice. As culture-m develops and such natural differences become less evident in our social interactions and psychological self-understandings, more and more women (though still a minority) are finding that they, too, may become aware of their ability to be committed to multiple partners. That is, laws banning multiple marriage actually reduce the freedom of *both* (or all) parties in such situations, eliminating a viable option that *some* persons (though probably always only a minority) would want to choose.

My suggestion here is that the only way to combat the hidden tendency of culture-m to oppress masculine sexuality is to work towards a culture-f that will do for males in culture-m what culture-k did for females in culture-p. Worried feminists might ask: What will prevent the relaxation of anti-polygamy laws from causing culture-f to fall back into the repressive, domineering sexist ways that were all–too–characteristic of culture-p? The answer is quite simple: *enlightened, empowered women will not allow it*. Until women in a sufficiently mature manifestation of culture-m have collectively reached this stage, through real political and financial equality (i.e., genuinely equal rights and equal pay), the existing anti-polygamy laws should therefore remain in place to protect them, thus forcing polyfidelitous individuals in that culture to continue accepting the burden of forced monogamy. Perhaps no manifestation of culture-m has reached this stage yet. But once the women in a given society are self-confident enough to accept them, the new laws will distribute the access to free choice in forming marital unions *equally* between men and women. Women will be as free to have multiple husbands (polyandry) as men will be to have multiple wives (polygamy), though they may not wish to take advantage of this option as often as men (because of their biological nature) are likely to do. In this way, the chief moral objection to culture-p, when assessed from the standpoint of culture-k or culture-m – that it allowed for an unfair distribution of access to freedom, thus effectively institutionalizing the male domination of women – will be abolished, yet *without* surreptitiously imposing onto men essentially the same unequal distribution of access to freedom, as culture-m currently does, with its tendency to ignore the natural differences between the sexes.

I do not claim here to have conclusively *demonstrated* that a culture allowing polyfidelitous marriage is morally superior to a culture that disallows such (currently unlawful) marital commitments. Rather, my mode of argument here has been more like a speculative prediction of what is most likely to come next in the cultural evolution of humanity's attempt to use marriage to render sexual relationships morally acceptable. If I am right, then persons living in culture-f will tend to look back at many of us in culture-m and shake their heads, accusing *us* of culturally institutionalized domineering sexism (ironically appearing under the guise of non-sexist ideals), because we established laws that *forced* many people to break heartfelt sexual commitments they longed not to break and felt no moral obligation to break, yet had to break because of our culture's failure to make proper allowances for the existence of natural differences between the sexes. While proudly proclaiming its freedom from all taint of sexism, culture-m hides a domineering tendency that is just as real as that of culture-p, but is more difficult to oppose, since it is hidden under the

veil of a desire to stamp out all sexism.[22] What I hope to have accomplished in this two-part series is the construction of a philosophical framework for making ethical assessments across cultures, a framework that exonerates Kant from the charge of domineering sexism and preserves the integrity of his egalitarian ethics. For his specific theory of marriage represents but a stage in an evolutionary process that cannot reach its natural end until the law gives both women and men the freedom to develop their natural sexuality in ethically sound (i.e., committed, non-promiscuous) marriages that do not unilaterally impose the norms favored by one sex onto the other.[23]

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[22] I am not claiming that all feminist scholars in culture-m are guilty of this domineering disposition; there are far too many varieties of feminist philosophy to make such a claim plausible. Moreover, one of the basic principles guiding the framework for cross-cultural ethical assessments that I have defended is that we can be properly judged only according to the standard we choose to adopt to judge ourselves and others. I take this to be the essential meaning not only of Kant's categorical imperative, but also of Jesus' corresponding maxim, in Matthew 7:1-2: "Do not judge, or you too will be judged. For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you". For a discussion of the relation between these two moral principles (Palmquist, 1991).

[23] This pair of articles began as a much shorter paper, presented in May of 2004 at the Beijing International Symposium on Kant's Moral Philosophy in Contemporary Perspectives, organized by the Institute of Foreign Philosophy and the Department of Philosophy at Peking University. I would like to thank the organizers of that conference and all who provided feedback on that first occasion, as well as the countless anonymous reviewers from many of the *nine* journals that rejected successive versions of this project since that time. Many of those reviewers offered incisive feedback and helpful suggestions for further development, though for each submission one reviewer, unable to stomach the thought of accepting a paper that questioned the basic myth of culture-m (i.e., the moral superiority of monogamy), advised the editors that the essay should *never* be published. Thanks also to Mark Sun, for assisting me in deciding how best to respond to the latest batch of reviews, and to Vasil Gluchman, for his courage in allowing this project to be disseminated to the general public at last.

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Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's proposal of ethical norms

Stefan Konstańczak

Abstract
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz is known primarily as a logician and methodologist. Ethics was a side discipline to his scientific research, which he lectured at Lvov University in the 1930s. Assuming that ethics is a philosophical science, he tried to systematise its contemplations according to the scientific principles developed at the Lvov–Warsaw School of thought. However, in his research he also took into account the philosophical tradition which recognised ethics as one of the chief branches of philosophy. Ajdukiewicz's submission of ethics to the requirements of logic was related to an attempt to analyse its core concepts. Consequently, an outline of the original ethical concept was developed, but never developed into a system.

Introduction

The name Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963) is generally associated exclusively with logic, semiotics, epistemology and methodology. With such a perception of his scientific interests, he became a classic representative of the Lvov–Warsaw School; privately he was the son-in-law of its founder, Kazimierz Twardowski. There is little mention of Ajdukiewicz as a universal philosopher, who also undertook axiological issues, and hence in his scholarly accomplishments there are statements which are strictly ethical in character. However, in light of conducted research, the belief that he did not formulate his own concept of ethics is not confirmed by facts. He could not ignore the power of tradition, which considered ethics to be one of the most important areas of philosophy.

Ajdukiewicz's road to ethics

Tadeusz Kotarbinski, in his memoirs of Ajdukiewicz, characterised his scientific attitude as follows: "insightful reflection, focused and deep thinking. Ajdukiewicz followed his profession with relish and passion. As one of his former colleagues rightly stated in his speech to the jubilarian, calling him 'a profound thinker'; a mind penetrating the depths" (Kotarbiński, 1964, p. 7).

Unlike most other Polish philosophers Ajdukiewicz, experienced a long route to the scientific world. Already on 1st July 1914, prior to the outbreak of World War I, he was mobilised into the Austrian army, where he served until 1st October 1918, practically until the end of the war. Then, at his own request, he served in the artillery units of the Polish Army. On 6th November 1918, Kazimierz Twardowski visited Ajdukiewicz (his former doctoral student) in the new unit (Twardowski, 1997, p. 69). Even war did not prevent them from dealing with scientific matters. In his "Diaries" for 22nd September 1918 Kazimierz Twardowski wrote: "Czeżowski and Ajdukiewicz were with me in the morning. We discussed how patriotism can be reconciled with ethics" (Twardowski, 1997, p. 60).

Ajdukiewicz's starting point for formulating his ethical views was to reflect on the issue of human freedom. In 1920, he published an article entitled "Polish Philosophy of Freedom", the result of discussions on patriotism and ethics conducted at Twardowski's house. It was at a time of protest against speculative philosophy, particularly against Kant and his followers. In the article, he acknowledged that in Poland great merits were due, especially to Łukasiewicz

and Kotarbinski, for creating a new philosophy free from "mists of unproductive speculation". He then stated: "Freedom is a property which Man assigns when he can do something. Man is free when he can call to life, into existence, a certain sphere of objects […] if we can create something, we can also destroy it and vice versa. [...] this dual capability is a condition of creativity in the broadest sense of these words" (Ajdukiewicz, 1920, p. 3). This was a contextual expression for him, which cannot be attributed to a specific designatum.

The impulse to deal with more specific ethical issues came after reading Kotarbinski's work "Practical Sketches", or more specifically the chapter entitled "The Problem of the Existence of the Future".[1] The book outlined certain suggestions for the possibility of creating multivalued logic, which predominantly fascinated Ajdukiewicz. Following Kotarbiński, he thus accepted that judgments about the future cannot be true or false, but he used a somewhat unfortunate term for them: "undecided". Importantly, this article unequivocally rejected fatalism and therefore, determinism, in science, because free actions can only be possible, never necessary. This text only had a loose connection with ethics, but it seems it presented the author with some suggestions about the possibility of working out a scientific concept of ethics.

Readings played an important role in shaping Ajdukiewicz's ethical views, and they directed his approach both scientifically and in his private life. An opportunity to reflect about himself came during a stay in Warsaw (1926–1928), when he took up the chair in philosophy at the university. As a professor at the university he took an inauguration oath on 10th December 1925 (Twardowski, 1997, p. 210), but his duties commenced in 1926. His final lectures as a lecturer at Lvov University were delivered on 16th December 1925. Moving to Warsaw resulted in his appointment to the post of professor at the University of Warsaw, but it also was associated with a renewal of old grudges with former colleagues from the university in Lvov, including Wladyslaw Witwicki and Stanisław Leśniewski (Twardowski, 1997, p. 300). Friction was so great that he never really adapted to Warsaw. He had to show a very high psychological resistance because he had to face, among others, Leśniewski's unjustified charges of plagiarism. Roman Ingarden reminisced about it. "Soon afterwards, a row broke out between Ajdukiewicz and Leśniewski, who accused him of plagiarism. Ajdukiewicz's position in Warsaw became untenable" (Ingarden, 1999, p. 193). There was rivalry amongst Twardowski's students which at times was conducted in an uncivilised manner. However, Ajdukiewicz did not withdraw from his scientific and journalistic work in Warsaw. When he gave his inaugural lecture at the General University of Warsaw, as suggested by the university board, on the basis of his own experience he tried to answer three questions: "1) how I studied philosophy; 2) how I started philosophising; 3) how I would advise others" (Ajdukiewicz, 1927, p. 74). In his lecture he concentrated on answering the second question. Although he stated that many different paths lead to philosophy, he concentrated on presenting his own: "[S]ome are led to it by the need to acquire life's compass which they have lost. They are looking for the answer in philosophy to the question of how to proceed. This question is not about how to behave if one desires to achieve so and so, it is not about indicating the means which guarantee achieving a particular goal; it is about unconditional duty, and ultimately about indicating what our absolute duty is. The need for an answer to this question arises in people, for whom in specific cases, conscience points to fairness and duty, but for whom the voice of their conscience, for whatever reason, is insufficient including those who were religious but have lost the faith.

While teaching religion, conscience is not considered the supreme arbitrator in matters of moral duty which no longer requires sanction of any higher instance. Instead, the binding

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[1] T. Kotarbiński, *Practical sketches. Issues from philosophy of deed,* E. Wende i S-ka Bookshop main publisher, Warszawa 1913. The chapter mentioned is included in the book pp.118–150. At the same time Kotarbiński also published an article titled *Issues of existence of the future* in: "Philosophical Review" (vol. 1 from 1913).

force of the injunctions and prohibitions of conscience is justified by the fact that they are commands and prohibitions from God. Therefore, breaking these commandments is bad; it is a lack of respect for God, an offence against Him which will be punished in this or a future life. Teaching religion thus deprives the voice of conscience of its character of final instance which determines whether something is good or bad. It creates the need to seek out something beyond the voice which is the justification of the voice's judgments and decisions. Thus, Man becomes moulded by such teaching; and after losing his religious faith he may not lose his attitude towards his own conscience but still feel the need to legitimise his judgements and directives. After the loss of religious faith, by not being able to find this legitimacy in divine authority, Man turns to philosophy so that it can provide the voice of his conscience with confirmation or rejection of its verdict" (Ajdukiewicz, 1927, pp. 77–80). Ajdukiewicz couldn't proclaim such a declaration publicly earlier in Lvov, which boasted with its traditionalism, and such declarations would undoubtedly be out of place there. Warsaw though had a strong tradition of free-thinking and religious tolerance.

However, in his lecture, Ajdukiewicz also tried to highlight the benefits of turning to philosophy which come with independence from moral directives and prohibitions that flow directly from religion. "However, not only those for whom teaching religion required legitimacy for remorse, turn to philosophy for life's compass. After all, our own compass has an assessment of what is good and bad, what should be supported, and what to fight and it is not always in agreement. And so, for example, our sense of compassion makes us take pity on human misery and do everything to counter it. On the other hand, our sense of good and evil makes us value human prowess, manifested in both [the] corporal and spiritual needs of man. The 19th Century German philosopher of Polish descent Friedrich Nietzsche called the moral commandments flowing out of pity on human misery "slave morality", whilst the commandments flowing out of worship for human prowess "master morality". The conflict between the two ethics can become a starting point for philosophical inquiries related to solving the dilemma. Also, those who see no conflict in their conscience and feel no need to seek higher sanctions in order to solve it can turn to philosophy in connection with ethical issues. Finally, those can turn to philosophy who desire finding a solution specified in one system and seek the main principles from which all the specific logical judgments follow" (Ajdukiewicz, 1927, pp. 80–82).

Philosophy is therefore indispensable, but not "to justify and systematise one's own moral judgments, but rather to understand morality as a social phenomenon, and to explain the role of morality and society in identifying the purpose they serve in society" ((Ajdukiewicz, 1927, pp. 82–83).

Ajdukiewicz pointed to two other paths leading to philosophy. One was the inner need to build one's own coherent view of the world. The final one that he himself followed was the path of insightful exploration of the essence of what he himself was interested in. He did not impose a path upon his listeners in any way whatsoever, for each of them must make that personal choice. Somewhat surprising were Ajdukiewicz's words related to the teachers to whom he owed most gratitude. He named his mathematics and physics teacher Wincenty Frank, from the III Grammar School in Lvov, the author of popular arithmetic and minerology textbooks for this type of school (Ajdukiewicz, 1927, pp. 9–97).

The explanation as to why he did not choose the first path related to the search for life's compass, which he devoted so much time to, is extremely instructive. "Why not the first path? It so happened that I never felt the need to have my moral judgments sanctioned by some higher authority which my moral sense dictated me. I also realised that however I would like to justify my moral judgments, then without appealing to my moral conscience, even at one point, I will not take one step forward. I realised that there is no logical transition from how it is to how it should be; and that I would not have made any assumption regarding my duties.

To clarify my thoughts let us consider the simplest example: in order to obtain an end proposal that I should not steal, from: that God commands not to steal, that God is a supernatural being, that breaking his commandment would offend God, I would have to assume for logical order that I should not defend the most venerable being. However, this assumption related to duty cannot be justified other than on the basis of moral premonition. So, I was not looking for the moral compass in philosophy because I had it within me and I realised that if I did not have it within me, philosophy would not help me. Rather, what interested me in ethical issues was the sociology of morality questions than normative ethics" (Ajdukiewicz, 1927, pp. 92–94).

What finally compelled him to pursue the final route was the study of Berkeley, particularly his work *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. As he later stated, "the Berkeley paradox was a challenge to solve" (Ajdukiewicz, 1927, pp. 99–102). It is thanks to philosophy that Ajdukiewicz became a scientist, and in the context of these considerations it becomes evident why Kotarbiński called him a "profound thinker".

Initially, ethics did not deserve, even for Ajdukiewicz, to be called a scientific discipline. In1923 he claimed that only "[F]ormal logic is, next to empirical psychology, the only philosophical discipline with a remarkably scientific nature" (Ajdukiewicz, 1923, p. 25). It is possible that Ajdukiewicz underwent an evolution of his ideas when he was lecturing ethics at Lvov University, probably not before the 1930s. His lectures, preserved in manuscripts, only begin in 1932. It was a turning point for Ajdukiewicz, as he was starting to cover for Twardowski at Lvov University. He was gaining independence, and his opinions were gaining increasing importance at the university. He was also an informal and unquestioned (also due to kinship) successor to Kazimierz Twardowski at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov. He also took over the leadership of the Polish Philosophical Society (PTF). It was a great responsibility, but also an opportunity for him to build his own original philosophical position.

Scientific attempt at ethics

Ajdukiewicz's lectures on ethics have never been published and have only survived in the form of rough notes and comments kept in the archives of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw. A sketch of the original concept for adapting ethics to the Learning Science program developed at the Lvov–Warsaw School is contained in a notebook preserved in this archive, as well as notes to lectures on ethics given at Lvov University, i.e. after Kazimierz Twardowski, his father-in-law's, retirement. In the 1930s, it was Ajdukiewicz who was entrusted to lecture in ethics. Ajdukiewicz began his first lecture very originally: "The origin of the word ethics from ἦθος – permanent place of arrival and permanent manner of conduct = custom with a similar meaning to ἔθος = habit. Custom – as opposed to habit, something collective, clustered, sanctified tradition. The name ethics encompasses a number of very diverse issues dispersed throughout the history of human thought. These issues are centred around one concept, the concept of «good». Thus, the word «good» has a great variety of meanings. «Good» sometimes means the same as much as «cordial», «benevolent», «indulgent», «human» (good person), «suitable for intended purpose» (good key, good grip ≠ but a good horse, still a good vehicle); this can also be extended to as in «good poem», «good drama» meaning «successful». When we say that something was successful we mean someone did something specific for this purpose in order to create something like this. This specific thing is the means to achieve a goal defined as something with particular properties. In addition to these numerous meanings of the word «good», there is one more which is a central concept in ethics, whose characteristic appears as «good deed» and «good character» etc. Ethical considerations should begin with an explanation of this concept i.e. the importance of the meaning of the word «good» in ethics. This explanation would have been

achieved if we were able to carry out an analysis of the meaning of the term «good». The meaning of the term is the same as the concept. To analyse a concept is just the same as finding two or more other concepts whose combined content = the content of the concept being analysed. For example, square = rectangular and equilateral. The result of such an analysis can be expressed in the sentence A is B, C, which is a content definition. The English philosopher Moore argues that an analysis of the concept of good cannot be performed as in his opinion the concept is a simpliciter. The same cannot be said of the concept yellow. Though it is possible to provide a concept with the same scope as the concept of yellow e.g. «the colour contained in the colour spectrum between orange and green», this is not an analysis of the concept, since the content of the term yellow and the content of the latter do not coincide. It may be possible to find a concept with the same meaning as the concept good, but it will not be its analysis, but a criterion provided which is sufficient and necessary for goodness. To give the secondary concept for good = a criterion sufficient but unnecessary. To give the primary concept for good = a criterion necessary but insufficient.

If clarification of the meaning of the expression 'good man' cannot be carried out by analysing this meaning, then another way is found. Available concepts for its decomposition (analysis) are all the meanings of the terms which have been introduced into the language by the definition of type «A is B being C». However, there are only a few words that have been introduced into the language by definitions. Most of the words are learnt using the Berlitz method, i.e. we learn to understand them by getting accustomed to using them in a certain way. For example, we understand the term «yellow» although we have never heard nor can provide the definition «yellow is such and such». We have learned to understand it by observing situations in which others use it in certain contexts and by getting into the habit of using these contexts in similar situations. We observed that in situations characterised by experiencing the impression of a certain tone of colour people say with conviction that this is something yellow. We have learnt to use it in a similar way.

Words we did not introduce by definitions, but which we learn to use by imitating others I call words of habitual meaning. Wanting to clarify the meaning of the habitual word, this can be achieved by pointing out the way this word is used. Particular usage of a certain word is important for its given meaning if someone who does not observe this usage demonstrates that he is not using the word in a given meaning. Who would, for example, at the sight of the colour of a buttercup was not ready to say with conviction this is something yellow, but instead, for example, this is something blue. This way he would demonstrate that he does not associate with the word «yellow» the same meaning as everyone else.

The habitual word is the word «good» and likewise the words «exists» and «true». The usage of the word «exists» is essential. A sentence in a logical sense. Its psychological meaning = judgment in a psychological sense. Its meaning in a logical sense = judgment in a logical sense.

A real judgment can be delivered seriously, make-believe and only considered. The delivered verdict is not a judgment about the judgment, that it is true, but is based on an assertive attitude. In speech, one does not stress whether the judgment is delivered or just considered. Essential for the meaning of correct usage: Whenever I deliver a judgment with a certain wording, I am ready to confidently pronounce about this content the word «true». This is not a declaration of infallibility. Every judgment is about a certain state of affairs found in this judgment. Whenever I deliver a judgment with a certain content I am ready to confidently pronounce the state of affairs stated in this judgment the word «existing».

Essential usage of the meaning for the word good. Regarding the judgment logically one can take up not only an assertive attitude but also many others: an imperative one «let Jan close the door»! an interrogative one «does Jan close the door»? an optative one «for Jan to close the door». There can also be an attitude of approval" (Ajdukiewicz, 1932, pp. 46–49).

From this lecture from Ajdukiewicz we can conclude that he tried to treat ethics as part of scientific philosophy, which was reflected in the use of both terminology and the way of conducting activities appropriate for the "logistics" of the time. In the following lecture, he continued with his earlier thought:

"Just like the imperatives by adding «let»..
the interrogatives by adding «do, does»
and the optative by adding «to»
So, the approval attitude we adopt by the addition of:

Characteristics of approving attitude:
1. The approving evaluative attitude towards the state of things may not go hand in hand with the imperative nor the optative one. «The court should have sentenced me».
2. The approval attitude is categorical and irrevocable. The statement: «a should have been b» is sometimes elliptical, with the default addition «if a is to be c. You should not smoke cigarettes if you want a healthy heart». But, for example, you should not torment others for your own pleasure.
3. This approval expressed as a duty occurs as if a surrender to authority, *however without it*, in order to clearly think: HE commands: «do not torment others for your own pleasure». *And not* as others abide, fearful of punishment because it would be a conditional obligation. *Children accustomed to obedience* through commands and prohibitions, from their educators learn to grasp things with approval or disapproval, depending on whether they were recommended or forbidden, but this is only at the start of their realisation of order. It is controversial though if any ethical valuation is started this way.

Use of words "good", "just".
Whenever we are in a position of approval "+" "–" (evaluative) with respect to something, we are ready to state that it is good (bad) and about the approval itself that it is just (unjust)" (Ajdukiewicz, 1932, pp. 54–55). Thus, Ajdukiewicz tried to proceed in a different way to George Moore who, in his "Principles of Ethics", adopted the position that the concept of "goodness" was indefinable.

In the following lecture, he clarified his position: "[S]o far [it was] about disapproval, i.e. negative approval. Positive approval is associated with it. Whenever we disapprove [of] the state of things we describe it as being forbidden, while those contradictory, we approve as commanded.

$-A \equiv +(-A)$

$+(-A) \equiv -A$

Essential use for the words "good" and "bad":

Whenever someone disapproves of A, the word "bad" is ready to proclaim it.

Whenever someone approves of A, the word "good" is ready to proclaim it.

$+A \rightarrow A \, \varepsilon \, good = (-A) \, \varepsilon \, bad$

$-A \rightarrow A \, \varepsilon \, bad = (-A) \, \varepsilon \, good$

This is one of the few ways of understanding of the word "good" in ethics, in which

"$\varepsilon \, good = duty$"

$(-A) \, \varepsilon \, bad = A \, \varepsilon \, duty$" (Ajdukiewicz, 1932, pp. 63–64).

The above-mentioned fragments of Ajdukiewicz's lectures indicate the direction of his thinking in an attempt at bestowing on ethics a scientific characteristic in accordance with the tradition of the Lvov–Warsaw School. This direction was initially begun by Kazimierz Twardowski, according to which there are three types of facts, which are subject to one of the authorities of reasoning: "[F]irstly, assessing things from an ethical standpoint, on the basis of

conscience; secondly, assessing things from an aesthetic standpoint on the basis of taste, beauty; thirdly, assessing things from a logical standpoint on the basis of reason. These three types of assessment rotate between two extremes: the first between good and evil, the second between beauty and repulsion, the third between truth and falsehood" (Twardowski, 1927, p. 348). This assessment follows the same overriding principle, as Twardowski himself stated as follows: "[I]t is easy to see that the contrasts between truth and falsehood, between beauty and repulsion, between evil and good can be presented as particular types of one general antithesis; it is the opposite of what we call just and what we call unjust" (Twardowski, 1927, p. 348). Twardowski was, therefore, a platonic scholar, who was convinced that reason reaches every truth on the same path. His further reflections on scientific ethics seem to confirm this view. Thus, the task of ethics is not to increase theoretical knowledge, but to identify signposts necessary for the art of life. So, he separated the theoretical aspect from the practical one. The fact that ethics points to goals people should strive towards does not mean that it points to the paths that they should follow. "[S]cientific ethics only has to define and justify the ethical criteria. [...] but by abandoning morality and ethical education, leaving them to other disciplines, ethics is still normative. [...] Because scientific ethics, is not occupied with implementing ethical regulations and by restricting itself to the formulation and justification of ethical criterion, it does not thereby lose the characteristics of normative ethics. For, as in logic, grammar, or as in hygiene, every truth can be expressed in the form of a norm" (Twardowski, 1973, p. 128).

Ajdukiewicz was not only a successor to Twardowski at Lvov University but also his follower. However, concentrating on issues of logic and methodology, he tried to reconcile their assumptions with ethical considerations. This was to lead him straight to radical conventionalism. However, abandoning this viewpoint undoubtedly was related with the failure of these efforts. As a result, he first came closer to utilitarianism, and in principle to naturalism, and later abandoned ethics altogether, without regret, presumably recognising it as a path without prospects. However, traces of this period left a permanent mark on all his creative work, which contributed to subsequent allegations of conventionalism. During a lecture in 1935, in which he was deliberating the problem of moral coercion, he still claimed: "[A] person's decisions are the result of his character and incentives. If two people have the same incentive and one of them performs an immoral act while the other doesn't, then we will acknowledge that the one who performs the immoral act is committing an act more immoral in nature in the domain in which the act lies. One person may be less moral than another in one domain (e.g. sexual), but in a different domain may be more moral. If someone possesses such a character which in a given domain does not lead to immoral actions against those motives that normal living conditions bring, then we bestow on him a normal moral character in the given domain. Thus, moral coercion exists where incentives act on a person in such a way that every person who is less moral than of normal moral character would be made to perform an immoral act. A sound person bears the guilt for deeds committed under moral coercion, but morally the person is not punished for them and is not held responsible" (Ajdukiewicz, 1932–1934, pp. 246–247).

Adjukiewicz's departure from conventionalism began as early as 1934. This is evidenced by his speeches on human values, with an attempt made (to use the language of logic) which at the same time referred to human will, to emotions and desires. Ajdukiewicz showed that they have to relate to two situational contexts, which are expressed by means of phrases: 'someone wants so and so' and 'someone feels inclined so and so'" (Jadacki, 2016, p. 321). Thus, in logic, one talks in the context of *de re* and *de dicte*. The first case refers to the objective state (verified), while the second refers to a state about which there is no certainty that it actually took place, because we have no possibility of directly checking whether it was so. Thus, we can only judge with a certain probability that every intelligent person will

behave in a certain manner in a given situation. Nevertheless, Ajdukiewicz had no doubts that to satisfy scientific rigors the certainty of the first kind is required. "To cultivate science, it is not sufficient to abide by the principles of intellectual honesty, i.e. to allow to be guided in the proclamation of opinion by no other than sincere conviction rooted in deep reflection. It is also necessary to express oneself in an intersubjective language and only proclaim what one is able to establish and justify, being sure of this justification" (Ajdukiewicz, 2016, pp. 157–158). Furthermore, referring to the school of philosophy he represented, he noted: "[T]he language of mathematical logic and its proper conceptual apparatus is the basis for our philosophical research. The fact that we restrict ourselves in our philosophical work exclusively to what can be intersubjectively communicated and to what we can justify through a reliable method self-limits the scope of the work. However, there is no place in our research for many problems usually considered as philosophical, and we will even have to exclude certain areas of traditional philosophy from our area of interest, namely, the cases where our methods are insufficient" (Ajdukiewicz, 2016, p. 159).

The problem that was most troublesome for Ajdukiewicz, and thus hindered the development of a coherent concept of ethics, was the issue of a person's free will. This issue was difficult to attain in a coherent theory. Thus, he pointed out: "[T]he problem of free will relates to whether free will is subordinated to the general principle of causality or whether it escapes from its rigour, whether acts of human willpower are merely indirect links in causal chains, having both causes and effects, or do they always just initiate some causal chain with effects, but no cause. A person's dignity seemed to demand recognising that human free will in the aforementioned sense, is somehow discredited by the thought that man is only a component of nature, at the mercy of her forces he cannot resist" (Ajdukiewicz, 1983, p. 168). It was precisely the problem of determining an individual's behaviour through his biological needs that was the subject of his further studies. Human freedom would have to be understood in a completely different way if the mind was dictated by corporeality on how to behave. However, he perceived that human desires could be explained by natural needs whether they be biological or emotional. Despite this, he remained distant from Spencer-style evolutionism, utilitarianism and emotivism. The most common solutions to this problem were solutions binding a person's behaviour to causes which could be explained by means of empirically verifiable indicators. Therefore, in the spirit of Freudian naturalism, he wrote: "[s]atisfying certain natural desires can be undesirable under certain conditions, whether it is due to the good of an individual, or because of the [sic] mandatory moral norms. Under such conditions, it is recommended from the point of view of these goals (the sake of the individual) that the given desire is not satisfied. Indeed, often society does not permit certain natural desires to be met in such a way as to deprive the individual of the physical possibility of satisfying them" Ajdukiewicz, 1938, p. 202). He perceived that ethics exerted a regulatory impact on individuals' lives, limiting them in a sense, but only enough so as not to harm others. One can notice here the significant influence of utilitarianism.

Conclusion

Ajdukiewicz did not write any work devoted strictly to ethics, although he did appreciate its importance and the need to practice it. However, it was for him an art rather than real science. Nonetheless, these problems were on different occasions the subject of his deliberations, including teaching needs. He certainly did not agree with basing ethics on any authority, as he considered it a non-scientific approach, assuming from the start that there was only one path of pursuing ethical discourse. In this he was also faithful to his principle: "I insist on basing my view of the world on a rational foundation rather than an irrational one, and I do not want to base my view of the world on becoming acquainted with knowledge as many modern philosophers do, but I want to base it on empirics, on experience and practice based on the

study of reality whose highest achievement are the sciences" (Ajdukiewicz, 1985, p. 191). Ajdukiewicz is hardly ever referred to during ethical debates in contemporary Polish philosophy. He is not even mentioned in the university textbook "Wiedza o etyce" [*Ethical basics*] (Woleński & Hartman, 2008) whose co-author is Jan Woleński – an outstanding expert on the Lvov–Warsaw School. In addition, Ajdukiewicz is not treated as an author of the ethics concept in Woleński's latest book "Historico–Philosophical Essays" (Woleński, 2013). In a monograph relating to the Lvov–Warsaw School the only time Woleński mentions Ajdukiewicz is in reference to his speech "About Justice" delivered in 1939 during a commemoration ceremony on the first anniversary of Kazimierz Twardowski's death. However, this speech was not related to ethics itself but rather was focussed on ethical tools, namely the application of a principle which is generally considered to be just. According to Ajdukiewicz the principle of "equal measure" (Ajdukiewicz, 1939, p. 117) can be an example of such a principle. Such an omission of Ajdukiewicz's philosophy seems to be related to the fact that none of his works on ethics were published and only his unfinished handwritten notes are stored in the archives.

However, it must be stressed that another well-known scholar familiar with the achievements of the Lvov–Warsaw School, Jacek Jadacki, appears to aptly interpret Ajdukiewicz's thoughts on moral issues. In his opinion for Ajdukiewicz, Twardowski's follower, duties and moral norms are related to the applied language since: "if the [sic] sentence Z uttered by the [sic] person O expresses judgement on a future act C by the [sic] person O, a judgement which was uttered 'on the basis of the experienced act of will' of the [sic] person O, and which of the 'germ' from which latter springs the [sic] act C by the [sic] person O – this sentence Z expresses a resolution of the [sic] person O" (Jadacki, 2013, pp. 23–24). Thus, Ajdukiewicz is constantly re-interpreted and rediscovered.

Today, it is only regrettable that he abandoned his research into systemising his own ethical system, since the road he followed was very promising. However, it is worth recalling even the partial results of his efforts, in the hope that they will inspire contemporary ethicists to continue his research.

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On the puzzling value of human life

Predrag Cicovacki

Abstract
The author examines our conflicting attitudes regarding the proper value of human life. While the main issue initially appears to deal with whether or not human life has an intrinsic (or absolute) value, it turns out that a far more important and complex issue concerns the tension between the equal value of every human life and the differences in the quality of one's life. The author discusses the views of Kant, Schweitzer, Berlin, Scheler, and then Hartmann, in whose views the author recognizes the most important contributions to this puzzle.

**Keywords**: antinomies of values, equal value of human lives, intrinsic value, quality of life

A challenge

Regardless of our culture, gender, or age, we display incompatible attitudes toward the value of human life. Sometimes we go out of our way to fight for and preserve every single life; other times we are completely indifferent to the fact that people who could be saved are left helplessly dying. We display the same ambiguous attitude toward our own lives: in some cases it appears that they are more valuable to us than anything else, while in other circumstances we are ready to sacrifice our lives for some higher values.

It would be unreasonable to claim that human life has no value whatsoever, yet when it comes to establishing precisely what value it does have, we do not know what to say. This perplexity may not be accidental; it may be an indication of *our inability to demonstrate* the value of human life in any conclusive manner. Or it may be an indication of the *complex nature* of the value of life, and perhaps of other values as well. It remains to be seen which of these is the case. What is already clear is that we are facing a challenge. To deal with it, let us focus our inquiry on the following four statements:

1.   Every human life has an intrinsic (or absolute) value.
2.   No human life has any intrinsic (or absolute) value.
3.   Some human lives are more valuable than others.
4.   No human lives are more valuable than others.

We can schematically represent them as follows (figure 1):

Let us briefly clarify the meanings of the contested claims. By value of something we mean its worth; however that worth is to be specifically defined. To say that a value of something is intrinsic is to maintain that it is desirable and esteemed for its own sake, for its own inherent qualities. Similarly, a value of something is absolute if it is never relative upon any further condition, restriction, consideration, or circumstance. Can such an intrinsic and absolute value be justifiably ascribed to human life? (Indeed, can anything have such a value?)

Our initial reactions are probably going to be ambiguous, for such a claim appears both intuitively evident and too strong. Following the history of the twentieth century – which is often called the century of wars and genocides – we would like to affirm that all human life is valuable in itself. This holds not only for extraordinary human beings, or even for every normal and healthy person. Indeed, it holds for *every* human being: a prematurely born baby that is going to live only for a few hours, a starving child in India or Somalia, a homeless person on the streets of New York or San Francisco, or a person suffering from Alzheimer's disease, dying secluded in some nursing home. Every one of them is unquestionably valuable and every one of them should be given a chance to live and die with dignity. Inspiring thoughts, but irritating doubts always find their way to creep in: What could possibly rationally justify the view that every human being is so sacred and of unquestionable value?

If we are willing to admit that, *prima facie*, every human life is a value and death is a disvalue, what other value but intrinsic or absolute could we wish to ascribe to human beings? In his book, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, C. I. Lewis distinguishes between the following values: (a) utility or usefulness for some purpose; (b) instrumental value (of means); (c) inherent value (or goodness); (d) intrinsic value (or being desirable as an end or in itself); (e) contributory value, relevant for our understanding of the relationship of parts and whole (Lewis, 1971, pp. 382–397). While these distinctions are useful in many contexts, they are not of much help for our discussion. Clearly, we are not going to claim that the value of human life is any variety of (a), (b), or maybe even (e). But on what grounds can we argue in favor of (c)? Perhaps, most importantly for our discussion, how can we establish (or refute) that (d) is the case?

Before we attempt to answer these questions, we should be aware of three potential ambiguities. The first is that value is usually ascribed to objects and acts: we say that a book has some (determinable) value, and that giving it as a gift to someone is a valuable act. Yet, life

cannot be counted as either an object or an act. This anomaly may be one source of our difficulties, but it may also lead to unexpected new insights.

The second point is not to confuse the so-called 'vital values' – such as health, energy level, life-enthusiasm, and so on – for the 'value of life'. Vital values deal with values vital *for* life, while our topic is about the value *of* life.

The third thing is to remember that what we are asking is not merely whether we should *regard* human life as inherently and intrinsically valuable; for our interpersonal relations it is very *useful* that we do regard each other in that way. Yet, just as there is a meaningful distinction between taking something to be true and its truth, and the two need not overlap, we are concerned with a similar distinction: Does human life really have such an intrinsic and absolute value?

An intrinsic value of human life?

The central issue with regard to our challenge seems to be dealing with the conflict between (1) and (2): Does human life have an intrinsic (or absolute) value, or does it not?

There are two principal grounds on which the positive view has been traditionally supported: the religious and the moral. Considering the religious grounds first, it is plausible to argue that the central message of the Gospel is the sanctity of all human life. Yet, why would that be? Does the Gospel reveal some undeniable facts about human nature on the basis of which a special value of human life can be derived? Is there something about the origin of humanity that would automatically reveal its preciousness? Furthermore, if this line of reasoning about the sanctity of human life is taken seriously, then why not go a step further and claim, together with Albert Schweitzer, that not only human life but all and any life is precious? As God created human life, He created all other life.

Schweitzer's religiously inspired ethics of reverence for life – *Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben* – asserts that good consists in maintaining, assisting and enhancing life, and that to destroy, to hurt, or to hinder life is evil. Reverence for life is the most direct achievement of what Schweitzer called 'my will-to-live': "I am life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live" (Schweitzer, 1987, p. 309).

While Schweitzer's line of reasoning appears admirable, it has found few adherents. We can agree with him that life is more valuable than death, and that we should avoid unnecessary destruction of human and all other life. Yet, reverence for the miracle of all life can be taken seriously without thereby implying that all life is sacred, or that it has an intrinsic and absolute value. Not surprisingly, Schweitzer himself was the first to recognize that, in order to preserve and enhance some life, other lives must be destroyed. Thus, his principle is primarily directed against our mindless and often unnecessary destruction of life (Schweitzer, 1987, pp. 310–314; Cicovacki, 2012, pp. 58–80).

Moreover, if we come to the point of arguing that not only human life but all life is sacred, why not make an even bolder step and maintain that every creature, everything that exists, is precious and sacred? The reason for not doing so is simple and compelling. Despite a deeply embedded Augustinian (and to a certain extent Platonic) tradition, 'being' does not imply 'goodness' and 'non-being' does not imply 'evil'. More generally, 'existence' does not imply 'value', and 'non-existence' does not imply 'disvalue'. By the same token we can claim that 'life' does not imply 'value', and 'death' (or 'absence of life') does not imply 'disvalue'. Our great teacher Socrates had taught us long ago that fear of death is irrational and that only good life (and not sheer life) is worth living.

We may thus be advised to check whether claim (1) can be supported on some other, perhaps moral, grounds. Kant argues, for instance, that every human being is an end in itself and that it

should never be treated as a means only. This so-called second formulation of the Categorical Imperative offers one of the strongest supporting arguments for the view that human life has an intrinsic and absolute value, but it also leads to numerous questions and concerns. Kant is right to claim that the value of human life should not be considered in terms of instrumental values alone; but is he thus right to ascribe an intrinsic value to human life?

Suppose that we indeed approach the world with the noble ideal that every human being is an end in itself and treat every person accordingly. Like the Christian precept to love our neighbors as we love ourselves, the implementation of Kant's Categorical Imperative would probably make the world a better place, yet it would also lead to some maddening dilemmas. There is no problem in treating our neighbors who behave reasonably and morally as ends in themselves. But should we treat murderers, rapists, and terrorists in the same manner? Should we treat them as rational moral agents even when they apparently behave both irrationally and immorally?

To be fair to Kant, he himself wavers between praising humanity as an end in itself and complaining that "[from] such crooked wood as man is made of nothing perfectly straight can be built" (Kant, in Beck, 1988, p. 419). He never successfully reconciles these conflicting views, nor is it an easy task to accomplish. Kant would have perhaps strengthened his cause had he distinguished between the value of human life *in general*, and the value of human life *in concreto*. The latter is a matter of specific appraisal and cannot be resolved by any *a priori* decree. But what should we say about the value of human life in general? Just as in his theoretical philosophy Kant tries to put an end to what he calls a 'scandal of reason' by offering conclusive proof of the existence of the external world, in his practical philosophy he attempts to remove an analogous scandal by demonstrating an intrinsic (and absolute) value of human life.

Perhaps Kant's approach is misguided in both cases. We do not really need proof of the existence of the external world, because the presupposition of its existence belongs to the very framework of any intelligent discourse and is necessarily presumed for any cognitive experience. It may similarly be beyond the power of our mind to prove that being human is of some ultimate, intrinsic or absolute, value. But such proof may not be needed either. The value of human existence seems intuitively obvious to us.

We have feelings for values. It is true that such feelings may be more or less developed, and that their accuracy and depth may vary. It is also true that the presence of such feelings does not demonstrate that the value of life is intrinsic; at best, it only indicates that such a value may exist. This is significant not only because it helps us establish a respectful attitude toward other human beings, but also because of the function this value has in our overall 'valuational' experience: the value of human existence belongs to the framework within which all other values could be experienced and evaluated.

As a value, human life may well be indefinable, but it provides a presupposition for the realization of other values, and perhaps also a framework within which different kinds of values – e.g., pleasure values, goods as values, vital values, spiritual values, and values of the holy – may be related, assessed, and realized. This may not be what we initially looked for in order to support claim (1), but it may be one element of the view yet to be fully developed and appreciated.

At the crossroads

Just as we, in Western civilization, have, from our Christian heritage, developed the attitudes of compassion and high esteem for every human life (claim 1), we can trace our strong support for the view that some human lives are more valuable than others (claim 3) to our Greek ancestors. With their ethics of aspiration, the ancient Greeks were preoccupied with striving toward virtue and excellence. As philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle understood it, the task was not

so much to compete against others, thereby making ourselves better than them. Rather, it was to compete against ourselves and to become as good as we could possibly be. Instead of an 'egalitarian' Christian ethics (based on e-*quality*), the Greeks believed that we should endorse an ethics based on merit (or *quality*).

We can strongly object to their parochial division between 'civilized Greeks' and 'uncivilized barbarians', as well as reject their treatment of some human beings as 'slaves by nature'. Nevertheless, we can rationally maintain that, in terms of numerous specific values, some human lives are, indeed, more valuable than others. We are different not only in terms of innate capacities and gifts, but principally in how far and how completely we develop and exercise them. How we live cannot be disregarded, for those ways of life make our lives more or less valuable. The *quality* of life must be taken into consideration when we discuss what value human life may have.

We have now arrived at the central crossroads in our complicated aporia concerning the value of human life. The real challenge does not consist in the opposition of (1) and (2), but of (1) and (3). The central question with regard to this axiological aporia is whether to accept one of the competing claims, or whether any such acceptance of either one of them may be so extreme and unsatisfactory that a proper response to the challenge calls for some kind of reconciliation of (1) and (3). Schematically, we can present this situation as follows (figure 2)

Let us first consider the reasons for choosing either (1) or (3). It appears that, just as a consistent Christian would be opposed not only to (2) but also to (3), a consistent advocate of the Greek ethics of aspiration would have to dispute not only (4), but (1) as well. The reason for this discrepancy could be seen from a more general distinction between 'having a value' and 'being given a value': if all things were in themselves valuable, there would be no sense in any attempt to enhance value. Thus, the tension between the view that every human life has an intrinsic and absolute value and the view that some human lives are more valuable than others is a real one; this controversy characterizes not merely our age but belongs to the very core of our Western civilization.

As the tension between claims (1) and (3) is real and important, so are the various attempts to resolve it. Even though Christianity clearly favors (1) over (3), its own rich and complex tradition indicates a number of ways in which they can be reconciled. One of them includes a simultaneous emphasis on mercy and compassion on the one hand, and the essential for our humanity project of the *imitatio Dei* on the other. For an illustration of this we can again turn to Schweitzer. Following Jesus, he believed in the affirmation of all life. But inspired by Goethe and Nietzsche, who in turn were inspired by the pagan ancient Greek tradition, Schweitzer also believed in a continuous effort toward ennoblement; our ideal must be to deepen our moral life and express it in moral action.

Kant similarly believed, if not in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Critique of Practical Reason*, then certainly in his later work *Metaphysics of Morals*, that our two fundamental goals in life are the perfection of ourselves and the happiness of others. It has always been perceived as an undeniable aspect of human nature to strive toward what is noble and good, toward the highest values and aspirations. Taken in that sense, the view that some lives are more valuable than others (claim 3) is more intuitive and seems to need less rational grounding than the view that every human life has an intrinsic (or absolute) value (claim 1). Nevertheless, taken to an extreme, this view may lead to something like Nietzsche's devaluation of all 'pity' and the reaffirmation of the Greek pagan ideal of excellence in terms of his *Übermensch*. Such an extreme view appears intuitively mistaken, as mistaken as its counterpart, which denies any morally relevant sense in which human lives may not all be of equal value.

Scheler's scale of values

Claims (1) and (3) stand in clear opposition to each other. Taken in isolation and driven to an extreme, they are not only one-sided but unsatisfactory. Is there any hope that, despite their opposition and our tendency to swing from one extreme position to another, they may be reconcilable? Max Scheler's view on values may offer a solution.

For (1) and (3) to be compatible, some kind of commensurability between these rival claims would be needed; the main issue, then, concerns finding a suitable ground for their potential and fruitful commensurability. Minimally, we need to assume that both of them may be true, and then to show how both can be true in different domains, or in different ways. From there, the crossroads lead in different directions. One of them, pursued by Scheler, shows that there is a unified, or one-dimensional, scale of values by means of which the value of human life can be precisely determined. (The second direction will be discussed in the next two sections.)

Scheler believes in an objective order of higher and lower values and tries to establish a one-dimensional scale that could reveal the exact ranking of each value. He is convinced that "the hierarchy of values is itself absolutely invariable, while the order of preference in history is what is variable" (Scheler, 1973, p. 106.) Scheler comes to realize, however, that no matter how that scale is constructed, we always run into counterintuitive examples: the value of human life cannot be permanently and unchangeable situated either at the top of the hierarchy of values, or at its bottom, or somewhere in the middle.

Scheler attempts to address this problem by proposing a number of additional categories and by formulating a complicated 'law of preference', but his successors abandoned his project. Although every human life is *prima facie* valuable, can we properly estimate the value of each life without taking into account its deeds and attitudes? And when we do take them into consideration, we run into a plurality of values, some apparently incompatible with others, and with no definite hierarchy. The value of human life may be not only indefinable but also indeterminable in any *a priori* manner. If so, this would account for both the richness of human

life and the bewildering difficulties in properly estimating its worth. Can we, then, make any further progress beyond the realization of the plurality and complexity of values?

A paradoxical thing about Scheler is that, despite his conscious effort precisely to establish the value of human life, he would in many ways welcome his critics' concerns; they may well be consistent with some other of his fundamental views. For instance, in opposition to Kant's rigid formalism, Scheler's moral theory is based on the view that our experience of values is not discrete but contextual. Rarely, if ever, is a value given in isolation from other values, and we always evaluate things within the given situational background, as well as within the background of our own social and personal experience. A lot must be known before a choice can be rationally made, and even when as much as possible is known, the tip of the scale may still stand pretty close to a dynamic equilibrium, or it may not even be clear in which direction it points. Of course, in practical life, a choice has to be made, for even a refusal to choose is to make a decision that carries with it significant implications and consequences. Whatever choices we end up making, we are not only in a double bond but in a double bind as well.

Some moral philosophers may be disappointed by this line of reasoning and insist that moral theories are designed to tell us how, in principle, we ought to act and what kind of attitude we ought to assume toward our lives and the lives of others. Why should we not, then, expect a more principled theoretical solution when there is a conflict between (1) and (3)?

Scheler's reply may be that we can still offer a variety of 'maxims' and 'rules' of prudence concerning how to treat our own lives and the lives of others, but this need not bring us any closer to a principal solution to our problem. For if we reject – as Scheler believes we should – all moral theories that postulate absolute obligations or prohibitions, no moral theory could regulate all possible cases. As he points out, theories and norms are too abstract and remote from actual ethical situations; they are disembodied and impersonal, too detached from the dynamic of real life.

Instead of looking for some 'regulate-it-all' moral theory, then, we may be better off searching for some principles of rational value-preference, something akin to what is nowadays called a theory of rational decision. Trying to improve on Scheler's view, one of Husserl's students, Hans Reiner, proposed a more detailed approach to issues of value-preference, which he presented through the following eleven principles:

1. Value-height, as developed in Scheler's ethical approach.
2. Value-urgency, by which Reiner means that those values that are of greater 'ontic' urgency must be realized first. (For example, securing one's physical survival is more urgent than realizing higher values and will take precedence in many situations.)
3. Temporal urgency: other things being equal, values in danger require immediate attention.
4. The greater or more pressing need.
5. Quantity of value-realization: other things being equal, we ought to aim at the greatest quantity of values.
6. The greater chance of success.
7. The negative demand of not violating already existing values usually has priority over the positive demand of realizing new values.
8. A person can be obliged to perform one task rather than another if there is a scarcity of people who can do the job equally well.
9. Special abilities and the possession of particular means for performing certain tasks can present a personal call and impose a unique obligation on an individual.

10. If a person is more gifted for one task rather than for another, he/she may have a special calling to choose that undertaking which he/she can do his/her best and in which he/she will perform best.
11. The principle of *daimonion*: when all of the mentioned ten principles of value-preference prove to be insufficient to reach a clear and correct decision, 'a voice of conscience', or a particular personal '*daimonion*' (as in Socrates' case), may have to function as the decisive principle of decision (Reiner, 1951, pp. 168–178).

Although valuable, this proposal is not without visible shortcomings. For instance, principles 2–4 cluster together and, just like principles 8–10, may be regarded as variations of the same principle. Furthermore, missing from Reiner's list is any consideration of the predicable short and long run consequences. These, however, are not of vital concern for us now. The essential point is that, regardless of what we think of the proposed principles and however useful as tools they may be, the burden of reaching an informed and proper decision is still on us. What is right in principle need not be appropriate in specific circumstances, and *vice versa*. Our human lives and the conflicting situations we encounter are so diverse and intricate that no theoretical tool can remove the onus of making decisions from our shoulders. And this holds for the puzzling issues concerning the value of human life as well.

This lack of a principled position on the value of human life may be the result of a subject's indecisiveness, or of one's inability to think about the issues in question in a systematic and thorough manner. Or, more importantly, and due to no fault of the judging subject, it may be the result of a realistic assessment of human nature and the complex place and role that human life plays in reality. Our very nature may be too convoluted; we may be simultaneously pulled in many different directions and attracted to incompatible values, so that an adequate principal position is not possible. It need not be the values themselves that are obscured, nor does it always have to be our imperfect vision of them. It may be that choosing between them, and choosing rightly, is what is so difficult – and so distinguishably human.

This position is championed by Isaiah Berlin, who recognizes the irreconcilable oppositions of some fundamental values, such as equality and liberty, order and tolerance, justice and mercy.[1] Berlin perceives this predicament in very pessimistic terms. We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss: "[I]f, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict – and of tragedy – can never be wholly eliminated from human life, either personal or social" (Berlin, 1969, p. 169).

Does the conflict of values have to lead to such pessimistic implications? Not so, according to a fascinating, although undeservedly neglected, approach which we find in Nicolai Hartmann's *Ethik*.[2] In this masterpiece, first published in 1926, Hartmann accepts that there are countless conflicts of values. Nevertheless, together with the plurality of values and their conflicts, Hartmann also recognizes (i) their absoluteness, (ii) mutual irreducibility, (iii) partial incompatibility, and (iv) their potential synthesis.

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[1] A similar position was defended by Max Weber and Robert Nozick.
[2] What is, in German, originally published as one book, is available in the English translation as three separate books: *Moral Phenomena*, *Moral Values*, and *Moral Freedom* (Hartmann, 2002; 2003; 2004).

Hartmann's account of values

Following Scheler, Hartmann maintains that values are essences, in the phenomenological sense of that word. Values possess the character of genuine essences, that is, the character of absoluteness, and any knowledge of them can be no other than aprioristic knowledge. This is possible because values have their own *ideal* existence: their realm is not that of the *real* but of the *ideal being*. That means, among other things, that values are not only independent of things that are estimated as valuable, but are their prerequisites: things can be valuable only through a relation to values themselves. It also means that values are equally independent of persons: they cannot make or create values, nor do values change as a result of a person's insights. The so-called relativity of values with regard to our subjective experience of them affects only the content but not the structure of values (Hartmann, 2002, pp. 232–244; Hartmann, 2014, pp. 367–368).

Against Scheler, Hartmann maintains that our understanding of values in general, and of the worth of human life in particular, can be further advanced if we recognize a *two-dimensional scale of values*. In accord with his ontological views, instead of one kind of 'bond' between values (respective height), Hartmann contends that values can be meaningfully contrasted not only in terms of their respective *height* but also with regard to their *strength* (Hartmann, 2003, pp. 44–64).

Like the ontological strata of reality – and Hartmann distinguishes between four of them: the inorganic, the organic, the psychic, and the spiritual – values are structured from the bottom up. Stronger values serve as a foundation for weaker values, but the positive reinforcement of stronger values does not thereby bring higher values into existence. Higher values have at least partial autonomy with regard to their lower counterparts. The key point for Hartmann is that, analogous to the relationship of the strata of the real being, the highest values are the weakest, and that the strongest values are the lowest. Higher and weaker values are dependent for their realization on the realization of lower and stronger values. Lower values are thus the *conditio sine qua non* of higher values and become 'matter for them', their 'clay to be shaped'. Despite such conditioning, the specific form of such shaping is introduced by higher values and cannot be predetermined by lower values.

On Hartmann's view, the value of human life in general definitely belongs among the most basic and foundational, that is, the strongest and the lowest values. Higher values are those of the personal subject, and they are not universal but individual values. The strength and relevance of the strongest values is expressed through prohibitions, and it is not accidental that virtually every society considers murder of other human beings as one of the worst crimes. Hartmann's important insight is that there is an asymmetry with respect to violation versus positive reinforcement of values: although murder is among the worst kind of violations, respect for life does not thereby automatically represent a very high value. Put differently, a violation of a lower value is a greater offense than a violation of a higher value. Nevertheless, a realization of a higher value is more valuable than a realization of a lower value (Hartmann, 2003, pp. 27–28, 53, 453–454).

Hartmann formulates this relationship as the 'inverse law of strength and height', which fully captures the double bond of values: evidence of their strength is found in the seriousness of the offense against a value, while their height is known by the meritoriousness of fulfillment. Our moral project can be summed up like this: do not violate the stronger values and aspire to realize the higher values (Hartmann, 2003, p. 457).

Where does this approach leave us with our concerns about the value of human life? First, it makes us aware not only of the plurality but also of the interconnectedness and

multidimensionality of values. More specifically, it cautions us against thinking of human life in terms of one single value that could be artificially isolated and separately defined. There are many values we associate with human life, and this richness is also indicated through the difference between two relevant expressions: 'human being' and 'being human'.

Claim (1) is closer to the former expression and claim (3) is more focused on the latter. 'Human being' (like 'human life') refers to something that is given, a *datum* of a kind, while 'being human' refers to a task – it points to the incompleteness and under-determinacy of the *datum*. Moreover, it poses a challenge to us. Human beings have a strong desire not only to live but to live well; ours is a deep awareness of the insufficiency of sheer living, and the question for us is not only *whether* to live but *how* to do it. Provided that the existence is granted, there could hardly be any alibi for failing to try, as seriously as we can, to bring about that which we consider to be good, beautiful, and true. Different cultures and viewpoints would understand this task of self-realization of our humanity in diverse ways. As already mentioned, our Christian and Greek ancestors certainly conceived of it in different fashions. As a result of such differences, we have inherited internally conflicting ideals and value systems.

There are different reasons for conflicts of values. The most obvious among them is an enormous plurality of values; in what is, in English, published as the second volume of his *Ethik*, *Moral Values*, Hartmann considers more than forty different values (cf. Hartmann, 2003; Cicovacki, 2014, pp. 65–136). Although values can be systematically analyzed, they cannot be arranged on the single scale of values. Instead of one single valuational scale which ascends in one unified series or a pyramid of values with one highest value on the top in Hartmann we find a network of multiple, frequently mutually dependent but also inconsistent values.

When he speaks about such inconsistencies and conflicts of values, Hartmann does not have in mind an opposition between one positive and one negative value (as in (1) and (2), or (3) and (4)). We usually choose among what we find valuable, so the real conflicts of values are either those between two positive values (as in (1) and (3)), or between two negative values. To be even more precise, the conflicts of values we experience can be either the conflicts of values themselves (V_1 vs. V_2), or the conflicts of various valuational situations in which we attempt to actualize values (VS_1 vs. VS_2).

Only the conflicts of values themselves (V_1 vs. V_2) can lead to what Hartmann calls 'antinomies of values'. He offers numerous examples of such antinomies, but for our present purposes it suffices to mention just a few: the communal versus the individual, with a related conflict of the general equality of all human beings as standing against the inequality which characterizes every person. Yet another example would be the perennial tension between justice and brotherly love. As we all know, "justice may be unloving, brotherly love quite unjust" (Hartmann 2003, p. 271).

Hartmann's most original treatment of the antinomies of values is to be found in his view that there are four equally fundamental and mutually irreducible moral values: the good, the noble, rich in experience, and the pure. The good is characterized by our attempts to convert values into ends. The noble is the value of the pursuit of one value to the exclusion of all others. Richness of experience is the value of personal many-sidedness, including some things that cannot be estimated as good, and is radically opposed to the one-sidedness of the noble. Like nobility, purity is also founded on single-mindedness and opposed to the richness of experience; unlike the noble, purity is predicated upon obliviousness of the conflict and opposition inherent in a good and noble character (Hartmann, 2003, pp. 171–222).

In addition to pointing out that these four fundamental moral values are not mutually consistent, Hartmann furthermore maintains that the entire realm of values is characterized by

ineradicable anatomies between values. Human beings reveal their character through the ways in which they tackle these ever renewing and multiplying antinomies of life. Life itself presents the greatest challenge for man as a spiritual and valuational being: "moral life is life in the midst of conflicts" (Hartmann, 2003, p. 94).

Like Berlin, Hartmann maintains that there is no pre-given schema to determine how such antinomies of values should be handled; in facing the conflicts and antinomies of values, every individual has to rely on his or her own sense of value and make personal preferences. Hartmann surprises us when, unlike Berlin, he points out that the existence of antinomical tensions is by itself something valuable; such tensions keep our discernment and the feeling of value alive and help it further develop.

Unlike Socrates, who continually battles against our ignorance and misconceptions, Hartmann is more focused on the *narrowness of our 'value-horizon'*: most of us virtually sleepwalk through life, oblivious to its complexity and depth, indifferent toward the richness of values. Hartmann sharply criticizes our blindness toward the higher values which have impoverished us and prevented us from living authentic human lives. For a value-blind man, everything ultimately becomes worthless, even what is in itself of value. For the open-hearted man, on the contrary, everything is valuable, even what in itself in contrary thereto. There is certainly no other way to ethical maturity and expansion than through the conflicts of life itself, through 'moral experience' – even experience of wrong-doing, and this perhaps most of all (Hartmann, 2003, p. 209).

Conflicts and antinomies of values are not something tragic, since they help us to awaken our value-feelings and sharpen our value-intuitions; they convey to us a sense of amazement and respect for a cosmos rich with values. Hartmann is a genuine pluralist with regard to values, but not a relativist. He believes in the universality, necessity, and objectivity of valuational judgments. But not everyone has the eye, the ethical maturity, and the spiritual development required for grasping the structural relations of values and for judging the valuational situations as they are (Hartmann, 2002, pp. 38–45; Hartmann, 2014, pp. 359–368). The *maieutic* function of philosophy is thus to free us not only, or perhaps not so much, from ignorance, as from our 'passing by values' in blindness of them.

Besides pointing to the strength and height, as two respective ways of comparing values, Hartmann also discusses the idea of *synthesis of values*. While Berlin laments what he calls 'the incommensurability of values', Hartmann reminds us that no single value exists for itself; rather, every value finds its fulfillment only in its synthesis with other values, and – finally – in one Idea, in one synthesis of all values.[3] Such synthesis is not something given, but is an ideal toward which we must strive: "Only a sense of justice which is at the same time loving, only a brotherly love which also considers the far distant, only a pride which would likewise be humble, could be valid as an ideal of moral conduct" (Hartmann, 2003, p. 425).

In our moral thinking, no less than in our moral practice, we tend to pursue single values, which are often taken to extremes. Hartmann warns us that such extremes serve only to distort our sense of values and to misguide us toward one-sidedness. The real challenge is to ground our moral and spiritual lives on a solid foundation of lower values, and then pursue higher values, for only in the synthesis of strong and high values can we find the reciprocal content of both types of values. To discern their synthesis, however, is a task of far greater magnitude than to attach oneself to one side and disregard the other: "The secret of human progress is that advance must

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[3] According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, who was Hartmann's student at the time when he wrote *Ethik*, Hartmann thought that his most important contribution to axiology may be his idea of synthesis of values (Gadamer, 1999, pp. 27–28).

be along the whole line, and not by fragments, that the trend towards the highest must be accompanied by a trend toward the most elementary. Every other progress is only a semblance. It surrenders on one side what it wins on the other" (Hartmann, 2003, p. 463).

In lieu of a conclusion

Hartmann does not offer a simple reply to our challenge to determine the value of human life. His findings are nevertheless valuable not only because of their originality, but also because they help us to discern our proper place and role in reality. According to Hartmann, the puzzling and complex nature of the value of human life is a reflection of the puzzling and complex nature of values in general. More specifically, Hartmann's findings could be summed up as follows:

(a) Life is a value and death is a disvalue. Life is not created by human beings, but it exists, it is real, and it is given to us; life is (as if) entrusted to our care.

(b) We may overestimate the value of life (e.g., when health is taken as the highest good, a vital value is then promoted too high, beyond its proper measure). We may also underestimate its value (e.g., when all value is carried over into the life beyond, as in asceticism, or in religious fanaticism).

(c) There is a value peculiar to life itself, and it may well be an intrinsic value. An intrinsic value does not, however, have to be the highest value.

(d) Life itself is not the highest value, but it is a very significant value; it is a foundation of all higher values. The value of life would not lapse if it were not linked up with some higher values, e.g., values of spiritual existence. Nonetheless, life gains in a decidedly higher significance from the connectedness with such spiritual values.

According to Hartmann, there is a fundamental antinomy in the nature of values, which consists in the claims to validity that go in two opposite directions: our unconditional preference for the higher is restricted by an equally unconditional preference for the lower and more fundamental values. The art of living consists in finding a proper balance between the claims that pull us in these different directions. His views could be represented by the following figure (figure 3):

(3)

(2)   (4)

160

(1)

While (1) refers to the value of life (existence) itself, and (3) refers to the quality of life, (2) and (4) in this figure are not their negations, but other positive values (such as justice, brotherly love, courage, truthfulness, trust, etc.) that make the transition from sheer life to the quality of life possible. Although never used by Hartmann himself, this figure captures his view that there is something good in each of us, and that we all strive, in our own way, toward what is great and superior. Hartmann is convinced that we strive toward them from the bottom of our nature, and he maintains that this is the most beautiful feature of humanity.

While Hartmann undoubtedly offers a very original and stimulating conception of values and their conflicts, there is much more that could and should be discussed before a final judgment can be passed on the value of his theory. Most of them deal with his views regarding the antinomies of values and a potential synthesis of values. For example, Hartmann mentions numerous antinomies of values, but some systematization of their tensions must also be developed: Are they all antinomical on the same grounds and for the same reasons? Are they all equally antinomical? Are they all equally incommensurable? Even when there are no principal resolutions of such antinomies, there must be practical resolutions: how can we decide which of them are better and which are worse? Furthermore, if the whole idea of the synthesis of values does not resolve their antinomies, what exactly is the point of such a synthesis? How realistic is Hartmann's idea of one ultimate synthesis of all values? Is it (to use Kant's language) a 'constitutive' or a 'regulative' idea? What is gained if such a synthesis is possible, and what is lost if it is not?

My hope is that my discussion will stimulate further study of Hartmann's provocative theory of values which may, in turn, lead to our better understanding of the puzzling value of human life.

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Anthropomorphism as a methodological problem of animal ethics (in the memory of Sir Patrick Bateson)[1]

Petr Jemelka & Martin Gluchman

Abstract
The paper aims to highlight the serious methodological issue of contemporary bioethics (especially topics on the subject of animal ethics). In the discourse on the issue of the pain and suffering of animals and in derived questions, a certain form of anthropomorphism is manifested. Ethical applications of empirical research results that are relevant to humans (or humans as an anatomically and physiologically analogous animal species) are preferred. Subsequently, these extrapolations serve as a criterion for judging the qualitative level of the capabilities of all animals. Serious ethical conclusions are drawn from this reduction.

Keywords: bioethics, anthropomorphism, animal behaviour, pain, evolution

The contemporary form of the interpretation of some results in the field of neurosciences presents "cartesian" approach through the complex participation of modern experimental research of man and animals. It is also related to the problem of pain and its perception and is unfortunately transformed even to ethical conceptions. It touches on the sphere of bioethics as well (animal ethics, ethics of medicine and nursing, etc.), but as an area of projection of human self-understanding into the interpretation of reality, it interferes even on a deeper level of ethical discourse – including ethics of scientific work, itself.

Contemporary renaissance of Cartesianism
We can define the presented issue in a way that Descartes' original (and often criticized) opinion on the status of animals[2] and the conclusions derived from it, has been updated, somewhat controversially. Briefly, the more general viewpoint is the traditional belief which doesn't consider the evolution of living nature as a complex of adaptive references on various parameters meaning the search for balanced existential optimum in certain conditions. Evolution in such interpretation is understood as a "hunt", where the winner is man. Animal species are categorized in this view as the so-called 'evolutionary advanced'.

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[1] Paul Patrick Gordon Bateson (31/03/1938 – 01/08/2017) was a key figure in ethology whose work advanced the understanding of the biological origins of behavior. His early research was on imprinting (a form of early learning in young animals). He later worked on unravelling the neurobiological mechanisms that underpin this learning. Another scientific focus was the role of play behavior in the development of the individual (physical, cognitive and social skills). Latterly, his interest turned to the evolutionary basis of development and the role of behavioral plasticity in biological evolution - see his last book 'Behavior, Development and Evolution' (Bateson, 2017). In addition to his scientific work, he made significant contributions to animal welfare and research ethics (Martin, 2017).

[2] Generally, according to Descartes, animals are automatically considered as working machines. They are not conscious (nor self-conscious), do not think, speak (due to any possession of tongue) and feel. The last characteristics (the absence of feeling) is controversial in traditional interpretations of Descartes' approach, which resulted from Descartes' original terminologically unclear definition (one term "cogitare" / from the French "penser" – Descartes included reasoning and sentiment). However, Descartes distinguished "cogitatio" (reasoning) and "sensus" (sentiment) and he did not deny it to animals, because he considered sentiment as a pure material (sensual) process (Cottingham, 2008, p. 164).

Regarding the question of the perception of pain (or suffering) it says that we pay attention to, quantitatively, a more significant number of recent animal species. Their body structure doesn't consist of a sufficiently developed organ system, which would enable them to perceive painful impulses. From the absence of certain anatomical structures (included within the "advanced" sorts – e.g. cortex cerebri), we can deduce the evidently controversial conclusion on the limited ability of these species to include the reflection of parameters of those which (as a potentially traumatically destructive and thus more or less threatening the integrity and conservation of an organism's vital functions) cause the initialization of reflective defense mechanisms. These mechanisms are considered (analogically as in case of Descartes) as a pure reaction of the body without equivalent mental reflection on the suffering caused. In addition, there is an ethical argument of replaceability denying the individual value of organisms – all animal species are the same.[3]

The whole discourse is mostly related to the issue of competence to reason from the similarity of body structures to analogical sensitive – and other – competencies.[4] The allowance of this analogy is usually one of the arguments used by supporters' of the idea that animals feel pain. On the other hand, objectors to this analogy refuse it as objective speculation; similarity of body structure shouldn't automatically be mistaken for functional similarity (or other similar understanding of quality). We don't want to consider behavioural arguments as analogical conclusions from the observed inner statements (behaviours).[5]

The Cartesian approach in ethics is significantly represented, for instance, by Peter Harrison and Peter Carruthers. The historian P. Harrison can represent the already mentioned behaviourally established refusal of analogies among us and animals.[6] According to him, we shouldn't conclude on the analogical functions or similar feelings neither based on the similarities of anatomical structures of the nervous system (nor evolutionary continuity). According to Harrison, pain is a mental state requiring the ability of self-reflection and thinking (Harrison, 1991).

Peter Carruthers is even more radical, although he allows there are two types of feelings – conscious and unconscious. Both types can be found in humanity, we can consider only unconscious feelings in the case of animals. Because they are not appreciated as suffering, neither are they morally relevant.

Opinions of both authors represent (at the ethical level) the stream of restored Cartesians we discussed at the beginning of this paper. Of course, both were criticized. For instance, Tom Regan claims in his well-known paper on the rights of animals: "Carruthers argues that

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[3] This aspect can be found in the depth of xenophobic opinions, which don't respect individuality. His source is the initial inability or unwillingness to differentiate. For instance, all Chinese look the same to us regarding their appearance. It can lead us to a tendency to create typological generalizations, characterising, for instance, the members of certain ethnicities or nations (Germans are supposed to be neat, the Scottish are thrifty, etc.) We look at animals analogically – however, zoologists think that, for instance, we cannot find two zebras with the same pattern of stripes, not considering the individual differences in behaviour.

[4] Let's say that from the point of view of Descartes' argumentation the opossum (Didelphis marsupialis) is a mammal that is "undeveloped" or its defensive reaction consists of so-called thanatosis (the reaction typical for other animal species). In this reaction, the animal falls into the state of stiffness simulating death. In the case of the opossum, there is a possibility of serious injury to the organism, as they reflect atypically in atypical conditions for mammals (artificial breeding), as if they won't feel pain (they can, for instance, feel burns). However, in order to survive in a natural environment, they need to adjust to the environment naturally.

[5] This approach is certainly a proven scope, which requires further examination. We will probably admit that we cannot consider the religiousness of insect based on its manners, in case of European mantis (Mantis religiosa). On the contrary, we can easily consider the perceptive sensitiveness when suffering. And even the awareness of death is not withheld to some animals and fills them with fear.

[6] According to the author, we cannot consider the quality of internal states of mind and senses in terms of behaviour. Pain is apparently not perceived, but it is just a purely sensual defense mechanism.

because animals are unable to use language, they are unable to think, and because they are unable to think, they are not conscious of anything ... In Carruthers´s view, animal pain is ´unconscious´" (Regan, 2003, pp. 34–35). Regan consequently concludes: "Contrary to the Cartesians among us, nonhuman animals *have* interests; and ... the interests of animals *are* directly morally relevant" (Regan, 2003, p. 49).

Biologically, we can conclude the objectives towards this type of negative arguments: "acute pain is the last warning of [an] organism on an impeding danger deflecting the tissues with physical or chemical agents. Warning signals are caused in weak afferent fibers … by stimulating activity, which enters the central nerve system (CNS) and causes a defense reaction of [the] organism accompanied with pain. Pain presents a subjective feeling of nonciceptive stimulation, therefore only a man can report on its quality and intensity. However, there is no reason to suppose that pain would exist just in terms of human living beings. All behavioral studies agree on the fact that there is a [sic] pain in [the] case of all vertebrates. Defense reactions on nonciceptive stimulations, painful for man, can be observed only in all animals including invertebrates, such as insects or worms. Therefore, only structures for nonciception, can be considered as the most primitive sensor organ significant for the purpose of life preservation and individual integrity" (Vlachová & Viklický, 1999, p. 8).

From the mentioned approaches of both parties, it is clear that the discourse is cycled somewhere – already for some period of time. It is comparable to polemics, which caused essential theses of neo-vitalism years ago. Well, where is the similarity?

Neo-vitalism as an example

The initial objection we can have towards (neo)vitalism is related to the justification of a key thesis on the hypothetical presence of vital factors (power, energy, etc.). This factor is unable to be revealed using standard scientific methods of research into living beings. However, vitalists supposed its presence and built the whole conception of life (or the whole ontology) on this presumption. The problem of verifiability has been performed by intuitive completion of the usual empiric-rational non-ethical sources. Vitalists were not doubtful about "something" being or not being and this causes the evolution of material and living organisms. When using hopelessly rough and inadequate invasive research processes of an observed object (living organism), a non-measurable life-giving "power" slowly died forever. Traditional scientists wanted to break through the essence of life by killing to anatomize – which was, according to the vitalist conception, the acting already disapproved in advance and couldn't tend towards the understanding of the phenomena of life.

Initial objections towards this argumentation construction of vitalism are its speculative character. According to critics, we shouldn't consider anything as an existing what we cannot access by exact standardized processes. Therefore we can criticize neo-vitalism as a speculation appearing from science (significant changes in physiology), which considers science and its legitimate processes as insufficient (insufficiently subtle within the methods regarding the character of the researched area).

Regarding the already mentioned issue of persisting with (or even regenerating) Cartesianism, the historical example of neo-vitalism can specifically inspire us for the requirement of critical evaluation of methodology in the scope of constructing hypotheses. We can formulate it as follows.

Through the inability of empirical methods to reveal certain qualitative (ontologically creative) characteristics of the reality of neo-vitalism reliably, he concluded its presence and significance – referring to the necessary presence of organizing factors in organized sets of reality. This approach was justly refused by critics of vitalism as an abusively speculative

conclusion, missing empirical essentials, problematically (just subjectively) verifiable and mostly non-falsifiable.

However, we cannot raise the similar objection against the presented counter (towards the possibility of organisms to perceive painful stimulations) conclusions made by neurophysiological argumentation by using qualitative ontic hierarchization of living nature.[7] The problem is that from the absence of certain anatomical structures, we can deduce merely speculative conclusions about the low quality of the perception of stimulus again.[8] However, this approach arrogantly misses the undisputed fact of evolution and the success of individual life forms of such handicapped creatures. They live and successfully survive (as species and individuals) in many cases much longer (in species terminology)[9] than other, so-called advanced, creatures. The reason for their evolutionary success is the fact that these organisms can efficiently (in comparison to "advanced" forms) evaluate the efficiency of the environmental factors. Their evolutionary memory (genome) fixes defense mechanisms, the activation of which is related to the adequate reflection of dangerous factors through their unpleasant activity on more or less differentiated (but functional) receptive body structures.

To conclude from the absence of anatomic-physical structure (identical or maximally similar to human) the absence of the possibility of unpleasant stimulations perception is the approach clearly speculative and reductionist.[10] It is based on the hypostasis of the anthropomorphically construed vision of "the ideal type", which consequently can be considered in the forms of reflections – again compared with our experience. We again encounter verification (subjective experience and its communicability) and problems with falsification.

Taxonomic reductionism and ethics of scientific work

This warning regarding the problem within the interpretation of the stated issue can be spread using more serious methodological criticism. This considers it as a problematic approach, which, although, examines physiological processes in living organisms through modern scientific processes, however, from all the spectrum of nature (or animals) for this research, it prefers only some of the species in the long term – regardless the quantitative distribution of well-known species as well as those hypothetically appearing. There are approximately 5 500 species of known mammals, there are approximately ten times more identified species of crustaceans, insects are represented by approximately one million known species. A research preference of a relatively small number of animal "prototypes" (so-called taxonomic chauvinism) is currently criticized by scientists as a crucial problem of the Ethics of Scientific Work: "Scientists who study 'unconventional' or 'unpopular' organisms often complain that their papers are rejected for publication, because they are seen as lacking general interest, whereas equally narrow studies on 'popular' or 'model organism' are accepted" (Bonet, Shine

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[7] Undoubtedly, living nature is in a certain manner hierarchical (for instance, subcellular structures – cell – tissue – organ – organ structure – organism – cenosis – ecosystem - biosphere). However, the question is, if we can conclude the quality in terms of various "fitness" levels based on diversion. This is a rather anthropomorphist approach. We need to think of another warning on the possible risk of being subjected to seduction from anthropomorphist interpretations, where man is positioned as the evaluative criterion of evolution advancement. We cannot consider man (his sapiens form) as the top level of the evolution of living nature, because cultural evolution has influenced it in some way, which cannot be considered as the continuation of natural evolution. Read further on J. Šmajs' concept of evolution ontology.

[8] Let's keep the possibilities of any consideration on the form of other "subjects" aside.

[9] However, from the perspective of the individual, many creatures show suspicious vital success. An example is the maximum ability of regeneration (decreasing proportionately to evolution "advancement"). In relation to the specific way of reproduction (partition), let's think of the fact that unicellular organisms are potentially immortal.

[10] The experiments on astrobiological hypotheses consider similar problems.

& Lourdais, 2002, p. 1). And it follows: "[T]he personal interests of ornithologists and mammalogists have influenced the structure of published papers only because their study animals have dominated ecological research, and thus people interested in these organisms have come to dominate the ranks of referees and editors ..." (Bonet, Shine & Lourdais 2002, p. 3).

The issue is not only related to the originally defined question of pain and its perception by animals, but this critical reflection affects wider ethical aspects of zoological research as well as the overall form of understanding the researched area: "Understanding the dynamic of behaviour in one taxonomic group is an important goal, but the entire field moves forward only when a series of such studies across a variety of taxa allows leaps in global understanding. ... Simply put, if we have a skewed representation of taxa in our research, then we have a skewed understanding of the world (Rosenthal, Gertler, Hamilton, Prasad & Andrade, 2017, p. 83). Authors consequently specify the issue as it was found during a critical analysis of publications in the most significant topical magazine (*Animal Behavior*) that more than a half of all published articles are texts on birds and mammals, as these taxa represent only 1,5% of all animal species (Rosenthal, Gertler, Hamilton, Prasad & Andrade, 2017, p. 85). This discovery corresponds with the above mentioned warning of privileged "interest" groups in the field of zoological (or ecological) research and the issue of publishing policy.

Particular efforts to overcome the reductionism in scientific research

Returning to the original problem of understanding pain in the case of animals, we find that even here we can find authors who strive to overcome taxonomic reductionism.

In 1991, P. Bateson offered a set of anatomical-physiological criteria for verifying experiments in the functional analogy of animal and human reception of painful stimulation (Bateson, 1991, p. 834). They are formed in short as the following criteria: "... possession of nociceptors, receptors that detect damaging stimuli on or in the body; pathways from nociceptors to the brain; brain structures analogous to the human cerebral cortex that process pain; opioid receptors and endogenous opioid substances in a nociceptive neural system; a reduction in adverse behavioral and physiological effects after administration of analgesics or painkillers; learning to avoid potentially painful stimuli and that this learning is rapid and inelastic" (Sneddon, Elwood, Adamo & Leach, 2014, p. 201).

This paper also offers the recent form of presented definitional criteria related to the development of experimental techniques and together with extended taxonomic range of the research: "Here we list criteria that animals can be tested on to determine their potential capacity for pain. Determining whether a specific species experiences pain will typically require species-specific behavioural and physiological tests. These are based upon the mechanism to detect, react and respond to pain and have two key sets of evidence: 1) whole animal responses to noxious stimuli such as physiological change and effects of analgesic and local anaesthetics which differ from those to innocuous stimuli and 2) evidence of long-term motivational change that might include rapid learning. These criteria must be considered as a whole and not as indicators in isolation" (Sneddon, Elwood, Adamo & Leach, 2014, p. 203).

However, this article isn't kept only within more general methodological formulations, but also offers a short summary of recent results within the category of mammals, amphibians, reptiles, fish, mollusks, some species of crustaceans and insects. We can underline one aspect here. We could easily observe that the ability of organisms to learn how to avoid painful stimulation has been classified into Bateson's mentioned set of original definition criteria. The overall actual results of recent experiments say that these abilities can be found not only in the case of birds and mammals, but even in the case of insects, fish and some mollusks (cephalopods). As it is obvious from the partial results, the proved ability of individual learning causes a serious problem for the Cartesian axiom.

Anyway, other significant possibilities are opening up here, as they contribute to a deeper understanding – not only in the case of the psychological animal world, but even ourselves. "The experience with research into mental competencies of different animal species could lead us towards careful judgments on what is an important or necessary feature of mentality" (Müllerová, Černý & Doležal, 2016, p. 251). In any case, we agree with this conclusion: "[F]rom an ethical and often a legal perspective, we must ensure the welfare of animals. ... [H]owever, even if we cannot be certain that some species experience pain, they should be treated with respect for reasons that do not hinge on whether or not they experience pain" (Sneddon, Elwood, Adamo & Leach, 2014, p. 209).

"Delictum of anthropomorphism" as an ethical challenge

Regarding the warning on the need for respecting the *welfare* of animals, let us get back one more time to the essential problem of anthropomorphism.

The above mentioned experiment to solve the problems of proving the perception by applying a differentiation between pain and suffering, we are just avoiding the issue.[11] We even consider this process problematic because of its strong anthropomorphic aspect – suffering is understood as a conscious state related to the person. The entry on Pain and Suffering in The Encyclopedia of Bioethics is defined in the same way (Post, 2004, pp. 1961–1969). The whole definition is focused only on the mechanisms of origin, transfer and evaluation of painful stimulation in the human body, as we defined several types of pain (acute, chronic, etc.) and special attention is paid to the mentioned form of differentiating between pain and suffering. There is no reference to the reflection of the issue in the case of other living creatures; however, there is a lot of space dedicated to theological aspects (including the relation to other encyclopedia entries such as – Palliative care, pastoral care).

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Let us ask this question within the conclusion, whether contemporary ethics is able to overcome this scientifically supported argument with a problematic reductionist position, as we defined anthropomorphism.

Hans Jonas defined in his text from 1983 the so-called "delictum of anthropomorphism" as being responsible for subjectivity in understanding living nature and man: "Our Western understanding of philosophical tradition looks fascinated by the appearance of man itself. It attributes him with everything unique, which is rooted in the organic being as itself … the understanding of man suffers by such a separation as well as by the understanding out-of-human life" (Jonas, 2005).

However, at the same time, Jonas claimed in this text that anthropomorphism is related to the fact that Darwinian versions of evolutionism, as a realization of monism, definitively terminated Cartesianism and other dualisms. This has brought the possibility of radical change of the world view: "Evolutionism weakens Descartes' construction more efficiently than any other metaphysical criticism did before. Within strong resentment over blame, teaching the animal origins of humans caused his/her dignity, it has been overseen that according to the same principle, that something from his dignity has not been returned to the kingdom of everything living" (Jonas, 2005). According to Jonas, anthropomorphism is not just a sin, which shifts the interpretation of the world in an unfavorable direction. In Jonas' phenomenologically construed argumentation, it can be the way how to reveal many of the grandiosities and the existential characteristics (freedom) traditionally assigned to man and other living creatures.

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[11] I consider Descartes' regenerated argument of sharing (only a man can define his/her suffering, which is the evidence of his/her distinction from animals – he/she is aware of it).

However, the problem is that even in Jonas' view on animals, we can find the speculative scale from "the primitive" to "the developed". Jonas also worked with the idea of larger or smaller evolutionary advancement of living creatures.

Anthropomorphism is, on one hand, a tool of Jonas' experiment for axiological rehabilitation of non-human creatures. It is applied with a good aim in mind – as searching of "superior" in "inferior". And this is his major problem – in this persisting classification of life into "superior" and "inferior", there is an internal inconsistency of text, which is undoubtedly interesting. And – as we can currently see – the already mentioned Cartesianism has not been beaten yet.

This reference to older works[12] and its internal inconsistency can illustrate the opinion that contemporary ethics should strive to overcome this problematic position, which we called anthropomorphism.[13] If ethics wants to testify on the set of serious bioethical questions – for instance (Bateson, 2005), it should strive not only for scientific results, but should be able to search for these results objectively (selectively or eclectically) and critically assess within its discourse. It should strive to overcome certain traditionalism in this sense and show more discourse courage. It should point to the potential sins of ethical scientific work itself, including courage.

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[12] However, the quoted Czech translation was published more than two decades after the original published piece of work. Therefore, we need to warn that this text presents an effort to define a much more closed form of questions, which H. Jonas dealt with in all his philosophical thinking. It would be very useful to compare this text with the original version of his thoughts, which Jonas produced in the 1950s. We talk about an extensive monograph, which was not published during his life and was just recently reconstructed in a critical edition (Jonas, 2016).

[13] More precisely – the basic reduction of preferences from the human point of view in theory made by man is obviously not possible. However, it is possible to strive to eliminate risks of reductionism and deformation in the used method as well as the designed picture of reality and conclusions related to it and value and moral challenges.

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Theoretical foundations of the Bratislava School of Business Ethics

Anna Remišová & Anna Lašáková

Abstract

The aim of this article is to explain the key theoretical foundations of business ethics as a social scientific and academic discipline that was established and further developed at the Faculty of Management at Comenius University in Bratislava. The authors of this article refer to this school of thought as the "Bratislava School of Business Ethics" with the intention of pointing out its relative autonomy in research and higher education in the Slovak academic environment.

Keywords: integrative business ethics, Bratislava School of Business Ethics, ethical rationality, economical rationality, ethical behavior, unethical conduct, managerial ethics

Introduction

The development of business ethics over a quarter of a century at economics-oriented universities has been symbolically crowned by the acknowledgement to integrate ethical education into a system of long-term and systematic university education of prospective managerial professionals. In 2017, the Faculty of Management at Comenius University in Bratislava (FMCU) started to implement an accredited study program of Management within the field of study of Management, which includes teaching a course of business ethics as a compulsory subject. For the first time in Slovakia, the academic discipline of business ethics became a part of the obligatory intellectual "equipment" of a professional manager. The transition from an optional course to an obligatory subject is of great importance for the development of business ethics in theory and practice.

This occasion has inspired our effort to clarify the theoretical postulates of the business ethics concept, which originated at FMCU and which forms the basis of pedagogical education and scientific research at this faculty. The authors of this article consider themselves as representatives of this coherent concept, which has already been developed for the three decades. They suggest titling this stream of thought as the Bratislava School of Business Ethics (BSBE). In this article, they focus on clarifying the basic postulates of ethical and entrepreneurial-ethical theories, on which the BSBE is based.

Basic postulates of BSBE

The formation of a uniform and systematic understanding of business ethics as an academic discipline at BSBE was initially outlined in the works of Anna Remišová, first at the University of Economics in Bratislava (during the 1990s) and consecutively (since 2000) at Comenius University in Bratislava. The key standpoints of the Swiss professor Peter Ulrich published in the seminal works *Transformation der ökonomischen Vernunft* (1993) and *Integrative Wirtschaftsethik* (1997) had a fundamental influence on her thinking and approach to business ethics.

The BSBE is partially rooted in Ulrich's theoretical and methodological standpoints and is based on five pillars. These basic postulates are as follows:
1. Business ethics as social science represents an integration of ethical and economic rationalities.
2. The economic sphere forms one of the spheres of social life and its basic mission is to procure basic life needs, i.e. service to life.

3. The key ethical-economic issue in business ethics is the relationship between ethics and profit.
4. Managerial ethics as the normative regulation of professional activities of managers is an important ingredient of business ethics. The ethical conduct of managers (ethical leadership) is central to the successful application of business ethics principles into organizational practice.
5. The BSBE assumes that the nature of organizational practice necessitates for a pluralistic and synthesizing approach to business ethics, integrating several theoretical approaches to ethics.

These five postulates accompany the development of the BSBE from its beginnings to the present and appear in the academic didactic preparation of the educational process. They serve as the starting point for scientific projects and related research in the field of business ethics at the FMCU.

Business ethics as a social science represents the integration of ethical and economic rationality

Business ethics as an academic discipline was formed in the 1970s and its development is accompanied by a number of attempts to define it. The interdisciplinary nature of business ethics is not questioned by researchers; what causes theoretical and methodological problems is related to the understanding of the potency of application of its normativity. Business ethics is about to uncover the mystery of interconnecting two methods of thinking about two legitimate ways of human cooperation. Its primary task is to explore the relationship between the theoretical disciplines of ethics and economic science and the real relationship of morality and economics in social practice. The mission of business ethics as a social science is to provide insights that not only explain the aforementioned relationships but also to guide on their application and use in the real live of individual persons, groups or society as a whole. Business ethics is therefore normative in nature and its acceptance should become a regulator of economically active entities.

According to the BSBE, the rise and subsequent expansion of business ethics represents the beginning of a new socio-scientific paradigm that disrupts the two hundred year paradigm of the separation of economic thinking and economic systems from values. The thought tradition of understanding the perfect functioning of the economic order solely on the basis of economic calculations and characteristics has proved to be illusory, theoretically and practically inoperative, because it failed to explain and subsequently solve real socio-economic and environmental problems.

The constitutive definition of business ethics at FMCU is as follows: Business ethics is a normative social scientific discipline that examines the integration of ethical and economic thinking and the integration of ethics and economics in all areas and at all levels of the economic system (Remišová, 2015).

This definition is based on the justification of the elimination of the dichotomy of economic and ethical rationality and on the demand for the introduction of ethical reflection into economic life in all its breadth and diversity. The essence of such an understanding of business ethics lies in bridging economic and ethical rationality to a single cognitive entity. The first author to create a concept of business science based on the integration of economic and ethical thinking and the integration of ethics and economics was Peter Ulrich (Ulrich, 1993; Ulrich, 1995; Ulrich, 1997).

Economic rationality is a way of rational reasoning applied by economically active entities. It is a way of thinking about how to achieve an economic goal in the state of permanent limitation of resources, e.g. human, natural, monetary, or informational resources. Economic rationality, understood as technical rationality, in itself, is not ethically problematic. What is

ethically problematic, however, is its dogmatic enforcement in a modern market economy that brings not only satisfaction of the economic needs of the planet's population but also a huge number of social and ecological problems, including the threat to human existence. The social and ecological reality around the globe, forming since the second half of the 20th century, has its roots in an unregulated economic rationality that prefers individual particular interests of the members of the society and not the interests of the society as a whole.

Ethical rationality is a way of thinking based on the search for universal rules of human coexistence and cooperation of people and with the natural environment. Morality is a distinguishing feature of human existence, it is the basis and at the same time the way of cooperation of human beings. Ethical rationality reflects the development of human thinking in the field of desirable human behavior. The current minimal ethical bases in interpersonal cooperation and coexistence require respect for every human being as a respectable creature whose life and activity on any part of the planet and in any human sphere are based on respect for human rights. The form of integration of this ethical rationality with economic thinking should acquire the character of "socio-economic rationality", that is the rationality which has "an ethical reason already in itself" (Ulrich, 1997, p. 96).

Economy is "only" one of the spheres of society

Economic action is an integral part of human life. The history of mankind shows that man has entered labor division at a certain stage, and has since ensured the satisfaction of needs through cooperation with others who produce. Pre-modern economic theories from Aristotle to Smith refer to normatively closed types of societies where economic life does not protrude beyond other social spheres but is one of them, and in the same way to them, it is embodied in the social and cultural ties of wider social life. The social anchor of the economy was of a dual nature; on the one hand. economic life was based on moral norms that were binding for the community, and it was penetrated by them, and "the economic aims and motives were thus comprehensively subordinated to the social ideas of good life and fair coexistence" (Ulrich, 1997, p. 132). On the other hand, the organization of the economy was "complexly connected to traditional institutions of everyday life" such as family, community, church (Ulrich, 1997, p. 133).

The modern market economy no longer derives from traditional moral standards, either bypassing them or making use of them in favor of achieving economically rationally set individual or particular goals. And as far as economic organizations are concerned, they are not organically associated with traditional institutions such as family, community, or church, but the market economy begins to control and to colonize them. Whereas in pre-modern societies various social spheres of life stood "side by side", modern economy dominates these institutions – it has infused them as a way of managing economic bonds, economic relations, economic values, economically rational thinking. Arts, sports, health, education derive no longer from their own mission in the society, but they take on the function of economic units, and manage themselves based on economic calculus, economic values and economic relations. The world of life – the *Lebenswelt*, as the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas titled it, is colonized by the economic thinking.

Our present is associated with the existence of a capitalist economic system in its globalized form, which from an economic point of view represents almost perfect pure economic rationality – the global player works with limited global resources in such a way that their use for the realization of business goals would be the most economically advantageous. Economic, and not the ethical, social or environmental value, remains the priority value of an economically active entity.

The BSBE promotes a critical insight into the ultimate role of the market in the modern economy. Market economy perceives market cooperation as "the principle of purely

economic creation of the social world", which changes the people who participate in the economic activity into "Homo oeconomicus", where the key market position takes up the character of an ideology of the total market community (Ulrich, 1993, pp. 127–129).

The market is one of the basic structural elements of modern capitalist economy. Market cooperation is seen in the BSBE as one of many other ways of coordinating human cooperation that has proved to be functioning and effective. However, its utter dominance and the attribution of quality of something objectively and totally independent of society are misleading. The market is a social institution that originated within the society, and as such it is not a natural or supernatural phenomenon. As a social phenomenon, it has its characteristics, which also include its social cultural anchorage. In human society there is a more broadly conceived social cooperation than the market one – it is the morality-based cooperation that works on the basis of recognition of the existence and interests of another person.

Relationship between morality and profit

The basic regulatory idea for the economic thinking of an economic actor in a modern market economy is profit. Business ethics as an integrative social scientific discipline is based on a serious critique of economics in its understanding of profit and of the key economic "cost-revenue" linkage. According to the BSBE, this type of reasoning fosters the idea that it is an independent economic criterion that provides the economy with precision and objectivity. Modern economic theorists are dominantly convinced that if the profitability and return on investment can be mathematically calculated, the economic world operates on a scientific basis, is autonomous, and no regulatory interventions are needed.

The concepts of profit and maximization of profit are closely related to the "costs-revenues" logic. Profit is the basic structural element of a market economy, and it seems that in the current economic world – both theoretically and practically – has the status of an untouchable deity. In the understanding of business ethics according to the BSBE, profit is perceived as an economic category that is neither ethical nor unethical. Profit is one of many economic tools to evaluate the entity's economic activity. Profit as an economic criterion for success in the economic world is linked only to the economic interests of one (individual or collective) economically active actor, and generally refers only to profit expressed in a financial form.

The BSBE accepts the place of profit in the market economy. However, ethical reflection of profit is essential. Profit can be evaluated as ethical or unethical. Profit is unethical if it is created in an unethical way or it is used in an unethical way. An economic entity that generates profits in an unethical way is unethical. Furthermore, an economic entity is also unethical should it redistribute its profit in an unfair manner (e.g. unfair employee remuneration, toxic investments). An economically active entity can generate profit in the long run and be ethical. Its true attitude to ethics will be revealed in a situation where profits come into conflict with ethics. In the BSBE the concept of business ethics is based on the idea that in the case of an irreconcilable conflict between ethics and profit, ethics is preferred over profit, i.e. human, humane and accountable conduct is given priority over economically successful conduct (a conduct that is fruitful usually only for an individual or a limited group of people). In addition, the BSBE regards profit in a wider sense, not only as an economic constant, but as a social and environmental issue; for instance, employee development, provision of social opportunities, or environmental protection may be regarded as diverse facets of profit.

Ethical theoretical framework of BSBE

Business ethics is applied ethics, meaning that it is a social science that applies ethical knowledge to the field of economics and human action in the economic sphere. At this point,

the BSBE differs from the understanding of business ethics as seen by Peter Ulrich, who opposes the idea of business ethics as applied ethics, fearing that in this form it would be reduced only to a social technique of solving economic problems, thereby losing its critically-reflective and integrative character. He argues that economics itself, as the ideal theory of rational ethically active entities, is a normative theory that applies the benefit principle for the business environment, but it is absolutely insufficient for business ethics.

The primary ethical starting point of the BSBE is Kant's deontological ethics, his understanding of unselfish moral behavior, and the application of the categorical imperative in its three meanings. "The basic formulations of a categorical imperative can be translated into a simple sentence: [O]ne can only speak of morality if he can appreciate another person with the same degree of respect he attributes toward himself. Relation to oneself represents form of the other side the relationship to another person. Self-esteem does not work without respect to every other person" (Muránsky, 2008, p. 350). On this ideological basis, we have come to the abovementioned point of view: ethics is placed before profit, i.e. humanity is placed above the economic interest of an individual or a group. Kant's universalistic and humanistic ideas are reflected fully in the conception of business ethics as a social scientific discipline, which is part of a new socio-economic paradigm, where economics and ethics are integrated more as two modes of human coexistence based on cooperation. This understanding of business ethics differs from utilitarian ethics, which is considered to be the ideological justification of modern capitalist market economy and neoclassical economics.

The BSBE follows Remišová's understanding of applied ethics as a theoretical reflection of the morale of individual social spheres and activities, which contains not only an ethical expert analysis of phenomena and issues in a given social sphere, but also focuses on a critical analysis of itself. In doing so, business ethics is also an application of a complex general ethics to the whole range of theoretical and practical problems in the economic sphere, and it is also a theory of ethical application (Remišová, 1999, p. 233).

In the analysis of economic behavior from an ethical standpoint and in the search for ways of integrating ethical and economic rationality, various concepts of business ethics are based on different ethical theories and concepts, examining morality, its origins, structure, basis, nature of ethical knowledge or methods of investigation and criteria of the truthfulness of ethical knowledge, which form the social science of ethics in its complexity and systemic nature. In essence, the BSBE emphasizes that there is not just *one* ethics, but there is a social scientific discipline formed by *various* ethical theories and more or less complex concepts that examine some of the ethical issues, deepening what has been already explored, and discovering novelties in moral human action and reasoning. No single ethical theory should entitle itself to an absolute solution of moral and ethical problems because it represents only one part of the enormous effort of the human intellect to theoretically and critically assist mankind and humanity as a whole to achieve a new quality of human coexistence and cooperation based on nonviolent communication and humanity. In addition, new scientific knowledge from the field of natural, technical and social sciences is shifting the borders of knowledge on the quality of human coexistence and human behavior that ethical theories cannot ignore.

In the process of critical moral and ethical reflection in the economic sphere, it is often insufficient to apply only one ethical concept to the area investigated. For instance, in modelling the construct of the ethical leader, we have drawn from the origins of these ethical theories: virtue ethics, deontological ethics, human rights ethics, ethics of responsibility and ethics of justice (Remišová & Lašáková, 2013; Remišová et al., 2016). In our opinion, the leader we designate as ethical:
- has certain ethical virtues such as honesty, tolerance, fairness, decency, reliability, and personality integrity (virtue ethics),

- bears responsibility to not to harm others; prioritizes ethical rationality over economic rationality in case the two cannot be reconciled in the decision-making process; keeps distance from unethical behavior of others jointly with clear communication of expectations related to ethical behavior of subordinates, verbalizes the importance of ethics in the workplace; distinguishes among subordinates based on their ethical conduct; and has self-reflection to be able to continually develop personally and professionally (deontological ethics),
- respects human rights, openly and clearly communicates with others and helps to develop their potential (human rights ethics),
- is able to consider the consequences of his/her own behavior and decisions and takes personal responsibility (ethics of responsibility),
- considers objectivity and justice important and keeps up these two ethical principles (ethics of justice).

Another example of the integration of diverse ethical knowledge and methods into the economic sphere is the BSBE itself that Remišová (1998), following Ulrich (1997), characterizes as rationalist, humane, and discourse-oriented. These three features present the application of different dimensions of ethical knowledge: the way of thinking, the basic ethical principle and the way of dealing with inconsistent standpoints.

The way of thinking: Business ethics is rationalistic. That is, it recognizes logical, reasoned and justified knowledge as the basis of human coexistence. Critical reflection of morality is based on evidence and argumentation as utilized in the scientific world, with the acceptance of the peculiarity of human coexistence and action as the subject matter of the study. Business ethics represents a critical reflection of the whole economic sphere and the activity of all economic subjects.

The basic ethical principle: Business ethics is based on the idea of humanity. That is, the acknowledgement of the dignity of a human being, as interpreted in the works of Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1999; Kant, 2004). Humanity means accepting another human being as a being who, like me, is a rational being and as such is worthy of respect, and not to use this autonomous being as a means to attain personal goals. The principle of humanity is a rational justification of the primary principle of morality – consideration of others in my own actions. The factum of reason and the factum of mutual recognition of others are the absolute primary principles of peaceful human coexistence.

The way of conflict resolution – discourse: Discursive ethics rationally justifies the solution of cohabitation with a focus on addressing potential or real conflict in human coexistence (Apel, 1992; Habermas, 1992). For business ethics, which is confronted with permanent tension between the interests of individuals and groups, this point is immensely important. It connects both rationalistic and humane principles. It requires human beings to resolve their conflicting coexistence in a nonviolent way – that is, by means of reciprocal recognition of the right of another party for respect, and taking into account the interests of those affected by a given decision.

Ethical and unethical conduct of managers: Integration of ethical motives and ethical consequences

Business ethics is normative in nature, and the specification of the initial ethical normative theory is crucial for the application of business ethics into practice, since the initial normative theory gives answers to the questions of "what the manager should do?", "how to decide ethically correctly?" "what his/her intention should be?" or "what behavior can be considered ethical?"

The peculiarity as well as the complexity of the application of ethical normative theories to the economic sphere and to the conduct of economically active entities, especially managers,

stems from the fact that the traditional division of normative ethics into deontological and consequentialist ethics appears in this area to be too "narrow". By avoiding a detailed discussion on the division of normative ethics, it can be stated briefly that the main criterion for their division is the attitude towards the solution of the second fundamental question of ethics; *what action is ethical?* Thus, to specify to what primacy belongs in determining the ethical behavior of a moral agent: to the motive or to the consequence of agent's conduct. In accordance with deontological ethics, conduct is ethical only and under such condition when the motive is ethical, or when the sum of righteous, good, positive, etc., prevails over the wrong, non-positive, or poor. What consequences are considered to be ethically correct, positive or good is further discussed in particular in the context of consequentialist ethics (Gluchman, 2008; Gluchman, 2017).

In the BSBE debate over normative ethical foundation it has shown that in business ethics, which is based on the integration of ethical and economic reason, it is not possible to accept only one normative ethics. In accordance with BSBE, both deontological and consequentialist ethical theories are essential. An attempt to build a concept of business ethics as an integrative and normative science on only one of them proved to be unrealistic. Economic activities conducted through human decisions and actions cannot be considered ethically relevant, as long as they are evaluated only either from the stance of ethical motives or from the position of consequences. We consider the conduct of a manager as ethical if it is based on an ethical motive and at the same time its consequences do not harm others (Lašáková, Remišová & Búciová, 2015).

Particularly crucial was the discussion on the ethical normative basis in defining a manager's unethical behavior. In the manager's activities, good motive alone does not guarantee that the consequences of the action will not harm anyone (in the broadest sense of the word). Therefore, it is vital that the manager in decision-making would be able to predict the influence of the decision on others. The manager's work epitomizes a continuous decision-making process that affects a large number of people and the natural environment within both the closer as well as more distant time horizons. Considering the consequences of actions, as well as the ethical reflection of the action itself, elements of the professional equipment of an ethical manager are essential. We define unethical managerial conduct as conduct that has an unethical motive and/or it harms others, be it individuals, organization and/or society as a whole (Lašáková & Remišová, 2015).

We emphasize that ethical conduct is only such an action that has an ethical motive, that is, the motivation, impetus or intent of a person to act is ethical. Or, paraphrasing Kant, the subject's acts are morally selfless. In conceptualizing the manager's ethical behavior, the motive itself cannot be excluded from the evaluation of ethicality/unethicality, at least because the manager as a professional subject has to have personality integrity – if his/her motives are unethical, his/her colleagues will sooner or later reveal it and such a manager will be "ethically disqualified". In modern theories on ethical leadership, the unity of personality characteristics of the manager and the ability to lead others (subordinates) toward ethical conduct is clearly preferred (Trevino, Hartman & Brown, 2000). At the same time, it should be noted that we do not understand the motivation of a person as something "flat" but as something multidimensional and developing in accordance with gaining new knowledge and experiences.

Today's economic knowledge is dominated by the concepts of corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory, which point to the fact that, besides economically active business entities, there is a number of social groups that have their legitimate interests. The professionalism of the current manager lies, among other things, in identifying these groups, recognizing their legitimate (social, socio-cultural, economic and environmental) interests and the consequences that managerial decisions have on these groups. In accordance with

professional ethics, the manager is required to take these interests into account and to re-evaluate them from the point of view of ethics. In other words, ethical managerial decision-making includes ethical motivation to act as well as ethical reflection of the consequences of the actions, followed by acceptance of ethical responsibility for such conduct (Lašáková & Remišová, 2017). In this respect, the manager's decisions are based on both deontological and consequentialist ethical knowledge.

Is our delineation of a manager's ethical behavior controversial from the point of view of ethical theories, or is the application of the motive and consequences of the manager's conduct a logical conclusion of our understanding of business ethics as an integrative science? At the given stage of development, it seems impossible to comprise ethically correct managerial decision-making only under one or another normative theory. Classification of theories is a necessary reasonable act, but the reality may be more complex than the division itself. The motive and the consequences of the action do not exist in the form of two isolated intellectual entities, but they are organically linked in managerial decision-making and subsequently in management. In this process, both the ethical self-reflection of the actions and the decision to accept responsibility for (un)ethical conduct play an important role.

The trend of integrating the deontological duty and the consequentialist considerations about the consequences of actions is also evident in the concept of professional managerial ethics. Accordingly, humanism and responsibility are the main principles of regulating managerial behavior (Ulrich, 1995; Remišová, 2011; McDonald, 2015; Dierksmeier, 2016).

We consider the issue of the criteria according to which the consequences of actions are evaluated from the point of view of ethics as a complex theoretical as well as practical and pedagogical-educational problem. The standards of ethical conduct, that is the criteria of correct and incorrect, moral and immoral, or put differently the criteria of morally correct and morally incorrect acts are extensively discussed (Gluchman, 2008; Gluchman, 2017). We believe that the consequences of any particular action from the point of view of ethics can be judged from different ethical positions – for example from the position of human rights ethics, ethics of justice, virtue ethics, ethics of duty, or discourse ethics, or from the position of values. Moreover, the evaluation of ethicality of actions as a process itself is carried out not only by the manager but also by other subjects. Their verdict depends on how a manager's actions affect the interests of the evaluators and what their ethical and intellectual abilities are. It is clear that the assessment of those people who were affected by a manager's conduct may be different from the assessments of the parties not directly affected.

Conclusion

We have drafted this article not as a deep theoretical dive into the issues of all areas which the representatives of the BSBE have been dealing with since its inception, but as a comprehensive overview of its basic theoretical positions with the focus on the ethical and entrepreneurial-ethical aspects. We have set out to clarify the essence of an integrated understanding of business ethics as an integration of ethical and economic rationality, its critical reflective character and humanistic orientation. The basic motivation to recapitulate the theoretical backgrounds of business ethics lies in a noticeable increase in the impact of business ethics as an academic discipline on the ethical reasoning and conduct of managers by means of an introduction to business ethics as a compulsory course at FMCU since 2017. In the past years only several dozen students (both Slovak and foreign) have graduated from business ethics; however, in the new intellectual space the numbers of students will be counted in hundreds – we expect about 500 graduates per year. The responsibility of BSBE lecturers and researchers for the formation of ethical thinking, ethical reflection and respect for professional managerial ethics has grown to an unprecedented extent.

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The problem of indoctrination, with a focus on moral education

Jan Hábl

Abstract

Indoctrination is a large and important issue in (not only moral) education. It is considered to be one of the capital pedagogical faults. However, the question is, what does it mean to indoctrinate? Educators from the liberal camp of the educational spectrum have had the tendency to criticize the traditional approach as "indoctrinational." On the other hand, proponents of the traditional approach object that if indoctrination were defined properly then even the liberal approach would not be immune. This raises two fundamental questions that will be the subject of this study: a) what exactly does it mean to indoctrinate? b) is education without indoctrination even possible?

Keywords: education, indoctrination, liberal approach, traditional approach, rationality

Introduction

The postwar crisis of values gave birth to a new approach to moral education in Western countries in the second half of the 20th century. The subsequent generation openly distanced themselves from the "morals" of their parents. In addition to freedom of expression, emancipation of human rights and an emphasis on autonomy, the prevailing sentiment of the so-called flower children was resistance towards the "stale" culture which priggishly preached, commissioned, and taught. The culture of their fathers—because of the horrors of war that were still fresh in their memories—had lost its moral legitimacy and became more of a source of shame than something to pass along pedagogically. From such a background it was not surprising, therefore, that in the 1950s and 60s there arose a method which had an emphasis on discussion, openness, engagement, no guidelines, and so on. The goal of the method was neither the formation nor transmission of any kind of specific "bag of virtues", in the words of Lawrence Kohlberg, or any other moral material. It was said that such an approach would be a form of indoctrination, the cardinal defect of "old" or "traditional" education (Hunter, 2000, p. 219). Teachers and educators of this new type considered their pedagogical task to help students to think independently and critically, based on the psychological assumption that if individuals themselves identified their own values, the internalization of those values would be easier and more durable than if they were mediated by an adult. Students were thus guided to discover, classify and develop their own values, that is, to construct their own moral universe. The key methodological motifs of the new approach are the *value clarification* method, the *decision-making* method and the *critical thinking* method. Because all these motifs together have the common feature of a personalistic, non-directive or client-oriented approach to the individual, they are often labeled as *liberal*. There were many proponents and advocates, but some of the most notable should be named: Carl Rodgers, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Sidney B. Simon, Louis Raths and Merrill Harmin.

Since the key problem which the liberal approach wanted to avoid was indoctrination, I want to give it special attention. It is indeed a large and important issue in (not only moral) education. Who would want to be accused of the capital pedagogical sin of indoctrination? However, some thinkers and educators have recently brought forward an interesting counter-criticism, objecting that if indoctrination was defined properly then even the liberal approach would not be immune. This raises two fundamental questions that will be the subject of this

study: a) what exactly does it mean to indoctrinate? b) is education without indoctrination even possible?

The definition of indoctrination

There have been many attempts to define indoctrination, as we shall see. It seems to me that one of the most thorough and exhaustive analysis of the phenomenon is provided by Elmer J. Thiessen in his book *Teaching for Commitment*. Thiessen responds to the terminological chaos surrounding the word. His approach is unique in that he does not present any kind of abstract conceptual analysis of the term, but pays careful attention to everyone who has treated the concept of indoctrination in the second half of the 20th century, synthesizing the partial objections into a coherent form, so that it is clear what exactly makes indoctrination, indoctrination. He then applies those facts to specific educational approaches, both traditional and liberal.[1]

Thiessen identifies four or five criteria or areas in which indoctrination can occur (Thiessen, 1993, p. 59ff): i) content, ii) method(s), iii) intention, iv) effects, v) some educational theorists would also add institutional as a criterion, in the sense that some educational institutions are, or necessarily must be, *apriori*, indoctrinational because of the nature of what they are.

i) Content

In the first place, indoctrination is associated with a certain kind of content. Certain doctrines or systems of doctrine form a specific worldview or ideology. Terms like doctrine and ideology have their own pejorative connotations, but in the twilight of modernity (the second half of the twentieth century) they were mainly connected with politics and religion. The only discourse considered to be free of any doctrine was scientific discourse, because it was supposedly based only on pure facts, rationality, rigorous logic and objective experience (Kazepides, 1987; Barrow & Woods, 1988; Hirst, 1974). When the word *doctrine* was used it was always understood to mean "unscientific", (and thus) "erroneous", "irrational", "ideological", "dogmatic", etc. This exclusive status of science has today, of course, been lost. The current scientific community, for the most part, no longer holds the romantic ideal of "scientific quality", because it is aware that the distance between the knower and the object known is not as unproblematic as modernity thought. Every scientist has a certain pre-understanding, a set of doctrines, theories and principles, which are non-negotiable yet which determine the human understanding of reality. Nevertheless, the discussion about indoctrination has its roots in the height of the period of modernity, and its spirit lives on. If you ask a modern romantic (liberal scientific educator) which doctrines (content) trigger indoctrination, here is a summary:

> *Faulty doctrines.* Simply wrong, not based on the facts. Wilson calls these doctrines "irrational" (Wilson, 1972, p. 103).

> *Unsupported or insufficiently substantiated doctrines.* What underpins doctrines, is evidence. An unsupported doctrine is questionable, dubious, uncertain, vague, or—as Wilson says—lacking "publicly accepted evidence" (Wilson, 1964, p. 28).

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[1] The practicality and functionality of Thiessen's methodological approach is evident in the kind of language he uses in the Introduction to illustrate his goal: If a town decree says that no "means of transport" are allowed in the park and someone asks whether a skateboard is a means of transport, it isn't necessary to formulate a deep and complex definition of what is and is not a "means of transport", but just to deal with the question directly, that is, to ask whether we want to allow skateboarding in the park or not (cf. Thiessen, 1993, p. 31).

Doctrines which cannot be confirmed or refuted. The anti-indoctrinational ideal of twentieth century liberal educational theorists has a direct connection with the positivist principle, verification-falsification. It says that any statement or doctrine that cannot be confirmed by the scientific method is, de facto, insignificant, because there is no existing criterion by which it is possible to judge its truthfulness or falsity. Moral, aesthetic and religious statements thus fall into this category, because they are not scientifically evaluable. Anyone who would teach them would inevitably indoctrinate. There is a consensus among the liberals on this subject (Kazepides, 1987; Flew, 1972a; Snook, 1972; White, 1972; Gregory & Woods, 1972).

Ideological doctrines. Flew, in one of his arguments, recognizes that not every belief that people hold must necessarily represent a doctrine which eventually becomes the subject of indoctrination. If human conviction is to "degenerate" into doctrine, it must be "tied to something broad and ideological", says Flew (Flew, 1972a, p. 71). He doesn't give any concrete examples, but I think that he has in mind that doctrines, as opposed to partial statements or convictions, are elements of some universally-explanatory meta-narrative or overall philosophy of life.

Engaging doctrines. It bothers the resisters of doctrine that their acceptance "is no mere academic matter – there is commitment to act in particular ways, to profess and act out a particular value and way of life" (Gregory & Woods, 1972, p. 166). Wilson cautions that political and moral doctrines have tendency to be "closer to the heart of an individual than other beliefs" (Wilson, 1964, p. 27). It's no wonder that "doctrines have a primarily prescriptive function", states Kazepides, i.e., they are engaging, and cause people to live according to them (Kazepides, 1987, p. 35).

Doctrines propagated with enthusiasm. Resisters of doctrine are further bothered that those on whom some doctrine "falls", have a tendency to hold onto that doctrine and propagate it with all their might and enthusiasm (Scruton et al., 1985, p. 24). Gregory and Woods clarify that this is because holders of doctrines consider them to be of momentous concern for mankind, and that is why it further leads them to "a strong urge to convince others, the waverers, the unbelievers, of their essential truth" (Gregory & Woods, 1972, p. 168). If all the preceding characteristics of doctrine describe the status of doctrines, or sometimes what the doctrines cause (see the previous paragraph), this one tries to express how they are handled by those who hold them.

Institutionally supported doctrines. This final characteristic is related to the previous one. Because doctrines are perceived as fundamentally important, they have a tendency to become institutionalized. Some communities, organizations, or institutions can grab hold of them, protect them, care for them, and proclaim them. Kazepides says that doctrines necessarily "presuppose the existence of authorities or institutions which have the power to uphold them when they are challenged by critics, heretics, or the faithless, and punish the enemies" (Kazepides, 1987, p. 235). In this sense, Flew and Gregory and Woods often cite the Roman Catholic Church or the Communist Party as examples of contexts from which this undesirable doctrinality could come (Flew, 1972a, pp. 75–76; Flew, 1972b, pp. 106, 109; Gregory & Woods, p. 1972).

Criticism of the content criteria is massive. Thiessen first points to the fact that there is no definition for the concept of doctrine. The critics of doctrines evidently regard the whole question of doctrinality as dubious and suspicious, but never offer any definition of what exactly a doctrine is

All the other critical responses point to one common denominator—the problem of self-referencing. It is a simple, but not trivial criterion for judging the meaningfulness of thought systems—any statement, system of statements, or methodological principle that claims to be true must withstand the self-referential test; that is, it must apply even when it refers to itself. When someone makes a statement like "I can't speak a word of English", it is obviously false because the content denies the message. It's the same with the central doctrine of the positivist concept to which the liberal thinkers refer. It claims that *only what is empirically verifiable, is true*. The problem with the statement is that it is not empirically verifiable. It suffers from the self-referential inconsistency. The same can be seen in all the above-mentioned criteria of content—liberals have forgotten to apply them to themselves. What version of therapeutic education does not hold its own (content) doctrines about people, the world, truth, the meaning of being, morality, etc.? Do not liberal thinkers regard their liberal values as meaningful, or morally important? Don't they espouse them with unflagging enthusiasm? Aren't they committed to (engaged in) their cause? Don't they even have institutions behind them which make sure the liberal model is spread, promoted and taught? Isn't the liberal concept of morality part of a broader worldview as well as political regime? Could we not, after all, speak of liberal ideology—and not only in the educational sense?

One example for everyone. Liberals believe that indoctrination occurs when doctrines are taught which do not have the attribute of general consensus or public agreement. The question arises—do liberal doctrines have that consensus? What do "general" and "public" mean in this context? One hundred percent agreement by the public? Or only by the experts? Either way liberals evidently don't have it and thus they indoctrinate. The thief is shouting "Catch the thief!" This is the point of the whole argument on the criteria of content. Liberal therapeutic education maintains its specific (provincial and period) doctrines (of content) just as every other philosophy of education does, but would like to be protected by science, universality or the public so it can claim that it is the only one that is right, the only one that educates while all the others indoctrinate.

To avoid any misunderstanding, that conclusion does not imply that in the end everyone indoctrinates, nor vice versa, that indoctrination doesn't exist. I am merely stating that the liberal definition of the criteria of content is so vague that it also applies to the liberals themselves. Everyone who teaches, conveys doctrines. And those doctrines can be true or false. The black-and-white vision of the liberal theorists of education—true content from us, false from them, *ergo* proper education with us, indoctrination with them—is untenable. And to make it even more difficult for liberal educators, we will see in the following chapter that it is possible to impart completely truthful content while indoctrinating, because pedagogical intent, aims, strategies, and other factors also come into play. In other words, it is possible to indoctrinate to the truth, but also to the opposite: it is possible, with very good and honest didactics, to lead someone into error.

ii) Methodology

Every educator intuitively knows that in education, the method by which content is conveyed is just as important as the content itself. Thus, it's not only *what* is taught, but *how* it is taught. Methods can be good or bad. It is therefore necessary to pose the question: What makes a method bad, or in our case, indoctrinating? Here are some characteristics:

> *Lack of evidence*. This problem can have at least four different nuances. 1) Methods which simply do not provide enough reason, proof or arguments for the material being taught. Hull says, "reasons are concealed and reason is bypassed" (Hull, 1984, p. 178). 2) Methods which place the question *what* over the question *how*. To this Green adds that "when, in teaching, we are concerned simply to lead another person to a correct answer, but are not correspondingly concerned that they arrive at the answer on the basis of good reasons, then

we are indoctrinating" (Green, 1972, p. 37). 3) Methods based on "mindless drill, recitation and rote memorization" (Passmore, 1967, p. 193). 4) Methods which force to persuade individuals "by force of the indoctrinator's personality, by emotional appeal, or by use of a variety of rhetorical devices", rather than by reasons, evidence, and proof (Benson, 1977, p. 336).

Misuse of evidence. Misuse can occur in several ways: 1) Direct falsification, fraud. 2) Rationalization of the evidence in the sense that what is inconclusive is presented as if it were conclusive (Wilson, 1972, pp. 19, 21). 3) Manipulation of reasons in order to confirm the given conclusion. Rationality here does not serve truth, but self-confirms or defends one's own position (Thiessen, 1993, p. 89). 4) "A one-sided or biased presentation of a debatable issue", and sometimes "suppression of counter-evidence" (Moore, 1972, p. 93) 5) Evidence can be misused in controversial issues, but also in common ones. Crittenden cautions that indoctrination occurs whenever "the criteria of inquiry" are violated (Crittenden, 1972, p. 146). 6) Flew states that indoctrination also occurs when the "logical status" of the doctrines being taught is violated, that is, when beliefs which are not true, or at least are not known to be true, are taught as if they are true (Flew, 1972a, pp. 75–76).

Abuse of the teacher-student relationship. A) The authoritarian approach. Teachers and instructors are, on principle, in the position of authority, but if they misuse that authority it is authoritarianism, which is unacceptable and inevitably implies indoctrination (Flew, 1972a, pp. 47–48). B) Threat to student autonomy. This directly relates to the previous problem. The authoritarian teacher suppresses the students' freedom. Autonomy is, like authority, a matter of degree. To what degree should autonomy be allowed without the teacher falling into indoctrination? This is difficult to define on a general level, but there is a consensus that a limit does exist, beyond which it's possible to say that a teacher fails to respect the individual's freedom, and thus indoctrinates (Peters, 1973, p. 155). C) Dogmatic approach. If a teacher promotes "the misleading impression that p is true because [he] says it is", he indoctrinates, notes Benson (Benson, 1977, pp. 336–337). And Crittenden adds that a dogmatic approach does not allow the learner "to examine voluntarily, to raise questions and objections and so on" (Crittenden, 1972, p. 139). D) Rewards and punishments. Green believes that the use of rewards and punishments may cause students "to learn to respond correctly or without hesitation", but not on the basis of evidence but in expectation of reward or punishment (Green, 1972, p. 35).

Neglect of intellectual virtues. This is Aristotle's term to express the kind of qualities needed in the search for truth. Such intellectual qualities include the desire for evidence, objectivity, consistency of thought and integrity, courage to rethink one's view, argumentational rigor, etc. Spiecker (1987) and Passmore (1967), as well as many others, consider the development of these virtues in children to be a necessary prerequisite to critical thinking. On the other hand, methods which don't favor these are considered to be indoctrinational (Moore, 1972, p. 98).

Non-rationality. All the methods mentioned above have one feature in common: "inculcating beliefs by the use of non-rational methods" (Spiecker, 1987, p. 262). The methods are non-rational in that they (summarizing everything preceding): either manipulate the material by not securing proper evidence, or manipulate the students so they don't acquire knowledge independently, freely, and rationally, but on the basis of authority, emotions or rewards and punishments.

It appears that the liberal theoreticians of education have succeeded, with the help of methodological criteria, in defining the border between indoctrinating and non-indoctrinating approaches. But there are some serious and interconnected problems which call for closer scrutiny. First, let's look at the basic requirement of all methodological approaches; rationality. Almost still in the spirit of Enlightenment reductionism, children should be led only by rational methods so themselves become rational, critically thinking, independent persons who are capable of evaluating evidence, distinguishing fact from opinion, etc. I don't want to get bogged down in the complexities of epistemological issues regarding the possibilities of human reason, but I must raise one question. How are children to acquire these rational skills and qualities? The problem—for liberal theoreticians—is that this kind of acquisition doesn't necessarily happen on a rational level, especially in the initial stages of human life. When children are born they find themselves in a completely non-autonomous and authoritative situation. Parents, teachers, and society have determined the cultural, moral, and intellectual heritage into which children are placed. Children are simply in no position to vote. Values, patterns, models, etc. are taken on primarily by habit, imitation, and identification, which are all non-rational processes. In order to avoid misunderstandings, we must first distinguish between the *subject* of habits (imitation and identification), and the *mechanism* of these processes. The subject, that which is imitated, can be completely understandable and rational, but the mechanism of imitation is a process that does not necessarily include a rational element. Children learn to be rational by imitating rational examples, even though the process of imitation is not a rational one. The foundation of rationality is thus, paradoxically, not formed in a rational way. A girl seeing her mother cooking and wanting her own kitchen has nothing to do with reason. The way parents help their children to clean their teeth is not with evidence and rational arguments (they come later, when the child is able to understand them), but with a cute little toothbrush. We don't allow a discussion—to liberal theoreticians these smacks of authoritarianism—but simply, teeth must be cleaned, toys must not be broken, and fingers must not be sucked. They will understand why, later.

It is only after a child's initiation into a specific tradition that the didactic stage of questioning or critical evaluation of that tradition can come. From the educational standpoint, however, the crucial thing is what happens in the critical period when the child is subordinate to authority. Critics might argue here that this is well-known, and that the above discussion on indoctrination does not concern the early stage of education. But that is a mistake—if indoctrination happens in situations of confrontation with authority, then it is precisely in the early phase that it is essential to distinguish acceptable (educational) methods from unacceptable (indoctrinational) methods. And it is here that we can see the problem with the liberal definition—if "acceptable" for a method means purely rational, then every initiation is necessarily indoctrination. Once again, the liberal definition fails the self-reference test. The point of the argument, though, is that it is a mistake to call educational initiation, indoctrination. This is implied by the liberal definition, but that only shows that the definition is wrong.

iii) Intention or goals
It has already been said that the primary intent, or final goal, of therapeutic education is *autonomy*. The teacher or instructor who "deliberately intends to hinder the growth of a student towards autonomy, indoctrinates", says Hare (Hare, 1964, p. 78). McLaughlin similarly finds that indoctrination "constitutes an attempt to restrict in a substantial way the child's eventual ability to function autonomously" (McLaughlin, 1984, p. 78). For the sake of order, I will remind the reader of the pillars of the liberal therapeutic ideal of autonomy:

1. *Freedom*. An autonomous individual is free, and free (in this context) usually means "the absence of constraints or restraints relevant to what we do or might want to do" (Dearden, 1975, p. 450).
2. *Independence*. Autonomous individuals have their own opinion and behave according to it. "They accept or make rules for themselves. They are capable of forming their own independent judgements. Their thoughts and actions are not governed by other people, by tradition, by authority, or by psychological problems" (Thiessen, 1993, p. 118).
3. *Self-control*. Autonomous individuals are not "swamped" by their own passions or needs. They are able to arrange and adjust their desires, ideals and goals corresponding to "a hierarchical structure of some life plan" (Thiessen, 1993, p. 118).
4. *Rational reflection*. Autonomous individuals contemplate and consciously think about what they do and who they believe. They subjugate their actions and convictions to reflection and criticisms. They are endowed with the sufficient and necessary knowledge to make intelligent decisions.
5. *Competence*. Autonomous individuals are able to implement the plans and projects they have made. They possess volition, determination, and every other "executive virtue" necessary for autonomous behavior (Thiessen, 1993, p. 119).
6. *Final note:* There is a consensus among educators that a person is not born autonomous. However, children have both the right and the natural tendency to develop their capacity for autonomy. If parents or educators don't create adequate space for the development of autonomy, it is an educational failure which often qualifies as neglect or indoctrination (Haworth, 1986, p. 127).

The problem with the autonomy criteria is the absence of a measure of degree or extent. To what extent should individuals be free, independent, rational, and competent, to be identified as autonomous? Liberal theoreticians of education usually quietly assume an idealized concept of full autonomy, completely or perfectly (as in the previous cases, where they presupposed the ideal ability of the individual to recognize and work with evidence). Only rarely do we find authors who are willing to deal with this problem. They admit that absolute autonomy is unthinkable, and suggest terms like "autonomy to a relative extent", or "autonomy in an important respect", or "weak autonomy" (Dearden, 1975, p. 458; Haydon, 1983, p. 220). None of these formulations solve the problem, they only beg the question— exactly to what extent, in what respect, how "weak" should the desired autonomy be?

In contrast, Thiessen offers the concept of "normal autonomy", which recognizes that every component of autonomy (freedom, independence, rationality, and competence) is fundamentally limited. Children a) are not born independent, b) are always formed (conditioned) by a specific culture, c) never have an exhaustive amount of information for making completely autonomous decisions, d) never have the ideal rationality necessary for evaluating the information. In addition, says Thiessen, it seems that "human nature desires both dependency and autonomy, both community and individuality", "we want both to be loved, to belong, to be dependent on a group and to be autonomous, independent" (Thiessen, 1993, pp. 135, 141). In other words—the freedom of an individual is never free from the freedom of the whole. The true meaning of the concept of socialization lies in the search for balance between the ideal of autonomy and the community, between dependence and independence.

iv) Consequences or effects of indoctrination
Education is indoctrinational if it results in closed-mindedness on the part of the student, the liberally-oriented theoreticians of education agree (Hare 1964, p. 8; Scruton et al. 1985, p. 25). Further—indoctrination occurs as the result of an educator's failure to cultivate a "critical

openness" (Hare, 1979, p. 41). If the desired result of education is "critical openness of the mind", what does that term mean? Thiessen, with reference to O'Leary, distinguishes several conditions which must be met in order to fulfill this ideal:

Neutrality. If a person with a closed mind is defined as one who "holds their beliefs as settled" and at the same time "committing" (O'Leary, 1979, p. 295), then critical openness, on the contrary, represents a neutral position towards any subject or doctrine. Gardner explains the concept by saying that being open-minded about alternatives means "not thinking these alternatives to be true or false" (Gardner, 1988, p. 92).

Epistemic. It has been said that indoctrinated individuals are those who hold their beliefs without regard to the evidence (Green, 1972). Critical openness, on the other hand, takes evidence into account. Green and Snook distinguish four epistemic aspects of working with evidence. A) Critically open individuals can give evidence for their beliefs. B) They can take into account opposing evidence. C) They are prepared to actively search out opposing evidence and weaknesses in their own system of beliefs. D) Individuals with open minds are willing to revise and reassess their beliefs in light of new evidence and arguments (Green, 1972, p. 56).

Truthfulness. Critical openness is explicitly excluded from the concept of any kind of exclusivity, definitive or absolute truth (Peschkin, 1986; Hare, 1979). It is just this claim to absolute truth which, according to the liberal thinkers, is a sign of narrow-mindedness or closed-mindedness.

Methodological. Critically open individuals methodically reflect on and doubt their beliefs. In this context, Hare cites Bertrand Russell, who said, "When you come to a point of view, maintain it with doubt. This doubt is precious because it suggests an open mind" (Hare, 1979, p. 41). Critical openness is also associated with strict objectivity, impartiality and tolerance towards the ideas of others (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 4–5).

Criticism of the consequential criteria is, in principle, the same as for all the preceding criteria. It is an idealized concept which doesn't take into account the limits of human nature or the limits of the educational situation as such. In other words, none of the above-mentioned conditions is actually feasible. Let's take the four given conditions, out of order. 1) There is no such thing as absolute neutrality. Everyone—including liberally-oriented educators—holds onto some beliefs that they consider to be "certain", "complete" or "closed", and they base their actions on them. Human thought necessarily springs from certain principles, premises, or assumptions which we consider to be "fundamental", that is, without need for any further evidence (for example, that cowardice is low, or that a triangle has three sides). 2) No one has complete epistemic certainty in all their beliefs. Not all the evidence is available to us, we cannot think through all the opposing evidence, and often don't even know how to evaluate the evidence. Nevertheless, we can make everyday moral judgments (stealing is bad). No matter how much liberal thinkers don't allow the idea of any kind of absolute truth, that very claim of truthfulness is implicitly assumed in their arguments. If, in their opinion, indoctrinated individuals believe things which are "dubious" or "controversial", then individuals with open minds must be those who believe only what is *undoubtedly* and *undeniably* true. So are the liberal thinkers absolutely certain that no absolute truth exists? Is their claim that there is no truth, true? If yes, then once again we have run into self-referential inconsistency. 4) Is it possible to methodologically doubt everything about everything? Do the liberal teachers really doubt everything, or only everything except their liberal doctrines?

In opposition to the idealized concept of critical openness, its opponents again construct the concept of "normally critical openness." That—as the above-mentioned criticism indicates—envisions limitation(s), as much on the possibilities of human nature as on the nature of each educational situation. Criticality makes no sense by itself or for itself, but always supposes there is *something* to criticize. The "what" represents the rich cultural material the child acquires through education. There is no discussion about language, values, traditions, or habits, because the as-yet undeveloped potential of the child doesn't allow it. Children are born uncritical, dependent, conditioned, and if they are to acquire a healthy, that is, a normal degree, of criticality, they must first gain the fundamentals which are not subject to criticism. Each kind of education mediates this to its children. And that is the final argument regarding the criteria of consequences—the critical openness of the learner's mind is possible and desirable, but a) never to the idealized extent, i.e., absolutely, b) every education which strives for the cultivation of criticality—even a liberal one—necessarily has "uncritical" fundamental doctrines which are transmitted through education.

Concluding observations

What follows from this discussion? That every education is indoctrinational? As has already been said, it depends on how the concept is defined. According to the liberal definition, indoctrination is inevitable, but in my opinion, that is not the best definition. I believe there is a definition which is better defensible both philosophically and pedagogically. It is based on the core idea of "the curtailment of a person's growth towards normal rational autonomy" (Thiessen, 1993, p. 233). The concept of *normal rational autonomy* is essential here, therefore it needs a brief summarization:

i. The proposal to define indoctrination as a limitation on development is aimed more at people than at doctrines or doctrinal propositions. This redirection of attention onto people is given with the recognition that indoctrination shows manipulation not only of the mind or understanding, but manipulation of the whole person. Rationality is closely and inseparably linked to all the other elements of human personality—our past, social ties, emotions, physical state, etc. Indoctrination, then, is not only "brainwashing", as the liberals say, but also a "washing" of the emotions, relationships, habits, traditions, etc. Every totalitarian regime knows this very well.

ii. Only when the principle of holistic integrity is firmly anchored, can we proceed to the question of limiting rational development, i.e., the cognitive capacity of humanity. Knowing that this is not the only area in which indoctrination can happen, it is good to consider some developmental-cognitive regularities. Any kind of cognitive development assumes that children in their early stages go through the processes of socialization, initiation, and the so-called acquisition of the primary culture, which are non-rational processes, as we saw above. To attach the pejorative term "indoctrination" to this stage for its non-rationality is a fundamental error. Children need to acquire their primary culture if they are to (not only cognitively) thrive. They also need that culture to be stable, safe and coherent.

iii. The developmental approach to the concept of indoctrination further recognizes that the meaning of the concept will change as the child matures. The development of a child begins with an initial phase that is necessarily non-rational, culturally specific and in big quotes "coercive", meaning that children simply cannot choose which culture, language, values, etc. they will be devoted to. When children are born into a certain culture we don't speak of coercion, therefore, when the children subsequently accept that culture we cannot speak of indoctrination. It is generally known that as children grow they ask questions, and this curiosity is supported by every normal parent and teacher. But what children in this stage need are answers, not doubts. It would be absurd and irresponsible

to present them with a lecture on "methodical skepticism" at this stage. A preschooler is not a college student. When the initial phase is finished, children can gradually (an important word) come to know the reality that there also exist other traditions and cultures than their own—if they haven't already noticed it themselves. If teachers do not inform the children of this reality, or even conceals it from them, they are indoctrinating in the true sense of the word, says Thiessen (Thiessen, 1993, p. 236). Not until the next (adolescent) stage of cognitive development, which Piaget would probably call the stage of *formal operations*, can individuals be led to critical reflection of their own traditions, as well as alternative traditions—whether current or past. The gradualness and gentleness of the whole process is given on the one hand by the fact that individual stages are not strictly separated, and on the other hand that each individual develops individually. We have different predispositions—intelligently, emotionally, socially, and otherwise—so what might truly be indoctrination for one person is not necessarily indoctrination for another. In other words, educators lead each student in an individualized way from a state of complete dependency to a state of relative, or normal, independence when they no longer need a teacher because they have successfully internalized the moral principles. The meaning of the term indoctrination changes according to the stage or according to the individual on whom it is being done.

iv. Real indoctrination thwarts the development of rationality, but when qualified as "normal", rationality is not idealized. Normal rationality involves and welcomes many traditional principles, such as concern for evidence, knowledge of different forms of knowing, cultivation of intellectual virtues like critical openness, etc., but at the same time, this concept is aware of the limits of human knowledge. It not only perceives the limited possibilities for objectivity in knowing, but also recognizes that empirical knowledge does not exhaust everything that can be known. Further, the concept of normal rationality understands that the justification of all specific doctrines or beliefs is always situated—socially, psychologically, culturally, historically, or otherwise. Reflective and open criticality in this context means that I am aware that the development of my criticality has taken place within the framework of a specific doctrinal community which has influenced my beliefs.

v. Indoctrination means a failure in the development of normal autonomy. Absolute autonomy is an empty ideal. It has already been said that normal autonomy strives for balance between the freedom of the individual and the freedom of the whole. It recognizes that no one is born autonomous, but is predisposed to autonomy. Normally autonomous individuals are aware of their dependence on their given community, that is, the need to belong, to share values, etc., while preserving a socially acceptable distance.[2] The concept of normal autonomy further allows that individuals can freely give it up—freely choose to submit themselves to an idea, a (loved) person, life mission, etc.

vi. Indoctrination is not a phenomenon that concerns only educational institutions; moreover, it is liberal theoreticians of education (Communist education, political education, religious education, etc.) who selectively choose what is to be considered indoctrination. It is necessary to take into account the wider social area that influences the development of children, youths and also adults—the media, advertising, goal-directed propaganda, and so on.

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[2] Václav Bělohradský notes in relation to this problem that when a mainstream culture goes wrong—like for example under a totalitarian regime—every mature and responsible person has to deal with the question to what extent am I to participate in the culture so that I can be its constructive critic and not an enemy (Bělohradský, 2007).

vii.   Indoctrination is a question of extent. In the liberal conception it was indicted as being a matter of "either/or." Specific people, institutions and methods were swept under the table as a whole. But the developmental understanding of the phenomenon of indoctrination shows that it is always a question of degree. In one or another stage it is possible to indoctrinate to a certain extent or with a certain magnitude, depending on the cause, intent or results of the indoctrination.

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